Mechanized Infantry Perceptions 2010

[Fuchs]

My question has to do with the Ground Combat Vehicle and arming it with a 25mm cannon and not something bigger. Could these type of experiences in Iraq had something to do with the idea of arming the GCV with a 25mm cannon?

Other armies went from 30 to 40 caseless (UK), from 20 to 30 (Germany), added a 100 mm next to their classic 30 mm (Russia) or kept using something in the 23-40 mm range. Most IFV purchases of the last few years appear to have been about 30-35 mm main guns.


I suppose the U.S.Army simply stuck with what's established in its training and ammunition stock system. I have yet to see or meet any source claiming that 25 mm is optimal. The problem is that the autocannon calibre choice is a choice between the devil and the deep sea. It's unsatisfactory in some regards, no matter what.
25 mm does not chew or bite easily through walls unless you use expensive APFSDS, and that's messy in infantry support because of all the sabots. 35 or 40 mm doesn't allow you to carry many rounds. Telescopic ammo such as used by the CTA 40 is more compact, but you could still carry more if you stuck with a smaller calibre.

[jcustis]

I would offer that there are clear distinctions between an infantry fighting vehicle, capable of killing comparable vehicles with its main cannon or ancillary ATGM, and an infantry support vehicle, capable of rendering support in any sort of built-up environment.

One needs to consider how the US Army has organized and equipped itself in the past to accomplish those two discrete tasks, before asking the question about caliber size for any main cannon.

When the Bradley was developed, side saddle TOW launchers were emplaced in the design, but the unit organizations still M1 tanks mixed in to provide the wall-busting support required, and the development of 120mm ammunition has followed an arc aimed at penetrating and reducing heavy cover.

As the Army transitioned to the Stryker and its remote weapon system of no larger than 40mm AGL or .50 HMG, it bought the 105mm Mobile Gun System variant to provide infantry support within those formations, since the M1's 120mm main gun was lost.

The US has never had a one-design-fits-all mindset when it comes to mechanized infantry operations, like the Russians have through the BMP-1 through -3 series of IFVs, and there is some inherent flexibility (and for sure some weaknesses) from that approach.

It seems the US Army stuck with what was in its training and ammunition system not so much out of a desire to avoid additional cost, but because that system and combination of capabilities has proven capable enough to meet the infantry's needs. If it were found woefully wanting, there would for sure be pressure to adjust and implement new systems, but the current crop of tools is generally adequate and the US Army mindset has recently trended towards C4ISR upgrades before ordnance changes.

I would guess that we won't see a main cannon for another couple of generations.