The Marine Corps already does this. We train our infantry lieutenants and captains as such to operate precisely as trainer/leaders for this sort of optimum utility force.Originally Posted by Distiller
When we motorize infantry in mine-resistant vehicles, it is typically through the use of infantrymen trained as incidental drivers. With amphibious tracked vehicles, those crewmen originate in a separate military occupational specialty.
Last edited by jcustis; 01-22-2012 at 05:21 AM.
one point of agreement
Above is quote of four weeks old item 177 on MRAP JLTV concept of infantry mobility thread. Followed here by:
At least we agree that infantry-carrying armoured vehicles can be/are useful.
Weight-based classification of armoured vehicles (p1/3)
That was a good question about APC/AIFV armament. Particularly for people like me who believe that all infantry in an industrialised army should be supported wherever practicable by vehicles – preferably armoured vehicles – for all combat and CS tasks and roles. The question was partly addressed in following posts on the Infantry Unit Tactics, Tasks, Weapons, and Organization thread. But the content of those posts was limited because it’s awkward to discuss vehicle armament without also considering vehicle weight. Approximate weight actually makes a good starting point. So here is an abbreviated extract from an unused study of modern armour.A couple of questions...
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... occur to me as I follow this thread (avidly, I must say, for a non-infantryman).
First, what thoughts do people have on what support weapons should be grouped at the platoon level, what should be grouped at company, and what should be grouped at both (or at battalion)? There has been some discussion of this in passing both here and in the thread on squads/sections, but I've yet to see anyone fully articulate a logic for how one would best decide this.
Second, can we really have a discussion of platoon weapons without more fully discussing APC/IFV issues? Here, I'm less interested in the perennial tracked vs wheeled and heavy versus light issues, and more on the optimal APC/IFV armament. Are 0.50 MGs enough? Should they mount 25/30mm cannon for punching through cover and providing some capability against light AFVs? What about ATGM mounts? (Of course, this also relates to light vs heavy, but let's try to leave that aside for now.)
Armoured vehicles are commonly referred to as light, medium, heavy to indicate their combat loaded weight. Historically those same terms have been confusingly used to
secondly describe the calibre of a main armament and thirdly the nature of armour protection. However, the specific calibre of a gun in millimetres has become increasingly used as a descriptor. Similarly, homogeneous or layered protection is now often described in terms of the actual or equivalent thickness in millimetres of rolled steel plate opposing kinetic and chemical attack respectively.
Below for example are the STANAG 4569 protection levels for steel armouring of logistic and light armoured vehicles against KE, artillery and blast threats. With steel at 7,850kg /cb-m, protecting Level 2 ballistic and artillery threats at 105kg/sq-m would require an armour thickness of about 13mm. And to protect a vehicle of M-113 size to Level 2 requires about three tonnes of homogeneous steel, or some equivalent armour.
Last edited by davidbfpo; 02-12-2012 at 10:51 AM. Reason: Correction at author's request
Weight-based classification of armoured vehicles (p2/3)
To conserve weight and reduce corrosion the M-113A1 was built with aluminium alloy armour that has a density of about 2750 kg/cu-m. The thickness of that armour was approx 40mm which provided almost the same degree of ballistic protection as would 13 mm of steel. However the increased thickness and stiffness of the aluminium plate meant that it was largely self-supporting and hence the hull needed few structural beams and ribs. The overall result was much lower vehicle weight than an M-113 built with steel armour.
During the 1960s aluminium armour became less popular because it tends to tear when subject to mine blast and also melts at a lower temperature than steel. Upgraded versions of the M-113 carry a steel belly plate and many have an outer skin of flat or corrugated aluminium or steel. Vehicle weight of the M-113A2 increased from 12 to about 15 tonnes in the M-113A3. The extended M-113A4/MTVL (Mobile Tactical Vehicle Light) with an extra wheel station and more powerful engine has a maximum all-up weight of about 18 tonnes.
Despite the formalisation of ballistic, shrapnel and mine blast threats there are still no commonly agreed meanings or boundaries for light (weight) as opposed to medium (weight) or heavy (weight) armoured vehicles. In some contexts the term light is used to mean vehicles weighing up to about 7 tonnes but in others the term is applied to vehicles such as the M-113 that weigh twice as much and more. So vehicle weight or mass is often discussed using relative terms without boundaries or a clearly understood specification.
The use of weight descriptors with agreed meanings is important because the all-up-weight of an armoured vehicle is a major factor in determining its primary attributes of armament, mobility and protection. Also weight highlights – again indirectly – some of the capabilities and vulnerabilities of armoured vehicles and units. Additionally it makes it easier to assess an armoured vehicle in one weight category against a generally similar vehicle in another category.
Various categorisations of weight can be devised using arbitrary or incremental limits but each is artificial and can become complex as in Table 1. And any such rigorous system of categories is likely to be acceptable only to pedants or Queensbury-style enthusiasts.
Weight-based classification of armoured vehicles (p3/3)
As a complicating factor military units are often referred to as light, mediumor heavy. In that context light means a unit that is readily portable by virtually any means and particularly by airlift. Heavy means a unit equipped for maximum combat power with few if any concessions toward weight or portability. Medium describes every unit in between. For example most of the vehicles such as GS trucks issued to a light unit would weigh less than 10 tonnes whereas a heavy unit would have many weighing several times that much.
Currently an upper limit for ready portability of a vehicle by fixed-wing aircraft is generally held to be 18 to 20 tonnes. That limit seems to have become accepted because it approximates the load of the widely used C-130 Hercules freighter at normal maximum take-off weight.
Of course 20 tonnes may seem too heavy to be referred to as light. However, a scan across the current variety of armoured vehicles suggests there could be natural boundaries predicated on weight, and that two such boundaries occur at about 20 and 40 tonnes all-up weight. Perhaps that is simply the result of subjective bias rather than Darwinian-style analysis. And even if the latter applies there could be other natural boundaries. But regardless of observation or analysis it is anyway convenient to postulate 20 tonne intervals between three main classes of armoured vehicle described by weight as light, medium and [/B]heavy[/B].
Those boundaries were in fact suggested – originally or otherwise – by MAJ John C. Larminie in ‘The operational requirements of light armoured vehicles,’ International Defense Review , 11/1987, p 1487-1492. Having never met Larminie this is a good time to comment on the pleasure of reading his articles.
If his suggested boundaries are accepted then light can be used to describe any armoured or unarmoured vehicle which has a maximum combat laden weight of less than 20 tonnes. Light could be similarly used to describe a military unit in which every item of equipment weighs less than 20 tonnes. The term heavy could be used to mean a vehicle weighing more than 40 tonnes, and also a unit which has many such vehicles and other similarly heavy items of equipment. In the middle a medium vehicle would weigh at least 20 tonnes but less than 40 tonnes, and a medium unit would have mostly medium and also light vehicles, but might additionally have a relatively small number of heavy vehicles as in Table 2.
Boundaries at 20 and 40 tonnes are much easier to remember than a contrived Queensbury-style classification. And exceptions for light vehicles and light units under say 10 tonnes could be described in specifics. For example a parachute unit could be described as X-tonne meaning than each of its vehicles and items of equipment weighed at most X tonnes.
The 20 and 40-tonne boundaries have been described and adopted here for convenience. It is not additionally implied that tracks become superior to wheels at either boundary. As a general observation wheeled vehicles are well suited to on-road/on-track movement and are particularly useful for operational mobility. However, for off-road movement, obstacle crossing and tactical mobility it is apparent that track laying vehicles – despite the hazard of breakage – become superior to wheeled vehicles at some weight well below 40 tonnes and probably below 20 tonnes.
Such superiority can be argued against. But it is well supported from historical times by the assessments of various analysts and commentators such as:
CAPT Edwin W. Besch, “Armoured reconnaissance Vehicles”, Interconnair –II-81, p B1-B8;
Paul Hornback, “The Wheels Versus Track Dilemma”, Armor, March-April 1998,
re-printed Defender, Winter 1998, p 19-20;
Maj. J. C. Larminie, “Soft-ground performance of military vehicles”,
International Defense Review, 4/1988, p 383-386;
Don Loughlin, “Wheels vs. Tracks: Rebuttal”, Aviation Today, 2000,
[www.c4inews.com/reports/wheelsvtracks.htm (cache)] d-l 21July2006.
Anyway back towards the thread. The purpose in this post was to develop the concept that there are three basic classes of armoured vehicles: light up to say 19.9 tonnes, medium from 20 to say 39.9 tonnes and heavy from 40 tonnes and upward. At the lower end below 10 tonnes, the X-tonne convention or classification can be used for specific vehicles and units.
The ‘Larminie’ weight-based classification may be thought contentious or unnecessary. However, a following post will use it as a framework against which to consider the types and armament of infantry carrying armoured vehicles. As an extension to ‘perceptions of mechanised infantry’ that post is likely to be contentious.
In regard to vehicles it's in my opinion more reasonable to divide between medium and heavy AFVs on basis of the compromise:
focus on (road) march mobility or focus on sturdiness in battle
The whole 8x8 medium AFV fashion was primarily about the race to Pristina, incited by Shinseki et al, secondarily about tight budgets in the many countries with smaller armies which wanted to modernize but lacked good AND affordable off-the shelf MBT and IFV choices and tertiarily about the widespread perception of tracked AFVs (especially MBTs) as Cold War dinosaurs.
It's so difficult to separate them nicely from light AFVs of the 10-15 ton range because the medium AFV (sans IFV) category is not founded on a consistent idea. It's a strange compromise. Wheeled APCs such as the Fuchs were nothing special during the Cold War, yet they were up-armoured, got better gun and lots of electronic whiz-bang and became the new hype.
To me there are three kinds of sensible army vehicles really small ones that are very agile and very easy to hide, very large trucks that allow for an unusually small vehicle count of formations and combat vehicles.
Combat vehicles (fully armoured, not just cab) again should be divided into a long-range wheeled category somewhat similar to French armoured recce, a medium tank (~40-45 tons, as the new Jap MBT) family for the greatest heat of battle and a carrier vehicle family supporting the latter (conceptually ~ stretched M113, SEP).
I can easily lay out better justifications for these categories than all the hype and buzzword rain about Strykers and other 8x8 MAFVs that I've seen published in 1999-2006 offered.
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On MechInf; the real difference is not about which ride they use, but about the combined arms setting they're expected to accomplish their mission (and what mission?).
Infantry fighting together with MBTs and indirect fire AFVs can and should be totally different from infantry that merely drives to a region of ops, dismounts and fights then without AFVs support.
The latter is not going to make very swift operational moves; a 150 km dash in one day through multiple defensive positions and surprised red columns is not to be expected. MBT cooperation infantry on the other hand is supposed to be rather reckless, to accomplish its offensive missions quickly and to provide security when the battlegroup is not on the move. It doesn't need much organic support weaponry such as Carl Gustaf or sniper rifles. In fact, an all-very light machinegun armament is a strangely interesting setup for them.
Any ride that can keep up with a mechanized battlegroup and not get shot to pieces too often by the encountered threats would be good enough, albeit not necessarily affordable.
Mechanised / armoured infantry that's not meant for quick offensive success with dismounted advance of less than 2 km is not going to have a consistent concept that meets operational needs.
some old things keep coming back
Your opinion is somewhat different to that being implemented by the French and German armies. They seem intent on also procuring light wheeled armour vehicles to fit every level or niche in some Queensbury/Queensberry classification scheme.
Agree the Euro trend toward medium 8x8 autobahn/route/strada armour is aimed at producing AFVs (as distinct from APCs and armnoured CS vehicles) with march mobility as their main attribute. That probably results from EEC concern that security problems can develop almost anywhere with little warning. In other words they don’t know where they will be called on to go next, but hopefully it won’t be a nextdoor country.The whole 8x8 medium AFV fashion was primarily about the race to Pristina, incited by Shinseki et al, secondarily about tight budgets in the many countries with smaller armies which wanted to modernize but lacked good AND affordable off-the shelf MBT and IFV choices and tertiarily about the widespread perception of tracked AFVs (especially MBTs) as Cold War dinosaurs.
At the more forceful level that “widespread perception of tracked AFVs ....” has been narrowing rapidly.
Neither of those - especially the latter - can be credited to GEN Shinseki. But at least his term did result in the US Army getting some of its cavalry and infantry back into wheeled armour. And he can hardly be blamed for excess production of the larger types of MRAV.
Suppose you meant ‘aggressive and determined ’ instead of ‘ rather reckless ’ but we still disagree on the likely nature of future combat. The era of huge armoured encounter battles and encirclements has passed - for some unknown period at least. However, believe all infantry units may need to be rapidly transported and deployed over short or long distances, preferably in the security of armoured transport. And when they get to wherever, their subsequent dismounted operations will often benefit from the availability – but not invariably the use – of heavy armour such as MBTs and AEVs supported by ARVs and AVLBs. Historically such vehicles have been very useful in reducing strongpoint complexes in urban zones and especially useful in reducing bunker complexes in jungle environments such as SVN where they dramatically reduced the expected rate of casualties of accompanying light infantry.On MechInf; the real difference is not about which ride they use, but about the combined arms setting they're expected to accomplish their mission (and what mission?).
Infantry fighting together with MBTs and indirect fire AFVs can and should be totally different from infantry that merely drives to a region of ops, dismounts and fights then without AFVs support.
The latter is not going to make very swift operational moves; a 150 km dash in one day through multiple defensive positions and surprised red columns is not to be expected. MBT cooperation infantry on the other hand is supposed to be rather reckless, to accomplish its offensive missions quickly and to provide security when the battlegroup is not on the move. It doesn't need much organic support weaponry such as Carl Gustaf or sniper rifles. In fact, an all-very light machinegun armament is a strangely interesting setup for them.
Any ride that can keep up with a mechanized battlegroup and not get shot to pieces too often by the encountered threats would be good enough, albeit not necessarily affordable.
Mechanised / armoured infantry that's not meant for quick offensive success with dismounted advance of less than 2 km is not going to have a consistent concept that meets operational needs.
In short it is back to the inception of the ‘tank’ and its use in ‘penny packets’ for the intimate support of infantry operations, with some ancillary use for long-range sniping. There may even be a future need for the assault gun.
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