Modern IFVs are fairly complicated and take some serious training to operate. So if you had a separate unit with a MOS that specialized in being an IFV crewman, then yes you could, and unlike Fuchs, I think that is a good thing. Otherwise no, like Ken says, mechanized infantry and "light" infantry often have different skill sets (like knowing how to operate an IFV) and attitudes.Originally Posted by Distiller
Reed
Which is probably why the British army got rid of the arms plot (rotating units through different roles). Personally I always thought it was a good idea rotating units which acquired experience of different roles and equipment. Perhaps those with experience of the arms plot would like to chime in? Wilf's idea seems similar in intent although I don't know if it would work (sounds a little too SF inspired) plus the cost may be prohibitive (which was one , if not, the reason it was cancelled IIRC).
The funny thing is I seem to recall that one of the reasons the arms plot was cancelled, apart from cost, was that it disrupted soldiers lives having to relocate constantly thereby destroyed family life. But intriguingly I don't recall the Army ever saying that the arms plot WASN'T a good idea. I never could figure out why the equipment couldn't be rotated rather than the troops. But as the great Ken White has pointed out long service troops can not only handle it its a good thing for the forces.
There's a psychological problem associated with rotating equipment.
I'll explain this with the same story as used to teach it to me years ago:
There were two large taxi cab companies in a city. One company is known for its nice, clean taxis and the other one for rotten, smelly taxis. The vehicle types are the same, the drivers are quite exchangeable (age, gender, ethnicity ...).
The difference? The clean taxi cabs belong to one driver, while the other company lets its drivers drive a different taxi every day.
Similarly, the (if I remember correctly) USN solved its major aircraft readiness issues decades ago by assigning one or two aircraft to one senior mechanician each, giving him responsibility for it. The mechanicians who previously worked based on assigned tasks (sent to aircraft x to replace spare part y) began to care about the state of "their" aircraft. This extended into black market activities to scrounge spare parts and working much more hours per week than official.
Equipment that requires care or is exposed to much wear should NEVER be rotated, but be assigned to a organisational unit (if not individuals) permanently.
On a sidenote I think the Luftwaffe used a system in which 1-2 mechanics were assigned to a pilot rather then to his aircraft. (Aircrafts losses IIRC being higher then those of pilots). Only specialized tasks would be addressed by specialists at various levels of the organization. According to the various pilots the system worked well and the bonds between the pilots and 'their' groundcrew were usually very strong with all the resulting positive results...
Holy crap, I agree with Fuchs on something. The end is near.
Reed
Resistance is futile.Holy crap, I agree with Fuchs on something. The end is near.
Reed
I did not see any such thing in the modern Luftwaffe, and I was in close combat with a ground crew unit for a while during the 90's. I never saw them in contact with pilots, never saw them leave for meetings with pilots - what I saw was that the small unit leader assigned tasks and an Oberfeldwebel, possibly an Unteroffizier and one enlisted helper went with a toolbox and a spare part to the bunker where the minor repairs would happen. Bigger repairs (such as replacing an engine) were done in a large maintenance building and there was still rather a tasking top-down by the small unit leader.
tasking and retasking is different to rotating whatever
However to make money that clean cab with regular driver have to carry passengers who use all the cab's amenities but are not involved in its maintenance. A better analogy would involve a back-country tour bus with driver and leader/organiser/cook because then the passengers – like an infantry section – do lots of dismounted work except maintaining the bus.
It's easy to erect a straw target and promptly knock it over but suggest you read what was written. My item stressed that - except for the austere trucklike and closely held PMV - infantry-carrying APCs, AIFVs and 'BW's should be operated and operationally maintained by specialist 'armoured corps' crews.
The concept that a particular crew of driver, vehicle commander and gunner(s) should be rotated together or individually across vehicles or vehicle types is entirely your idea.
By contrast the infantry does most of its work dismounted and at a short to very long distance from its armoured transport vehicles. If that absence is prolonged then it makes operational and financial sense for that unit of vehicles together with crews to be re-tasked and attached elsewhere.
The talk was also about units rotating roles, and consequently rotating equipment.
Armies vary, as do people...
However, the US Army tried that for a number of years after World War II and while not totally unsatisfactory, two glaring problems did occur causing the concept to be discarded.That's one and it's the biggest problem. The concept places the carriers at the whim * of not only the organization that owns the carriers but the next higher headquarters. Carriers tended to be yanked or moved at inopportune times occasionally leaving units both exposed and relatively immobile as well as Carriers sometimes being left 'unprotected.'By contrast the infantry does most of its work dismounted and at a short to very long distance from its armoured transport vehicles. If that absence is prolonged then it makes operational and financial sense for that unit of vehicles together with crews to be re-tasked and attached elsewhere.
A second problem was the Carrier organization naturally placed a premium on protecting its vehicles (and crews) while the transported unit was more concerned with their folks and the their mission. This led to discord at Squad / Section, Platoon, Company and higher levels on occasion -- said discord extending to deliberately damaged carriers by uncontrolled transported Troops and precipitous and unauthorized abandonment of transported troops by carriers units. A side issue was that individual carrier crews often had no real grounding in the mission and thus, in event of loss of their transported Infantry were often at a loss on what should be done.
A minor issue is that in event of a thrown track or other mechanical problem where help to the crew from the transported element would have been beneficial, the transported lacked the knowledges and skills needed and so, often, several Carriers were out of action so that the crews could combine to work on one while the hapless Infantry just stood and watched.
None of that is to say that such a system does not work at all, it merely indicates that as is true of any compromise, there are minor issues that affect outcomes. A smaller, more cohesive Army might not have any of those issues. Then again, it might...
* One can say that whim (or misplaced priorities) has no place in combat operations, that all troops should be better disciplined and that the joint mission should drive the behavior of all concerned. One can say all that. Whether one can get a bunch of random, thrown together humans under the stress of combat and with no particular loyalty to each other as occurs in large Armies to behave so properly is another issue...
Well-trained infantry can furthermore make use of the mothership concept (additional equipment in the vehicle) in order to be versatile without carrying all stuff all the time.
The mothership concept doesn't work well if dismounted element and vehicle element are separated much. You might end up having the heavy AT stuff in a vehicle 20 km behind and higher command expecting you to set up an ambush against armoured recce because your TO&E tells them that you're capable of it.
Minor quibble...
Mmm. If I said that, it wasn't exactly what I meant. Yes, they can handle it and yes for a small long service Army it makes sense from an economic and versatility standpoint -- but for the reasons Firn, Fuchs and Reed11B mentioned as well as in line with JMA's comment above it is not universally a good thing. It is also not even possible much less advisable in periods of intense war and high casualties.
These bear repeating: "Yet again, it's a METT-TC and situational issue -- there is advisedly NO one size fits all in warfare." and "...it's the cognitve skill enhancement and, even more importantly, muscle memory that become important to survival and success in intense combat and that argues for specialization."
Regrettably the answer to JMA's question is, as I expect he knows, all too often the emphasis is on the more 'sexy' aspects -- and the things that are easier and cheaper to train. The US Army did a good job for a while in providing enough Ammo and the right kind of training but my sensing is that it will too easily slip back into old and bad habits of mediocre training. Good units will persevere, the poorer ones will not..
People know my views - I disagree with this statement. The skills to operate a modern IFV are not really serious - nothing more serious than learning to operate any dismounted piece of kit. For example, a Delco turret with a 25 mm Bushmaster requires that one learn a new weapon and some sequencing for turning on optical devices, but that's about it.
It ain't rocket science, and I've seen soldiers that are more than able to handle "light" and "mech" missions equally well without any significant skill loss.
As for the Arms plot, Tukhachevskii raises an interesting point. I wonder what was deemed more difficult - having guys rotate on different specializations or transfering kit all over the place ever few years?
Last edited by Infanteer; 01-21-2012 at 02:19 AM.
No question it can be done in peacetime.
It can be done in war time as well -- if one is winning as were the Allies in Europe 1944-45. Whether it can be safely done in other aspects of major war is arguable.
The real issue is not whether it can be done -- as most anything can be if one wants it badly enough -- the issue is should it be done. I'd say for a small well trained Army under most circumstances it makes a great deal of sense. For a large, mobilizing Army, perhaps a little less sense. There is also the issue of affordability; all well and good to train broadly but if either time or funds or constrained, it may be inadvisable to train soldiers in skills they may never use...
A point to recall is not the raw skills, they're easy -- it's the cognitve skill enhancement and, even more importantly, muscle memory that become important to survival and success in intense combat and that argues for specialization.
Yet again, it's a METT-TC and situational issue -- there is advisedly NO one size fits all in warfare.
That's a good point Ken. We have a small, long-service Army up here so it is easy to pile on the skills.
On a tangent (surprise).
Within the U.S. military is there good recognition of the perishability of skills? Even fairly gross motor skills like swimming and skiing that are there to stay once acquired require maintenance to be done well at the drop of a hat.
If you don’t read the newspaper, you are uninformed; if you do read the newspaper, you are misinformed. – Mark Twain (attributed)
The development of this muscle memory requires repetitive and ongoing practical/physical training.
Is there enough time (and live ammunition) being made available for this purpose or is there a tendency to focus on the more 'sexy' aspects of soldiering?
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