Mechanized Infantry Perceptions 2010

[Firn]

Hey Firn,

Esp. "leadership, troop quality" - Stavelot was the second time 1 SS Pz had run into 1/117. The first was at St.-Bart near Mortain in Aug 1944. There, the Panzers and their Grenadiers were also stacked up, but it was a close call. See here and here.

As to "overall supporting resources", those were also present at Stavelot - perhaps more good circumstance (luck) than exact operational planning. 1/117 (organically, 3 rifle coys, a heavy weapons coy - MGs & 81mm mortars, an HHC with a pioneer platoon and an AT platoon) had an attached AT Coy (towed) since Aug 1944 (with them at Mortain). That coy had been pulled back to its Bn (along with its other coys) for refitting and retraining with M-10 SPs. It just got back with 1/117 in time for the Stavelot infiltration.

In addition, 1/117 had attached combat engineers (also with them at Mortain), who eventually managed to blow the Stavelot bridge. Further close support were the 117th's regimental mortars and arty. They happened to be plunked down in close proximity to Stavelot - good logistics or luck.

Thus, the US force at Stavelot was de facto a "combined arms task force" - even though not formally designated as such. I've never claimed, BTW, that infantry alone is superior to armor:


The Germans did not co-ordinate their panzers and grenadiers. There were good reasons for that (as you've pointed to in the SS 501 articles). Of course, even if they had and eventually wiped out 1/117 and its attached units, that would have taken too long. The Germans were FUBAR because of the "M" and last "T" in METT-T (again as you pointed out).

Regards

Mike

Thanks for this very good post. My aim was to point out the implications of the bigger picture and you did a better job then me at that. I might add that they were also FUBAR because of the ET and locally of the second T as well in those circumstances.

In any case it once again shows the importance of quality of leadership at all the levels of a unit. The ability to act and react quickly in times of crisis, taking the initiative is one of the greatest attributes persons and units can have in times of deep and sudden crisis.

Regards

[kaur]

It's all about METT, but ...

After several days of fighting by daring but lightly armed opposition forces, the army, equipped with tanks and heavy weaponry, was forced to pull back on January 18th. Residents hailed their “liberated city” and hung pictures of the dead in a tree. They waved placards and shouted slogans ridiculing the regime. Civilians guarded checkpoints usually manned by the security forces.

http://www.economist.com/node/21543538

[jmm99]

it gets down to "the importance of quality of leadership at all the levels of a unit."

Bob Frankland, a National Guardsman from East Tennessee, commanded Curlew (1/117). While decorations are far from an absolute measurement of the man, we find for him: Distinguished Service Cross, Silver Star (w/ Oak Leaf Cluster), Bronze Star (w/ 3 Oak Leaf Clusters). He led from the rear - and from the front ! - and retired in grade of Major General:



Leadership goes beyond officers. Charlie Coy (Co C) was Curlew's tip of the spear for the Siegfried Breakthrough (map here). When the going got rough for Charlie, a PFC from West Virginia, Frank C. Brakefield, got going. First individually and then (after proving it could be done) led a composite squad which he formed - thereby giving heart to the remainder of the company to move forward. As Curlew History notes: "In this situation, a First Platoon man performed in an exceptionally heroic manner." Awarded the Silver Star and promoted to Sgt., Brakefield was available to lead at Stavelot (WIA, 24 Dec 1944).

As important as leadership and individual heroics is training. The 117th Inf. Regt. was the demonstration regiment at the Ft. Benning Infantry School for five months. Curlew (1/117) was the demonstration Bn for the problem "Battalion in a River Crossing". This "make believe" training resulted in a "belief made" attitude which carried over in Curlew.

See, Breaching the Siegfried Line, the XIX Corps in Germany (done) (emphasis added to paras re: Curlew):

This study is a General Staff analysis and record of the most important operational details of the XIX Corps’ successful attack on and penetration through the Siegfried Line. This successful attack against the Siegfried Line should be treated largely as a tribute to the superb fighting ability of our infantry and armored soldiers, well supported by artillery and engineers, intelligently led in a well-planned action. It has demonstrated that thorough planning, determined leadership and aggressiveness in battle, can overcome what otherwise seems to be insuperable obstacles. Both, the 30th Infantry Division and 2d Armored Division were battle experienced with able leadership throughout their echelons. The 29th Infantry Division, which came in during the latter phases of the operation, was also a battle experienced Division.
...
(d). Training and Preparation

The assault on the Siegfried Line by the 30th Infantry Division was preceded by intense training all the way down to squad tactics. Despite the fact that units were in the line during this period of training, a reshuffling of reserves enabled all battalions of the 117th Infantry, 119th Infantry and 3d Bn of the 120th Infantry to withdraw behind the lines for reviewing assault tactics. All three battalions of the 117th and 119th Infantry Regiments went through a two day training period in training areas west of the line which they had been holding. The 3d Bn of the 120th Infantry spent most of its time in assault training while in Division reserve. The first and second Bns of the 120th Infantry rotated companies in assault training areas.

The work covered the use of demolitions, flame throwers, bazookas; tactical review of the coordination of assault detachments; practice firing of all weapons; and dry runs in storming the pillboxes and crossing the Wurm River. Engineers, Tank and TD units also rehearsed for the attack, the engineers constructing bridges with the tanks and TDs crossing and fanning out to support the infantry. The practice river-crossing was done in a gully with stagnant water about the width of the Wurm and with the same steep banks. Improvised foot bridges were constructed, two feet wide and 15-30 feet long, with ridged cleats to aid the footing.

Lt Col Robert E. Frankland, battalion commander of the 1st battalion of the 117th, says that “training for the river crossing paid off, because the enemy was surprised and overwhelmed by the sheer aggressiveness of our crossing”.

Under Col Frankland’s direction, an elaborate sand table was constructed, showing in detail the location of the pillboxes, river, wire, roads, ridges, draws, houses and trees. As each reconnaissance patrol returned, changes were made on the sand table to conform with what it had observed. Company commanders were assigned their areas; platoon leaders were shown which pillboxes they were to reduce; squad leaders were drilled in their mission, and before the training had been completed, every man in the assault companies of the battalion was shown the sand table and had his exact route thereon explained to him. Not only the riflemen, but the heavy weapons men, the engineers, the tank destroyer and tank commanders, all studied what was to be their role.

The training was so thorough that, according to S/Sgt Howard King of A Co, 117th Inf Regt, “even when we got a new pillbox to take we just pushed out our support and assault detachment mechanically. The men were also well prepared psychologically. They were inculcated with the necessity for high speed in advancing to the river, crossing, and attacking the fortification. Many men testify that they remembered this when they attacked on October 2, and double-timed through heavy artillery and mortar fire.

BTW: To the extent that I make any sense in the military area is due to following Ken White. My sins here are totally my own.

Regards

Mike

A better and more complete version of the staff report on Siegfried (including links to its nine appendices; last 4 not completed) is here !