Mechanized Infantry Perceptions 2010

[B.Smitty]

First, we need to define exactly what 'light' Infantry happens to be. To me, the word light means just that. They are lightly equipped to include few to no assigned vehicles and are more highly trained than normal infantry. They are expected to be foot or opportunity mobile. They are incapable of extended operations and their use is conjunction with Armor should be extremely rare. A US example would be airborne units and the former 7th Inf Div (and not the Tenth Mountain Division which is a hybrid)

Since the utility of pure, un-augmented light infantry seems to be rather limited. Perhaps we need to look at reconstituting most of them as "just plain infantry" units. I realize we are doing this, to some extent, with the Stryker brigades, but even these are "deployability challenged", fairly expensive, and not suited to certain types of conflicts (e.g. Afghanistan).

Maybe we need to look at a TOE that mounts most or all "light" infantry on HMMWVs or trucks.

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/m...g=content;col1
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc...f&AD=ADA339420
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc...c=GetTRDoc.pdf

The resulting organization would train to fight dismounted, but also have organic vehicular mobility. HMMWVs are much lighter and cheaper than Strykers, and have more utility as logistics platforms.

[Chris jM]

Since the utility of pure, un-augmented light infantry seems to be rather limited. Perhaps we need to look at reconstituting most of them as "just plain infantry" units.

Or you can use light infantry to their strengths. Dominate areas where vehicles are unsuitable (the mountains inside Afghanistan), conduct persistent, economy-of-effort security operations around rural populations and fight the enemy on his own terms (light, away from predictable routes and in areas he doesn't expect it).

If one uses Loss-Exchange-Ratios as a guide, one light-infantry platoon placing an ambush deep in Indian country can be worth an entire Bn of Mech Inf who are limited to driving back and forth along a single route for a month.

It is very situationally dependent, but the flexibility and utility offered by light inf should, I strongly believe, be retained. Keep the 'MRAP mentality' out of the picture, and aim at being able to raise, train and deploy a range of competent and audacious infantry forces (SF/Cdo, light, motorised, mech, armd). Inevitably the roles will never be as clear cut in practice, but I would much prefer re-rolling a Light Infantry unit into a motor or mech role than trying to tell Mr Back-seat-Trooper that he needs to re-enact Marius's mules.

WRT the culture of equipment care, tough force-on-force training will drive home the validity and necessity of combined-arms operations and even the dumbest grunt will realise that those APC-things are actually really good if he doesn't want to assault 600m on his guts, deflect 7.62mm on his own accord and wants a lift home afterwards. A competent and professional unit will be able to care for the equipment they employ if they have sufficient 'belonging' to the wider group. There are problems if units are affected by tribal divisions that see little universal cohesion, and this will manifest itself in both poor tactical/technical performance and poor equipment maintainence. While Fuchs is right that reassigning ownership and responsibility will work some of the time, it won't always be a possible solution. Good training, on the other hand, will always be a relevant solution.

[gute]

Or you can use light infantry to their strengths. Dominate areas where vehicles are unsuitable (the mountains inside Afghanistan), conduct persistent, economy-of-effort security operations around rural populations and fight the enemy on his own terms (light, away from predictable routes and in areas he doesn't expect it).

I was reading some comments made by Mike Sparks (I don't know much about him, but he seems to be controversial) regarding infantry and it's use. He doesn't seem to have much use for light infantry claiming only about 10% of the earth's land mass is not easily accessible, which would require true light infantry. His reasoning seems sound.

[ganulv]

He doesn't seem to have much use for light infantry claiming only about 10% of the earth's land mass is not easily accessible, which would require true light infantry.

10% of a dollar is .10¢ but 10% of our planet’s surface area is about 51,000,000 km2.

If I didn't have crews that knew their tracks, we'd never get them repaired. The maintenance section doesn't have enough people to do the work. I've watched my crews repair damage in hours, with no mechanic on site.

I know a fellow who was an LAV crewman and he has described a relationship with the mechanics that didn’t sound to me to be outright antagonistic but apparently wasn’t exactly cozy, either.

[Ken White]

Chris jM:

Truly excellent and thoughtful post.

Gute:

Assess anything from Sparks with caution. He's wedded to the M113 as the epitome of mil tech.

With reference to terrain, as ganulv illustrates, 10%, even if accurate is relative. I doubt that figure is accurate and it's in any event totally immaterial. Terrain is but one item in the METT-TC dictum and that dictum should always be assessed in totality and applied to forces to be committed.

You do not fight terrain, you fight people. There are over 400 cities in or on accessible terrain worldwide that have over a million people; in 2008, roughly half the world population was classified as urban. One can use heavy forces in cities but there's a cost and Light or regular Infantry is better suited. That doesn't even address jungle, the Taiga or Mountains where vehicles can go but are sometimes tactically disadvantageous.

There's a place and use for all and too many wars have proven that "One size fits all" is not a good solution. A parochial approach similar to the one espoused by Sparks and too many others as well as the equally bad 'universalist' approach is unwise.

[gute]

Chris jM:

Truly excellent and thoughtful post.

Gute:

Assess anything from Sparks with caution. He's wedded to the M113 as the epitome of mil tech.

With reference to terrain, as ganulv illustrates, 10%, even if accurate is relative. I doubt that figure is accurate and it's in any event totally immaterial. Terrain is but one item in the METT-TC dictum and that dictum should always be assessed in totality and applied to forces to be committed.

You do not fight terrain, you fight people. There are over 400 cities in or on accessible terrain worldwide that have over a million people; in 2008, roughly half the world population was classified as urban. One can use heavy forces in cities but there's a cost and Light or regular Infantry is better suited. That doesn't even address jungle, the Taiga or Mountains where vehicles can go but are sometimes tactically disadvantageous.

There's a place and use for all and too many wars have proven that "One size fits all" is not a good solution. A parochial approach similar to the one espoused by Sparks and too many others as well as the equally bad 'universalist' approach is unwise.

I probably did not explain things well enough. I think Sparks was trying to make the point that most of the world population is located in areas which are accessible to "Stryker like" infantry (in M113 Gavins I would assume).

So, light and regular infantry are better suited for urban warfare? It seems that after the Thunder Runs and battles of Fallujah 11/04, Mosul, Najaf there were many (not saying here at SWJ) advocating heavy armor in cities - that we had made it work unlike the Russians in Grozny?

[Ken White]

So, light and regular infantry are better suited for urban warfare? It seems that after the Thunder Runs and battles of Fallujah 11/04, Mosul, Najaf there were many (not saying here at SWJ) advocating heavy armor in cities - that we had made it work unlike the Russians in Grozny?

M E TT-TC (emphasis added / kw). It can work, just as armor can be employed in the jungle -- but in both cases, you better know what you're doing and / or be significantly more competent than your opponent.

We made a terrible mistake -- one which many in the Army warned against -- in basing many things on the flawed learning of 'lessons' from Operation Desert Storm. One hundred casualties in 100 hours is not a war and the only lesson is that it's unlikely to be repeatable...

On the first item you mentioned, "accessible" and effective conduct of combat operations are not always synonymous activities. Rarely are, in fact. Regardless, I still question the figure -- and still contend it's immaterial...

[B.Smitty]

Or you can use light infantry to their strengths. Dominate areas where vehicles are unsuitable (the mountains inside Afghanistan), conduct persistent, economy-of-effort security operations around rural populations and fight the enemy on his own terms (light, away from predictable routes and in areas he doesn't expect it).

Assuming most light infantry deployments require significant vehicular augmentation anyway, wouldn't it make sense to design most infantry TOEs to reflect this? Perhaps even add drivers and gunners so you don't have to dedicate squads to vehicle security while the rest of the unit dismounts.

In the rare situations where vehicles are unsuitable, deploy without them.

From the first link in my last post,

To be able to focus our efforts on the population, the task force had to get its maneuver forces to where the people lived. Unfortunately, for a light infantry unit, nothing was within walking distance. Paktika is 19,101 square kilometers, with over 600 kilometers of border with Pakistan. The "box" at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana, the Army's premier light infantry training area, is approximately 800 square kilometers, only about one-sixth of which is used by a light infantry battalion during a rotation. According to the MTOE, the primary maneuver forces in a light infantry battalion, the rifle companies, have no internal transportation assets. The only vehicles it has are assigned to headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) and consists of approximately 40 cargo HMMWVs which are used to transport the battalion headquarters, staff, specialty platoons, and limited supplies across the battlefield. This lack of vehicles presented a significant problem for missions that demanded rifle companies and platoons to move hundreds of miles for weeks at a time. Anticipating this sort of challenge prior to deployment, the battalion reorganized and deployed 27 organic HMMWVs, and once in theater, the task force signed for more vehicles that had become installation equipment from previous rotations. The task force signed for approximately 25 M1114, up-armored, five-person models, most less than three years old with improved engines, suspensions, and drive trains. To supplement these gun trucks, the task force also signed for approximately 65 M998, M1038, and other miscellaneous unarmored cargo models, capable of carrying up to 11 Soldiers, their weapons, and supplies. These vehicles, as well as the 27 from Hawaii, had an average age of 15 years and had no improvements to the major stock components. These cargo versions were modified with Kevlar blankets and sheeting to improve survivability, and units strapped M240B machine guns on tripods to the top of the vehicle's cab to create a makeshift weapons platform. With a hodgepodge collection of tactical vehicles, TF 2-27 became motorized.

While creating a fleet of vehicles for the mission in Paktika and motorizing TF 2-27 worked, it was far from ideal. The cargo HMMWV, which made up well over half of the vehicles used by the maneuver elements in the task force, was never meant to be a tactical troop carrier, and its use as such had a variety of disadvantages. The number of vehicles assigned to each company, between six to eight M1114s and 10-15 cargo variants, required companies and platoons to put an average of 10 Soldiers in a cargo variant, and the limited space in the cargo area made carrying the necessary food, water, parts, and equipment to sustain operations challenging at best. The lack of room in the cargo space made firing weapons or defending the vehicle difficult as well.

Another problem with reorganizing as a motorized battalion when TF 2-27 arrived in Paktika was the lack of tactical and technical training and experience with vehicles throughout the task force. Though the battalion was a well-trained infantry unit, there was a significant dearth of experience working as a mounted force. The task force lacked qualified drivers and qualified M2 and Mk19 gunners, and few, if any, had conducted a mounted live-fire exercise. As with most infantry tasks, this lack of experience could have been overcome had the task force had vehicles to train with prior to deployment. Although there are a limited number of vehicles in a light infantry battalion, it was not possible to get every company trained in mounted tactics prior to our departure. Once in Paktika, the tactical learning curve was steep, but the battalion accepted a large amount of risk in the first month, using vehicles that the operators were just not trained to use. The technical learning curve was not as steep, and it had greater longterm effect. Maintenance on any piece of equipment is important to ensure that it works when it is needed. It is especially true with vehicles, and that truth is magnified when those vehicles are operating in the conditions mentioned above. Trained vehicle operators are taught to inspect the vehicle before every use, monitor its condition during operation, and check the vehicle every time it stops. The majority of the Soldiers operating vehicles did not receive formal training on the maintenance required for a HMMWV, and this had a major impact on the vehicles. In the first month, operator errors resulted in vehicles breaking down at an extremely high rate. Simple mistakes such as failing to tighten loose half-shaft bolts before operation and putting the wrong kind of fuel in the engine were common, and these mistakes could have been avoided with proper training prior to deployment. Had the rifle companies spent even one month with their vehicles prior to deployment, many of the problems the task force experienced could have been avoided.

[Compost]

Or you can use light infantry to their strengths. Dominate areas where vehicles are unsuitable (the mountains inside Afghanistan), conduct persistent, economy-of-effort security operations around rural populations and fight the enemy on his own terms (light, away from predictable routes and in areas he doesn't expect it).

Most commentators seem to come from the same camp area, and that is one which can be used for light infantry and similar units with ready access to heavier equipment.

Such camps can be useful if well provisioned but austere, and situated for supporting extended operations ‘outside the wire’ and not used merely for brief forays into ‘indian county’.