A follow-on by the same author, Daniel Byman, looking at AQ after a new lader is chosen:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...tions?page=0,0

Hat-tip to FP Blog.

He ends with:
This list, while done with tongue firmly in cheek, does have some value for U.S. counterterrorism officials. As the above lessons suggest, al Qaeda is an organization prone to divisions, and Zawahiri will have his hands full keeping it even semi-unified in this time of crisis. Efforts like the drone campaign in Pakistan are vital because they kill skilled leaders, which are in short supply these days. U.S. information operations must take advantage of al Qaeda's blunders, making the terrorists defend their mistakes rather than gloat about their successes. And if the United States and its allies can decrease the number and scope of terrorist havens, it will be harder for them to form the in-person bonds they need to trust one another.
If there was a 'score card' to our post-9/11 response to the threat (there probably is somewhere) I'd rate information operations our weakest link.