Rifleman,Originally Posted by Rifleman
Thanks. IMO the E2 was to the Marines as the 1911 was to many Army SF well after replacements arrived. The M-16 came in around 68 ? but yet we still had the M-14s around in the mid-90s when Clinton wanted to burn them ?
Yes, three fire teams for the USMC. A bit confusing on how many soldiers now following Sam's post. I have 10, you have 11 and Sam has 13
Last edited by Stan; 12-24-2010 at 12:16 AM.
If you want to blend in, take the bus
Excellent find Sam! That's just what I thought would be true. All M16s eh? I take it these were M16A1 models with a full auto sear assembly?
And does that guidebook offer any tidbits on employment of that automatic rifleman?
Last edited by jcustis; 12-24-2010 at 12:19 AM.
I don't want to bitch, but if the SAW entered service in 84, then Sam's book from 79 is a smiggin old
So, how many were in a USMC rifle squad from say 69 (when the M-14E2 expired) to 79 and what exactly was the SAW's direct replacement ?
If you want to blend in, take the bus
It says..
The Automatic Rifleman . He carries out the orders of the fire team leader. He is also the assistant fire team leader. He is responsible to the fire team leader for the effective employment of the automatic rifle and for the condition and care of his weapon and equipment. As assistant fire team leader, he assumes leadership for his unit whenever his fire team is not present.
Yes these were M16a1's ...
And to hold others off. It is (C) 1979, but this Fourteenth Revised Edition (Third Printing) 1 November 1982...
ETA: There is also an entire section on squad tactics if that was of interest.
Last edited by selil; 12-24-2010 at 12:53 AM.
Sam Liles
Selil Blog
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The scholarship of teaching and learning results in equal hatred from latte leftists and cappuccino conservatives.
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Hmmm. I figured as much. Well, that doesn't lead me too many places...
In the Army
The primary difference as far as the weapon is the selector switch for the AR man was always supposed to be on Automatic (full automatic) back then everyone else should switch to semi-auto. The AR man did or at least he was supposed to carry a light-weight aluminum bi-pod that could be easily attached to the M-16. It was M-16 A1 through E1 series if I remember E1 had (different flash suppressor). The 3 man fire team was really unusual to the Army, there whole squad formations and tactics were alot different. Used to have a thing called Fire Team in trace or something like that, maybe Sam knows. Pretty much the end of my memory. I do remember some marines still having the M-79 blooper as of 1973.
I did look through my NCO books (yes I kept all that stuff it's fun to scare children with), and a few of my tactical manuals. But, none of them really fit. I was a technical squad, and in a TOW company, which means we were by default heavy weapons (I carried an M60 most of the time because I was fat).
Sam Liles
Selil Blog
Don't forget to duck Secret Squirrel
The scholarship of teaching and learning results in equal hatred from latte leftists and cappuccino conservatives.
All opinions are mine and may or may not reflect those of my employer depending on the chance it might affect funding, politics, or the setting of the sun. As such these are my opinions you can get your own.
Thanks Sam !
I was more interested in the troop numbers and weapons prior to the SAW and according to this Vietnam-era history site, there were 13 men and no sign of m-16s.
If you want to blend in, take the bus
Cool site. Under the rifle squad paragraph it does actually say this:
Each squad was broken down into three fireteams of 4 men. Each fireteam has an NCO as leader, an automatic rifleman (M-14 modified) and 2 riflemen (assistant automatic rifleman and scout) armed with the standard M-14.
Each Rifle Squad has an M-14 Modified, equipped with a bipod, for use as an automatic weapon. Unless otherwise noted all personnel are equipped with the M-14 prior to 1968. From 1968 on the USMC were issued with the M-16 though it was not uncommon for units to retain the Modified M-14's for their firepower.
The M-79 grenadier was usually directed by the squad leader.
Nothing that results in human progress is achieved with unanimous consent. (Christopher Columbus)
All great truth passes through three stages: first it is ridiculed, second it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident.
(Arthur Schopenhauer)
ONWARD
You kids...
The MarCorps 13 man squad, 1943-1962, had three BARs. From 1962 until 1964-5, it had three standard M-14s which were equipped with the full auto selector capability in lieu of the supposed to be issued M-15, a heavy barrel, permanent bipod M-14 with selective fire but which proved to be no better in the role than the full auto standard M-14s.
That led to the M-14E2 which later became the M-14A1(LINK). They were issued starting in 63-64 but weren't in place everyhwere prior to the replacement of the M-14 by the M-16.
Then in the mid 60s, the M-79 Grenadier working for the Squad Leader was introduced and shortly thereafter, depending on where you were in the world, the M-16 was issued, replacing the M-14s. No dedicated auto weapon other than the M-16appeared between then and introduction of the M-249 SAW. I heard some idiots even insisted that when in formation, the designated AR man must have had the removable M-16 Bipod (LINK) affixed to the weapon.
Initially, each M-16 issued came with the Bipod. That didn't last long.
The M-14E2 /M-14A1 suffered from a weak stock at the wrist and a too-light barrel which would rapidly overheat so no one really cried when it left.
Since Sam's 1970s book amuses Stan, I guess it's a good thing I gave all my 40s stuff to the Library, huh...
Thats great a lot of interesting stuff happened in the 1840's.Since Sam's 1970s book amuses Stan, I guess it's a good thing I gave all my 40s stuff to the Library, huh...
Ooops, you're gonna be in lot of trouble when Ken wakes from his nap
Ken,
It wasn't so much Sam's aging book with 1,000 plus revisions rather the period in question before the SAW as the book (thankfully) stopped being revised well before the SAW was introduced.
In any case, you, Slap and me are Army dogs and no Marines herein are old enough to spell it out as you so eloquently did... beginning from 1840
If you want to blend in, take the bus
Napoleon is reputed to have said: There are no bad soldiers... only bad officers.
If you could refrain from making openly disparaging comments about young men facing combat and taking on the enemy, it would be appreciated.
These fine looking young men are therefore a mirror image of their officer corps.
Gen Bill Slim, that great Brit general, also had this to say:
and"That the fighting capacity of every unit is based upon the faith of soldiers in their leaders; that discipline begins with the officer and spreads downward from him to the soldier; that genuine comradeship in arms is achieved when all ranks do more than is required of them."
"What has a soldier got? asks Slim, and answers it himself. "He has got his country, but that is far away. In battle, the soldier has only his sense of duty, and his sense of shame. These are the things which make men go on fighting even though terror grips their heart. Every soldier, therefore, must be instilled with pride in his unit and in himself, and to do this he must be treated with justice and respect."
Slim on how to deal with officers:
Bought my first copy of Slim's Defeat into Victory in 1975 and treasured it. It should be required reading for every officer at every rank level as he advances (as one needs to absorb it as a lieutenant, a captain, a major and so on to gain full perspective). A magnificent book by a great general:Then Slim relates at one critical point in the retreat in a jungle clearing he came across a unit which was in a bad way. "I took one look at them and thought "My God, they’re worse than I supposed." then I saw why. I walked round the corner of that clearing and I saw officers making themselves a bivouac. They were just as exhausted as their men, but that isn’t my point. Officers are there to lead. I tell you, therefore, as officers, that you will neither eat, nor drink, nor sleep, nor smoke, nor even sit down until you have personally seen that your men have done those things. If you will do this for them, they will follow you to the end of the world. And, if you do not, I will break you."
Defeat Into Victory: Battling Japan in Burma and India, 1942-1945
Those are airsofters. But nice ad hominem attack anyways.
Sigh...
........................
Slim echoes the German mantra about officers caring for their men and such (including a rule that nobody lesser than a general (or cook) can get away with eating better than ordinary soldiers)."What has a soldier got? asks Slim, and answers it himself. "He has got his country, but that is far away. In battle, the soldier has only his sense of duty, and his sense of shame. These are the things which make men go on fighting even though terror grips their heart. Every soldier, therefore, must be instilled with pride in his unit and in himself, and to do this he must be treated with justice and respect."
His thoughts on the foundation of cohesion and morale are very different than the German army ones', though.
The German army praises the importance of the "kleine Kampfgemeinschaft" - small groups of comrades (squad to company) who stick together, help each other, fight and work for each other. Ranks play no real role in this concept.
A (in)famous booklet of the 80's, meant to motivate junior leadership to do its job and to transport WW2 lessons learned to the late 20th went so far as to give the example of soldiers with wounds and illnesses avoiding being sent to hospital in favour of sticking with their company (as they expected to fare best among their closest comrades).
Btw, the booklet became infamous and PC-incompatible because of is many WW2 anecdotes, was rewritten (some anecdotes less) and re-titled around 2000 and came again under PC fire. I wasn't able to spot a single offensive anecdote, but I know for sure that the PC outcry (apparently deliberately) didn't even mention the least PC content of the booklet!
Patton was a cavalryman at heart, which during WW II meant he'd get there "the fastest with the mostest" during breakthrough and exploitation operations in places where the enemy wasn't. He did that in Sicily during his advance up the western part of the island, during the breakout from Normandy across France, and also after the Bulge when the Wehrmacht was on the verge of defeat.
However, during the Lorraine Campaign in September-December 1944 he made little progress in the area of Metz and Nancy in the heavily fortified part of France that had been German from 1870 to 1918. The Germans were masters of tactics and their reconstituted army had its fields of fire and artillery fire planning all worked out during that campaign. That was also when the Allied armies had outrun their logistic support from the Normandy beachead and fuel and ammunition had been diverted for the Market Garden operation in the Netherlands. Patton and Third Army also had to contend with heavy rains which flooded the rivers and led to the writing of the famous "Weather Prayer" later published during the Bulge as a Christmas card to his troops.
During the First World War Patton saw only one week of combat in command of troops before he was wounded, although he had been in-theater since Pershing had arrived in 1917, which is to say he'd spent a lot of time in combat zones but not very much in close combat. One might be able to add a few more days of combat to his resume from his Pancho Villa-chasing days in Mexico, but that fighting was more like Wild West gunfights against bandits rather than hard-core combat.
The point I was making about movement drills is that they should be trained often enough that they become second-nature -- perhaps saying "by the numbers" was a poor choice of words, but guys tend to remember things that have been taught that way. The idea is to be able to assume one of perhaps four or five formations instantly without the need for lengthy discussions about what needs to be done on the radio. It goes without saying that METT-TC will modify any and all template solutions the schoolhouse might devise. In schools we might also teach that fully automatic fire is to be discouraged except for certain Hail Mary situations.
I think Patton was one hell of a combat leader, and I'm unwilling to downgrade his accomplishments in order to compensate for the near-divinity some admirers have accorded him. I'm glad he was on our side.
Last edited by Pete; 12-29-2010 at 10:06 PM.
I'm beginning to form the opinion, based on a good bit o first hand observation, and followed by spending a whole day watching youtube videos of US, Brit, Canadian, and Dane forces in Afghanistan, that there are two constants we can see.
The first is that maneuver under fire is easier to the rear, especially if it is along a covered and concealed route.
The second is that a massive amount of "suppressive" fire, applied at the enemy as you are about to conduct an assault or otherwise maneuver forward, provides a moral effect more than anything else. It may keep the enemy's head down, but that is not what provides the impact...it is the notion in the head of the man moving forward, that the enemy has his head down in the first place. As it gives him comfort the enemy is going to have less effect on him, he pushes forward.
That's an interesting thought.
Now add two ingredients: The morale effect of NIJ level IV plates and the incompetence of the opponent (inability to exploit the potential of modern infantry arms to inflict devastating casualties even when most troops are suppressed).
A really capable opponent could inflict so much damage even with a fraction of his forces and against hard body armour-equipped opposition that I decided to seek refuge in dreams of near-perfect self-discipline, camouflage, concealment (incl. obscuration) and deception years ago.
Armour battles and armour insights of the Cold War period might lead the way: It was understood back in the 70's (before Chobham armour gave some confidence in passive protection) that tanks that are being seen will be shot at. Tanks that get shot at will be hit. Tanks that get hit will be destroyed.
The armour community understood this, but also kinda threw this overboard asap in order to be able to keep at least some offensive tactics.
These offensive tactics rested heavily on a combination of casualty tolerance and combined arms efforts.
Good units do that.
Bad units have little to no idea what you're talking about...
That has to be a unit thing because many different approaches to the issue are available and used; the 'one size fits all' school model doesn't work well.Can't speak to today; we used to do that but poorly trained -- and not really well selected -- junior leaders allowed it anyway and their bosses had other, weightier things on their minds so the proscription was ignored. Apparently still is...In schools we might also teach that fully automatic fire is to be discouraged except for certain Hail Mary situations.
Again, that's a unit thing. Too much time usually elapses between institutional training and combat application.
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