Security Cooperation at the strategic level

[Fuchs]

I'm in the early stages of working on a paper (about 15 pages) on security cooperation at the strategic level. Right now I'm looking at the "ends" that I want to cover. In other words: What strategic effects can good security cooperation bring to the U.S. Here's what I have so far (terms may change):

1. Force augmentation
2. Enemy Resource Denial- think Brasidas fostering rebellions amongst Athens' colonies
3. Economy of Force denial- think Stillwell tying up Japanese troops in China
4. Strengthen partnered nations
5. Strengthen US/Partnered nation relationship
6. Assist allies without a major US commitment

I'd love some comments if anyone has any ideas or if I'm missing something since I know we have a lot of SC experts on here. I'm only in the rough draft of a vague outline stage and have six months before my deadline, so I'm not emotionally invested in any ideas yet.

Thanks.

Strange. I see nowhere a "reduce the probability of involvement in a costly and terrible war" on the list. Am I the only one who thinks that this is THE reason for entering a security co-operation?

[Xenophon]

I think 4, 5, and 6 can all contribute to that.

There's no specific policy or specific partner. I'm looking at the potential, "big picture" benefits of SC. What it could do.

[Old Eagle]

Will you limit yourself to SC as currently defined or propose an expansion of authorities?

[William F. Owen]

There's no specific policy or specific partner. I'm looking at the potential, "big picture" benefits of SC. What it could do.

No policy, no strategy. It's like a light bulb with no electricity. Meaningless and useless.

[Rex Brynen]

"Strategic security cooperation" is a very, very broad topic to be addressed in the abstract, and I would worry about therefore having to generalize to the point of not saying anything terribly interesting or profound.

No policy, no strategy. It's like a light bulb with no electricity. Meaningless and useless.

Not entirely, Wilf: one could talk about what different types of effects security cooperation might have, as a way of identifying how it might fit into strategy. To use the light bulb analogy, one could certainly talk about what a light bulb can do (light things), might do (heat things, depending on the type), requirements (electricity), categories of adverse consequences (running up the electrical bill, setting the house on fire), and what it definitively can't do (make cheese sandwiches and walk the dog), all as a way of enhancing understanding of the tool in the broader strategic toolkit.

However, as noted above, it does seem rather broad (and already broadly understood).

A more interesting paper might the potential liabilities and second/third order effects of security cooperation: association with host nation human rights abuses, domestic political effects in the host nation, unintended signalling to other regional countries, mission creep and strategic entanglement, military-centric reporting and analysis, dependency, etc. These are much less well understood IMHO.

[Fuchs]

I think 4, 5, and 6 can all contribute to that.

You were supposedly "looking at ends". 4, 5 and 6 are not ends but intermediate steps.


Our difference is probably fundamental. I am looking at national security, while you're probably rather in pursuit of giving a big stick to a government.

The latter is no end, though. It's a weapon.

[Old Eagle]

Unclassified strategic ends are enumerated in the National Security Strategy. Classified details are in the GEF.

[CloseDanger]

Between US and Russia.

[Xenophon]

Thanks for the discussion so far, all. I have since convinced my Professor that we need to scale down the goal a little bit. After the holidays I'm going to discuss with him looking at specific security cooperation efforts, either in a geographic context like AFRICOM or a specific enablor, like SC MAGTFs.

[Bill Moore]

Xenophon,

I encourage you to look at the pacom.mil website, and then look over the strategy link to get an idea of the purpose of strategic cooperation according to PACOM. I'm not so sure there is an "endstate", since it is a process that must be sustained to various degrees to maintain the desired relationships and build the cabilities needed to enable us to operate together should the need arise. Relationships garnered from SC can be as important (or more important) as the capabilities generated from these events. The perception that they are our partners and we're their partner has contributed to the prevention of conflict the PACOM AOR in recent years, but of course there is no guaruntee that peace will continue and if we need to go war the relationships we developed through SC will be critical enablers.

I disagree with what I think Wilf implied about the need for a strategy first. The relationships we develop allow us to respond to a host of threats and disasters that we may not be able to predict (thus develop a strategy for). They allow us access to the region and the relationships allow us to reach a consensus quicker should the need arise where we have to respond. We also demonstrate our will to honor our security commitments in the region by participating in various exercises, and with the increasing instability in nK and a rising China that is important. Hard to sum up in a couple of paragraphs, but SC is critical to our overall security.

http://www.pacom.mil/web/PACOM_Resou...Sep%202010.pdf