Do Special Operations live up to their role in Air Power support?

[Van]

Louis,
This sounds suspiciously like a CGSC/ACSC or SAMS/SAAS thesis. And this is great, but discussion would be easier if you be a little more up front about it.

Similar questions would include "how is this different from service transportation assets being service run versus USTRANSCOM run?", or "how is this different from the problems the intel community runs into with the 'service missions' versus 'joint missions'?" You might also look at communications, with the conflicts between service doctrines, joint requirements, and systems capabilities.

Are there valid analogies, and are there misleading analogies?

Also, could you more clearly define 'Air Power' for the sake of this discussion?

After glancing at the AFDD 1, I noted that special operations is its own role in "Air Power" operational functions. So when you ask

Does AFSOC require greater power in its role to be able to deliver more Air Power?

I think you may still need to clarify your question.

And (last point for this post, I promise) how often does AFSOC operate without a clear role in a larger USSOCOM operation? I do not have numbers, but I suspect the percentage is very small. If this is the case, it would be hard to justify greater autonomy (where I think you're going with this) for AFSOC, when the relationship with USSOCOM is wired as tightly as it seems to be. In this, your point (as I understand it) is part of a much larger issue of balancing degrees of service autonomy, degrees of fragmentation of DoD, against greater jointness and centralization.

We could go into the culture of the Air Force, and Billy Mitchell's role in shaping the personality of the Air Force today, but that could turn into a serious thread-jacking.

[Old Eagle]

What about AFSOC's advisory role? In the past, they had maintained a small, very specialized advisory squadron. That has reportedly been expanded now. The Air Force clearly needs a capability to advise in a diverse environment on a number of airframes, sustainment tasks, tactics and doctrine. Without the ability to help host nation air forces, USAF risks being mired in conflicts even more than ground forces. IT's not all about flying ISO U.S. forces.

[Peacedog]

The issue with the USAF is more fundamental than that. The bottom line is that the USAF as an institution does not want to change or add anything in its basic mission set. In fact, the USAF as an institution wants to further reduce its mission set to its self perceived traditional “core” missions.

This is, of course, completely delusional behavior. The reason the USAF is in a budget crunch in the first place is the, very accurate, perception that the service has not done much in the war on terror realm. Additionally, as a service it has made the fewest changes to accommodate post cold War reality.

A consistent issue brought up to the USAF, and one their leadership actively chooses to completely ignore, is that a military is valued off of what it does today. Most of the core missions of the USAF fall into the category of contingency capabilities, that have little utility outside of a very narrow band of activity.

The central problem facing the USAF, and this goes back to the heart of your AFSOC question, is that the USAF as an institution does not want to expand its capabilities list beyond what it is currently performing. In fact, it wants to reduce this, but it does not want to cease performing any of its traditional roles as well. In essence, the USAF is engaging in self induced irrelevancy.

[Entropy]

The issue with the USAF is more fundamental than that. The bottom line is that the USAF as an institution does not want to change or add anything in its basic mission set. In fact, the USAF as an institution wants to further reduce its mission set to its self perceived traditional “core” missions.

Actually, the problem is the Air Force is constantly trying to reinvent itself. In my view, it's trying to change too much and too often.

This is, of course, completely delusional behavior. The reason the USAF is in a budget crunch in the first place is the, very accurate, perception that the service has not done much in the war on terror realm. Additionally, as a service it has made the fewest changes to accommodate post cold War reality.

On your first point, the war on terror is not an air war. What more would you have the AF do? On your second point, I think you need to look at some history. SAC, for example, was the Air Force's most important organization through most of the service's history. SAC isn't around anymore - it was disestablished 19 years ago as a consequence of the end of the Cold War. I'm not sure how getting rid of your premiere Cold War organization is failing to change to post-Cold War reality.

A consistent issue brought up to the USAF, and one their leadership actively chooses to completely ignore, is that a military is valued off of what it does today. Most of the core missions of the USAF fall into the category of contingency capabilities, that have little utility outside of a very narrow band of activity.

Policymakers like contingency operations and like those capabilities. I spent almost all of the 1990's doing contingency operations when I was in the Navy, for example. We're still doing them today. I think policymakers would disagree with your assertion that "a military is valued off of what it does today."

The central problem facing the USAF, and this goes back to the heart of your AFSOC question, is that the USAF as an institution does not want to expand its capabilities list beyond what it is currently performing. In fact, it wants to reduce this, but it does not want to cease performing any of its traditional roles as well. In essence, the USAF is engaging in self induced irrelevancy.

What specifically should the AF be doing that it is not doing? What about UAV's and so-called Cyber-warfare - those are two areas where the AF has not only tried to expand, but tried to control almost the whole ball of wax.