An Open Letter to President Obama

[JJackson]

I find it far more plausible that the U.S. can build and fund an Afghan military and associated militias capable of holding several provinces against the Taliban than to believe that the Taliban will voluntarily negotiate a politically viable diplomatic solution to the war with Western nations, the Afghan government, and Pakistan.

While I believe it would be possible to fund an army the question is ‘for whom would they hold the territory?’ Create a dominant military force and someone will arise to wield it and I see no reason to have any faith that they would use it in a way the funders would approve of. The funding would also need to be sustained indefinitely as the type of force being created is not one Afghanistan can afford or - even on the rosiest estimates – look likely to become able to afford for at least a generation or two.

As to the ‘viable diplomatic solution’ I agree that seems unlikely at present as the occupying coalition’s domestic audience has been sold an unrealistic dream so a reality based outcome is not politically acceptable. I think abandonment of an alien top down, secular, democratic government in favour of a bottom up Islamic Sharia/Shura system has a chance if there is no overwhelming central military force and only a weak central government that is stripped of the ‘Vichy’ taint so it is acceptable to Pakistan, China, the resistance and regional/tribal leaders. This kind of arrangement might be acceptable to the Asian stakeholders but is probably a bridge too far for the occupation.

[carl]

As to the ‘viable diplomatic solution’ I agree that seems unlikely at present as the occupying coalition’s domestic audience has been sold an unrealistic dream so a reality based outcome is not politically acceptable. I think abandonment of an alien top down, secular, democratic government in favour of a bottom up Islamic Sharia/Shura system has a chance if there is no overwhelming central military force and only a weak central government that is stripped of the ‘Vichy’ taint so it is acceptable to Pakistan, China, the resistance and regional/tribal leaders. This kind of arrangement might be acceptable to the Asian stakeholders but is probably a bridge too far for the occupation.

That sounds to me like the restoration of the Taliban to power. That may be palatable to "Pakistan, China, the resistance and regional/tribal leaders" but what about the rest of the world and the Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras and the Pashtuns who want their daughters to graduate high school?

[Bob's World]

I am always amazed by those who argue against doing what is most likely to work simply because it is difficult.

Doing the wrong thing, like the surge, is difficult as well and highly unlikely to produce any positive results, yet we plunge into that. Yet when a group of very savvy professionals suggest doing the right thing (with its clear difficulties) it is attacked.

I would sign this letter in a second, with no regrets. The key is in the paragraph following the one recommending mediating a cease fire to sit down with the Quetta Shura. This is a no-trust environment, and the Northern Alliance does not want the camel's nose under the tent of governance, for fear it will barge on in and run them back into the roll of the oppressed. They prefer to keep us there guarding them. We must become neutral in our approach, stop protecting one side, and bring them together to form a shared approach to governance. A new constitution that breaks the Karzai monopoly must be crafted with all parties participating.

My wife is a school teacher. When a teacher breaks up a fight between students, they don't jump in and help the student they like the best to kick the other kid's butt. They jump in the middle, taking some shots as the push the parties apart and then force them to sort it out. You can't make them like it, but you can make them do it. Same should apply to our intervention.

[JJackson]

Carl, I do not think it needs to be a return to Taliban totalitarianism but I think it is unrealistic to believe they can be totally excluded, and still have a peaceful Afghanistan. The ethnic groups you listed would all be represented, as they have been historically, by those they choose to represent them at the various levels of Shura. Polling – such as it is in this environment – makes it clear there is no appetite for a return to the ultra orthodox Taliban interpretation of Koranic law but that does not mean a legal system routed in Sharia, not Magna Carta, would not gain wide acceptance. The Taliban imposed ruled by force, I think a solution requires that no group be able to dictate with out being able to enlist the support of others to form a coalition. My understanding of traditional Afghan governance is that consensus, after a fair bit of arguing and horse trading, is they way they expect things to be done.

I do not know if there is a way to get to this point, from where we are now, and how to dismantle some of the corrupt structures we have been busy creating. I am however convinced that the poor long suffering civilians do not want, or trust, the solution we are imposing or a return of an all powerful Taliban. What they want is the fighting to stop and the troops to go away, and that means negotiating with and sharing some power with the resistance, including the Taliban.

[carl]

Bob and JJackson:

The big question is how can you make them do it? A negotiated solution whereby everybody has to agree to play nice together is a great goal but what if they refuse to do it? The teacher Bob mentioned has moral authority but ultimately she has recourse to superior physical force with which to impose her will upon the combatants. She calls the cops.

If the antagonists in this case refuse to play nice, who are we going to call? Are we willing to impose the physical force needed to make them, especially the Taliban who get to hide in Pakistan?

What concerns me about this is the point I raised before. By the nature of our society, the deck is stacked against us in "talks." Dayahun said in another thread that one or both sides will just use the talks to advance their real goal, acquisition of total power.

The tragic thing about this is the wishes of the long suffering Afghan civilian don't matter much. The wishes of the people who are willing to organize, arm themselves, seek support and fight, for good cause or bad, are the ones that maatter.

[Bob's World]

Bob and JJackson:

The big question is how can you make them do it? A negotiated solution whereby everybody has to agree to play nice together is a great goal but what if they refuse to do it? The teacher Bob mentioned has moral authority but ultimately she has recourse to superior physical force with which to impose her will upon the combatants. She calls the cops.

If the antagonists in this case refuse to play nice, who are we going to call? Are we willing to impose the physical force needed to make them, especially the Taliban who get to hide in Pakistan?

What concerns me about this is the point I raised before. By the nature of our society, the deck is stacked against us in "talks." Dayahun said in another thread that one or both sides will just use the talks to advance their real goal, acquisition of total power.

The tragic thing about this is the wishes of the long suffering Afghan civilian don't matter much. The wishes of the people who are willing to organize, arm themselves, seek support and fight, for good cause or bad, are the ones that matter.

Or any other country. But we did, and we are now committed to keeping our illegitimate solution in power.

We all know how we would feel if China inserted itself In US politics to keep some party in power to protect their national interest of preventing the default on our debt to them or adoption of expensive programs that made that default more likely. Yet somehow we cannot grasp that others look at our interventions in the same way. Hell, maybe China would indeed save us from our own foolishness, but even the best external program forced on some nation is worse than the worst internal program the adopt on their own.

There is no easy or sure answer to this, but there are smart fundamental parameters that we routinely violate, usually to our chagrin.

There are viable models out there that can guide our actions. A constitution in Lebanon that guarantees roles and percentages of seats by critical interest group. A US constitution that keeps any one branch of power from becoming to strong, and a bill of rights that protects the populace from the government, and ensures that the government stays in line for fear of an informed and armed populace.

COIN doctrine is rooted in Colonial and Cold War control of others. It needs updated to recognize a greater neutrality on the part of those who deign to intervene in the governance of others. Similarly the U.S. is grown too used to controlling others with various tools of statecraft, and is therefore frustrated by the ineffectiveness of those tools on controlling non-state entities. Another area that needs updating.

But the real bottom line is, what do we lose by attempting to reconcile the parties and forcing them to share governance within the constraints of a new constitution under the oversight of the coalition until they prove they can play nice? Isn't 10 years of spinning our wheels enough? At the end of the day the Taliban are not and never were an enemy of the U.S.; and it is the Pashtun people, not the governments of Afghanistan or Pakistan that grant sanctuary to AQ. We just need to refocus a bit.

[carl]

Robert C. Jones:

I have a few questions. You say "it's not our call to pick who governs Afghanistan." Does the same go for the Pak Army/ISI? Do they get to pick?

I am not sure Lebanon's constitution is a viable model. They seem to have a lot of trouble over there.

You also said.

At the end of the day the Taliban are not and never were an enemy of the U.S.; and it is the Pashtun people, not the governments of Afghanistan or Pakistan that grant sanctuary to AQ.

I disagree with that of course but let us say for arguments sake that it is true. Now AQ has attacked the US and killed thousands of our people. They keep trying to do it again and have made it clear that they will continue to try and kill our countrymen. They are our enemy. If, as you say, it is the Pashtun people who grant sanctuary to AQ, are not the Pashtun people then our enemy? I don't think that is true because they never got a vote on it.

I think it is the Taliban and, though we are loath to admit it, and the Pak Army/ISI (or at least the mover and shaker part of it) who give sanctuary to AQ and are our enemies.

[Dayuhan]

But the real bottom line is, what do we lose by attempting to reconcile the parties and forcing them to share governance within the constraints of a new constitution under the oversight of the coalition until they prove they can play nice?

Force them to share governance? How?

This is a winner-take-all environment, and neither party will be willing to share. They may play at it if they see the game as something that will bring them one step closer to complete control, but they aren't going to sit down and "play nice" just because we want them to.

I think your faith in Constitutions and structures is more than a bit unrealistic. Documents don't shape cultures, cultures shape documents that suit their needs and priorities. We could impose the US constitution on Afghanistan tomorrow and it wouldn't change a thing: the document would simply be ignored. That's what happens to documents that don't fit the culture they propose to shape. The culture is the culture. It may change, over generations and in unpredictable ways, but we can't change it.

It was foolish of us to try to shape Afghan governance in the first place; it's no less foolish now.

An example of where this sort of initiative can lead may be found in recent memory in the Philippines, where the US supported an astonishingly inept "peace agreement" that was doomed to failure from the start. The parties involved knew it wouldn't work, but went along for reasons of their own. Of course it was shot down, mercifully at an early stage, with generally poor effects on eventual prospects for peace and for US credibility.

We can't make people "play nice" if they don't see "playing nice" as compatible with their interests and goals. It would be lovely if we could, but we can't, and we only step on our equipment when we try.

[tequila]

I am always amazed by those who argue against doing what is most likely to work simply because it is difficult.

Difficult is what we are doing now.

A successful negotiation is entering the realm of the impossible.

The Taliban and Pakistan have no incentive to move towards a negotiated end to the fighting. Indeed, they have material incentives to sabotage such negotiations.

The Taliban
1) Have repeatedly denied negotiating with anyone. Have predicated the beginning of negotations on a Western withdrawal of forces. Would likely lose credibility with Gulf Arab funders if seen as publicly breaking with either of the prior two conditions.

2) If the letter is correct in its assumptions, the Taliban are already winning militarily. Why negotiate now when its position will be much stronger later?

3) Various Taliban warlords are making enormous sums off the Western presence now and will continue to do so only if they continue to exert a credible threat of violence to extort funds from contractors, NGOs, narcotics organizations, and ordinary Afghans.

Pakistan
1) Is making billions in its current position as regional spoiler from U.S. aid. Primary goal is keep this money spigot flowing, as this maintains the current tottering power structure. This will stop if the U.S. begins to take Afghanistan less seriously.

2) Is watching its primary Afghan agent, the Taliban, taking power. Why stop this, when dominance is within view?

[Entropy]

I try not to talk about Afghanistan much anymore because I'm burned out, cynical and unobjective at this point. However, the two alternatives provided here sound to me like being given a choice to contract either syphilis or gonorrhea - in other words neither is good even if one might be marginally "better" than the other.

We should explore anything that is even remotely likely to result in a stable Afghanistan and/or provide the US with an opportunity to honorably disengage from Afghanistan, but let's not kid ourselves that our chances for success are very good with either of these two options.