Mechanized Infantry Perceptions 2010

[Compost]

As a complicating factor military units are often referred to as light, mediumor heavy. In that context light means a unit that is readily portable by virtually any means and particularly by airlift. Heavy means a unit equipped for maximum combat power with few if any concessions toward weight or portability. Medium describes every unit in between. For example most of the vehicles such as GS trucks issued to a light unit would weigh less than 10 tonnes whereas a heavy unit would have many weighing several times that much.

Currently an upper limit for ready portability of a vehicle by fixed-wing aircraft is generally held to be 18 to 20 tonnes. That limit seems to have become accepted because it approximates the load of the widely used C-130 Hercules freighter at normal maximum take-off weight.

Of course 20 tonnes may seem too heavy to be referred to as light. However, a scan across the current variety of armoured vehicles suggests there could be natural boundaries predicated on weight, and that two such boundaries occur at about 20 and 40 tonnes all-up weight. Perhaps that is simply the result of subjective bias rather than Darwinian-style analysis. And even if the latter applies there could be other natural boundaries. But regardless of observation or analysis it is anyway convenient to postulate 20 tonne intervals between three main classes of armoured vehicle described by weight as light, medium and [/B]heavy[/B].

Those boundaries were in fact suggested – originally or otherwise – by MAJ John C. Larminie in ‘The operational requirements of light armoured vehicles,’ International Defense Review , 11/1987, p 1487-1492. Having never met Larminie this is a good time to comment on the pleasure of reading his articles.

If his suggested boundaries are accepted then light can be used to describe any armoured or unarmoured vehicle which has a maximum combat laden weight of less than 20 tonnes. Light could be similarly used to describe a military unit in which every item of equipment weighs less than 20 tonnes. The term heavy could be used to mean a vehicle weighing more than 40 tonnes, and also a unit which has many such vehicles and other similarly heavy items of equipment. In the middle a medium vehicle would weigh at least 20 tonnes but less than 40 tonnes, and a medium unit would have mostly medium and also light vehicles, but might additionally have a relatively small number of heavy vehicles as in Table 2.

Boundaries at 20 and 40 tonnes are much easier to remember than a contrived Queensbury-style classification. And exceptions for light vehicles and light units under say 10 tonnes could be described in specifics. For example a parachute unit could be described as X-tonne meaning than each of its vehicles and items of equipment weighed at most X tonnes.

The 20 and 40-tonne boundaries have been described and adopted here for convenience. It is not additionally implied that tracks become superior to wheels at either boundary. As a general observation wheeled vehicles are well suited to on-road/on-track movement and are particularly useful for operational mobility. However, for off-road movement, obstacle crossing and tactical mobility it is apparent that track laying vehicles – despite the hazard of breakage – become superior to wheeled vehicles at some weight well below 40 tonnes and probably below 20 tonnes.

Such superiority can be argued against. But it is well supported from historical times by the assessments of various analysts and commentators such as:
CAPT Edwin W. Besch, “Armoured reconnaissance Vehicles”, Interconnair –II-81, p B1-B8;
Paul Hornback, “The Wheels Versus Track Dilemma”, Armor, March-April 1998,
re-printed Defender, Winter 1998, p 19-20;
Maj. J. C. Larminie, “Soft-ground performance of military vehicles”,
International Defense Review, 4/1988, p 383-386;
Don Loughlin, “Wheels vs. Tracks: Rebuttal”, Aviation Today, 2000,
[www.c4inews.com/reports/wheelsvtracks.htm (cache)] d-l 21July2006.

Anyway back towards the thread. The purpose in this post was to develop the concept that there are three basic classes of armoured vehicles: light up to say 19.9 tonnes, medium from 20 to say 39.9 tonnes and heavy from 40 tonnes and upward. At the lower end below 10 tonnes, the X-tonne convention or classification can be used for specific vehicles and units.

The ‘Larminie’ weight-based classification may be thought contentious or unnecessary. However, a following post will use it as a framework against which to consider the types and armament of infantry carrying armoured vehicles. As an extension to ‘perceptions of mechanised infantry’ that post is likely to be contentious.

[Fuchs]

In regard to vehicles it's in my opinion more reasonable to divide between medium and heavy AFVs on basis of the compromise:
focus on (road) march mobility or focus on sturdiness in battle

The whole 8x8 medium AFV fashion was primarily about the race to Pristina, incited by Shinseki et al, secondarily about tight budgets in the many countries with smaller armies which wanted to modernize but lacked good AND affordable off-the shelf MBT and IFV choices and tertiarily about the widespread perception of tracked AFVs (especially MBTs) as Cold War dinosaurs.

It's so difficult to separate them nicely from light AFVs of the 10-15 ton range because the medium AFV (sans IFV) category is not founded on a consistent idea. It's a strange compromise. Wheeled APCs such as the Fuchs were nothing special during the Cold War, yet they were up-armoured, got better gun and lots of electronic whiz-bang and became the new hype.


To me there are three kinds of sensible army vehicles really small ones that are very agile and very easy to hide, very large trucks that allow for an unusually small vehicle count of formations and combat vehicles.
Combat vehicles (fully armoured, not just cab) again should be divided into a long-range wheeled category somewhat similar to French armoured recce, a medium tank (~40-45 tons, as the new Jap MBT) family for the greatest heat of battle and a carrier vehicle family supporting the latter (conceptually ~ stretched M113, SEP).

I can easily lay out better justifications for these categories than all the hype and buzzword rain about Strykers and other 8x8 MAFVs that I've seen published in 1999-2006 offered.

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On MechInf; the real difference is not about which ride they use, but about the combined arms setting they're expected to accomplish their mission (and what mission?).
Infantry fighting together with MBTs and indirect fire AFVs can and should be totally different from infantry that merely drives to a region of ops, dismounts and fights then without AFVs support.
The latter is not going to make very swift operational moves; a 150 km dash in one day through multiple defensive positions and surprised red columns is not to be expected. MBT cooperation infantry on the other hand is supposed to be rather reckless, to accomplish its offensive missions quickly and to provide security when the battlegroup is not on the move. It doesn't need much organic support weaponry such as Carl Gustaf or sniper rifles. In fact, an all-very light machinegun armament is a strangely interesting setup for them.
Any ride that can keep up with a mechanized battlegroup and not get shot to pieces too often by the encountered threats would be good enough, albeit not necessarily affordable.

Mechanised / armoured infantry that's not meant for quick offensive success with dismounted advance of less than 2 km is not going to have a consistent concept that meets operational needs.

[Compost]

In regard to vehicles it's in my opinion more reasonable to divide between medium and heavy AFVs on basis of the compromise: focus on (road) march mobility or focus on sturdiness in battle.

Your opinion is somewhat different to that being implemented by the French and German armies. They seem intent on also procuring light wheeled armour vehicles to fit every level or niche in some Queensbury/Queensberry classification scheme.

The whole 8x8 medium AFV fashion was primarily about the race to Pristina, incited by Shinseki et al, secondarily about tight budgets in the many countries with smaller armies which wanted to modernize but lacked good AND affordable off-the shelf MBT and IFV choices and tertiarily about the widespread perception of tracked AFVs (especially MBTs) as Cold War dinosaurs.

Agree the Euro trend toward medium 8x8 autobahn/route/strada armour is aimed at producing AFVs (as distinct from APCs and armnoured CS vehicles) with march mobility as their main attribute. That probably results from EEC concern that security problems can develop almost anywhere with little warning. In other words they don’t know where they will be called on to go next, but hopefully it won’t be a nextdoor country.

At the more forceful level that “widespread perception of tracked AFVs ....” has been narrowing rapidly.

Neither of those - especially the latter - can be credited to GEN Shinseki. But at least his term did result in the US Army getting some of its cavalry and infantry back into wheeled armour. And he can hardly be blamed for excess production of the larger types of MRAV.

On MechInf; the real difference is not about which ride they use, but about the combined arms setting they're expected to accomplish their mission (and what mission?).
Infantry fighting together with MBTs and indirect fire AFVs can and should be totally different from infantry that merely drives to a region of ops, dismounts and fights then without AFVs support.
The latter is not going to make very swift operational moves; a 150 km dash in one day through multiple defensive positions and surprised red columns is not to be expected. MBT cooperation infantry on the other hand is supposed to be rather reckless, to accomplish its offensive missions quickly and to provide security when the battlegroup is not on the move. It doesn't need much organic support weaponry such as Carl Gustaf or sniper rifles. In fact, an all-very light machinegun armament is a strangely interesting setup for them.
Any ride that can keep up with a mechanized battlegroup and not get shot to pieces too often by the encountered threats would be good enough, albeit not necessarily affordable.

Mechanised / armoured infantry that's not meant for quick offensive success with dismounted advance of less than 2 km is not going to have a consistent concept that meets operational needs.

Suppose you meant ‘aggressive and determined ’ instead of ‘ rather reckless ’ but we still disagree on the likely nature of future combat. The era of huge armoured encounter battles and encirclements has passed - for some unknown period at least. However, believe all infantry units may need to be rapidly transported and deployed over short or long distances, preferably in the security of armoured transport. And when they get to wherever, their subsequent dismounted operations will often benefit from the availability – but not invariably the use – of heavy armour such as MBTs and AEVs supported by ARVs and AVLBs. Historically such vehicles have been very useful in reducing strongpoint complexes in urban zones and especially useful in reducing bunker complexes in jungle environments such as SVN where they dramatically reduced the expected rate of casualties of accompanying light infantry.

In short it is back to the inception of the ‘tank’ and its use in ‘penny packets’ for the intimate support of infantry operations, with some ancillary use for long-range sniping. There may even be a future need for the assault gun.

[Fuchs]

"Decisive and determined" doesn't sound as if I would ever write it. Sounds too superficial. No, mechanised forces will have great opportunities and the loss of 100 or 200 infantrymen will be risked and acceptable to their commander in such a situation. The most successful ones will be reckless and focused on an objective. Mechanised forces need to be the realm of officers who provoke the HQ to frantically try to hold them back, not to push them forward.
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Yeah sure, armour battles period is over. That's why the regions with a combination of decent economic output and high perceived risk of war are bristling with main battle tanks...

Mechanised forces are still the only ones which can advance swiftly and bring decision by operational manoeuvre.
Helicopter-mobile armies are too flimsy and too expensive. Airborne is similar. Motorised forces with focus on dismounted fight and support fires are slow in combat and easily slowed down by delaying actions when on the move.
The only exception is the desert; a place where ambushes are extremely difficult and where wheeled AFV-motorised columns can roam quickly over vast distances.

I agree that assault gun tactics experience a revival and have a reason fro their existence despite portable infantry guns (bazookas) and despite portable radios for calling in mortar support.
Nevertheless, that's an application in small wars and for older MBTs in great wars. The unique selling proposition of tanks is still the operational manoeuvre, even if it's down to battlegroup (~between Bn and Bde) scale.

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The European 8x8 trend isn't really about quick fast and long marches; the Strykers are about that.
The Europeans had wheeled AFVs in quantity even during the Cold War (Italy, Germany), purchased them because of tiny budgets and lack of alternatives etc. The Boxer MRAV is pretty much a Cold War concept, including DPICM protection requirement.
The Piranha vehicle range comes from a country that doesn't think about deploying its forces to the European frontiers the slightest (Switzerland).
The Finns use wheeled AFVs apparently because even tracked vehicles have only minimal off-road capability on their terrain.

The Stryker mess created the fashion and was the primary driver of it. The other factors enabled the spreading of the fashion in the entire Western world, with some influence even in E/SE Asia.

[Firn]

'Reckless' sounds a bit like Rommel or Guderian storming forwards with guns blazing to take the next objective by handstreich just to keep going for next one, determined to risk men and material in the short run, by not sacrificing speed for time-consuming scouting while keeping the overarching goal in mind hoping will safe a lot men and material in the long run.

This goes back to the old Saber or Stealth debate, I guess.

[Fuchs]

During recent small wars casualty aversion has been general.

In a great war, casualty aversion means to sacrifice few to not need to sacrifice many.
This means that often times commanders need to be reckless in their use of few in order to do their job right, to keep casualties relatively low.
Examples are the use of small and weak scouting teams (aggressive armoured reconnaissance, for example), the use of LRRP without a huge institution of heliborne extraction on call, the reckless push disregarding losses in the three digit range in order to seal the fate of an entire opposing peer force brigade.

It's a different military culture, one in which recklessness has a justified role.


This doesn't change that away from highly important actions, extreme caution and often even outright refusal of combat may be a very good idea.

[Distiller]

'Light' is easy. Walking men with everything they might possibly need in their rucksacks, in units without organic technical mobility assets. Focus tactical mobility and low signature, but with man-portable missiles and other systems very dangerous in the infight. And I think to maximize effectiveness such units have to be organized almost irregularily and very flat. Mobility and fire support assets as needed.

But then it becomes complicated, so lets start with the upper end. I think the real place these days for heavy mech inf is urban combat. Vehicles are rolling fortresses with protection far outweighing mobility. Bringing infantry directly and under fire to the close-in combat. Here also the assault gun would come into play, as part of the direct-indirect fires mix. Such units are way too unwieldy for fast open terrain movements and their standard effector portfolio not suited for long range combat. But equipped with guided missiles also very good for defensive operations over longer ranges.

And for 'in between' I'm not sure infantry is the right tool. Rather I'd think of cavalry. Focus on mobility (also air portable and amphibious - so let's keep under 15/18 tons) and (missile) firepower. Very important aerial ISR, primary fire support via air power, also logistics support primarily via air. Think VDV and think BMD-4. A reduced infantry contingent can be valuable for some tasks, but dismounted combat should not even be tried as it robs the units of its greatest assets speed and mobility. Designed for rapid maneuvers in rural and vehicle-compatible environment. These are the units for 'recklessness'.

[Compost]

This short version summarises conclusions on the armament of infantry carrying armoured vehicles developed in a 3-part version which follows. The attributes for an armoured vehicle that carries infantry in and near combat zones can be generally ranked in order as protection, mobility and then armament. The minimum load has been set as an 8-man squad/section. The vehicles considered are the tracked and wheeled light and medium APCs used mainly by mechanised infantry, the wheeled PMV used by light infantry, and the medium tracked AIFV and the heavy BW used by armoured infantry.

Installation of a heavy armament on an infantry carrying vehicle is - excluding the AIFV - a hazard to be carefully avoided. Being able to deploy and manoeuvre powerful weapons is the role of purpose-designed AFVs that have the space and weight capabilities needed to keep such weapons in operation.

APC – General. An APC needs a defensive armament for use against ambush and for local security when in overwatch and laager. That armament might also be employed offensively while infantry dismount. Stabilisation is useful but increases weight, complexity and cost. Development of effective systems for operation of external weapons and skeletal RCWS mounts has been accompanied by a trend to remotely operated turrets. With ready magazine(s) included in the turret the need for bulky trunking is reduced. However the turret itself tends to become bulky and there is still a need for manual or mechanical replenishment of magazines from lower in the hull.

Alternatively a weapon can be in an external mount above a mini-turret or cupola or independently mounted as a RCWS. Both those types of overhead mount avoid in-board concerns such as bore evacuation and venting, but magazine arrangements and clearance and reloading of overhead external mounts are more complex than in a turret. And for a RCWS, there is the further difficulty that its pedestal must include the traversing and elevating mechanisms that can for an external mount be included as part of a mini turret or cupola.

Similar to the 1-man turret on a light APC, the cupola or mini-turret or unmanned turret on a medium or heavy armoured vehicle can be offset to one or other side of the roof centreline. And to reduce the intrusion of trunking or cable runs any 2-man turret or large unmanned turret might be installed near the forward bulkhead of a troop cabin

Light wheeled and tracked APCs – mechanised infantry. The APC was mainly developed to transport infantry and their equipment and stores in the vicinity of - but not actually into - close combat. The appropriate main armament for a light tracked or wheeled APC is a semi or fully stabilised AGL/MMG combination in an electrically driven 1-man turret occupied by the commander of a 2-man crew.

Alternatively the armament could consist of an AGL and MMG or possibly a 12.7mm HMG, with the AGL mounted in a 1-man turret and the MG on an overhead mount. To minimise the intrusion of trunking the turret should be located at the front of the cabin and/or offset to one side. If heavier weapons were required then it would be necessary to employ light scout cars or scout carriers or else medium or heavy armoured vehicles.

The secondary armament of light (and also of medium and heavy) infantry carrying armoured vehicles should include vehicle and turret or cupola mounted 76mm multi-tube dischargers for smoke and other types of grenade. Additionally, pintles or even swing-arm mounts should be available beside some rooftop hatches to support weapons such as MMGs and mounted infantry launchers for recoilless weapons including especially any standard LATGW.

Medium wheeled and tracked APCs – mechanised infantry. Medium tracked vehicles typically weigh more than 30 tonnes and have a HV cannon of 25 to 35mm calibre in a 2-man turret and are clearly intended for use as an AIFV rather than an APC. On that empirical basis, tracked vehicles are not further considered under this medium APC heading.

With a lesser proportion of its weight allocated to carrying and protecting a powerful cannon and its ammunition, a medium wheeled APC can be protected by homogeneous, composite and spaced armour to all-round S-4569 Level 4 with bow and forward protection in excess of Level 5. That passive protection can be complemented by installation of a defensive aids suite. Further protection can be provided by operating whenever practicable hull down and behind cover. That requires a means of observation by means of devices elevated above or extended to either side of the vehicle.

Extensible masts and articulated booms are already used to elevate equipment pods ten and more metres above stationary armoured communications and reconnaissance vehicles. Use of a raisable weapon pod has already been implemented in the limited elevation of a multi-tube TOW ATGM launcher on a modified M113 vehicle. Prospective use of multi-capable sensor and weapon pods that can be manoeuvred on articulated booms of several – say four to five - metres overall length has been discussed in technical journals for several decades. The base mechanisms for manoeuvring the boom would probably need to be installed in a small unmanned cleft turret, and the pod would have to be operable in high and low profile modes.

Assuming that such a boom and manoeuvrable pod can be engineered in the fairly near future, a useful armament for a medium wheeled APC with a 3-man crew would have for the commander an unmanned cleft turret with articulated boom and pod containing observation devices and a MMG with ready ammunition. That could be complemented by 1-man gunner’s turret armed as on the light APC with a stabilised AGL/MMG combination, or with an AGL in the turret and a HMG overhead. Despite the risk of over-tasking the vehicle commander the boom might also be arranged to carry an attachable launcher for a command guided or self-homing close-range missile.

If the boom were not feasible then the commander should be provided with a cupola fitted with overhead observation devices and a MMG. The gunner should then have a 1-man turret armed as above and also able to carry an attachable launcher for a command guided or self-homing close-range missile.

PMV - light infantry. The PMV is a simple but carefully engineered type of light or medium wheeled infantry-carrying vehicle that can be provided with protection of its lower hull protection to at least S-4569 Level 4 and of the upper hull to at least S-4569 Level 2. Some commentators consider tracked and wheeled APCs too intimidating and provocative for use in security operations. Depreciating that viewpoint is one reason to include well armoured truck-like PMVs in a balanced fleet of armour vehicles. And some armament can be installed provided it is clearly of small calibre.

Ultimately the need for a PMV - in addition to other and more capable wheeled APCs – is predicated on its being relatively inexpensive to procure and operate. In accordance with that austerity and ostensible appearance, the suitable armament for a PMV is a readily-removable/installable MMG flexibly mounted and protected against sniper fire: in a manually or electrically traversed 1-man all-round gunshield rather than a turret or RCWS.

Medium tracked AIFV – armoured infantry. The AIFV is a hybrid intended to transport, accompany and support armoured infantry in close combat zones where it will be exposed to adversary fire. Typically it is expected to be capable of some types of operation without intimate support from more heavily armed and armoured vehicles such as tanks. So the AIFV is expected to combine the capabilities of an APC together with a more powerful armament, and the ranking of its big three attributes is modified to become protection, armament and mobility.

Hence, a useful AIFV armament would consist of an offset 1-man or unmanned turret with a fully stabilised automatic cannon of 30 or 35mm calibre plus coaxial MMG. Assuming any major problems relating to an articulated boom can be solved in the fairly near future, the turreted armament should be complemented by a boom-mounted pod controlled by the vehicle commander. That manoeuvrable pod should contain observation and target acquisition devices and a MMG. Additionally the pod should – despite the risk of overtasking the vehicle commander - be able to carry an attachable launcher for a light AT or assault missile with command or semi-active guidance.

Pending availability of such an articulated boom the commander of an AIFV should in its place be provided with an independent cupola carrying an external MMG, with the gunner in a 1-man turret with 30mm cannon and MMG and arrangements to carry an attachable launcher for a light AT or assault missile with command or semi-active guidance.

BW – armoured infantry. Battle Wagon is the term used here to describe a heavy tracked vehicle designed to transport armoured infantry and also combat engineers operating in close conjunction with MBTs and particularly during entry into heavily defended localities.

For its escort and assault role a BW would be usefully armed with a stabilised cupola-mounted MMG or HMG plus a commander’s partly or fully stabilised observation and weapon pod with MMG on an articulated boom for elevation overhead and to the sides. That pod operable in both high and low profile modes might also carry an attachable launcher for a command guided or self-homing close-range missile. However, to provide redundancy for observation and supporting fire it might be practicable to install two such booms. In that case the second boom operated by a fourth crewman should be arranged to carry an AGL or MMG, and also the launcher for a command guided or self-homing close-range missile.

[Compost]

Here it is in six sections because of the 10,000 char limit.

Every infantry unit can for some tasks benefit by working dismounted alongside armoured vehicles and by making routine and expedient use of armoured vehicles for infantry mobility and transport of stores. The initial question to be asked when planning an infantry carrying armoured vehicle is ‘ how many dismountable infantry should it carry ? ’ And the immediate answer that comes to mind is ‘ a complete section/squad ’. The alternate and final answer is probably ‘ a complete squad plus a support element ’.

However infantry are organised and equipped in different ways. Some armies – including the American, British and German – have several types of infantry mounted on armoured vehicles. Firstly they employ a 6- to 8-strong infantry squad in a tracked vehicle armed with a powerful turreted cannon. The vehicle is intended for combat and together with its crew of two or more can function as a weapon team and support the squad after it has dismounted. Units mounted on such vehicles are usually described as armoured infantry.

Secondly there are mechanised infantry units that when dismounted are expected to sometimes operate independent of fire support from their vehicle. Each mechanised squad typically includes a dismountable weapon team, and a whole squad of 8 to 10 or sometimes as many as 12 dismounts is transported in one tracked or wheeled armoured vehicle, or in two such vehicles.

Thirdly for operational and local mobility it can be useful to provide light infantry with armoured transport vehicles. Light infantry squads in most industrial armies vary in size from as large 13 in the USMC to as small as 8 in other forces. The larger squads of 10 or 12 often include a weapons team of three or four which may deploy close to or at some distance from the rest of the squad. Similar to mechanised infantry the whole squad may be transported in one armoured vehicle. Alternatively 8 or 9 infantry could be in one vehicle with a 3- or 4-man weapon team in another vehicle. Forces organised with smaller light infantry squads of 9 or fewer dismounts usually employ those squads in conjunction with weapon teams detached from platoon and company level that are transported in the same or accompanying vehicles.

Is it necessary to provide different vehicles for armoured and mechanised infantry, and similarly for mechanised and light infantry ? The common needs applying across different types of organisation are that a mounted squad or part squad be small enough to restrain the size of its transport vehicle, big enough to put a useful number of infantry on the ground, small enough to enable some commonality of sub-unit doctrine across different types of infantry, and big enough to limit average procurement and operating costs for each crew and infantry seat.

Those size-related considerations together with the attributes of protection, mobility and armament and dollar costs are essentially determined by doctrine and the extent of interaction between infantry and their vehicle in combat and in the vicinity of combat. If doctrine has established a need for three distinct types of infantry based on such interaction, then it is probable that three distinct types of squad carrying armoured vehicles will be required. However, for flexibility those vehicles - or at least those intended for mechanised and light infantry - should be able to transport all manner of customary squads.

Most seats for dismounts are arranged to face inwards or outwards. With each seat shock-resistant and spall-protected the length of an armoured transport vehicle’s cabin can increase by at least 70cm for each pair of seats. From an organizational perspective, having seats in one vehicle for 10 infantry would enable transport of a 6-man to 8-man squad or part squad plus a 4-man to 2-man weapon or command team or other specialised element Seating for twelve infantry might seem to be a reasonable maximum as it would allow for a large 12-man squad, or an 8-man squad plus a 4-man weapon team or other element, or two 6-man squads.

But if 12 why not 13 to provide for squads organised with three 4-man teams and a squad commander as in the USMC ? There is a practical limit beyond which the dimensions of a vehicle become so large and its armour protection so stretched that it becomes an unnecessarily bulky and vulnerable target. Also it is impractical to squeeze extra infantry into a small vehicle by using foldable jump seats instead of shock-resistant and contoured seating. One certain result of the former is to deliver infantry whose fitness has been degraded by the inadequacies of cramped and uncomfortable seats.

Here in order to simplify things it is supposed that a squad carrying armoured vehicle should be restricted in size and designed to carry its basic crew and at least eight dismounts. That minimum capacity would provide for any squad - or part squad - up to 8-strong, or alternatively two 4-man weapon teams or other combinations such as a weapon team with an engineer, HQ or other element.

An alternate minimum of 10 would enable transport of an 8-man squad plus a 2-man element but would still not suit the needs of the USMC. Transport of its complete 13-man squad implies a needed capacity for up to 15 dismounts and a large increase in vehicle size. Hence in order to reduce potential vulnerability and despite any loss of co-ordination it is also supposed here that the maximum capacity for an infantry carrying armoured vehicle should be the vehicle crew plus 12 dismounts.

The capability to deploy and manoeuvre powerful weapons is a role for purpose-designed AFVs that have the space and weight arrangements to keep such weapons in operation. Infantry-carrying vehicles - including to some extent the AIFV - need a restrained form of armament because the weight and space of a substantial armament modifies the armour and protection that can be provided for the crew and mounted infantry. Prospective and actual use of weapons can also distract a vehicle commander, and additionally encourage inappropriate manoeuvre in hazardous zones.

The vehicles considered are the tracked and wheeled light and medium APCs used mainly by mechanised infantry, the wheeled PMV used by light infantry, and the medium tracked AIFV and the heavy BW used by armoured infantry.

APC – General

The Armoured Personnel Carrier was mainly developed to transport infantry and their equipment and stores in the vicinity of - but not actually into - close combat. That covers transport of mechanised infantry and occasionally light infantry but not armoured infantry. However, roles and priorities vary and some armies persist in confusing the APC concept with that of an AIFV suitable for use by armoured infantry.

Early APCs such as the German SdKfz 251 and US M3 halftracks used during the 1940s were open-topped but - within a loaded weight of about 10 tonnes – they could carry an upper belt of frontal and side armour protection equivalent to about S-4659 Level 2 standard. Their typical armament consisted of one or more MMGs on pintles attached to the vehicle’s front or sides, and sometimes a HMG on a pintle or ringmount.

More recently airburst and other fuses enable artillery shells, rockets and bombs to reliably produce downward and radial destructive affects instead of cratering the landscape. Open-top APCs may also be subject to overhead attack by EFP, liquids, aerosols and gas. And every APC is liable to all-round roof to wheel attack by kinetic and chemical energy warheads delivered by guided missiles, direct-fire guns and rockets. Additional attack especially on vehicle sides and belly can be made by bomblets and buried and off-route blast and EFP mines detonated by pressure-plate, tilt-rod, vehicle counters and other sensors or remote command. Hence most recent APCs have a fully enclosed 6-sided armoured body, and many have a roof-mounted turret for observation and defensive fire. Protection when closed up can also include filtered over-pressurisation.

The deployment and manoeuvering of powerful weapons is a task for purpose-designed AFVs that can be built with the space and weight arrangements to keep such weapons in operation. And it can be supposed that the mobile forces of an industrialised army will be equipped with a mix of small and larger AFVs. Also access to and movement within operational areas is important for all vehicles. Hence, the attributes of an infantry squad-carrying vehicle or APC can be clearly ranked in order as protection, mobility, armament.

[Compost]

Each member of an APC crew and each embarked infantryman needs about one cubic metre of protected volume. With additional space for movement that becomes more than 10 cubic metres for a minimum size crew of driver and commander and a squad of eight, and makes the squad-carrying APC a quite bulky vehicle. Some APCs have upper and lower sides that are inward sloping but a sculptured and confining bodyshape such as on the 1950s Alvis Saracen has become uncommon because it does little to conserve the area and weight of armour.

To protect its crew and mounted infantry with their equipment - and separately the engine compartment and fuel tank(s) - the armoured surface area of an APC is typically more than 40 sqm. Hence within the light category it is feasible to shape and protect a modern light APC to all-round S-4569 Level 3 with homogeneous steel armour and to obtain a somewhat higher protection for its underbelly and over its frontal aspect. Getting to all-round Level 5 with homogeneous armour protection is impossible for a light APC but almost possible for a medium APC.

Higher general levels of protection can be passively achieved by use of composite layered armour and spaced armour. These armours can have their outer surfaces augmented by ablative arrangements and explosive reactive armour (ERA). A major problem with ERA is that it cannot be de-activated before infantry dismount. Also stand-off protection against shaped charge projectiles can be extended by attaching see-through steel or aluminium screens with close-set bars or slats. Using modern passive armour techniques - and without resort to ERA - the general protection provided to a medium vehicle of APC size can be raised above S-4569 Level 5, and the forward part of the hull can be further protected to withstand threats such as 30mm cannon fire.

Research has been conducted into reactive electric armour but without apparent employment to date. Research into active/passive defensive aids suites has been more successful. Numerous suites are being developed and some have been installed to provide early-warning and intercept or disruption of various types of anti-armour threat. However, many such systems are problematic because they are signature dependent. Also a wide spectrum suite can be costly and provide only limited multi-shot protection. Use of ERA and defensive aids radiation and interceptors can also be hazardous to dismounted infantry. But - unlike ERA - defensive aids suites or selected sub-systems can be deactivated whenever appropriate.

An APC needs a defensive armament for use against ambush and for local security when in overwatch and laager. That armament might also be employed offensively while infantry dismount. Stabilisation is useful but increases weight, complexity and cost. And it is appropriate to emphasize that notwithstanding its armament an APC is mainly intended for use as CS vehicle rather than for routine employment as a lightly-armed AFV. With protection and mobility as its main attributes it is apparent that the appropriate defensive/offensive weapon or weapons for an APC should be unobtrusive in terms of in-board volume and length, and that the weight of each weapon and ammunition should also be constrained.

A one-man 360 degree rotatable cupola or turret can provide top-mounted all-round viewing by the vehicle commander. If located near the front centreline of the cabin the increase in cabin length might be reduced below 0.7m but could still equate to suppression of probably two infantry seats. A location offset to one side anywhere down the cabin can similarly mean that head clearance will not be obstructed by cable runs. And an offset 1-man turret can be accommodated in little more than the space needed for one infantry seat. The ‘second’ seat in a 2-man turret was sometimes promoted on the basis that it could be interchangeably used by an infantry squad commander to see outside the vehicle. However, episcopes and electro-optics such as CCTV now enable such viewing by infantry seated anywhere in a vehicle.

Development of effective systems for operation of overhead weapons and skeletal RCWS mounts has been accompanied by a trend to remotely operated turrets. With ready magazine(s) included in the turret the need for bulky trunking is reduced. However the turret itself tends to become bulky and there is still a need for manual or mechanical replenishment of magazines from lower in the hull. Provision for head-up – but not simultaneous all-round – direct viewing by a vehicle commander and/or gunner and also manual operation of any ancillary external weapon such as a MMG can then be arranged by means of roof-mounted hatches or cupolas forward and aft of the turret. Overall an unmanned turret is more suitably mounted on a medium than on a light APC.

Alternatively a weapon can be in an external mount above a mini-turret or cupola or independently mounted as a RCWS. Both those types of overhead mount avoid in-board concerns such as bore evacuation and venting, but magazine arrangements and clearance and reloading of overhead external mounts are more complex than in a turret. And for a RCWS, there is the further difficulty that its pedestal must include the traversing and elevating mechanisms that can for an overhead mount be included as part of a mini turret or cupola.

Similar to the 1-man turret on a light APC, the cupola or mini-turret or unmanned turret on a medium or heavy armoured vehicle can be offset to one or other side of the roof centreline. And to reduce the intrusion of trunking or cable runs any 2-man turret or large unmanned turret might be installed near the forward bulkhead of a troop cabin

For head-up operation on a light, medium or heavy vehicle, the vehicle commander or gunner may also be provided with a flexible MMG or AGL mounted on a swing-arm or a ring and skate around a hatch or an otherwise unarmed cupola.

Light APC – mechanised infantry

Initially there is the question of wheeled or tracked. The important difference is that of operational or tactical mobility. The army of any large industrialized state will tend to have both wheeled and tracked light APCs, with the wheeled APCs concentrated in cavalry/reconnaissance and early entry units and the tracked APCs used for main force infantry and CS units. Examples of well configured light APCs are the Rheinmetal Tpz-1 Fuchs 6x6 and GDLS Stryker 8x8, and the tracked Steyr 4K7 and - despite slab sides - the UDLS M-113A3 and M-113A4/MTVL.

The largest readily installed and operated defensive/support weapon for a light APC is the 12.7x99mm HMG or - for approximately the same weight and space - a 40mm AGL combined with a 7.62mm rifle-calibre MMG. As a general purpose DF weapon the choice is either a 7.62mm MMG or a 12.7mm HMG. However a 40mm AGL is clearly superior to either for bombardment tasks and also useful for DF and anti-armour fire. Hence instead of a single HMG, a combined armament of AGL and MMG would provide a vehicle commander with useful choice. Due to their different characteristics it would not be practicable to use both weapons simultaneously, and concern to keep one or other weapon in use at any particular time would reduce the risk of overtasking. For flexibility also an AGL/MMG combination is preferable to the short-term prophylaptic benefits of twin MMGs and the complexities of an alternate rotary MG.

So an appropriate armament for a light APC could have a 40mm AGL and MMG in a 1-man turret. If a capability for hull-down fire were rated as essential, then somewhat less satisfactorily the MG could be on an overhead mount carried above a 1-man turret mounting the higher trajectory AGL whose feed and re-loading/replenishment is also more problematic. Regardless of the increase in weight and despite its cost, stabilisation of the armament for elevation/range should be rated as essential with full stabilisation rated as desirable.

A more powerful armament would have a 12.7mm HMG combined with a 40mm AGL. However, an AGL/MMG combination provides more flexibility for counter-ambush and harassing fire than the HMG/AGL and also the HMG/MMG alternative. Additionally a 40mm AGL and a MMG can be more readily dismounted and deployed on tripods than a 12.7mm HMG that weighs about 40kgs plus the weight of its tripod. Also the 12.7mm HMG with its ammunition may not already be in service with a
supported infantry unit. Finally, arming an APC with all three weapons would overtask the commander in a 2-man crew and hence necessitate a third crew member and an additional cupola or turret. The result would over-crew a light APC and increase its weight and bulk.

[Compost]

Depending on the operational environment and the armaments of friendly and adversary vehicles - and possible threat of attack by fixed or rotary wing aircraft – some armies have nonetheless considered it necessary to arm a light APC with a cannon of typically 20mm calibre in a 1-man or 2-man turret. A 1-man turret with cannon and by necessity an MMG would be larger than a 1-man AGL/HMG turret but would occupy much the same volume in the cabin. Top weight would be larger but a 20x139mm cannon only weighs about 90kg or twice that of a HMG. The troublesome needs would be the increased volume and weight allowances needed for replenishment ammunition.

Installing a 2-man turret would be much more demanding. The space occupied by the trunk of a 2-man turret has a minimum diameter of about 1.5 metres. Accommodating such a turret in an APC can due to the limits of practical cabin width occupy the same cabin length and space as three or four infantry seats. The weight of a 2-man turret, cannon, ammunition and a necessarily larger vehicle also results in a lower degree of armour protection.

A useful example is to compare two of the older types of tracked APC, the high and wide slab-sided Giat AMX-10 with 2-man 20mm turret against the slope-sided Steyr 4K7 with 1-man turret armed with a single 12.7mm HMG. The Steyr APC has similar all-up weight but is narrower and lower and has thicker and better sloped armour protection. However and partly explaining the differences, the AMX-10 is amphibious and was probably developed for DP use by cavalry and mechanised units.

With usually a 2-man crew of driver and a commander - also functioning as a gunner and controlling the turreted or cupola or RCWS mounted weapons - there is little point in fitting other permanent armament. If doctrine absolutely requires that a light APC have a 3-man crew of driver, commander and gunner then the commander could be provided with a separate cupola located away from a 1-man turret. Masking of the turret by a weapon mount on the cupola would apply on a temporary basis depending on the offset nature of the mount on its cupola. That restriction - and the reciprocal loss of the commander’s direct all-round vision from the cupola might not be acceptable. Alternative all-round vision could be provided by electro-optics relayed from the turret roof. Also the armament at a cupola might anyway be lowerable or displaced for re-loading and clearance of the turret arc. Failing that and unless some masking is accepted it is back to the problems inherent in a 2-man turret.

A light APC with a 20mm or larger calibre cannon does have a nominal capability to function as an AFV. It might be considered suitable for use as an accompanying fire support vehicle - presumably with infantry already dismounted or as a scout carrier. However, both those capabilities are illusory. A cannon-equipped light APC is certain to be somewhat less well protected than the scout carrier widely used by cavalry as a light AFV. And a purpose-designed scout carrier – though likely to be built on the same light chassis as an APC – can be readily armed with a 20mm or larger cannon because its cabin need only accommodate a 4 or 5-man scout team.

Many older types of APC had provision for infantry to fire weapons and particularly MMGs through ports in the sides and rear of the vehicle. All mounted infantry small arms and support weapons including shoulder-fired LATGW and other recoilless launchers could also be fired through roof hatches where pintles were sometimes provided. Such use of roof hatches is certain to continue because the potential use of ports is being increasingly obstructed by addition of full height spaced and bar/slat armour on the sides and rear of vehicles.

And finally some APC-type vehicles include a ball-mounted forward-firing MMG for use by an already busy driver or another crew-member. One example is the Russian BMP-3 light tracked vehicle. It has a rear-mounted engine, 3-man crew with two in a turret with a 100mm medium velocity gun and co-axial 30mm cannon and MMG, plus two ball mounted MMGs in the forward hull controlled by a 7-man mounted infantry squad. The BMP-3 is also amphibious and was clearly developed as a rapid exploitation vehicle with exceptional armament and correspondingly poor protection that is below that reasonably expected of an APC.

Summarising, the appropriate main armament for a light tracked or wheeled APC is a semi or fully stabilised AGL/MMG combination in an electrically driven 1-man turret occupied by the commander of a 2-man crew. Alternatively the armament could consist of an AGL and MMG or possibly a 12.7mm HMG, with the AGL mounted in a 1-man turret and the MG on an overhead mount. To minimise the intrusion of trunking the turret should be located at the front of the cabin and/or offset to one side. If heavier weapons were required then it would be necessary to employ light scout cars or scout carriers or else medium or heavy armoured vehicles.

The secondary armament of light (and also of medium and heavy) infantry carrying armoured vehicles should include vehicle and turret or cupola mounted multi-tube 76mm dischargers for smoke and other types of grenade. Additionally, pintles or even swing-arm mounts should be available beside some rooftop hatches to support weapons such as MMGs and mounted infantry launchers for recoilless weapons including especially any standard LATGW.

[Compost]

Medium APC – mechanised infantry

Almost all recently designed medium wheeled armoured vehicles are built with an 8x8 driveline, and most are offered in an APC and also an AIFV configuration. The APC variants include the 30-tonne GDELS/Mowag Piranha 5 with crew of 2 plus 9 dismounts armed with 12.7mm HMG in a RCWS, the 33-tonne KMW/Rheinmetall Boxer with crew of 3 man plus 8 dismounts and overhead 12.7mm HMG above a 1-man turret, and the 30-tonne BAE/OMC RG41 with crew of 3 plus 8 dismounts armed with two LATGMs on each side of a low-profile unmanned turret that also carries an overhead MMG or HMG.

Medium tracked vehicles typically weigh more than 30 tonnes and have a HV cannon of 25 to 35mm calibre in a 2-man turret and are clearly intended for use as an AIFV rather than an APC. There are few medium weight tracked APCs. Those that have been built are of comparatively low weight (20 to 25 tonnes) and hence protected to much the same level as light APC. On that empirical basis, tracked vehicles are not further considered under this medium APC heading.

With a lesser proportion of its weight allocated to carrying and protecting a powerful cannon and its ammunition, a medium wheeled APC can be protected by homogeneous, composite and spaced armour to all-round S-4569 Level 4 with bow and forward protection in excess of Level 5. That passive protection can be complemented by installation of a defensive aids suite. Further protection can be provided by operating whenever practicable hull down and behind cover. That requires a means of observation by means of devices elevated above or extended to either side of the vehicle.

Extensible masts and articulated booms are already used to elevate equipment pods ten and more metres above stationary armoured communications and reconnaissance vehicles. Such masts and booms generally enhance LOS access by enabling observation over and to some extent around solid or other cover. Use of a raisable weapon pod has already been implemented in the limited elevation of a multi-tube TOW ATGM launcher on a modified M113 vehicle. Prospective use of multi-capable sensor and weapon pods that can be manoeuvred on articulated booms of several – say four to five - metres overall length has been discussed in technical journals for several decades. The base mechanisms for manoeuvring the boom would probably need to be installed in a small unmanned cleft turret, and the pod would have to be operable in high and in low profile mode.

The electro-mechanical or hydraulic means of rapidly orienting and manoeuvring such a boom and its pod are generally similar to those employed in current RCWS and hence might already be capably engineered. Arranging full or even part-stabilised observation and target acquisition on the move could be difficult but that should be reducible by using wide angle viewing arrangements. If a podded MG was included then the boom and pod could be also used to deliver elevated or round-the-corner fire. Stabilised fire on the move might require an impractical increase in pod weight. Other difficulties would include along-the-boom or podded supply of ready ammunition, replenishment of ready ammunition, and vulnerability of the pod and boom systems.

Assuming that such a boom and manoeuvrable pod can be engineered in the fairly near future, a useful armament for a medium wheeled APC with a 3-man crew would have for the commander an unmanned cleft turret with articulated boom and pod containing observation devices and a MMG with ready ammunition. That could be complemented by 1-man gunner’s turret armed as on the light APC with a stabilised AGL/MMG combination, or with an AGL in the turret and a HMG overhead. Despite the risk of over-tasking the vehicle commander the boom might also be arranged to carry an attachable launcher for a command guided or self-homing close-range missile.

If the boom were not feasible then the commander should be provided with a cupola fitted with overhead observation devices and a MMG. The gunner should then have a 1-man turret armed as above and also able to carry an attachable launcher for a command guided or self-homing close-range missile.

PMV – light infantry

The Protected Mobility Vehicle is an austere form of wheeled APC to provide protected mobility in place of an unarmoured GS truck. It is essentially intended for use by light infantry and by CS and CSS units. The South African army was effectively the first to experience an unrestricted landmine campaign. And it went on to write the definitive book on PMV design as exemplified by the skeletal and V-bottomed 12-tonne Reumech Casspir 4x4. The British failed to recognise the merits of that vehicle and instead developed a poorly configured and top heavy 4x4 of similar loaded weight known as the GKN Saxon. It was mainly procured to transport Territorial light infantry battalions from the UK into Europe, and might have adequately performed that limited role. The French produced a somewhat better PMV with the amphibious GIAT VAB 4x4 that weighed about 13 tonnes. However, it may have been relatively expensive.

An important attribute of a PMV is that it should - in comparison to more capable wheeled and tracked APCs - be cheap to procure and operate. For economy combined with resistance to mine blast that means a PMV will be a specialised type of truck, usually a 4x4 truck. Protection of its lower hull can reach at least S-4569 Level 4 with the upper hull protected to at least S-4569 Level 2. That protection is typically based on homogeneous and spaced armour and engineered features such as a monocoque chassis, V-shaped hull and sacrificial wheel stations.

Some commentators consider tracked and wheeled APCs too intimidating and provocative for use in security operations. Depreciating that viewpoint - regardless of its validity - is one reason to include well armoured truck-like PMVs in a balanced fleet of armour vehicles. And some armament can be installed provided it is self-evidently of small calibre.

Examples of well configured PMVs are the International/Navistar MaxxPro DXM 4x4 and the Thales Bushmaster 4x4 each of which weigh less than 15 tonnes. For transport of more than 10 dismounts there are also some overgrown medium weight PMVs of more than 30 tonnes such as the BAE RG-35 6x6 and some similarly large MRAVs that been built or upgraded with independent suspensions. In time almost every industrialised army is likely to provide its light infantry battalions with PMVs rather than GS trucks. Those PMVs will probably be complemented by light armoured weapon carriers for a proportion of a unit’s support weapon teams.

In keeping with austerity and to reduce any tendency to employ a PMV like an AFV, its basic armament should consist of a MMG complemented by ubiquitous 76mm multi-barrel dischargers. Again to minimise complexity, weight and cost a semi-permanently fitted MMG or a MMG provided by embarked infantry can be flexibly mounted in a manually or electrically traversed all-round gunshield or small turret on top of the PMV. The sometime practice of instead fitting a complicated multi-function turret or an expensive RCWS can be kindly said to be illogical but is more accurately described as misplaced and irrational.

Ultimately the need for a PMV - in addition to other and more capable wheeled APCs – is predicated on its being relatively inexpensive to procure and operate. In accordance with that austerity and ostensible appearance, the suitable armament for a PMV is a readily-installable/removable MMG flexibly mounted and protected against sniper fire: in a manually or electrically traversed 1-man all-round gunshield rather than a turret or RCWS.

[Compost]

AIFV - armoured infantry

The Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle is a hybrid intended to transport, accompany and support armoured infantry in close combat zones where it will be exposed to adversary fire. Typically it is expected to be capable of some types of operation without intimate support from more heavily armed and armoured vehicles such as tanks. So the AIFV is expected to combine the capabilities of an APC together with a more powerful armament, and the ranking of its big three attributes is modified to become protection, armament and mobility.

In order to carry that more powerful armament an AIFV has to be more bulky and less well protected by passive armour than an APC of similar weight and the same number of infantry seats. For those reasons the homogeneous, composite and spaced armour of a modern AIFV is likely to be complemented by an active defence system that further protects especially its upper sides and roof. Thus and although the passive protection of a medium AIFV may well be less than S-4569 Level 5, its effective all-round protection can be at a higher level.

One underlying rationale for the AIFV is that it can enable some reduction in the total number of APCs and AFVs or weapon carriers and also crews that would otherwise be needed to provide the same overall force of mounted infantry and vehicle mounted firepower. But any need for a light armoured vehicle with a heavier armament than an APC and carrying less than a squad of infantry is already met by the scout carrier. The scout carrier is outside the scope of this post. However it can be noted that - notwithstanding its limited troop capacity - a scout carrier might be considered a satisfactory substitute for a fully-fledged AIFV in the light category.

On that basis the remaining issue is the type and size of weapons suitable for mounting on a medium weight AIFV that can carry an 8-man infantry squad. To combat fixed strongpoints and adversary vehicles whilst moving it is essential that an AIFV have a fully stabilised main armament. The need for hitting power and extended operation can best be met by a small to medium calibre cannon rather than by larger and heavier guided missiles or unguided rocket-type projectiles.

Most contemporary AIFVs are armed with self-loading or auto cannon of 25x137 to 40x225mm calibre in a 2-man turret. It has been suggested by some commentators that developments in cased telescopic ammunition (CTA) could result in an increase in calibre to at least 50mm. However, those larger calibres can be more readily kept in operation when mounted on AFVs and weapon carriers that have hulls and magazines arranged for that single purpose.

An appropriate main armament for a medium weight AIFV is a fully stabilised high-velocity cannon complemented by a co-axial MMG. A cannon of 30-35mm calibre would be optimum when supplied with say 150 to 250 rounds of ammunition and complemented by a squad of 8 infantry. A semi-automatic cannon might be satisfactory in the larger calibre but a capability for short burst automatic fire can be generally useful and especially against fixed wing aircraft and helicopters. So a stabilised automatic cannon of 30x170mm, 30x173mm or 35x227mm calibre would seem suitable.

The 35 tonne BAE/Hagglunds CV90 with a cannon of 35mm or optionally 40mm calibre, and the 30 tonne GDELS/Stehr-Santa Barbara ASCOD/Ulan-Pizarro with 30 mm cannon are examples of current tracked AIFVs. Both those vehicles have 2-man turrets.

For reasons that are not immediately clear, many of the modern medium weight 8x8 wheeled vehicles developed in Europe - such as the Iveco/Oto Melara Freccia, Nexter/Renault VBCI and Patria AMV - are uniformly armed with a 25x137mm in a 20man turret. Each of the vehicles is promoted by its manufacturer as an AIFV but the 25mm main armament is not adequate for that classification. There are some near exceptions such as the AIFV variant of the KMW/Rheinmetall Boxer which is armed with a 30x173mm cannon in a 2-man turret. But despite its size it - like several other 8x8 AIFVs - carries only 6 dismounts and hence fails to meet the local criteria for a squad carrying vehicle. Its large size and intermediate armament would also prejudice alternate use as a medium scout carrier if such were contemplated.

More fundamentally wheels are well suited to movement on roads and hence offer operational mobility that appeals to European armies. But wheels are inferior to tracks for crossing rough terrain and obstacles. Also the typical 8x8 driveline provides high ground clearance that results in a bulky and high profile target. That might be addressed by a kneeling suspension. But the empirical limitation on the size of their cannon armament when arranged to carry an 8-man squad suggests that 8x8 vehicles are inherently unsuited for use as an AIFV. Hence wheeled vehicles are not further considered here although some might become marginally suitable if fitted with an 1-man or unmanned main armament turret as described below.

Mounting a cannon in or above a 2-man turret invariably means large diameter trunking and loss of cabin space. That can be minimised by using sidewall trunking in any of three ways: fitting the cannon in or on top of an offset 1-man mini-turret or in an unmanned and probably offset turret. Target designation and fire control might seem more difficult to achieve with a 1-man or unmanned turret. However, there are at least two good reasons to place the vehicle commander outside a main armament turret.

First, an AIFV commander - having initially identified and handed off a target to the gunner – needs to continue all-round and route-oriented observation. For that purpose some vehicles such as MBTs have a contra-rotating commander’s cupola. For co-ordination and next target designation the commander’s position and the electro or hydro-mechanicals in the 2-man turret of a MBT - and in any similarly equipped AIFV – are arranged with overriding or lockout-delayed controls that can direct the turreted armament onto a new target. Contra-rotating optics are apparently less practical or more disorienting than a contra-rotating cupola. And if the latter is not provided for weight, space, complexity or other reasons then the vehicle commander in that turret is re-oriented

Second and alternatively, a vehicle commander located anywhere in a vehicle can now be provided with all-round viewing by use of observation and target acquisition devices installed on the turret roof, or possibly from such devices carried in a boom-mounted pod as described above. And in either case that commander can be provided with controls to alert the gunner and re-direct the armament of the smaller 1-man or unmanned main armament turret.

Hence, a useful AIFV armament would consist of an offset 1-man or unmanned turret with a fully stabilised automatic cannon of 30 or 35mm calibre plus coaxial MMG. Assuming any major problems relating to an articulated boom can be solved in the fairly near future, the turreted armament should be complemented by a boom-mounted pod controlled by the vehicle commander. That manoeuvrable pod should contain observation and target acquisition devices and a MMG. Additionally the pod should – despite the risk of overtasking the vehicle commander - be able to carry an attachable launcher for a light AT or assault missile with command or semi-active guidance.

Pending availability of such an articulated boom the commander of an AIFV should in its place be provided with an independent cupola carrying an overhead MMG, with the gunner in a 1-man turret with 30mm cannon and MMG and arrangements to carry an attachable launcher for a light AT or assault missile with command or semi-active guidance.

[Compost]

BW – armoured infantry

Battle Wagon is the term used here to describe a heavy tracked vehicle designed to transport armoured infantry and also combat engineers operating in close conjunction with MBTs and particularly during entry into heavily defended localities. Currently there are two dissimilar types of BW in production, and also one conceptual type with two different forms of main armament. All three are based on heavy tank-like tracked vehicles but with a front-mounted engine contributing to forward protection. Hence, each is configured similar to an AIFV with a rear door/ramp and is better suited also for ancillary tasks such as combat retrieval of casualties and personnel than are the AIFV and the sometimes used but rear-engined heavy ARV. The composite and spaced protection of each BW is or would – instead of ERA – be complemented by an active defence system.

First of the BWs is the Israeli IOC/GDLS Namer. The Namer uses the extensively modified hull of a 65 tonne Merkava 4 MBT and has a turtle-back roof and sides. Namer entered production in 2008, reportedly weighs about 60 tonnes, has a crew of 3 and carries an infantry squad of 8 or 9. It does not have a large and heavy turreted armament and its most important characteristic is that the crew and infantry squad have all-round and particularly frontal protection at least equivalent to that of a MBT. On the right front of its roof Namer has a RCWS with 12.7mm HMG in front of a gunner’s cupola. Alternative weapons for the RCWS have been reported to be a 40mm AGL or 7.62mm MMG. On the left front of the roof is a commander’s cupola with a MMG on a ring and skate mount for head-up use. There has as yet been no indication of fitting additional cupolas or further weapons on cupolas or as RCWS.

Second is the German KMW/RmLS Puma. In its basic configuration for transport without side arrays Puma weighs about 30 tonnes but addition of applique panels increases that to at least 44 tonnes. The vehicle is arranged for a crew of three and six infantry. That is the same crewing and capacity as its predecessor the 34-tonne Marder AIFV which had a 2-man turret with overhead 20mm cannon and a rear cupola carrying an overhead MMG. Puma has a remotely operated turret with stabilised 30mm cannon and co-axial 5.56mm LMG. All-round remote viewing is apparently arranged via an armoured pod on the turret roof. The prototype version of Puma as planned to enter service with the Bundeswehr had five irregularly spaced road wheels per side but there is another version with six road wheels. Its hull does not appear to have been lengthened but the KMW website mentions an export version for up to 9 infantry.

Third is a pair of heavy vehicles devised by Richard Simpkin in about 1986 and based on the front-engined hull of a[Merkava120mm MBT but carrying a less powerful turreted armament. Both vehicles were proposed as complements to the MBT. Each was to have a crew of four and capacity for an 8-man infantry squad, although Simpkin also discussed reduction to a 4-man infantry team. One vehicle was to be armed with a medium calibre gun of 60 to 90mm in a low profile turret and was intended to double as a form of assault gun. The other vehicle had an overhead cannon of 30 to 40mm calibre externally mounted on top of a small turret and was in that respect different to the German Puma. (Richard Simpkin, [Q]A Triumvirate of Heavyweights ?[/Q], Military Technology, 10/86, p 149-159).

Of those three concepts it is the Namer which has the single minded focus of the heaviest armour protection for its crew and squad of infantry or engineers. In accordance with Simpkin’s views such a vehicle might frequently carry less than an 8-man squad. Together with its MBT-plus protection Namer has the lightest armament. That does seem incongruous. But provided doctrine expects a BW to operate in conjunction with MBTs or other heavy gun or cannon-armed vehicles, then a HMG in a remote-controlled mount could be adequate for opportunity and prophylactic fire.

However, a Namer-type BW would be better equipped and armed if it had a forward gunner’s cupola carrying a stabilised HMG or MMG plus a commander’s partly or fully stabilised observation and weapon pod on an articulated boom as described under the medium APC heading. The latter should be feasible because the vehicle hull has sufficient capacity to accept even onerous weight and space requirements that might be expected of an early prototypical armoured boom. A BW with a single boom carrying a pod of viewing and ranging devices and a MMG could be a useful companion for a MBT armed with a turret-bound 105 or 120mm HV gun and coaxial MG. The pod operable in both high and low profile modes might also carry an attachable launcher for a command guided or self-homing close-range missile.

To provide redundancy for observation and supporting fire it might be practicable to install a second boom. That boom operated by a fourth crewman should be arranged to carry a MG or interchangeable AGL and also – instead of the commander’s boom - the launcher for a command guided or self-homing close-range missile.

[Infanteer]

Have you read Richard Simpkin's "Mechanized Infantry"?

[Compost]

Have you read Richard Simpkin's "Mechanized Infantry"?

No. What I have read are his articles in Military Technology. So if my stuff seems to copy him that was the source.

[Compost]

“ Wrong Technology for the Wrong Tactics, The Infantry Fighting Vehicle “ by William F. Owen in The Journal of Military Operations, V1-3 Winter 2012,. Owen strongly advances the view that the utility of the AIFV be critically assessed. His general argument deals with the exposure of mounted infantry to avoidable and hence unnecessary hazard, and with the effective employment of tanks and dismounted infantry.

The argument was brief and clearcut and it is easy to agree with his conclusion which is essentially that employment of the AIFV be constrained. His argument ended there. Probably because he considered it preferable to leave the reader to progress to the follow-on conclusion.

It is easy although somewhat tedious to examine each of the distinctive types of combat unit that currently do or might employ the AIFV. There are effectively three such types: armoured cavalry, armoured infantry, and the tank-infantry union as in the HBCT. The only one that survives even superficial examination is armoured cavalry that includes an infantry component for expedient scouting, harassing and ambush. For armoured infantry and also tank/infantry units it can be promptly seen that in manoeuvre, assault and defence the AIFV is grossly inferior and wasteful when compared to similar weighted but specialised gun and cannon equipped vehicles (tanks or limited-traverse weapon carriers) and a better protected though lesser armed medium or heavyweight APC.

The principal question which then remains is how to appropriately structure an armoured cavalry unit, say a platoon or troop. Dependent on vehicle size and capacity - a cavalry troop of four light or medium weight AIFVs (3 crew plus 4 or 5 scouts) could with 12 crewmen lift 16 or 20 infantry scouts. A similar troop of five AIFVs could with 15 crewmen lift 20 or 25 scouts. Alternatively a cavalry troop of two AIFVs and two similarly sized APCs (2 crew plus 7 or 8 scouts) could with 10 crewmen lift 22 or 26 infantry scouts. A similar troop with two AIFVs and three APCs could with 12 crewmen lift 29 or 34 scouts.

It is likely that the weapons issued to the larger group of scouts embarked in an APC could more readily include a LATGW suitable for dismounted/embarked use. In that case the mixed cavalry troop of two AIFVs with two or three APCs would seem more capable than a troop equipped only with AIFVs, or for that matter only APCs.

In the light of Simpkins (NATO-specific) and Owen’s analyses it interesting to speculate on the eventual output of the GCV project. Assuming something does emerge will it be configured as an AIFV or an APC ? Might it be a gamechanger and will it be intended for armoured infantry, tank-infantry and/or cavalry units.

[gute]

It is easy although somewhat tedious to examine each of the distinctive types of combat unit that currently do or might employ the AIFV. There are effectively three such types: armoured cavalry, armoured infantry, and the tank-infantry union as in the HBCT. The only one that survives even superficial examination is armoured cavalry that includes an infantry component for expedient scouting, harassing and ambush. For armoured infantry and also tank/infantry units it can be promptly seen that in manoeuvre, assault and defence the AIFV is grossly inferior and wasteful when compared to similar weighted but specialised gun and cannon equipped vehicles (tanks or limited-traverse weapon carriers) and a better protected though lesser armed medium or heavyweight APC.

I'm not getting your point. Why does the armored cavalry survive examination, but the combined arms battalion (HBCT)? Is it because the AIFV is only good for scouting?

I also found his article interesting and based on his view one could create combined arms battalions of Stryker ICVs and M1 tanks. Of course the most glaring drawback is mobility - Stryker can not go where a tank can, but does it need to?

[Compost]

I'm not getting your point. Why does the armored cavalry survive examination, but the combined arms battalion (HBCT)? Is it because the AIFV is only good for scouting?

Yes, believe the compromises inherent in the ‘AIFV’ mean that it can be useful for scouting and also rapid exploitation but poor in any role which involves persistent contact or frequent/continued exposure. After reading Simpkin and Owen no longer believe any ‘AIFV’ has to carry an 8 (or 9) man squad. Adequate capacity for both lightweight and medium weight contenders would seem to be at least a 4-man team and at most a 6-man squad/team. With that role and capacity such vehicles might be described as scout carriers and so avoid the troublesome AIFV-label !

I also found his article interesting and based on his view one could create combined arms battalions of Stryker ICVs and M1 tanks. Of course the most glaring drawback is mobility - Stryker can not go where a tank can, but does it need to?

Agree one glaring differential is mobility. The Abrams, Challenger and Leopard-2 tanks cannot be loaded into a C-130 nor cross a MLC20 bridge like the Stryker, nor an A400M or MLC40 bridge like the CV9035. Also it seems preferable that scouts be able to go close to and return from wherever adversary or friendly tanks might go. Hence the Stryker M1128 and CV90120T although each seems over powerful and problematic.

[jcustis]

Compost,

What's your background? Have you ever maneuvered in an APC or AIFV?