Just trying to expand on the thoughts I put in my first post. Hopefully it may stir some discussion and/or debate as well.

I think that strategic compression is a result of 3GW methods being combined with modern media capability (sorry, but I'm becoming more and more convinced that “4GW” is just a more advanced form of 3GW and not something new and different). As operations become more and more “real time” in terms of their impact within reporting circles (witness the level of instant feed both in speed and scope we had with the WTC, for just one example, and then compare that to the lag with Pearl Harbor – even Tet '68 pales in comparison), the decision-making process struggles to keep up. And since this is really an OODA loop, strategic compression is just another way to get inside the OODA loop. What happens is that the time pressure created by media attention shrinks the envelope available to higher commanders to make decisions.

Having said that, I think that certain cultural trends within the US armed forces make the process worse than perhaps it needs to be. Since World War II, centralized control has been the unspoken goal of most military leaders, as demonstrated by actions and not words. In my earlier post I mentioned the “Charlie-Charlie bird” syndrome in Vietnam and its replacement by the video conference in more recent conflicts. We may talk and write a great deal about empowering and enabling our lower-level commanders to make their own decisions, but in practice it seems that the higher command levels (the Army in particular, although centralized command is really a way of life with the Air Force) like to take any chance they can to try to reclaim control of the battlefield and decisions made there. Sean Naylor's book about Operation Anaconda explores this in some detail, but commentary on it can be found throughout the literature on Vietnam and some of the writings about Somalia. Some crucial decisions regarding force structure were made for what could be called cosmetic reasons, ignoring the needs of the commanders on the ground. Of course, we've seen this before. But strategic compression (as defined as the pressure of instant media attention shrinking the time available to make what could be called standoff decisions) seems to increase the reluctance on the part of higher commanders to allow their subordinates to actually command and lead.

How do you deal with strategic compression? Frankly, I think one of the starting points is to trust your commanders in the field to make correct decisions and then support them. I/O campaigns are nice, but the reality is that we cannot conduct one properly because the U.S. mainstream media isn't disposed to play along. We can force out information, but that doesn't mean anyone will listen. I think the important part is to develop I/O campaigns that target local populations and not so much the home front. Higher level commanders need to recognize that their impact on local operations is naturally limited and that meddling simply because you have the technology to do so is counterproductive. Total situation awareness is a myth, and strategic compression (defined as time compression) makes this myth even more damaging.

Just some Monday morning thoughts.