Suppressive Fire

[JMA]

First, I would disapprove -- full auto fire is only rarely effective and therefor rarely beneficial. Techniques always have to be adjusted to operating modes and METT-TC. That adjustment must be constant, you've got to assess each day and change modes when appropriate..

I once fired one magazine on automatic (2LTs do the craziest things). Learnt enough from that never to do it again ... nor to allow any of my troops to do that either. We carried the FN MAG on a ratio of 1:4 so we really got all the firepower we needed from that baby. The riflemen were fillers, always (at least) one facing backwards and unlike the conventional training where the machine gun was deployed on the higher ground flank we pushed it right up front to be there and operating in those first critical seconds when contact is made.

So how does the gunner fire? - bursts of 2-3 rounds in a controlled fashion.

So how did the riflemen fire? - single rounds or at most double taps in a controlled fashion.

Secondly, the linked article must be analyzed with caution. The Australian Area of Operations was unique in several respects and the Australian and US Armies had differing operating philosophies.. Note that most of their contact were in ambushes or reactions to them -- negligible 'hot LZs.' Most American units had different experiences, more helicopter assaults, fewer ambushes and more meeting engagements.

With caution indeed. I have a massive problem with averaging the number of rounds fired per kill achieved. Not sure what the point is as every contact is unique and different in one way or tuther enough to question the value of the finding.

I read that article last year and I understand what they say -- but I have reservations about their conclusion. Strong reservations. Much depends on the enemy and the terrain / vegetation but as a general rule, massive volume fire in several varieties of all that are in my observation rarely as effective as a smaller volume of accurate fire -- accurate not being one shot, one kill but fire directed very near the proper target. One problem with the high volume of fire folks is that most of that fire will go in places where no opponent is located. It's wasted. If it's automatic, about 2/3 of it will be high...

I would add that for raw unexperienced troops the noise of battle can be intimidating. However, combat experienced troops know and are able to differentiate between the odd stray round and really close stuff. One just needs to watch the difference in reaction to battlefield "bangs" between new guys and the old soldiers.

In a fire force setting where one could be close to a contact but not personally and physically involved the last thing you needed was troopies ducking and flinching every time a high miss or ricochet passed overhead. We needed to upgrade the battle inoculation part of our training.

Simply put find a piece of bush which will pass for a range. Get the troopies to lie (section at a time) on the firing point. Get your sergeant to fire over their heads high and close so that they can differentiate between stray shots and the real deal. (The Health and Safety Gestapo will never allow this - so that is why I suggest you just disappear into the bush somewhere.) Let the distances vary from 100-150m to 10m. And close is as close as possible.

Also use different weapons (theirs and ours) so that they learn to ID the various weapons at various ranges.

The need result is that you realise when you can clearly hear the shots they are probably not aimed at you but when the noise (of the crack) turns into a "sensation" then you know he wants to convert you into a notch on his buttstock.

[Fuchs]

I actually took price at the fact that on the firing range I was able to put four to five rounds into a kneeling target at 30 m with my G3 on full auto. The first impact was usually low left (hip), the last one in the opposite shoulder.

Such a burst coupled with the quality of the German 7.62NATO bullet ends every doubt about "stopping power".

[JMA]

I actually took price at the fact that on the firing range I was able to put four to five rounds into a kneeling target at 30 m with my G3 on full auto. The first impact was usually low left (hip), the last one in the opposite shoulder.

Such a burst coupled with the quality of the German 7.62NATO bullet ends every doubt about "stopping power".

There are different people with different skills. The fact that a small minority of soldiers are capable of the controlled, accurate and discriminate use of automatic rifle fire should not open the door for the indiscriminate use of automatic fire in panic or otherwise by soldiers who find themselves in difficult circumstances.

It is rather when the crunch comes that the quality of the training should come out.

If you want to know what can go wrong read the Wanat study

A few quotes:

... Bogar had fired about 600 rounds at the cyclic rate of fire when his “SAW jammed, basically it just got way overheated because he opened the feed tray cover and I remember him trying to get it open and it just looked like the bolt had welded itself inside the chamber. His barrel was just white hot.”

and

McKaig began to experience problems with his M4. “My weapon was overheating. I had shot about 12 magazines by this point already and it had only been about a half hour or so into the fight. I couldn’t charge my weapon and put another round in because it was too hot, so I got mad and threw my weapon down.”

Soldiers should train as they intend to fight. If you believe that automatic fire is OK then make the additional ammo available for training. No training on auto, use of it on ops... end of story.

Lets get back to the hotdog posers who insist on using an AK-47. I would suggest that they pony up the cost of 1,000 rounds of the ammo and pass a shooting table and weapon handling (stoppage drills etc) then their request can be considered.

The stopping power of the NATO 7.62 is undisputed. Can't think what the Americans were thinking when they introduced that pea-shooter firing 5.56?

[Fuchs]

Oops, I meant "pride", not "price". I #§$% my typos.

[RC]

When it comes to suppressive fire two things are need, accuracy and volume. Just because an infantryman is dumbing rounds in the general area, it is not enough to ensure suppressive ability. As mentioned, seasoned fighters will not duck simply at the sound of fire, but look to see where the rounds are landing. If the shots are accurate, than the enemy knows he is fighting a trained, seasoned, and disciplined fighter. The second function is volume. The standard load carried is for doctrine patrol - where one fight is expected, max. After contact is made, the patrol is ended and all return to the patrol base. The reality is that on deliberate attacks, where more ammo is required, the 1SG will have more ammo, (or at least the platoon sergeant). I hope this helps clarifies the issue

-Robert Cumbo, SGT US ARMY INFANTRY

[Ken White]

The standard load carried is for doctrine patrol - where one fight is expected, max. After contact is made, the patrol is ended and all return to the patrol base.

Could you expand on that? Do you mean that comment to apply to all combat generically, to a particular theater / war / operation, or to specific unit(s)?

The reason for my question is that while a patrol can be made specifically to gain contact based on intel and that contact becomes the mission of the patrol or unit, many if not most patrols are going to be purpose (reconnaissance, etc.) patrols where contact may or may not be made and if it is, that may not satisfy the purpose of the patrol and there may not be a return to a patrol base, rather there may be more movement and thus possibly additional contacts.

There is also the possibility that hypothetical contact patrol having made and successfully concluded their contact could while in process of returning to the patrol base have a meeting engagement or get ambushed and thus also have one or more additional contacts...

[jcustis]

The stopping power of the NATO 7.62 is undisputed. Can't think what the Americans were thinking when they introduced that pea-shooter firing 5.56?

It is in fact fairly well-documented exactly what designers were thinking. We;ve killed a lot of knuckleheads with it in the days that have ensued. Is it the best? Depends on way too many points of view to cover in a single thread here.

[JMA]

It is in fact fairly well-documented exactly what designers were thinking. We;ve killed a lot of knuckleheads with it in the days that have ensued. Is it the best? Depends on way too many points of view to cover in a single thread here.

Jon with respect the decision is poor in retrospect (and it does not matter whether that is wisdom in retrospect). There can be no reason to defend a poor decision (even if seemingly made in good faith at the time).

What we see in this thread is that one of the key supposed positives of the 5.56, being the weight of ammo and the ability to use greater volumes of fire in contact, has actually developed into to specific operational problem in today's armies using the 5.56.

In my experience I never heard a soldier complain about the weight of the FN FAL or its ammo - I don't know what that tells me considering the M4 with all the "extras" must now weigh about the same as the FN? Even if not if a soldier can't carry a ten pound (loaded) personal weapon they are not physically up to being a combat soldier IMHO.

Then we have the fallacy of the weight of the ammo. (5.56 = 4.01 gm, 7.62 = 9.7 gm) So one Nato 7.62 weighs the equivalent of 2.4 5.56 rounds. So the theory is that you can carry 2.4 times the number of 5.56 rounds as opposed to 7.62 NATO. Now the perceived benefit of that is clearly lost if the M4 is used on automatic fire, yes?

Jon the simple truth is that the pea-shooter and its BB style ammo has very little redeeming value. A bad decision then, confirmed time and again since.

[selil]

I don't know if it has been mentioned but in civilian applications of the .223 (following based on bs sessions not evidence!) pass through has been significant variable as the round travels through a body. Defining an entrance path to exit for reduced secondary casualties is supposedly an issue. This was one reason a department I worked with a long time ago went to the .308. However, you're not packing it around more than a few 100 yards. There hasn't been significant change in the weapons systems in the last few years that I know of. I have an open invitation to go train with the local SWAT team and do qual fires with them. I'll have to look into that and see what state of the art is today.

[Pete]

That doesn't make sense. Are you saying 5.56mm goes through walls but 7.62mm doesn't?

[Kiwigrunt]

That doesn't make sense. Are you saying 5.56mm goes through walls but 7.62mm doesn't?

No. Through hard cover like walls and foliage 7.62 is far superior to 5.56.
However, through armour (think helmets and Crisat) SS109/M855 is superior to 7.62 ball because of the steel penetrator, which means we are comparing a ball round to a semi-armour piercing round.

The issue that Selil brought up pertains to the behaviour of the rounds through tissue (bodies). Both M193 and SS109/M855 behave very inconsistently. 7.62 ball does too but to a lesser extent.
I have hunted goats with both M193 and SS109 with very different results. If the round is allowed to travel a fair distance through the tissue, or hits bone, than it will tumble and disintegrate (provided the velocity is adequate). When that happens it tends to turn the goat inside out (I exaggerate somewhat). If not, and that is most of the time, it will indeed just drill a pretty little 5.56 mm hole clean through. I have stopped using these rounds for hunting because it is not very goatistically correct. Softpoint is way more consistent and will start to mushroom pretty much straight away.

So this is really more a function of bullet design rather than calibre. Mk262 is apparently more consistent and far superior to M193 and M855. And a few others have recently been designed to help overcome these shortcomings. With a well designed 5.56 bullet it is likely that it will outperform the old 7.62 NATO, in tissue anyway. Destroying hard cover and the ability to maintain its trajectory though foliage are still a different matter. There you can’t beat the mass of 7.62.

[Ken White]

and applauded...

[selil]

and exactly the issues as described to me Kiwigrunt

[JMA]

Not sure if it is still the case, but for our recon platoons it was SOP for the first man in a contact to empty a mag on full auto in the general direction, after that everyone went to semi.

A few excerpts from “Sleeping with your ears open” by Gary Mckay, about Australian SAS in Nam.

I suggest that one needs to be aware of the difference between "small team" recce work and standard infantry patrolling (even for line infantry battalion recce platoons).

There is a real danger that line infantry try to emulate SF and this leads to their missing the boat.

I will try to stay within a response to what you quoted.

Page 43: The amount of ammunition carried by the SAS on patrol in Bornea was far less than they carried in Viet Nam, as the threat of enemy contact was far greater in the Viet Nam campaign. Because there was little chance of resupply once a contact started, the troopers used to carry whatever they thought they would need to get out of trouble.

The troopers personally decide how much ammo to carry? Like we hear that they should be able to decide what weapon they want to carry?

Ridiculous. The patrol commander must dictate the ammo load each man carries.

The second is the attitude (probably correct for a SAS 5 man recce patrol deep in Indian territory) that having a contact represents "trouble". For the majority of line infantry patrols that is what the purpose of the patrol is (or at least should be) and presents the opportunity to close with and kill the enemy.

... [These wepaons] gave a very good initial burst of fire in a contact and gave the SAS patrol considerable firepower for a five-man group. An SAS contact drill often sounded like a 30-man platoon in contact when they opened fire instead of just five men.

The intention was [for the 5 man team] to break contact so spray and pray was the order of the day. Even if the formation did not allow for each of the 5 men to fire in the direction of the enemy the drill was probably to empty a magazine or whatever and break contact and start to withdraw.

A line infantry patrol would not select a formation suitable for a shoot and scoot breaking of contact but rather one which will allow them to best follow up with the required offensive action. I have mentioned before that with the kind of low level enemies we see these days the initial exchange of fire is critical to 1) win the fire fight, and 2) to get some kills before they can get away. That is why machine guns should be positioned and distributed among the formation to apply an accurate volume of fire in the opening seconds of the contact (for the purposes mentioned and not in order to break contact like an SAS patrol typically would).

Page 97: The SLR was actually designed with a holding open device so that on the last shot of the magazine it held open and so you could carry out an immediate action drill really easy, but that’s no good for a parade ground, you can’t have people messing around on the parade ground like this. So, the hierarchy of the Australian army [and the NZ and I think also the UK] said remove the pin. Our armourers put a pin where it was supposed to be..

I don't know what the point of this is? Troopies (even in the mighty SAS) should be made/trained to count their rounds. If you start with recruits and sustain the requirement with trained soldiers it works. Actually peer pressure
takes over and sustains it. The troopie who is seen to "flinch" on the trigger of an empty weapon was subjected to merciless ribbing from the other troopies - nothing a troopie likes less than being called a *#@$*#@ wanker by his mates. So don't alter the weapon... train the soldiers.

Page 187: The expression that ‘bull#### baffles brains’ is very true in the SAS notion of throwing as much lead at the enemy to get him to keep his head down while the patrol took off. The other thing that also helped was the reports from the weapons. The 7.62 SLR was a noisy beast which didn’t go bang, it went boom! […] when you get these beasts firing on automatic and in unison, the noise level was dramatic.

On automatic? Maybe good for a SAS 5 man recce team when they desperately need to break contact but for the line infantry? This is not something line infantry should try to emulate.

…and if you had those bloody SLRs on fully automatic, firing a 30-round magazine, and if the flash eliminator was taken off it, you would think, ‘####! What have I hit here?’ Because it sounded heavy, and fast, and automatic, and it would just make old Charlie think, ‘####, I’ve hit something big here’ and it would stop them, rather than race in and try to take you out. Because they think they have hit so much firepower, it’s at least a bloody company, and by that time we’ve got ourselves on a back bearing and ####ed off out of there. But, once that first magazine was gone, from then on that was our rules, you fired well aimed, single shots.” “…if you’ve got three SLRs on fully automatic with a 30–round magazine, s##t flies everywhere.

That sounds like what they would like to believe the enemy are thinking. The problem always is that if you don't kill the enemy involved in the contact they learn from it too. They may be saying OK if you contact the SAS they wildly and blindly fire a magazine each then pull back down their line of approach. Give then a couple of such contacts and even low grade enemy will figure out a counter measure.

But again this is not a feasible tactic for line infantry patrols of section and platoon strength (METT-TC considered of course). That said if the drill is (for line infantry) to break contact with the Taliban rather than press home an attack then that development and emasculation of the infantry is a good enough reason to pack up and go home.

In summary then. What is/was good tacticlly for 5 man SAS recce patrols is unlikely to be good for a standard line infantry patrol. Different roles and missions require different tactics.

[JMA]

Actually, there is a Youtube video of Canadians in a firefight in Helmand and you can hear one of the section commanders calling out a target indication. In the first 10 seconds here:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9_S9P1kMNuM

I watched that video a number of times and (as Pete will tell you) I have an opinion on that (and on most things).

First, maybe it was the audio quality or my service damaged hearing but I was unable to hear whether that was a target indication or a fire control order.

Pretty sure GRIT and CLAP were not correctly applied though. (GRIT - group, range, indication, type of fire, and , CLAP - clear, loud, as an order, with pauses)

Saw the bunching and as Fuchs will tell you the Canadians back in 1944 wouldn't have tried that... more than once. (Where was the sergeant and why was he not kicking ass?)

The use of grenades and the follow up thereafter was noted.

I would have thought that it would have been realised that the 4-5 second delay on a HE grenade is too long to be so used into a room/bunker/trench. I assume the Canadians have practice grenades. Probably never had a grenade thrown back out - which in that hard open ground would be a problem for sure.

The trick (and there are probably other methods) is to turn the grenade in the hand so that instead of the striker lever being in the palm of the hand it is against the fingers. Once the pin is pulled and the striker lever is released the thrower counts one, two, three or whatever and throws the grenade and then he positions or his buddy positions to follow up immediately on the grenade exploding and clear by fire.

Back to the video.

In the first case the soldier threw the grenade and left the scene only returning some seconds after the blast to fire into the room (or whatever). No delay before throwing the grenade, left the area with fingers in his ears like a kid playing with fire crackers, no positioning ready to enter fire immediately after the blast and then when firing the weapon remained in the horizontal plain whereas he should have fired high, low and everywhere and even entered to clear around any corners. (A buddy should have been right behind him to pull him out immediately if he got shot (or got stuck) on entering.)

The second I noted the barrel of the weapon in the dirt. No delay before throwing, slow approach after blast... no more visuals.

And the comments say "hardcore". Sad.

[Blah]

Another example of a firefight in Afghan: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MBd8Fl6gGdI
Although it's from MSNBC, so take it with a grain of salt.

Then we have the fallacy of the weight of the ammo. (5.56 = 4.01 gm, 7.62 = 9.7 gm) So one Nato 7.62 weighs the equivalent of 2.4 5.56 rounds. So the theory is that you can carry 2.4 times the number of 5.56 rounds as opposed to 7.62 NATO. Now the perceived benefit of that is clearly lost if the M4 is used on automatic fire, yes?

My sources indicate that M885 weighs 12.31 grams, and M80 weighs 25.4 grams. So just a smidge more than 2* the weight.

[JMA]

My sources indicate that M885 weighs 12.31 grams, and M80 weighs 25.4 grams. So just a smidge more than 2* the weight.

OK, well spotted. I will try to fix that.

The standard 7.62mm M59 ball round has the following applicable characteristics:

Cartridge Weight: 393 gr (25.47 g)
Projectile Weight: 150.5 gr (9.75 g)

The standard 5.56mm M193 ball round has the following applicable characteristics:

Cartridge Weight: 182 gr (11.79 g)
Projectile Weight: 56 gr (3.63 g)

So dealing with cartridges (rather than bullets) the 7.62mm is 2.16 x the weight of the 5.56mm cartridge.

Source: Gary's U.S. Infantry Weapons Reference Guide

It just gets worse for the 5.56mm BB round.

The calibre debate from the Brit angle can be found here:

http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2010/0...alibre-debate/

Problems with 5.56 mm ammunition fall into four categories:

1. Lack of effective range. More than 50% of infantry engagements in Afghanistan take place at ranges above 300 meters. When 5.56 mm ammunition was adopted, it was believed that 90% of combat engagements would take place under 300 meters. It frequently results in situations where ISAF troops cannot return fire when engaged by enemy snipers. 5.56 mm ammunition is meant to be effective at 500 metres, but combat feedback suggests that this is not the case.

2. Inconsistent lethality. There have been instances where enemy combatants have not been neutralised by 5.56 mm bullets, sometimes despite receiving multiple hits. This has happened at longer ranges, but also, surprisingly, at shorter ranges.

3. Poor barrier penetration. In certain situations, 5.56 mm ammunition has been defeated or deflected by barriers obscuring a target, including car windows, car doors, light masonry and woodwork. Even when a 5.56 mm succeeds in penetrating an intermediate barrier, its energy may be depleted so that lethality is compromised.

4. Inadequate suppressive effect. The UK MoD’s own analysis suggests that insurgent forces are not suppressed by 5.56 mm ammunition, whereas larger calibres have a more notable psychological effect.

So I say again... what were the Americans thinking?

[Fuchs]

Much about suppression:

Rethinking the Basis of Infantry Close Combat
Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen, Australian Army

http://www.army.gov.au/lwsc/AAJ_I1.asp

[JMA]

Much about suppression:

Rethinking the Basis of Infantry Close Combat
Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen, Australian Army

http://www.army.gov.au/lwsc/AAJ_I1.asp

This seems to be a little dated now - circa 2003.

Got to hand it to Kilcullen for having the chutzpah to attempt a doctrine change based on his experience through a training attachment to the UK and one contact in Timor.

I would respond by saying that he should go back and read the Brit Infantry Platoon in Battle (don't know what is in the Australian version) as its all there for him to see what the doctrine actually says.

I now see Wilf's point about the danger of training people on drills and expecting them to adapt them to the tactical situation on the ground. Here we have a major who was writing as a Lt Col who seems to see the guidelines in the manual as being hard and fast.

So yes Wilf, if majors and Lt Cols don't get it we have a problem.

Back to the issue.

I would suggest that the US forces that were in Iraq are the most current on warfare in urban terrain. Lets wait and see what they have to say on the matter.

[Fuchs]

I would suggest that the US forces that were in Iraq are the most current on warfare in urban terrain.

Only partially. They didn't encounter a competent and well-equipped opposition.