How to build a State in a non State environment?

[Stan]

Post-conflict humanitarian aid is a whole different thing. Ask the Red Cross. Food, shelter, treatment, refugee/resettlement assistance.

Why don't our programs focus, for example, on documenting and resettling refugees? Isn't that a valid way to stabilize a community in conflict?

Steve,
IMO refugees and the crisis they bring are nothing but a huge cash cow. Not sure what sort of success you would have with documenting and resettling in Iraq, but I can tell you a lot about Sub-Sahara. It ain't happening. It kind of brings us back to your question though... What was here before and what will it take to bring it back ? Even then most of the refugees still hung out in the jungle until they were literally flushed out from another conflict.

And, oddly enough, even with 1,8 million refugees, the nation in question was still firmly in control (relatively speaking).

I share M-A's concerns with the UN and most of the aid agencies.

[M-A Lagrange]

First of all, Steve, your example is not boring or useless or even going against what I am saying.

I do believe that this bridge was not only a problem for the Iraqi people but also for the US forces and was a military strategic point (Or tactical or maneuver or WTF). And the main problem was not the bridge but security.
Once you had security, you have been able to convince contractors to rebuild it.
The bridge was a major logistical issue for the local market and for access.
Well, I had an experience a little different but similar in many points: a cross road linking an agricultural production area with a town and several militia/bandits long that road.
As you mentioned it, the people found a way to have the goods moving anyways until security came. We did the same in including all parties, working on both sides of that cross road. Was not easy… (Nice to find a grenade on your door step in the morning. Lucky it did not blow up).
Working at grass roots level by injecting $ in each and every household participates in building security (That does not replace a check point, intel and search and destroy teams…) but first of all participates in building/developing households economy. As the people get money, they can reorganize markets; reorganize the economical network according to the circumstances.

The “streets clean up project” is just an example of what you can do in the very early stage. What I have learned is that projects have to be with immediate effect. You have to inject cash and make it accessible right now. Waiting even several weeks (basically more than 1 month, great max) brings only problems cause the people want to be in position to rebuild their lives right now.
I like to say that the 3 phase of war for civilians are: survive, rebuild, normality.
In military timing:
Survive=shock
Rebuild= hold
Normality= build
The key moment is hold. That’s the moment you want to provide security + rebuild household economy and really build a government.

Why don't our programs focus, for example, on documenting and resettling refugees? Isn't that a valid way to stabilize a community in conflict?

Refugees are per excellence a destabilizing factor. And the problem is that they have the right to go back home but also the right to not go back were they come from but you have no right to tell them where to go.
And you have no right to bring them back at the exact same place but have the responsibility to compensate them with what they lost… (Basically sending them back home exactly where they came from is the cheapest)
I hate to say so but Kagame made a great job in relocating the refugees and redesigning the habitat in Rwanda. Some may say it was to establish control over –populations, some may say it was to facilitate security provision…

Also I agree with Stan, refugees are cash cow.

[Steve the Planner]

Stan/ MAL:

Having spent time with the UN (after reading the De Mello Book), I can only say that they have a lot of intelligent and committed people on the ground struggling to obtain approvals/funding/staffing through a very complex structure.

The current UN SRSG is a formidable example of competence and commitment, as I learned working for his political section in Iraq.

This business of looking at wars and refugees in different modes is the challenge.

Refugees usually become mobile well-before actual conflict, and, logically, will hide in the jungle as long as they need to before returning. The history of forced and non-forced resettlements is complex.

The problems during conflict are complex, including dealing with refugee mobility through the lines, assistance for internal refugees, and bad guys using refugees as cover for their purposes. My belief is that our military tactics do not fully comprehend or address pitfalls and opportunities to actively manage refugee issues.

If money is a weapon of war (a concept which I have problems with), then surely refugee management/control is one, too. These are the actual people to whom the hearts and minds are attached.

The problem, however, for post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction is that it just isn't over until all viable and willing resettlement has occurred.

To date, the US has not dealt with this phase/activity except as to assistance for external refugees, and resettlements to the US.

having spent time with UN folks involved in serious refugee issues, and studying them independently, I know there is much we don't know or have needed skills in.

This is the place where the deal is really closed---whether we actually do it or not, it is the end game, so it would be nice to be on our radar.

[M-A Lagrange]

Stan/ MAL:
Having spent time with the UN (after reading the De Mello Book), I can only say that they have a lot of intelligent and committed people on the ground struggling to obtain approvals/funding/staffing through a very complex structure.
The current UN SRSG is a formidable example of competence and commitment, as I learned working for his political section in Iraq.

Being part of the UN folks, I do agree with you but you are in a rolls royce mission: Iraq!
Other part of the world are not always like that. I know a lot of barrely competent people in The UN who are there just for the money.
The problematic lay down to the security council interrest in the mission. And also mainly in the parties involved.
I have too much witnessed how the system works to come to a so happy conclusion.

having spent time with UN folks involved in serious refugee issues, and studying them independently, I know there is much we don't know or have needed skills in.
This is the place where the deal is really closed---whether we actually do it or not, it is the end game, so it would be nice to be on our radar.

Concure too with that. But still believe that a grand reorganisation and evaluation of people skills is needed. Actually the machine works much more because you have 2 out of 10 people who do the job rather than a strong cinergy between sections and agencies.

Then comes the problem I was pointing on the threat on Sudan: when the UN staff is composed of people coming from highly corrupted countries which are apointed to pleasee the assembly members and make their countries earn money...
Then you gat a disaster and you end up building a corrupted machine. That's why, IMO, you have to start by taking full control and not let too much the UN machinery put its nose in. Once all is finished and that you can deliver a viable structure "clef en main" then the UN can come.

[Steve the Planner]

MAL

Loud and clear on UNAMI. The political team their were some of the best of the best.

Like comparing a Division staff to life in a platoon.

I was just reading a WP article on CERP, recanting the many woes of Money as Weapon:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...T2011010300196

The incidents cited and folks involved (including Hertling) were all getting their hands handed to them (us) for imposing silly standards like ensuring governate sign off/acceptance prior to any CERP funds for brigade/sheik projects.

The folks that should lead in challenging circumstances are often adverse to the machine.

I remember the tasking to identify from historic photos all the pools in Iraq so that CERP funds could be used to reopen them---even if no power, clean water, or sustainment funding. It would be good for "hearts and minds."

How 'bout just being boring and repairing the water systems? That didn't start to be a focus until later in 2008. (2008, five years after 2003).

Let's not forget that for every UN Oil-For-Food Program there is a US boondoggle of equal or greater value.

Wanna be a mid/senior level leader at USAID? Need six years of experience as a USAID contractor. What does that tell you about "change?" (I would never qualify).

[JJackson]

A number of posters have bought up the willingness to meet the capital cost of a program without adequate provision for the running costs. Also there have been a number of examples illustrating the need for security prior to infrastructure needed for economic activity. Our destabilisation of the Soviet backed regime and Pakistan’s destabilisation of the US backed regime (and plenty of other examples elsewhere) have shown it is much cheaper to destroy than build. Putting these all together I have been surprised not to see more discussion of the viability of building an Afghan security force (police and army) in a country that could not afford to sustain either. Looking at the country, even assuming a miracle occurred and the central government had a firm grip and security of half the territory, would this be an adequate tax base to sustain a force defending it?

Going back to the question of ‘is a cleptocracy a necessary step on the path to a less corrupt form of government?’ and the excellent notion that it might be a good idea to look at the existing political systems, which the population are used to and understand, and try and build on these. In Afghanistan we seem to have setup a top down model in direct completion with the tribal shura model. The traditional model seems to have evolved to cope with an inbuilt level of endemic ‘corruption’ while our model has not, as yet, found a working balance. Corruption is, to a degree, in the eye of the beholder. In the US the political system has an ‘accepted’ balance in laws are passed by inducing Congressman to support a bill – he does not really care about – by promising some pork for something he does. It is the cost of doing business as is a bit of backshish in other parts of the world, in each case there are norms and there are unacceptable excesses.

The discussion has touched on legitimacy and I have real problems with NATO or ‘coalitions of the willing’ being legitimate arbiters of which countries should be invaded or what individuals/governments are created and empowered. This is a very dangerous precedent and I suspect Western publics would have a serious problems if Venezuela formed a coalition of the willing including Cuba, Iran and its friends and decided to do something about the failed state of Haiti. Which brings me to the UN, which I am unfashionably fond of, baring the Security Council which brings the rest of the organisation into disrepute. The fact that it has representatives from countries with high levels of corruption that are in it for personal gain is just another cost of doing business. Single nation states, with comparatively homogeneous political views, have enough trouble reconciling the wants of very red and very blue states when most countries could not spot the difference. For an organisation that needs to accommodate Myanmar, KSA, Israel, China and the US it does a remarkable job and, despite the weaknesses caused by this width, it can confer a level of legitimacy among the community of nation states that a military superpower and a few like-minded friends can not.

Looking at the latest batch of polling data – going back to ascertaining what the people actually want/think – I was surprised by the level of support the Karzai government received. Faith in the coalition forces has been slipping, year-on-year, and the only saving grace is the Taliban is even less popular than we are.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Going back to the question of ‘is a cleptocracy a necessary step on the path to a less corrupt form of government?’ and the excellent notion that it might be a good idea to look at the existing political systems, which the population are used to and understand, and try and build on these.

OK, a note on cleptocracy from a tribal point of view. Depending on the area and the level of centralization in the existing governance system property is viewed as corporate in a tribe. What I mean by that is that all the tribes property is considered owned by the head of the tribe and is distributed for use by members of the tribe in accordance with how he or she views it as being appropriate. A person in a tribal leadership position will look at the property that they have as theirs. All tribal members under him must get permission to use it.

In my mind this creates two problems. First, since the property is essentially theirs, they can use it for anything they want including themselves. Fast-forward to a tribal leader in a government position (or a leader whose only frame of reference for how to lead is tribal ways) that person does not see spending their budget any way they want as stealing. Second, all tribal members must get permission to use the tribal property. Fast-forward to a mid-level manager in a logistics chain. He will not release any parts until he has permission from the "owner" of the property. These are not things you are going to change over night. Iraq has had the "dictatorial advantage" for many years and the tribal mindset still limits capabilities. It is something you have to learn to work with.