Key Leader Engagement (KLE) TTPs

[jcustis]

EPA, I'll dig up the KLE SOP I drafted for the battalion and send it your way if you can PM me with a .mil address. Take from it what works and discard the rest, but it remains the document that I referenced for the task of handling shuras and KLE.

[Xenophon]

Lots of good stuff here. I'll add one thing: watch Restrepo. The Company Commander provides an excellent example of how not to act in a shura.

[jcustis]

Lots of good stuff here. I'll add one thing: watch Restrepo. The Company Commander provides an excellent example of how not to act in a shura.

Not necessarily, but it depends on which shura you are talking about.

If you mean the one where the local men come to ask about one of the men previously detained, I agree only inasmuch as he could have had a cooler head and refrained from profanity when he was talking to the soldier off camera. As for his other stern responses during that meeting, well, sometimes that is exactly what is needed, as the locals can easily try to push the coalition side around.

How would you have gone after the issue?

It's totally a cultural thing, but our opposites often came across as prone to nagging...sometimes they need a raised voice to get them to stop nagging.

I think he did everything consciously and with a purpose, which is all I might ever ask for from someone representing the coalition. if there was a different shura that you're referencing, I might not be orienting on on the right one.

Now that I think of it, i think the married guys among us handled the worst of the shuras fairly well, once they remembered to disconnect themselves from the topic and nod their head occasionally or scribble a note every now and then. Feigning interest, in a fashion not all that unlike listening to your significant other, is an acquired skill.

[tankersteve]

Feigning interest, in a fashion not all that unlike listening to your significant other, is an acquired skill.

Best COIN KLE skill ever. Don't look bored, pay attention to the details, try to find some common ground.

Looking forward to this SOP.

Tankersteve

[Michael C]

I wrote an article on this topic, and attached to it advice on Information Operations and using an interpreter. It was Afghanistan specific. Infantry Magazine published it, but it is easier just to follow the link to my blog at the end.

Even better than my ramblings is the bibliography I included at the end. One of the articles I mentioned specifically mentions negotiating in shuras and is very much along the lines of jcustis's initial advice.

I will say profanity and yelling should never enter a shura. Ever. Even after multiple attacks in your AO with a strong suspicion a village knows about it. Why? Because yelling is bad in American culture, and worse in Pashtun culture. Can you imagine a board meeting that ended up with one side yelling at everyone? Or a city council meeting where a foreigner came in and berated the board? I can, but in each case it would be a bad thing. Yelling--from either side--is usually a sign of superiority and a sign of division. It is a sign that that is a dysfunctional group. For instance, think of congress when a bunch of members are yelling at each other, that is a sign that not much is getting accomplished. If you have to yell at local Afghans you probably lost control. (Much like everyone has that boss who yells and screams, and everyone thinks he is a sucky boss.)

I bring this up because on more than one occasion I have heard Soldiers or Officers above me specifically point to the "yell at the elders" TTP as an effective shura strategy.

[Monk]

I am curious if you guys have used the CIDNE data base, just got started in theater in 08. KLE is one of the datafields, it allows you to see who was talked to and what was promised by the last guy visiting the village. It helps to avoid that "Where's my well" faceshot on your first sit down. I would also love to see your units TTP on KLE. It might be worth adding it as a module of instruction to our course.

[Bob's World]

KLEs, Shuras, etc are all about relationship building. Not just showing respect, but actually resecting the roles, background, and experiences that brought each of the participants to that meeting, from the young kid making tea to the senior participant. Hand in glove with respect is establishing trust. This takes time and only begins at the KLE.

Americans tend to be too impatient and want to "get down to business." Well, the "business" of the KLE is to get to know each other a bit better, personally, as well professionally. As to the operational issues that are discussed it is more about how people feel about those issues, and appreciating who, in what role, is harboring what feelings, and being able to sort out what all that means in terms of what type of response to expect, or how to tailor the operations to ensure best effects for all.

One of my first KLEs as a young (2-3 months out of the Q-course) captain, meeting for the first time with the CG of the first Egyptian Division to close in Saudi Arabia for the first Gulf War, was a disaster. I'd spent the previous month with the Egyptian Ranger BDE, and my company commander had just arrived in country and we were shifting over as a company to begin pulling this Arab Coalition together.

The Major, myself and another ODA Commander go to the CG's tent, and for me it was a bit of a surreal experience. The large Saudi Hajj tent, the carpets, the incense and music, and this huge wood desk, behind which was this refined, accomplished gentleman. As a Company commander he had led the assault across the Suez and had employed sagger missiles with great effect against the Israelies to forge a successful bridgehead. And here we were, just talking. He wanted to know all about us. We spoke of where we were from, family, etc. I didn't know much, but I knew that he was assessing us as men, as well as seeking to divine through us the intentions and goals of our nation. It was going very well, though very long, and my Major was getting fidgity. I later learned that the other Majors in the BN called this guy "the Baron," but that afternoon, three Americans in the middle of an Egyptian Division, in the middle of the Saudi desert, a few miles of empty sand south of the Iraqi Army, I was about to learn why. The Major cut off the general in mid-sentence and proclaimed, "I'm Major ___ _____, and I'm here to train your division!" I doubt I concealed the shock and horror on my face, and certainly a veil dropped over the expression of the CG, who replied simply "I see." The Major handed him a list of training tasks he'd cooked up in his office back at KKMC, the General accepted the list, glanced at it briefly as he set it aside, and then concluded the meeting and escorted us out.

Driving away, I offered "Sir, I think you insulted the General." "Nonsense!" he mentored, " I thought he was going to talk all day, someone had to take charge of the situation!" We were off to a rocky start, both the Company's relationship with the Division, and mine with the Major.

Respect and trust, empathy and relationship. Too much business too soon is counterproductive to actually getting that business done.

[Xenophon]

I definitely agree that sometime you need to be firm. He wasn't firm, he acted firm. But his voice cracked with frustration. He didn't bother to learn the names of the people he wanted to talk to the Afghans about. His disgust with the Afghans and his lack of confidence shown through his facade like a WP round. If I picked up on it, the Afghans sure did.

But, I may have been biased against him from the start. In the first interview piece with him in the movie, he said something to the effect of, "I didn't bother to study the Korengal or read anything about the AO before we got there, I didn't think it was important."

Disgusting. Especially from a company commander. The First Sergeant seemed on point though.