That was our general observation as well. Lots of 40mm grenades and M-72s.Originally Posted by Fuchs
Sometimes the soldiers get these things wrong and it becomes a thing of myth. One would need to have this confirmed through "debriefs" held with captured/surrendered Taliban to be absolutely sure what the dynamics are. These "debriefs" would be the best source of which buttons to push with the Taliban so as to achieve the best psychological result. Got to take the guesswork out the understanding of the enemy.
@ JMA
We have a counterINS Training in Germany. But I think it is not that effective than the training in the US or the UK. When you come to the German Army, you have 3 months of Basic Training. In my time you only got trained for conventional warfare. Today the newbies have two weeks of CI-Training. But its not very effective. When you got an employment in AFG, bosnia or what ever, you have to do several training modoules before you go there. The germans also participate from the experiences of other nations and try to push this into the trainings. But I think the trainings could prepare you for real combat action in AFG. But by the time, enough advisors will have made their own combat experiences...
And we alltough get better... Learning by doing!!!
The need for special Counterinsurgent combat training such as convoy protection training does little else but exposing that the conventional warfare training is horribly incomplete.
Insurgents are comparable to lightly armed stragglers of destroyed enemy armoured brigades; that's supposed to be the least trouble in a conventional war.
Let's not get too crazy about this now. Convoy protection is trained so much because it's one of the few combat scenarios that most non-infantry troops will encounter, not because we're somehow overwhelmingly incompetent about it. It's not as if the Taliban is overrunning NATO convoys or even seriously inhibiting us.
Well you have (generally) a peace time army with (at one point) little real expectation of becoming involved in a counter insurgency operation - like in Afghanistan. So perhaps on that basis the short basic training is acceptable - with the emphasis on the "basic". The additional training would presumably take place to fill the time hanging-around in peacetime waiting for the next war to break out.
Under that scenario it would be understandable to conduct counter insurgency training prior to deployment. I would like to believe that the German military has seized the opportunity to urgently and aggressively use the opportunity to develop and exercise a COIN doctrine while deployed in Afghanistan.
I wonder if the same problem exists with the German military as with the Brit and US deployments where due to the rapid rotation a lot of troops learn a little and no one learns enough? For German soldiers Afghanistan may well be a once in a career opportunity to see some action. What rotation system do you work on there?
You are correct that if the conventional warfare training is complete - meaning that it is covered and well exercised in all its aspects - adapting to COIN operations would be/should be a relatively simple process.
But if the insurgents come out of the population itself and with the support of the population itself (as the Germans found in Russia 1941-5) it will be a different story.
This snippet from a recent Marine Corps Gazette article, by a pretty talented 1stLt Franco, provides one of the best descriptions of enemy fire I have seen in a while. He wrote it in the context of reporting to higher headquarters in the Afghan environment, but I think it serves as an interesting reminder that sometimes, fire sent towards the enemy and (returned in your direction) can be a lot of noise and nothing more.
> Sporadic ineffective fire...the enemy is engaging the unit every few minutes with a few bursts or single shots. The effects of the fire are not deterring the unit from maneuvering or returning fire. The fact that it is ineffective can help determine whether the enemy is trying to bait the ground force into an ambush; wants to see their tactics, techniques, and procedures; or is just harassing the unit. The ineffective fire also shows the level of marksmanship of the enemy and may help determine their range.
> Sporadic effective fire...the enemy is engaging with a purpose, from closer range, or is a skilled marksman. On numerous occasions in Marjah, the enemy would engage an element in a compound every few minutes with a single accurate shot or burst. Effective fire means it is affecting the element’s ability to maneuver or return fire.
> Sustained ineffective fire. This type of fire will mostly come from inexperienced fighters who are not aiming but rather making noise with their weapons. The sustained rate of ineffective fire shows the enemy element’s lack of fire discipline, ineffective range at which they are trying to engage a unit, or lack of training.
> Sustained effective fire. Effective fire of any kind halts a unit’s ability to maneuver and return fire freely. When that fire is sustained, the ground commander and COC need to begin to utilize supporting arms internally to the ground element or externally utilizing 81mm mortars, close air support, or artillery. As Marines we can never become fixed by the enemy and allow them the ability to maneuver on us and control the pace of the firefight...an element taking sustained effective fire should initiate some type of support.
OK, so now we know the problem, now what is the solution?
If these circumstances were to be termed type A, B, C, D contacts with the enemy what would be the most appropriate tactical response to each? (Given that this will differ between mounted and dismounted infantry.)
I am still hoping that the role of the infantry remains to close with and kill the enemy.
More recent amended Brit infantry role "The mission of the infantry is to defeat the enemy through close combat."
There has never been any difference in the ends, when it comes to the means of mounted or dismounted infantry.
The answer is, and will always be, to fix and maneuver.
Did I say any different?
You get the benefit of the doubt on your interpretation so I accept the need to clarify what I said.
The initial tactical response at the time of making contact will differ if infantry are mounted or dismounted.
I hope this removes the confusion.
Again, regardless of the condition - mounted or dismounted - the battle drill is the same:The initial tactical response at the time of making contact will differ if infantry are mounted or dismounted.
-Seek cover
-Return fire
-Assess the situation and develop a course of action
-Recommend the course of action
-Execute the course of action
That course of action had better follow the principle of fix and maneuver or the unit isn't going to achieve the desired end.
Actually, some responses include simply keep driving to leave the kill zone asap.
It depends.
True, but chalk that up to seeking cover, so it is still point #1 really.
Nobody should be taking free shots at infantry. Support units might allow the enemy to take a swipe, but that is not the COA infantry should be employing by default.
The difference is greater. There are counter-ambush tactics whose inventors did not trust the ability of leaders to survive the ambush, understand the situation behind cover, communicate, have control over their men and do something smart in such a situation.
That's why some approaches simply advise to an automated response (and some of them avoid getting pinned).
Depends on what?
From the Rhodesian manual:
Immediate Action Techniques
3. The killing ground. This is the area in which effective terrorist fire can be brought to bear. In order that the terrorists may not have the advantage of opening fire on ground of their own choosing, every effort must be made to get vehicles clear of the killing ground. Thus when vehicles are fired upon:
a. Drivers are not to stop, but are to attempt to drive on out of the killing ground.
b. Sentries are to fire immediately to keep the terrorists down.
c. When vehicles are clear of the killing ground, they are to be stopped to allow their occupants to debus and carry out offensive action.
d. Following vehicles approaching the killing ground are not to attempt to run the gauntlet of the ambush, but are to halt clear of the area to allow their occupants to take offensive action.
4. Where vehicles have not been able to drive clear of the area under fire, troops are to debus under the covering fire of the lookout men, which should include smoke if possible, and are to make for cover on the side of the road. The actual bailing out drill is dealt with in greater detail later in this section.
It depends on much.
A vehicle convoy must not be pinned because it's got little combat power but much speed in the killing zone. Its threatened vehicles need to speed out of the killing zone.
An Infantry squad on the other hand has relatively much firepower, but little speed. It needs to dive first, then react to the situation.
There's also the decisionmaking and communication thing and the human factor.
You can expect a driver to drive on when under fire (even though with much increased risk of a crash) while almost every infantry squad has at least one soldier who's sure to take a dive into cover, no matter what's the orders.
Speed is relative, of course. Movement speed, ability to accelerate further, distance to end of killing zone, lethality of ambush fire / time ... this can be calculated by OR, but usually the troops in the conflict learn when to run and when to duck by trial & error.
Finally there's a big problem; how do you react differently to an RPG strike and a AT mine strike? The RPG requires a speedy reaction, while the same could just drive the blue force into many more AT mines...
I attempted to find something simple that allows for a good reaction almost every time even with human factors in play, but I didn't find any back in '03 or '04 when I was looking at ambush problems.
An unpredictable opfor that varies its tactics or even combines them is a helluva lot more difficult and dangerous than the remote controlled HE mine tactics that dominated in the last decade.
The proper response to the aforementioned dilemma is probably to be so overwhelmingly dangerous to direct fire opfor that they restrict themselves in their tactics down to a point where we are not in such serious dilemmas any more; that's pretty much what was done.
Fuchs has touched on it in that if in a vehicle and in the killing zone the drill is/should be to drive through and out and then to stop. If the killing ground is ahead then stop before entering and deploy - taking care not to fire on your own forces who where ahead of you.
Foot patrols had a response in Reaction to Effective Enemy Fire summarised as - dash, down, crawl, observe, sights, fire on receiving the command to "take cover".
There are some changes coming in the Brit minor tactical doctrine where it will go something like this:
This change seems to be coming as a result of an acceptance (through Afghanistan experience one supposes) that whole sections may be caught out in the open when the enemy initiate contact and then have to implement one of a number break contact drills to get out of trouble. Hitherto these break contact drills were the preserve of special forces or recce patrols where they were either badly outnumbered or fighting was not their mission.The reaction to effective enemy fire must be for the whole section to remove itself from the killing area immediately. ...
The initial drill, therefore, is: Return fire – take cover – return appropriate fire. It is recognised that the initial return of fire will be largely inaccurate, however, it assists with locating the enemy and will disrupt enemy fire. Even after this individual drill has been completed it may be necessary for the section commander to organise further extraction of his section from the killing area under the cover of smoke and F&M (fire and movement), especially if casualties have been taken.
So this is the kind of change/innovation I was inquiring after.
Last edited by JMA; 05-20-2011 at 09:26 PM.
I think that piece on Movement Security mentioned earlier has much value even though it is circa 1970s.
While it is necessary to have the doctrine it is TTPs which need to be locally adapted to enemy and terrain in the ever changing operational environment. You are correct that one needs to avoid settling into a predictable routine.
As far as the killing zone is concerned it rather depends how long it is and due to spacing how many vehicles are caught therein. Obviously those vehicles caught in the killing zone must attempt to drive out and those not yet in should avoid entering it. The enemy would presumably want to force the vehicle of their choice to stop in the killing ground and prevent following vehicles from being able to pass by to get out. Good selection of the position of the ambush is also important with steep inclines and narrow bridges being of the best.
Anti-tank mines one would assume would be command detonated otherwise there would be just too much guesswork about how and when the ambush would be initiated. But then maybe the enemy think differently (or don't think). For slow moving vehicles an RPG into the radiator will most often stop such a vehicle or cause it to loose control and crash... but then generally it must be the first vehicle which may have some frontal protection.
The rule applies that the vehicle(s) caught in the killing ground must attempt to drive out and allow the troops to debus and form up. Those who have not yet entered the killing should stop and carry out the drill to secure the vehicles and the prepare to clear the ambush party. The command and control is another issue which should be rehearsed.
The kind of reaction required will be determined by the quality of the enemy you face.
It seems that the logistic convoys out of Pakistan are well secured as they only (from what I hear) have problems in Pakistan and few if any on the Afghanistan leg of the route.
no automatic fire rule
What do you think about the idea of issuing semi-only rifles to the troops, or to the new troops? Would you support it?
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