Not really
One could go semi-auto only without too great a penalty but there is a need for very, very rare full auto fire. Some ambush situations, breaking contact, CQB in buildings and the like. Not always in those examples but sometimes...Originally Posted by Markus
For combat, better to have a capability that one may use rarely than to not have it when one might need it. In this case, given little additional complexity, small to no weight increase (other than ammo usage...) ease of manufacture and such, there is no significant burden attached to the weapon. The training requirement is increased but only slightly.
Using semi-auto only weapons is essentially a technological cover for inadequate training. The full-auto problems of lack of accuracy and excessive ammo expenditure are obviated by better training. Thus the weapon should not be the issue, training should be. All things considered, best to keep the capability and train better.
The one issue that relates to the weapon and its design is the sequence of the change lever switching. For example the AK goes Safe-Auto-Single, while the FAL FN goes Safe-Single-Auto. This has an impact with (as you say) undertrained troops.
Yes. The difference is indicative of the underpinning philosophy.
The USSR undertrained and knew it so they compensated by emphasizing the use of full auto and requiring a conscious decision to go to semi-auto. Tactically and training-wise, the AK was a direct descendant of the PpSh series...
The west with the FAL and the M-16 reversed that requiring extra effort to get to full auto. The M14 and some nation's FALs were issued as semi-auto only and required armorer modificiation to employ the full auto capability. In the US Army, that worked but again it was just a mechanical substitute to compensate for mediocre training. The M16 with all weapons full auto capable had no problems in good units, bad units allowed misuse. The US Army's foolish and flawed attempt to improve full-auto accuracy with a burst limiter only encouraged poor habits without improving accuracy. It is a good example of providing a capability for one thing that gets used for others. Some believed the 3-round burst was to save ammo and thus encouraged its use(???
). Fortunately, that aberration of a mechanical substitute is on the way out.
Give the troops the capability they need and train them to use it properly. Really easier and cheaper than complicating the logistic system for no good reason...
You sure about that?
It seems to me that the current reality is that its easier to complicate the logistic system than to provide army wide high quality training even if that were cheaper and a dedicated and professional corps of instructors existed.
Pretty much so.
As positive as one can be about anything based on reasonably comprehensive but not full knowledge.It is easier because but only because it is the route that was chosen during WW II and that became thoroughly embedded in the psyche of the organism that is the US defense establishment. That route was logical and advisable at the time due to the fact that personnel, mobilization and training systems adopted for WW I were themselves already firmly embedded and thus it made sense to do it that way at the time.It seems to me that the current reality is that its easier to complicate the logistic system than to provide army wide high quality training even if that were cheaper and a dedicated and professional corps of instructors existed.
Achieving change in a massive bureaucracy is never easy. Remaining wedded to systems that originated almost 100 years ago to cope with the mobilization of a large conscripted force is thus understandable -- but that doesn't mean it's right...
Aside from wasting many personnel capabilities and not using others to the fullest, it is extremely expensive -- I believe unsustainably so given future costs of materiel, transport and such -- and provides only marginal effectiveness. IOW, it is true today because it's a habit and we can afford it. I do not believe the former is an adequate justification or that the latter will remain true. That dedicated corps of professionally competent instructors does indeed not exist today. It did but it was allowed -- forced -- to wither in the name of 'personnel management' and 'career progression.' It can be reconstituted. The talent is available in large quantities; it just isn't being used.
OK, so training is the problem.
Now what will it take for the military to address this problem?
Just a question... what % of currently serving senior NCOs and field rank and above officers would be willing to agree that training quality is the problem?
Sample of one.
Training is the primary problem (well, that or leadership). Would be glad to help fix it, but its going to take more than one MAJ (or all the MAJs, or even all the FGs) to fix. Until the GOs are convinced enough to change the system (granted, we can help with this convincing), training effectiveness will only be possible in small units for short periods of time (I think these two attributes, size of unit and length of time have inverse proportions, so a small unit can achieve effectiveness of training for longer- see 75th RGR RGT or a larger unit can achieve effectiveness of training for shorter). Notice I said effectiveness of training, not efficiency. Effective is good, efficient is good enough, which is what we have now.
I would be happy if you would clarify that differentiation.
Make that sample of two
I agree with 82 Redleg -- only things I'd add are that, to paraphrase Bertrand Russell, 80% of the work is done by 20% of the people -- thus I suspect about 20% would agree with the Redleg and I...
Add the fact that leadership is influenced significantly by training; i.e. people tend to do what their training suggested they should do. The personnel system is not supporting the Army as it should and that also needs to be fixed but a good leader would do that. There are equipment issues but they are a result of inadequately trained persons buying less than necessary or effective gear.
In the end analysis, mediocre training simply produces mediocre results across the board.
Effective training is good training, "producing the intended or expected result"
Efficient training is good enough training "productive of desired effects; productive without waste"
In a mass mobilization situation, for the US in WW1, WW2 or what we expected during the Cold War, you settle for efficient training- good enough to get Soldiers into the fight. Sure its not perfect, or even close, but allows you to field the force you need to win the war.
Its exactly the model that we built to win WW2, and have sustained since then. Unfortunately, it is not optimized for implementation in a long service, professional force, such as the US is using to fight the current conflicts.
What we are doing is train Soldiers well enough with minimal resources (especially the resource of time, although there are others). What we should be doing is providing the best training possible for the limited number of professional Soldiers we have. In return we should treat these professionals as professionals. We don't pay master plumbers or master carpenters union wages to rake leaves, cut grass, or do janitorial work. So why do we let professional Soldiers deal with the same distractions from their trade of managing violence. The Ranger Regiment model is, from my limited interaction with it, about right. We should expect (and provide the resources) for our Soldiers, especially our combat arms Soldiers, to train to the level of professional athletes and master their weapons and combat skills. They should work on that at least 40 hrs per week. Instead, they are treated as a replaceable cog in the machine.
Thanks for the response.
Never served in a peace-time environment so seldom had to find something to keep the troopies busy (... the sergeant major took care of that anyway). But I can understand the problem.
I suggest the problem at company level is the number of qualified instructors among the NCOs. In any event there are not enough NCOs on most establishments to maintain a training tempo of 40 hours a week of effective and worthwhile training. I would be interested in how you would see this being achieved whilst achieving maximum activity at the same time?
This might be a good point for me to display my ignorance.
The L110 LMG (called the FN Minimi in Australia, if I am not mistaken), is called "the noisemaker" and the GPMG (which in this case probably means FN MAG) is preferred, but this is solely based on its calibre, right? They wouldn't scoff at the Minimi 7.62 variant?
Also, I still don't get it: I understand that there have been complaints about lighter rounds not putting down drug-crazed religious fundamentalists, but I don't think I'd like to be hit by a .22 round let alone a .223 or .308. Is it solely range that is the issue (I read somewhere, perhaps here, that firefights are happening at greater distances than the 300m that came out of all those old studies)? Or could it be mere bravado that people scoff at the 5.56?
Finally, what does everyone think about an intermediate round - something like 6.5 or 6.8? My theory is that the 7.62 may simply be bigger than necessary - that the proponents of 5.56 were right but they went overboard. What is needed is the minimum mass necessary to knock down a peaking dervish at 500m, wouldn't you say? Shouldn't we be going for the lightest round that will do this? And might that round be smaller than 7.62?
I'll borrow from the recently deceased Stephen A. Camp and say that placement is stopping power, and I think the advantages of the newer rounds are not exceptional right now. From another forum I frequent (and from a ballistics expert):
The 6.8 mm design does not offer "ideal" terminal performance, as it is a compromise that was constrained by the requirement that it had to function in the 5.56 mm M4/M16 envelope; however, given those platform design requirements, 6.8 mm works VERY well for combat, as it offers better terminal performance than ALL 5.56 mm loads, as well as 7.62x39 mm loads.
The designers of the 6.8 mm SPC simultaneously developed an "ideal" assault rifle cartridge, with NO platform imposed design limitations. This "idealized" assault rifle cartridge, the 7x46 mm, offers better range and terminal performance than 6.5 mm Grendel, 6.8 mm SPC, or any other common assault rifle cartridges, including 5.45x39mm, 5.56x45mm and 7.62x39mm. Felt recoil appears manageable and weapons remain controllable in FA fire. The 7x46 mm cartridge OAL is a bit too long to fit into the M4/M16 or other 5.56 mm size weapons/magazines, yet it does not need a receiver/magazine as large as those used by 7.62x51mm/.308 platforms. As a result, the 7x46mm requires new weapons
One thing that I often wonder about but have just managed to articulate is pressure to return fire, especially social pressure. It seems to me that often one would have no idea, or only a vague idea, where fire came from. I can imagine feeling totally confused yet also feel like a bit of a goose sitting there doing nothing and wondering what's going on - like at school. I can also imagine a sergeant yelling at me to start firing, everyone else is firing, so I just do what everyone else is doing. Don't want to be accused of cowardice or something later...
Now I think about it, I wonder how much of that is going on on the other side as well. How much of the 'Taliban' fire is bravado, a feeling of 'I've got to be seen to be doing something', or just some larrikins messing with the soldiers' heads to get a rise?
Besides a few initial bursts, I'd probably say 75% of their fire is just as errant and misplaced. That's part of the reason why they'll go to the effort they do to emplace IEDs.
Thanks Ken White and JMA.
So, ideally, give them full-auto and train them properly. If - and only if - proper training is unavailable, giving them semi-auto only is then a strategy available to compensate for this.
PS: It is conventional wisdom in Australia (from the little I've heard) that the reason the SLRs had their auto capability disabled was because they tended to jam on full auto, not because training was inadequate. Of course, it's perfectly possible that that was just an excuse - the powers that be would prefer not to admit that training was inadequate or that they didn't trust their troops.
Has anyone here experienced incoming suppressive fire? Did it work?
Would tracer have a suppressive psychological effect? Or would it merely serve to highlight how poorly aimed and useless and laughable one's fire is?
The SLR was from the beginning a semi-auto version of the FAL (which was known in Germany as G1 iirc). It has to be seen in context of the Sterling submachinegun which was in parallel service with the infantry and provided the full auto fire at short range that the SLR lacked.
It's possible to train very quick semi-auto 7.62NATO fire (with rifles such as SLR and G3) in order to emulate the short-range firepower of the full auto setting. It only takes a quick index finger with 'quick fire muscle memory' for this.
I remember to have been quite effective at about 30 m range with G3 full auto (multiple hits on 'kneeling soldier' target with one burst), but it's generally unlikely that you'll hit something with a 7.62NATO rifle burst that you wouldn't have hit with single fire as well. In fact, aiming low left for the burst felt like more of an effort than to simply aim at centre with the V-sight.
The real full auto advantage only comes into play when you're in an indoor firefight at distances where a compact submachinegun would have been first choice. The SLR has an excessive length for indoor use and has the Sterling as partner, thus the Commonwealth armies didn't lose much by ditching the full auto option.
Special forward-visible tracers were developed for .50" machine guns in World War 2 for bomber defences. The point of the concept was exactly their unnerving effect on fighter pilots.
I second that.
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