"Strategic security cooperation" is a very, very broad topic to be addressed in the abstract, and I would worry about therefore having to generalize to the point of not saying anything terribly interesting or profound.

Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
No policy, no strategy. It's like a light bulb with no electricity. Meaningless and useless.
Not entirely, Wilf: one could talk about what different types of effects security cooperation might have, as a way of identifying how it might fit into strategy. To use the light bulb analogy, one could certainly talk about what a light bulb can do (light things), might do (heat things, depending on the type), requirements (electricity), categories of adverse consequences (running up the electrical bill, setting the house on fire), and what it definitively can't do (make cheese sandwiches and walk the dog), all as a way of enhancing understanding of the tool in the broader strategic toolkit.

However, as noted above, it does seem rather broad (and already broadly understood).

A more interesting paper might the potential liabilities and second/third order effects of security cooperation: association with host nation human rights abuses, domestic political effects in the host nation, unintended signalling to other regional countries, mission creep and strategic entanglement, military-centric reporting and analysis, dependency, etc. These are much less well understood IMHO.