Strategic Compression

[zenpundit]

What about a systemic consideration of factors that exert a countervailing effect ("strategic de-compression") to disaggergate war into levels ? They could be man-made or something natural like distance/time

I would hazard that these variables always exist to some extent in tension with the forces of compression. Perhaps a comparative taxonomy ?

[SWJED]

What about a systemic consideration of factors that exert a countervailing effect ("strategic de-compression") to disaggergate war into levels ? They could be man-made or something natural like distance/time

I would hazard that these variables always exist to some extent in tension with the forces of compression. Perhaps a comparative taxonomy ?

One school of thought is that there are no "man-made" factors that could contribute to de-compression. (Short of say an EMP attack or some other counterproductive and catastrophic device).

Seems that distance-time has been regulated to the back-waters when it comes to command, control and intelligence.

This brings us to yet another focus area - command and control can be instantaneous - yet bringing to bear "physical aspects" of warfare have not yet caught up - troops and logistics stand out here. Does this force us to rely on those physical aspects that are "timely" - airpower for example?

The school of thought that there is little or nothing we can do to control strategic compression seems to be pointing towards command awareness that it does indeed exist and providing the tools, training and education to enable timely mitigation when negative incidents of strategic compression occur.

This last item raises another question for the Council – are there positive aspects of strategic compression that we can use to our advantage?

[selil]

What about cyber-warfare as a impetus to de-compression? If for example command and control has been over taken by the adversary and they can listen to and change the communications conduit (Hezbollah?) what happens to compression? Is compression necessarily bad or is it an asset when used appropriately?

Consider the scenario where commanders in the field are exerting up to the minute movement orders and those communications are subject to monitoring by the adversary. In that situation the adversary does not have to divine the intent of movement by a unit they can monitor changes in movement orders and be prepared.

[slapout9]

1- I have written about this before but since you brought historic examples I will add some more. This is based upon his "War and Peace in the Space Age"written in 1958 and a personal interview at his winter home in Winter Park,Fl. in 1985. He no longer believed that Strategy at the military level existed! Here is why. He believed in 58 that once the earth was mapped with satellites and ICBMs came on line the whole world was now a tactical battlefield. Anyplace in the world could be hit with a missile. So all military functions of shooting-moving and communicating would be sent to a tactical battle command system, i.e. C4ISR. Strategy was now in the realm national policy only. Wars would become "Pushbutton" fast and furious with breaks in between for political solutions. This is why he fought so hard for a national missile defense system. My personal opinion is this is why he had a winter home in Florida near the Martin Co. which actually produced an operational missile defense system before Henry Kissinger gave it away in SALT treaty one.

[slapout9]

I had more to post the first time but I hit a wrong button so the rest of my original post is lost in cyber space somewhere. However to continue. General Gavin also believed and never really understood why ICBMs could only be equipped with nuclear warheads, he would very much agree with the Navy's recent proposal to put conventional warheads on long range submarine launched missiles. Or land based missiles. He also thought ALL ships in the navy should be submersible.

He was highly upset over the military failure to understand the implications of the Falkland islands missile attacks on British ships. Besides being better than aircraft missiles are cheap.


Finally he thought good generals should know tactics. He literally believed that the only way military strategy could be defined was generalship. If a general had to have a strategy then he had failed to realize that he (the general himself was strategy) and good generals know tactics.

To me this makes a lot of sense. Example look at Iraq, if our strategy is clear, hold and build. That makes know sense. Clear,hold and build might be goals or objectives but they are not a strategy.The general must know (how) which tactics to use before anything happens. If you don't know clearing tactics and holding tactics you will not reach your objectives. How to do something is the hard part, what to do is easy.


We have talked a lot about the Strategic corporal maybe Strategic Compression is nothing more than how to be a "One Minute General"

From the Slapout, Alabama the cultural center of the universe, good night.

[Steve Blair]

I intend to post some more on this subject, as it's very fascinating to me. I just want to go over the main points and get my own thoughts sorted and organized.

[Steve Blair]

Here are a few more thoughts on strategic compression:

1)Your point about this not being a new phenomenon is well-taken and needs to be remembered. Many of the historical examples of Hitler meddling in the decisions of his subordinate commanders could be taken as examples of strategic compression (France in 1940, operations in Russia from the very beginning, and many more examples).

2)It's worth keeping in mind as well that while combat unit size/numbers may be decreasing, their supply and logistics “tail” often does not shrink at the same pace. Modern units may be more efficient, but they still consume large amounts of ammo and POL. There is also the base area syndrome to consider. By this I mean that the level of creature comforts “needed” by the troops (in many cases it's the supply line troops and higher command levels “needing” the goodies) tends to increase, putting a greater strain on the supply line.

3)In my mind, I see the biggest problem with strategic compression coming from the higher command levels. We DO need better training with regard to independent operations, decision making, cultural awareness, and so on, but it all goes out the window the exact second someone with more junk on his or her shoulders decides to “help” the tactical leaders. It's also worth remembering that strategic compression can make the results of that “help” more damaging than ever (it's hard to dismiss as outdated an order that arrives in real time), and the “helper” quite often escapes unscathed if something goes wrong. While I see much talk about improving lower-level training, there is a great silence regarding the training of higher-level commanders. It should be remembered that every time they “help,” micro-manage, or lead by video-conference or Charlie-Charlie bird, they are undercutting the authority and confidence of their subordinate leaders.

For the most part, I feel we have a well-trained basic force, one that understands the impact the CNN Effect can have on their operations – if for no other reason than they've seen it happen before they enlisted or during the early stages of their active duty time. With proper guidance, training, and above all moral support (meaning the freedom to make mistakes and learn from them), this force can adapt to strategic compression. What worries me is the response of higher command levels (battalion command and higher, especially above brigade command) to strategic compression. You cannot use fears of the CNN Effect to clamp down on lower level leaders and then turn around and complain that they do not show enough initiative. Of course they don't! They've been “educated” not to.
It should also be remembered that much of this real time information is going to be incomplete and even incorrect. The ability on the part of higher commanders to correctly evaluate what they're seeing and hearing will become even more important than it has in the past. Being able to put information in context, especially when it's pouring in from a number of sources (many of which are unreliable), may become THE key job for at least part of a commander's staff.
I used the example of Hitler earlier for a reason. He created his own strategic compression, reacting to his own vision of what was happening at the front and his own (often fuzzy) strategic goals. And he would interfere down to the battalion and even company level when it came to combat orders and postings. Given today's level of communication, ANY higher commander could take on the role of Hitler within his own chain of command, reacting to faulty intelligence and/or vision and giving operational or tactical orders that result in a poor outcome or possibly disaster, or at the very least gumming up the works.
One final observation: There is a flip side to strategic compression. Given the speed of operations, it is now more possible than it has ever been (perhaps) for a small unit (company sized) to have the impact of a much larger unit. This may come through combat power, or through a company commander's decision to not use his combat power in a particular way. This makes the ability of our senior NCOs, lieutenants, and captains to function independently more important than it has been since the days of the Frontier Army. If they are over-controlled they will not be able to make correct decisions. However, if they are trained to think for themselves and understand the impact their decisions may have on a higher level, we may gain an edge in time against our enemies. Being able to react while they are still pondering a response is invaluable, and we too often find ourselves on the receiving end of this situation.
Also, an increased reliance on communications makes us more vulnerable than we have ever been to some sort of attack on our communications systems. Commanders who are conditioned to wait for “help” from higher will not respond well when that “help” goes away. We can use the possibility of strategic compression to follow a training system similar to that used by the German army after World War I. Train each subordinate leader to think of and consider the problems of a commander one or two levels higher. That doesn't mean they're being prepared for such command positions, but that they become aware that their decisions in a village may have an impact on operations in the province, the situation in the country, and possibly throughout the world depending on the media presence. And then train the senior commanders to sit back and let their subordinates do their jobs with a minimum of “help.”