Mechanized Infantry Perceptions 2010

[Ken White]

There was a good reason for that MOS and no reason to eliminate it other than to make life easier for the Personnel Management types. There are very different skill sets and attitudes involved and the two approaches to ground combat, both needed, do not mesh at all well...

It also is, in Korea, partly due to the fact that a lot of Airborne types, light to a fault, go there on an unaccompanied tour in order to get returned to Bragg or to jump status somewhere rather than go for a leg long tour and ending up elsewhere.

[Distiller]

Would it be possible to have a basic, standardized infantry unit ("light"), and put it on trucks or HMMVVs (making it "mot"), APCs or IFVs (making it "mech" or "heavy"), and helicopters (making it "airborne/air assault"), just as the operations require? Making the mobility component a modular attachment to a standardized infantry building block, say a platoon? Could that work? And going one step further, making it "amphib", and thus taking the same standardized basic infantry unit all across the ground combat environment?

[Fuchs]

Would it be possible to have a basic, standardized infantry unit ("light"), and put it on trucks or HMMVVs (making it "mot"), APCs or IFVs (making it "mech" or "heavy"), and helicopters (making it "airborne/air assault"), just as the operations require? Making the mobility component a modular attachment to a standardized infantry building block, say a platoon? Could that work? And going one step further, making it "amphib", and thus taking the same standardized basic infantry unit all across the ground combat environment?

http://www.army.gov.au/lwsc/docs/Owe...l_Infantry.pdf


Possible? - sure.

Good idea? - Probably only for small armies (smaller than corps-sized).

[reed11b]

Would it be possible to have a basic, standardized infantry unit ("light"), and put it on trucks or HMMVVs (making it "mot"), APCs or IFVs (making it "mech" or "heavy"), and helicopters (making it "airborne/air assault"), just as the operations require? Making the mobility component a modular attachment to a standardized infantry building block, say a platoon? Could that work? And going one step further, making it "amphib", and thus taking the same standardized basic infantry unit all across the ground combat environment?

Modern IFVs are fairly complicated and take some serious training to operate. So if you had a separate unit with a MOS that specialized in being an IFV crewman, then yes you could, and unlike Fuchs, I think that is a good thing. Otherwise no, like Ken says, mechanized infantry and "light" infantry often have different skill sets (like knowing how to operate an IFV) and attitudes.
Reed

[Tukhachevskii]

Modern IFVs are fairly complicated and take some serious training to operate. So if you had a separate unit with a MOS that specialized in being an IFV crewman, then yes you could, and unlike Fuchs, I think that is a good thing. Otherwise no, like Ken says, mechanized infantry and "light" infantry often have different skill sets (like knowing how to operate an IFV) and attitudes.
Reed

Which is probably why the British army got rid of the arms plot (rotating units through different roles). Personally I always thought it was a good idea rotating units which acquired experience of different roles and equipment. Perhaps those with experience of the arms plot would like to chime in? Wilf's idea seems similar in intent although I don't know if it would work (sounds a little too SF inspired) plus the cost may be prohibitive (which was one , if not, the reason it was cancelled IIRC).

[Tukhachevskii]

Which is probably why the British army got rid of the arms plot (rotating units through different roles). Personally I always thought it was a good idea rotating units which acquired experience of different roles and equipment. Perhaps those with experience of the arms plot would like to chime in? Wilf's idea seems similar in intent although I don't know if it would work (sounds a little too SF inspired) plus the cost may be prohibitive (which was one , if not, the reason it was cancelled IIRC).

The funny thing is I seem to recall that one of the reasons the arms plot was cancelled, apart from cost, was that it disrupted soldiers lives having to relocate constantly thereby destroyed family life. But intriguingly I don't recall the Army ever saying that the arms plot WASN'T a good idea. I never could figure out why the equipment couldn't be rotated rather than the troops. But as the great Ken White has pointed out long service troops can not only handle it its a good thing for the forces.

[Fuchs]

There's a psychological problem associated with rotating equipment.

I'll explain this with the same story as used to teach it to me years ago:

There were two large taxi cab companies in a city. One company is known for its nice, clean taxis and the other one for rotten, smelly taxis. The vehicle types are the same, the drivers are quite exchangeable (age, gender, ethnicity ...).
The difference? The clean taxi cabs belong to one driver, while the other company lets its drivers drive a different taxi every day.


Similarly, the (if I remember correctly) USN solved its major aircraft readiness issues decades ago by assigning one or two aircraft to one senior mechanician each, giving him responsibility for it. The mechanicians who previously worked based on assigned tasks (sent to aircraft x to replace spare part y) began to care about the state of "their" aircraft. This extended into black market activities to scrounge spare parts and working much more hours per week than official.


Equipment that requires care or is exposed to much wear should NEVER be rotated, but be assigned to a organisational unit (if not individuals) permanently.

[Firn]

On a sidenote I think the Luftwaffe used a system in which 1-2 mechanics were assigned to a pilot rather then to his aircraft. (Aircrafts losses IIRC being higher then those of pilots). Only specialized tasks would be addressed by specialists at various levels of the organization. According to the various pilots the system worked well and the bonds between the pilots and 'their' groundcrew were usually very strong with all the resulting positive results...

[reed11b]

There's a psychological problem associated with rotating equipment.

I'll explain this with the same story as used to teach it to me years ago:

There were two large taxi cab companies in a city. One company is known for its nice, clean taxis and the other one for rotten, smelly taxis. The vehicle types are the same, the drivers are quite exchangeable (age, gender, ethnicity ...).
The difference? The clean taxi cabs belong to one driver, while the other company lets its drivers drive a different taxi every day.


Similarly, the (if I remember correctly) USN solved its major aircraft readiness issues decades ago by assigning one or two aircraft to one senior mechanician each, giving him responsibility for it. The mechanicians who previously worked based on assigned tasks (sent to aircraft x to replace spare part y) began to care about the state of "their" aircraft. This extended into black market activities to scrounge spare parts and working much more hours per week than official.


Equipment that requires care or is exposed to much wear should NEVER be rotated, but be assigned to a organisational unit (if not individuals) permanently.

Holy crap, I agree with Fuchs on something. The end is near.
Reed

[Compost]

There's a psychological problem associated with rotating equipment.

I'll explain this with the same story as used to teach it to me years ago:

There were two large taxi cab companies in a city. One company is known for its nice, clean taxis and the other one for rotten, smelly taxis. The vehicle types are the same, the drivers are quite exchangeable (age, gender, ethnicity ...).
The difference? The clean taxi cabs belong to one driver, while the other company lets its drivers drive a different taxi every day.

However to make money that clean cab with regular driver have to carry passengers who use all the cab's amenities but are not involved in its maintenance. A better analogy would involve a back-country tour bus with driver and leader/organiser/cook because then the passengers – like an infantry section – do lots of dismounted work except maintaining the bus.

Similarly, the (if I remember correctly) USN solved its major aircraft readiness issues decades ago by assigning one or two aircraft to one senior mechanician each, giving him responsibility for it. The mechanicians who previously worked based on assigned tasks (sent to aircraft x to replace spare part y) began to care about the state of "their" aircraft. This extended into black market activities to scrounge spare parts and working much more hours per week than official.

Equipment that requires care or is exposed to much wear should NEVER be rotated, but be assigned to a organisational unit (if not individuals) permanently.

It's easy to erect a straw target and promptly knock it over but suggest you read what was written. My item stressed that - except for the austere trucklike and closely held PMV - infantry-carrying APCs, AIFVs and 'BW's should be operated and operationally maintained by specialist 'armoured corps' crews.

The concept that a particular crew of driver, vehicle commander and gunner(s) should be rotated together or individually across vehicles or vehicle types is entirely your idea.

By contrast the infantry does most of its work dismounted and at a short to very long distance from its armoured transport vehicles. If that absence is prolonged then it makes operational and financial sense for that unit of vehicles together with crews to be re-tasked and attached elsewhere.

[Ken White]

As... Ken White has pointed out long service troops can not only handle it its a good thing for the forces.

Mmm. If I said that, it wasn't exactly what I meant. Yes, they can handle it and yes for a small long service Army it makes sense from an economic and versatility standpoint -- but for the reasons Firn, Fuchs and Reed11B mentioned as well as in line with JMA's comment above it is not universally a good thing. It is also not even possible much less advisable in periods of intense war and high casualties.

These bear repeating: "Yet again, it's a METT-TC and situational issue -- there is advisedly NO one size fits all in warfare." and "...it's the cognitve skill enhancement and, even more importantly, muscle memory that become important to survival and success in intense combat and that argues for specialization."

Regrettably the answer to JMA's question is, as I expect he knows, all too often the emphasis is on the more 'sexy' aspects -- and the things that are easier and cheaper to train. The US Army did a good job for a while in providing enough Ammo and the right kind of training but my sensing is that it will too easily slip back into old and bad habits of mediocre training. Good units will persevere, the poorer ones will not..

[Infanteer]

Modern IFVs are fairly complicated and take some serious training to operate. So if you had a separate unit with a MOS that specialized in being an IFV crewman, then yes you could, and unlike Fuchs, I think that is a good thing. Otherwise no, like Ken says, mechanized infantry and "light" infantry often have different skill sets (like knowing how to operate an IFV) and attitudes.
Reed

People know my views - I disagree with this statement. The skills to operate a modern IFV are not really serious - nothing more serious than learning to operate any dismounted piece of kit. For example, a Delco turret with a 25 mm Bushmaster requires that one learn a new weapon and some sequencing for turning on optical devices, but that's about it.

It ain't rocket science, and I've seen soldiers that are more than able to handle "light" and "mech" missions equally well without any significant skill loss.

As for the Arms plot, Tukhachevskii raises an interesting point. I wonder what was deemed more difficult - having guys rotate on different specializations or transfering kit all over the place ever few years?

[Ken White]

It can be done in war time as well -- if one is winning as were the Allies in Europe 1944-45. Whether it can be safely done in other aspects of major war is arguable.

The real issue is not whether it can be done -- as most anything can be if one wants it badly enough -- the issue is should it be done. I'd say for a small well trained Army under most circumstances it makes a great deal of sense. For a large, mobilizing Army, perhaps a little less sense. There is also the issue of affordability; all well and good to train broadly but if either time or funds or constrained, it may be inadvisable to train soldiers in skills they may never use...

A point to recall is not the raw skills, they're easy -- it's the cognitve skill enhancement and, even more importantly, muscle memory that become important to survival and success in intense combat and that argues for specialization.

Yet again, it's a METT-TC and situational issue -- there is advisedly NO one size fits all in warfare.

[Infanteer]

That's a good point Ken. We have a small, long-service Army up here so it is easy to pile on the skills.

[ganulv]

A point to recall is not the raw skills, they're easy -- it's the cognitve skill enhancement and, even more importantly, muscle memory that become important to survival and success in intense combat and that argues for specialization.

Within the U.S. military is there good recognition of the perishability of skills? Even fairly gross motor skills like swimming and skiing that are there to stay once acquired require maintenance to be done well at the drop of a hat.

[JMA]

A point to recall is not the raw skills, they're easy -- it's the cognitve skill enhancement and, even more importantly, muscle memory that become important to survival and success in intense combat and that argues for specialization.

The development of this muscle memory requires repetitive and ongoing practical/physical training.

Is there enough time (and live ammunition) being made available for this purpose or is there a tendency to focus on the more 'sexy' aspects of soldiering?

[Compost]

Would it be possible to have a basic, standardized infantry unit ("light"), and put it on trucks or HMMVVs (making it "mot"), APCs or IFVs (making it "mech" or "heavy"), and helicopters (making it "airborne/air assault"), just as the operations require? Making the mobility component a modular attachment to a standardized infantry building block, say a platoon? Could that work? And going one step further, making it "amphib", and thus taking the same standardized basic infantry unit all across the ground combat environment?

Your questions have been often asked. They were particularly well examined and answered by commentators like Ogorkiewicz and Simpkin in their books and also articles in Military Technology published several decades ago.

And the general answer is ‘yes’. To do anything else would be careless because all infantry are firstly trained to be resourceful and aggressive when fighting on their feet, essentially as light infantry. Fighting from within vehicles demands a different type of endurance and a different skill set including maintenance. Neither of those require a vehicle crew of eight or more men. And a standard section of about eight infantry is about the minimum for versatility and staying power. A section of that size can also be augmented by a three or four–man weapon team from the platoon or company without becoming too cumbersome to control and manoeuvre.

However, light infantry operations can – without exception – benefit from vehicle support as a means of rapid, less tiring and protected transport, sometime source of observation and offensive/defensive fire, systems support and mobility and also as an arms-room, Q-store, kitchen and casevac post. What varies is the distance between dismounted infantry and their supporting vehicle – whether that be a GS truck or light-medium-heavy ground-based armour vehicle or watercraft, or in another context a STOL or VTOL aircraft. And a standard infantry section of about eight enables the overall size of that vehicle to be restrained.

Light infantry/armour co-operation was around for more than a millennia before Hannibal and his elephants. Modern infantry/armour co-operation has been productive in most environments since WW I and generally the closer together the better. Armour – MBTs, AEVs and APCs - proved unexpectedly useful in heavily vegetated areas in WWII and more recently in South Vietnam.

The result is that close coordination of armour and dismounted infantry is generally regarded as beneficial in defence and productive in offence for all environments and all forms of conflict – extending from prompt delivery of heavy firepower, combat engineering resources and concentrated and diffused infantry manoeuvre to passive overwatch and less vulnerable sentry in peacekeeping operations. APC concepts and capabilities have also been enhanced to produce not only AIFVs but also heavier armoured ‘battle wagons’ such as the German Lynx and Israeli Namer. And there are Ogorkiewicz and Simpkin concepts that have yet to be realized.

Usage improves with applied training, familiarity and frequent exercise but that does not require the infantry-carrying armoured vehicle to be operated by infantry. As implied by you, the mobility component or crew – driver, vehicle commander and gunner(s) or systems/weapon operator(s) - is better composed of personnel from an Armoured Corps. Most armoured vehicles have specialised systems and weapons and the vehicles themselves need attentive maintenance. So who better to crew infantry-carrying armoured vehicles than those specialists who already crew generally similar armoured vehicles that transport cavalry scouts. And the pool of Armoured Corps personnel can anyway be boosted by cross-corps recruiting of infantry who may have ‘lost’ some agility or fitness due to age or accident such as to an ankle during a parachute jump. That and other types of accident are prevalent in active training and often result in premature retirement.

It is in the nature of campaigns that after operating with one type of armoured vehicle for some period, a light infantry unit might be deployed to another operational area as light infantry, or as infantry mounted in another type of armoured vehicle more suited to that operational area. That type of rota is especially likely during operations conducted on a basis of periodic deployment or re-deployment.

There is the old furphy that an Armoured Corps crew may lack the knowledge and drive to deliver the infantry section where and how it needs to go. So some stalwarts strenuously argue that the infantry section commander should - instead of advising the vehicle commander – have command until the infantry dismount. However, after basic training and reasonably frequent exercise together (plus in some instances specific-to-operation rehearsal) the typical vehicle commander and typical section commander are likely to function well enough regardless of which is in substantive command.

But there is almost always an exception. And here is one such. There are several distinct types of infantry carrying armoured surface vehicle: light, medium and heavy wheeled and tracked. The least capable but also the least expensive to procure and operate is the light (less than 20 tonnes) wheeled APC. The Australian Army has decided that it is generally adviseable to transport an infantry section in an armoured vehicle. As a result many of the GS trucks in its regular and in some reserve light infantry battalions are being effectively replaced by about 800 Bushmaster 4x4 Protected Mobility Vehicles: an austere type of APC with V-shaped hull, blow-off external lockers and sacrificial wheel stations, some with Platt mounts but all currently without a shield or small turret. ( There are also two so-called armoured infantry battalions equipped with a mix of obsolescent M113A1 and modernised M113A3 APCs with an extra wheel station and upgraded engine, systems, spall liner and turret.)

The exception is partly due to the Bushmaster PMV having only ten seats. Hence - whenever it is required to carry a standard 8-man infantry section plus a 2-man command, engineer or other special team - an infantryman from the section has to be the designated driver and vehicle minder. And that seems to anyway be standard procedure in order to avoid having to increase battalion strength by about 100 drivers.

However, it is pleasing to note that AustArmy are ahead of the pack at the lightweight end of the protected mobility field. The US Army and USMC might find it convenient to employ the lighter variants of their MRAV vehicles in much the same way, provided they have independent springing rather than beam axles.

Unfortunately as a bitter aside AustArmy have mucked up the heavy end. It has only 59 M1A1(AIM)D Abrams MBTs on strength and not even one squadron can be deployed because for mobility support there is only a batch of M88A2 Hercules ARVs that rely on dissimilar spares. There is strangely not one AEV nor AVLB. So AustArmy may continue to perform at the light end but will have to rely on some other force such as the US Army and/or USMC to do any heavy lifting.

Returning to the basic question, it is generally preferable for each infantry battalion to be trained and primarily equipped as light infantry ? The answer has to be 'YES'.

If a battalion is issued with austere wheeled PMV-type vehicles then the unit might itself provide the driver and any weapon/systems operator for each vehicle. All other types of wheeled and tracked armoured infantry-carrying vehicles should be crewed by specialist drivers, commanders, gunners etc from an Armoured as opposed to the Infantry Corps. And groups or units of such vehicles should be attached to infantry units for periodic training and exercise, for specific operations and for more extended periods of use.

[Fuchs]

And the general answer is ‘yes’. To do anything else would be careless because all infantry are firstly trained to be resourceful and aggressive when fighting on their feet, essentially as light infantry.

That kind of training is awfully outdated, and on top of that pretty much ignorant of actual historical infantry missions. Aggressive actions are sometimes called for, but that's extremely rare in comparison to what infantry does during war overall.


I'd emphasize self-discipline (especially patience, thoroughness in camouflage and observation) and elusiveness instead - even and especially for offensive purposes.
These traits are required for vehicle crews as well, and it's more difficult for them since their vehicle's size makes it more difficult to meet the requirements.

[jcustis]

Would it be possible to have a basic, standardized infantry unit ("light"), and put it on trucks or HMMVVs (making it "mot"), APCs or IFVs (making it "mech" or "heavy"), and helicopters (making it "airborne/air assault"), just as the operations require? Making the mobility component a modular attachment to a standardized infantry building block, say a platoon? Could that work? And going one step further, making it "amphib", and thus taking the same standardized basic infantry unit all across the ground combat environment?

The Marine Corps already does this. We train our infantry lieutenants and captains as such to operate precisely as trainer/leaders for this sort of optimum utility force.

When we motorize infantry in mine-resistant vehicles, it is typically through the use of infantrymen trained as incidental drivers. With amphibious tracked vehicles, those crewmen originate in a separate military occupational specialty.

[Compost]

German experience was that APCs (SdKfz 251 mostly) halved infantry losses. APCs were only employed in motorised/armoured formations which tended to use aggressive (offensive) tactics, of course.

Above is quote of four weeks old item 177 on MRAP JLTV concept of infantry mobility thread. Followed here by:

That kind of training is awfully outdated, and on top of that pretty much ignorant of actual historical infantry missions. Aggressive actions are sometimes called for, but that's extremely rare in comparison to what infantry does during war overall.

At least we agree that infantry-carrying armoured vehicles can be/are useful.