Strategic Compression

[SWJED]

I would like to keep the discussion going - any additional thoughts on the earlier posts and discussions would be most appreciated.

We have identified several historical examples (just the beginning of our research) of strategic compression - the overlapping or merging of the three levels of war: strategic, operational, and tactical. Please comment on these and feel free to suggest additional case studies / areas to explore....

Strategic compression has been a common aspect of warfighting throughout the past. It is not that strategic compression is a new reality to warfighting. Rather, it is the mechanisms in place in the current security environment (C4ISR, CNN effect) that are new and that exacerbate the problem. The examples below are intended to give a historical perspective of strategic compression and show how the levels of war moved closer together or further apart, as well as well as some of the historical mechanisms that brought strategic compression about.

Warrior-Kings of Antiquity

As previously mentioned, strategic compression is not new to warfare. In fact, at times, all three levels were represented in the form of single actors such as Alexander the Great or Genghis Khan. These leaders would initiate wars at the strategic level, plan campaigns, and sometimes even fight at the front. In these instances, the main mechanism that allowed for strategic compression to take place was the charismatic warrior-king who decided to follow his soldiers into battle rather than delegate that authority to an inferior. The later rise of the nation-state, the levee en masse, and the resulting approaches to administering large forces through delegation had strong effect in delineating the levels of war.

Lawrence of Arabia (1916-1918)

Lawrence of Arabia is one of the most recent pre-WWII examples of tactical level actors making strategic decisions. Away from lines of communication and under a broad mandate, T.E. Lawrence took his own initiative to seek peace between the Arab tribes and then the operational and tactical decisions needed to wage a guerilla campaign against the Ottoman Empire. Until recently, tactical actors in remote locations regularly made strategic decisions due to the inability to effectively communicate with strategic or operational actors. With the development of technologies such as the wireless field radio, tactical units in the preceding years were rarely left to make strategic or operational decisions without higher guidance. The lone tactical commander granted a broad mandate or even plenipotentiary powers such as T.E. Lawrence had largely become an anachronism by World War II.

World War II and the Cold War (1939-1945, 1947-1991)

During World War II through the Cold War, the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war became quite distinct and had minimal overlap. World War II provides an interesting example. Strategic level actors such as President Roosevelt or Truman could direct the war effort by determining war objectives and setting domestic priorities. Operational level actors such as General Eisenhower could plan and direct theater wide campaigns. Tactical commanders and units were responsible for the actual organization and fighting of individual battles. The accomplishment or failure of specific tactical actions did not necessarily determine the operational outcome of the war. Individual tactical actions rarely (if ever) had an effect on the strategic level war. Conversely, strategic level actors, while responsible for giving general guidance to operational level commanders, usually had limited or no interface with tactical level commanders or units. The state of World War II era communications technology and situational awareness made effective strategic level micro-management of the tactical level unlikely and was the mechanism for not having much strategic compression.

Highway of Death (1991)

While media coverage played a significant role in America’s eventual departure from Vietnam and the Beirut barracks bombing in 1983. The Persian Gulf War’s ‘Highway of Death’ incident stands out as a clear instance of strategic compression according to the model. American units destroyed retreating Iraqi Armor so that Saddam Hussein would be deprived of his military assets including his Hammurabi division of the Iraqi Republican Guard. Then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell, wary of the fallout of targeting retreating soldiers and how it would play in the international media, stopped the air war before all original objectives were complete. The CNN effect or the fear of the CNN effect played a role in forcing changes to strategic objectives.

Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003)

More recently during Operation Iraqi Freedom, C4ISR had become a mechanism driving strategic compression. There was an instance during the war where American units that had previously made a quick advance toward Baghdad slowed and even stopped. CENTCOM commander General Tommy Franks was upset that “on the CENTCOM computer screens, the blue icons that represented the Army had not been moving north” what the screens didn’t show was that Army units were stalled because they were engaged in heavy fighting against Saddam’s Fedayeen units. The CFLCC Lieutenant General David McKiernan was at odds with Franks for not seeming to grasp the tactical situation and insisting that the units continue to advance. A telling statement showing how C4ISR technology allows higher level actors to potentially micro-manage the tactical level of war was captured by reporter Michael Gordon who quoted McKiernan as saying that the “Blue Force Tracker drives the CINC.”