Suppressive Fire

[Blah]

Greetings SWC,

Infantry tactics has always been a topic of interest to me, and here has always been a certain aspect that has been of particular interest me. As you can probably guess from the thread title, that aspect is suppressive fire.

I've read about the value of suppressive fire in an attack in order for the maneuver element to close in and destroy the enemy. I have little doubt regarding the validity of such a statement.

There is one particular point I'm having some difficulty wrapping my head around however, and it has to do with what I believe is the US doctrine on the matter. I believe the US instructs its infantry to fire in the general direction of the incoming during a contact with the enemy in order to suppress them.

The problem in my mind arises with the fact that suppression is psychological in nature, therefore, what if the individual(s) receiving said suppressive fire simply... don't keep their heads down. I imagine that the more disciplined the soldier, the more accurate the fire would need to be in order to successfully suppress them.

The way I understand it, there are two facets to suppressive fire: volume and accuracy. I have no doubt that both in tandem are the most effective means of suppression, but I cannot help but feel that accuracy is the more effective of the two.

While the threat of being hit with a stray bullet is ever present when one is taking a high volume of inaccurate fire, would not the discipline soldier realize that being "pinned down" is a more long-term danger against an enemy of similar capabilities, as it allows the enemy to freely maneuver. Not to mention making him a ripe target for indirect fire. Therefore, would the disciplined soldier not will himself to be unsuppressed?

Accurate fire on the other hand, is a significant danger. A near miss has a reasonable chance of turning into a hit within the next 1 or 2 rounds. As the threat to his life is more immediate if he stays exposed, he has an incentive to take cover over remaining unsuppressed.

I feel that there is a danger in the mere firing of one's weapon without effect as well. Firing your weapon makes you more visible to the enemy through your muzzle flashes If the enemy is not suppressed, then you have just presented him with a (more) visible target.

Which brings us back to the US... What I've gleaned from the testimonies of soldiers returning from Iraq/Afghan is that many of the riflemen carry around 500-600 (some have claimed as many as 1000) rounds of 5.56 ammunition with them on patrols, not to mention all of the other munitions and equipment they have to carry. This seems awfully excessive to me, and I wonder if this is due to the nature of their approach to suppression. I wouldn't be surprised if "firing in the general direction of the enemy" works on the insurgents there, however I wonder if it would work if the US were to face a similarly capable military.

Of course, I have never been in combat, nor do I claim to know what it's like, so everything I've just written could be a load of garbage for all I know. In that event, I apologize. Regardless, I'd be interested in hearing your opinion on the matter.

Thank you for reading, hope my thread is to the standards of this fine forum.

[Fuchs]

You'll be interested in this.

Accuracy can be overstated, though. U.S. infantry was trained to shoot aimed fire when it arrived in Europe in '42-'43. The semi-auto Garand rifle had twice the practical rate of fire of bolt-action rifles and this required increased fire discipline because of limited ammunition.

The infantrymen didn't see much of their enemies on the battlefield, though. Consequently, they shot less and were often suppressed. In the end, they had to be allowed to be more active and shoot into the general direction of the enemy, through concealment and inadequate cover.


My greatest concern with suppression is that at times you might not even guess the general direction of incoming fire right because you're not prepared to expect fire from all directions. That's most of the trick behind parapet and flanking fighting positions, after all.

I remember a report of an infantry regiment's river crossing in France. The river crossing's success was delayed for half an hour with many losses by a single light machine gun which was well-sited in a building for flanking fire along the river. They simply didn't identify that fighting position until the third or fourth attempt or so (I have no clue why the flanking nature of the fire wasn't obvious because of the small fountains on the water surface.)

[Ken White]

Which brings us back to the US... What I've gleaned from the testimonies of soldiers returning from Iraq/Afghan is that many of the riflemen carry around 500-600 (some have claimed as many as 1000) rounds of 5.56 ammunition with them on patrols, not to mention all of the other munitions and equipment they have to carry. This seems awfully excessive to me, and I wonder if this is due to the nature of their approach to suppression. I wouldn't be surprised if "firing in the general direction of the enemy" works on the insurgents there, however I wonder if it would work if the US were to face a similarly capable military.

The significant overuse of automatic fire by Riflemen is one such habit. The US Forces 'learned' to do that in Viet Nam and it became embedded. It is, as you discern, a terrible waste of ammunition and -- probably really more importantly, load carrying and general logistic capability. Basically, I'm firmly convinced that your perception is quite accurate and that pun is intended. Volume of fire is not nearly as important as the accuracy of that fire. A nominal basic load of seven Mags, 210 rounds, per rifle is more than adequate for most things but the carrying of an additional 3-400 rounds started in Viet Nam and is still allowed. It should not be.

As Fuchs writes, accuracy can be overstated but not by much -- the real issue is location of the correct targets --as the Storr article linked by Fuchs states and as the anecdote on the river crossing illustrates. The issue is not pinpoint, one shot - one target accuracy, the issue is the amount of relatively accurate fire placed on or near the correct target area. As you note, well trained opponents will not be deterred for a second by poorly place fire, no matter the volume.

The US failure is to adequately train in two areas; fire discipline or control and target detection. The old target detection ranges, created as a result of hard won WW II experience, essentially fell into disuse after Korea and the availability of a full automatic individual weapon and tons of ammunition in Viet Nam effectively killed the knowledge of the importance of the skill. The Army's adoption of the terribly flawed Task, Condition and Standard 'training' system -- it is not training, it is instruction and a poor instructional methodology at that -- mean that we send folks off to war missing essential, life saving skills. Doctrine states that NCOs and Officers control fire -- reality states they cannot actually do that all too often, thus Joe has to know what to do -- and he has to be trained in order to do that. Unfortunately, it's easier to 'train' him to "Fire when and where your Squad Leader tells you..."

We should generally preclude full automatic fire unless the METT-TC factors call for it and in my experience that is relatively, even surprisingly, rarely. Correctly assessing the METT-TC factors is critically important, basic individual skills provide the ability to do that, every lowly Rifleman should be able to do that and we do not train them to do so -- they have to learn by doing in combat and that kills too many needlessly before they figure it out. We should better train both target detection AND marksmanship; the Troops are capable of doing more than we allow them to do...

We should also reduce the allowable amount of ammunition.

Getting rid of the SAW / M249 would also be a step forward. The Marines are on the right track with an Automatic Rifle, one per fire team...

[Granite_State]

Getting rid of the SAW / M249 would also be a step forward. The Marines are on the right track with an Automatic Rifle, one per fire team...

Beat me to it. OP, you might be interested in reading up on the IAR:

http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news...istan-120610w/

I have no combat experience, but can say as a very recent graduate of the USMC infantry officer training pipeline that accurate suppression is what is being taught and stressed.

[Granite_State]

The US failure is to adequately train in two areas; fire discipline or control and target detection. The old target detection ranges, created as a result of hard won WW II experience, essentially fell into disuse after Korea

Can you explain how those functioned?

[Pete]

During the First World War in the U.S. Army suppressive fire had a precedent, marching fire. I'm not sure whether the term made it into official doctrine or if it was an innovation made on the spot. The Pedersen Device that converted the M1903 rifle into a semiautomatic weapon was intended to make marching fire possible but the device was only made in small quantities and not used in combat. Patton uses the term marching fire several times in his WW II memoirs War As I Knew It.

[Ken White]

Can you explain how those functioned?

Take about a square Kilometer of local terrain either with or modified to have some wooded areas, some scrub or low brush areas and some open gently rolling terrain and emplace at selected locations and various distances and angles from a base point or line silhouette targets and / or items to represent targets insuring that they range from little to much concealment and none to significant cover -- varied degrees of difficulty to locate being the object -- and, if available, firing simulators (or support personnel who can fire blanks) for some sets of targets. Ideally, a few buildings might be present, lacking them, CONEXs, MilVans or containers could be used.

Troops are placed on a base point or firing line like location and are tasked to locate a set number of targets. The training must be repeated a minimum of three times, more is better -- and it should be progressive. Start with 10 target fairly visible to be located, then got to fifteen with slightly more obscured targets, then 25 with about half being pretty well concealed. They should be shown targets they missed or did not report, particularly the ones that were most likely to be significant threats.

Even though it is a non-firing effort, the use of some covered targets is necessary so the Troops learn what cover looks like from their side and how difficult it can be to get to targets who have adequate cover. This integrates terrain appreciation, target detection, reporting, use of the map, observation and other skills.

That's the generic, peacetime training approach as it used to conducted. Obviously, if the training is to be theater specific as it should be in war time, then modifications for that theater and terrain set should be made.

After the minimum three repetitions a week or so apart, move on to a field firing range / trainfire like setup that combines target detection AND live firing. That also should be for a minimum of three repetitions. US Field Firing (prehistoric stuff, that...) preceded the Rhodesian developed Drake shoot (LINK). there are a lot of variants. Training requires only a little imagination and a lot of work.

Here's the Army's current Field Firing idea (LINK). It's okay but it should be preceded with the non-firing target detection effort -- it also should be conducted at least three times. My perception is that is done once and my suspicion is that a lot of the integrated training is often not conducted and the goal merely becomes to get the Troops to fire acceptable scores one time. I could be wrong and I hope I am.

This (LINK) may have some good info.

Pete:

Marching fire efforts are things that are beloved of Generals and movie makers because they look neat. It's really a holdover from an idealized and stupidly ultra romantic view of the wars of the early 19th Century. The US Civil War proved it to not be a good idea -- and yet as late as Viet Nam, some still tried it.

A long skirmish line of Infantry moving forward, firing from the hip or pausing briefly to aim (and get shot... ) looks impressive, particularly if vehicles are in the line and also firing on the move (before there was Stab... ). Awesome. Also incredibly stupid, it only looks impressive, it is not actually so.

In practice, they're a huge waste of ammunition and are a really dumb attempt to tie mobility (marching) and mass (volume of fire) together and they do not impress halfway trained opponents even a little bit. Said opponents are likely to thank the idiot who orders it for the target array presented. Agility is greatly preferable to a blunt force frontal assault.

[Pete]

I haven't read about anything like marching fire in Civil War accounts, but Patton in War As I Knew It is emphatic about having all weapons firing at the objective during an assault. In a way he parallels what SLA Marshall said about soldiers not firing their weapons, even though what Marshall wrote was exaggerated. Had he lived longer I'm pretty sure Patton was enough of a master of his craft to have seen when suppressive fire reaches the point of diminishing returns.

This leads us back to the old FM 22-5 tactics drill tactics of the Civil War and First World War that nobody has ever been able to answer -- how do junior officers and NCOs re-establish fire control after the initial bursts of suppressive fire? What next after that? Find a flank? Call in artillery?

[Fuchs]

The Germans also experimented with all-assault rifle platoons and attacks using full auto assault rifle fire of the attack element. Some enthusiastic officers even asserted that success in battle showed no need for machine guns on the attack any more.
These reports were from about the same time when more normal mechanized infantry squads were strengthened by a second MG42...

It appears that the effect of suppressive fires is first and foremost dependent on the enemy. Late 1944 Germans attacking Russian infantry in a local surprise attack probably met much more brittle opposition than was usual in other conflicts.

The post-war German army didn't even attempt anything like that, in fact it introduced the FAL and then the G3. These battle rifles were less well-suited for a high volume of fire and more generally combat out to about 200 or 300m (I forgot the exact figure from the relevant early 90's test which compared G3 and AKM) than the StG 44 and similar weapons.

[Ken White]

I haven't read about anything like marching fire in Civil War accounts...

Not with muzzle loaders, of course not. The broader point though is that the power of the even poorly dug in defense and the relative rapidity of reloading with the Minie Ball plus the few repeaters made frontal assaults bloody as all get out.

...Patton in War As I Knew It is emphatic about having all weapons firing at the objective during an assault.

That's the issue isn't it -- assaults. They are a particularly poor way to do business and the Armed forces of the US use the and have used the 'techniques' entirely too often. Patton was almost as fond of them as Grant...

T.J.Jackson, John Buford, Walter Kreuger and James Gavin had more sense.

Had he lived longer I'm pretty sure Patton was enough of a master of his craft to have seen when suppressive fire reaches the point of diminishing returns.

I wouldn't bet on that. He was a master at manipulating people. I'll give him that. Consider the fact that a good many Majors today have more combat experience than Patton had.

This leads us back to the old FM 22-5 tactics drill tactics of the Civil War and First World War that nobody has ever been able to answer -- how do junior officers and NCOs re-establish fire control after the initial bursts of suppressive fire? What next after that? Find a flank? Call in artillery?

It hasn't been answered to your satisfaction you mean? Colud that be because it, as you state it, is a big open ended question lacking in any context and specificity and -- wait for it -- METT-TC applies. Always.

Our marginally trained troops may seem to need such NCO / Officer control and do in some units. Realistically in combat they have to know what to do at first contact and most figure it out after a couple of contacts. After that first rattle, they must know to look for and keep an eye on their leaders to watch for hand and arm signals -- the advent of individual troopies having radios will not totally change that aspect. Any good unit will develop that capability internally and since all leaders are different, most will do it in different ways. As for flank, call for fire, etc. -- all very much situation dependent.

The real constant is proper training and response to fire while keeping an eye on the leaders for cues. For the leaders, it should all be about what they need to have done to keep people alive and get on with the job. That can entail anything from a rapid departure from the area; to just going to ground; to trying to flank left or right (left or right are bad ju-ju, leaders should always use Compass directions, N,E,S,W, NW, etc. to preclude confusion which is generally around when under fire); to establish a base of fire; to a suicidal frontal assault supported by three DS and two GS Arty units -- and everything in between. It's really simple...

[Infanteer]

Getting rid of the SAW / M249 would also be a step forward. The Marines are on the right track with an Automatic Rifle, one per fire team...

We've had the weapon for some 20 years and I've never had a problem with it. If a LMG Gunner is well trained in fire control (as all machinegunners should be) I don't see what advantage would be accrued by replacing the LMG with an AR - and yes I've read all of CWO Eby's stuff.

[Ken White]

We've had the weapon for some 20 years and I've never had a problem with it.

It's employment as a Squad /Section weapon is the problem -- and if you've never had a problem, I'm happy for you. Personally, I've never seen any belt fed weapon that did not have problems with feeding, often belt problem caused, at least occasionally and with breakage of the feeding mechanism parts once in a while, much more so than with mag fed weapons. Anyway you couch it, belt fed weapons are more expensive, less mechanically reliable, often less accurate (a particular M249 problem) and require more training. Machine guns are necessary and important -- too important to allow proliferation to a level where high casualties in a more intense combat will eventually result in untrained machinegunners...

I won't even mention the logistics and ammunition expenditure for results gained.

If a LMG Gunner is well trained in fire control (as all machinegunners should be) I don't see what advantage would be accrued by replacing the LMG with an AR - and yes I've read all of CWO Eby's stuff.

I have not read any of Eby's stuff, whoever he is. My comments are based on my own observations and experience. The advantages are simplicity, less weight, more reliability, less maintenance, no spare barrels (much less tripods) to carry at Squad / Section level, lessened ammunition consumption (waste???), hopefully and probably a more durable weapon and the ability to put your Machine Guns where they belong, in a dedicated MG Platoon (YMMV ).

Every one does not take the time that Canada does to train folks. Perhaps they should but most do not and are unfortunately not likely to do so. Nor do most get the long service, multi skilled Corporals that Canada has. Hopefully that will continue for you because it has merit, however, the probability in high intensity conflict is more turnover, abbreviated training and less experienced leaders and gunners. Military weapons should be selected with that probability in mind, not peace time optimal conditions, training time and support.

[Nick]

As a Marine Machine Gunner MOS 0331 you are trained from day one in SOI School of Infantry that when you recieve contact you immediatly lay down that supression. (obviously in the direction of the enemy) Now accuracy is most defanitly wanted but the main goal is to keep the enemys heads pinned down. This is in the current war atleast. That is just for machine gunnery, any other MOS such as Rifleman 0311 will take the accurate shots and maneuver towards the enemy.

[Leopard 2A4]

Hello at all...

Let me tell you about my experiences I had to make as a german soldier in AFG.
When I started my duty in the german army 1999, we were trained for defending our country against large armys. The doctrine was the same like in the cold war. A temleader had to lead every single riffleman. Fire was controlled by the leader. Surpressing fire we user for movement Rio. But we trained for fights when the enemy advances from one direction When you can see him comming miles away.
Then we were sent to AFG, where everything changed. Enemy comes from multiple directions and when you recognize it, he is too close to coordinate fire by one man. We germans where shocked the first times we got troops in contact. No one had real fighting experience in his life, even the commanding officers did not. So we just defend our asses by trying to get away.
But by the time we got this experience and we started to engage an defeat the INS who attack us. And I can tell you, we do our job now. And I am proud.
In my last tour, late 2010, I had to learn that the most INS does not give #### of surpressing fire. They don't keep thier heads down. They just go on doing thier business. They don't care about dying, they are full of drugs. You just can stop them with accurate fire. Body-Body-Head...

Hope you won't be angry for my english!

[JMA]

Hello at all...

Let me tell you about my experiences I had to make as a german soldier in AFG.
When I started my duty in the german army 1999, we were trained for defending our country against large armys. The doctrine was the same like in the cold war. A temleader had to lead every single riffleman. Fire was controlled by the leader. Surpressing fire we user for movement Rio. But we trained for fights when the enemy advances from one direction When you can see him comming miles away.
Then we were sent to AFG, where everything changed. Enemy comes from multiple directions and when you recognize it, he is too close to coordinate fire by one man. We germans where shocked the first times we got troops in contact. No one had real fighting experience in his life, even the commanding officers did not. So we just defend our asses by trying to get away.
But by the time we got this experience and we started to engage an defeat the INS who attack us. And I can tell you, we do our job now. And I am proud.
In my last tour, late 2010, I had to learn that the most INS does not give #### of surpressing fire. They don't keep thier heads down. They just go on doing thier business. They don't care about dying, they are full of drugs. You just can stop them with accurate fire. Body-Body-Head...

Hope you won't be angry for my english!

Thank you for posting that.

I would be interested to hear more about how the German troops in Afghanistan adjusted to the type of warfare and to combat itself.

I presume that there is no formal counter insurgency training as part of the basic and normal training of German soldiers? If there is now was it written based of Afghanistan or where did you draw the doctrine and tactics from?

[Fuchs]

The best public article on it is probably this recent one:
http://www.strategie-technik.de/04_11/Fue.pdf
(in German, of course)

A frequent remark of German soldiers from AFG is that only explosive warheads (40 mm) seem to have a psychological impact on the enemy.

Then again, this kind of firefights is not necessarily representative for other conflicts, nor is the skill applied necessarily matching historical heights.

-------

I have no good relations with any AFG vet, thus I've got no good source.
I am nevertheless a bit puzzled by those reports. They seem to be illogical or be based on some basic misunderstanding.

An enemy who doesn't get suppressed / impressed by small arms fire would expose himself so much that firefights would be over after mere seconds. That's apparently not the case.

A possible explanation could be that people have an exaggerated idea of what suppressing fires are. The seem to believe it's a near-permanent 100% silencing of the enemy (or causing his flight) when it's merely meant to be a very temporary interruption of his aimed fire capability.

I advise therefore caution about veteran reports about supposed failures to suppress the enemy. There may be a problem of inaccurate language.

[JMA]

I advise therefore caution about veteran reports about supposed failures to suppress the enemy. There may be a problem of inaccurate language.[/I]

My experience thought me to exercise caution when debriefing or hearing reports from soldiers with limited combat experience. Most often they read the situation wrong and/or draw the wrong conclusions from their experiences. No soldier wants to accept that his squad/section fired off 1,000 rounds of ammo to no effect. These same soldiers - often half way to becoming 6 month wonders - are often asked and offer an estimate of how many of the enemy they killed. Kind of like if 1,000 rounds were fired then they must have at least got ten... surely, yes? The debriefing officer writes it down muttering "yes, that sounds reasonable".

[Infanteer]

A frequent remark of German soldiers from AFG is that only explosive warheads (40 mm) seem to have a psychological impact on the enemy.

That was our general observation as well. Lots of 40mm grenades and M-72s.

[JMA]

A frequent remark of German soldiers from AFG is that only explosive warheads (40 mm) seem to have a psychological impact on the enemy.

Sometimes the soldiers get these things wrong and it becomes a thing of myth. One would need to have this confirmed through "debriefs" held with captured/surrendered Taliban to be absolutely sure what the dynamics are. These "debriefs" would be the best source of which buttons to push with the Taliban so as to achieve the best psychological result. Got to take the guesswork out the understanding of the enemy.

[Markus]

I would be interested to hear more about how the German troops in Afghanistan adjusted to the type of warfare and to combat itself.

I second that.