This study is a General Staff analysis and record of the most important operational details of the XIX Corps’ successful attack on and penetration through the Siegfried Line. This successful attack against the Siegfried Line should be treated largely as a tribute to the superb fighting ability of our infantry and armored soldiers, well supported by artillery and engineers, intelligently led in a well-planned action. It has demonstrated that thorough planning, determined leadership and aggressiveness in battle, can overcome what otherwise seems to be insuperable obstacles. Both, the 30th Infantry Division and 2d Armored Division were battle experienced with able leadership throughout their echelons. The 29th Infantry Division, which came in during the latter phases of the operation, was also a battle experienced Division.
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(d). Training and Preparation
The assault on the Siegfried Line by the 30th Infantry Division was preceded by intense training all the way down to squad tactics. Despite the fact that units were in the line during this period of training, a reshuffling of reserves enabled all battalions of the 117th Infantry, 119th Infantry and 3d Bn of the 120th Infantry to withdraw behind the lines for reviewing assault tactics. All three battalions of the 117th and 119th Infantry Regiments went through a two day training period in training areas west of the line which they had been holding. The 3d Bn of the 120th Infantry spent most of its time in assault training while in Division reserve. The first and second Bns of the 120th Infantry rotated companies in assault training areas.
The work covered the use of demolitions, flame throwers, bazookas; tactical review of the coordination of assault detachments; practice firing of all weapons; and dry runs in storming the pillboxes and crossing the Wurm River. Engineers, Tank and TD units also rehearsed for the attack, the engineers constructing bridges with the tanks and TDs crossing and fanning out to support the infantry. The practice river-crossing was done in a gully with stagnant water about the width of the Wurm and with the same steep banks. Improvised foot bridges were constructed, two feet wide and 15-30 feet long, with ridged cleats to aid the footing.
Lt Col Robert E. Frankland, battalion commander of the 1st battalion of the 117th, says that “training for the river crossing paid off, because the enemy was surprised and overwhelmed by the sheer aggressiveness of our crossing”.
Under Col Frankland’s direction, an elaborate sand table was constructed, showing in detail the location of the pillboxes, river, wire, roads, ridges, draws, houses and trees. As each reconnaissance patrol returned, changes were made on the sand table to conform with what it had observed. Company commanders were assigned their areas; platoon leaders were shown which pillboxes they were to reduce; squad leaders were drilled in their mission, and before the training had been completed, every man in the assault companies of the battalion was shown the sand table and had his exact route thereon explained to him. Not only the riflemen, but the heavy weapons men, the engineers, the tank destroyer and tank commanders, all studied what was to be their role.
The training was so thorough that, according to S/Sgt Howard King of A Co, 117th Inf Regt, “even when we got a new pillbox to take we just pushed out our support and assault detachment mechanically. The men were also well prepared psychologically. They were inculcated with the necessity for high speed in advancing to the river, crossing, and attacking the fortification. Many men testify that they remembered this when they attacked on October 2, and double-timed through heavy artillery and mortar fire.
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