Having said that, I think that certain cultural trends within the US armed forces make the process worse than perhaps it needs to be. Since World War II, centralized control has been the unspoken goal of most military leaders, as demonstrated by actions and not words. In my earlier post I mentioned the “Charlie-Charlie bird” syndrome in Vietnam and its replacement by the video conference in more recent conflicts. We may talk and write a great deal about empowering and enabling our lower-level commanders to make their own decisions, but in practice it seems that the higher command levels (the Army in particular, although centralized command is really a way of life with the Air Force) like to take any chance they can to try to reclaim control of the battlefield and decisions made there. Sean Naylor's book about Operation Anaconda explores this in some detail, but commentary on it can be found throughout the literature on Vietnam and some of the writings about Somalia. Some crucial decisions regarding force structure were made for what could be called cosmetic reasons, ignoring the needs of the commanders on the ground. Of course, we've seen this before. But strategic compression (as defined as the pressure of instant media attention shrinking the time available to make what could be called standoff decisions) seems to increase the reluctance on the part of higher commanders to allow their subordinates to actually command and lead.As much as talk of 4GW makes me grind my teeth, all the responses are on the mark. As a former battle captain of a task force, I can confirm that the C4I networks available can at times drive an unrealistic "pull" of information from higher headquarters. Something along the lines of compression is occuring, because there is a never-ending need to "feed the machine", so to speak. Until we recognized the downside, the reporting requirements to higher drove us to request a sitrep from 1) the wrong Marine on the ground (a radio operator) 2) too soon after the contact for a clear picture of exactly what happened (just the facts). The outcome was that the RTO would embellish raw information, or someone other than the commander on the ground (but still in a leadership role) would pass what he thought was a complete report. We learned that this was not the way, and adjusted accordingly. Telling higher that they are advised to do the same isn't usually an option.Would appreciate comments on the following and any additional thoughts on the implications of strategic compression...
Since strategic compression is largely technology driven new technologies will likely exacerbate the effects of strategic compression and further blur the lines between the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. Advanced systems like the Land Warrior will give guidance and integrate the individual soldier into an increasingly complex command and control network. Improvements to ISR capabilities through better and more UAVs, satellites, and other means will give commanders on all levels of war a greater ability to see the battlefield and destroy targets through precision guided munitions and increased maneuverability. These examples show how units will be more prone to direct control by strategic actors.
The CNN effect is also unlikely to diminish. Inexpensive, ubiquitous cameras and the ability to post images and video on the internet by amateur reporters will increasingly contribute to this phenomenon. Sources of news will likely proliferate and instances of media responding to tactical mistakes are likely to grow. This will place greater emphasis on General Krulak’s strategic corporal idea as tactical actions should be expected to receive hyper-scrutiny in the future. The CNN effect will play an increasingly important role in small wars relative to major combat operations (MCO), because unlike the enemy in MCO, the two major centers of gravity in small wars—the occupied population and the American public—depend upon news media to gain information and formulate opinions about military actions. Ensuring that tactical actions are well understood by both audiences is essential. Small wars are also likely to be increasingly fought in urban environments. The likelihood that collateral damage will occur during operations and be documented by international media is dramatically increased. As such, the CNN effect is additionally exacerbated when American forces are operating amongst urban civilian population centers.
We can expect longer, and more detailed lists of CCIRs, almost to the point that subsets of the larger CCIR list will have to be managed by individual watch standers, because the senior guy won't be able to do it alone. I've read the Naylor book, and if accurate, it is a warning of the potential mess that we can get into as a result of strategic compression. I know a MGySgt who can tell horror stories of the shenanigans at the CENTCOM COC, so I believe Naylor's accounts to be credible.
To counter the negative effects of compression, branches will need to maintain an aggressive embed program, and perhaps become more transparent, almost to the point of exposing OPSEC risks.
The Sago Mine and Haditha incidents are closely related, considering the repercussions that stemmed from inaccurate initial reports, and I think they typify "strategic compression" if I'm getting the concept right. How does Haditha, and Abu Ghraib for that matter, reconcile with compression if the model presumes small incidents have strategic implcations? Is it merely force of leadership and will from the POTUS that has prevented these and similar incidents from crippling our friendly center of gravity (American public)? Is the degree of the "CNN effect" a measurable variable? Can actors only hope to mitigate, but never completely control, this variable?
Originally Posted by jcustis
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