Dissertation Assistance

[Silas]

For my background see: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=12090

I'm looking for a bit of assistance with my fourth year undergrad dissertation. Time is ticking by and I haven't locked down the focus and question. I've been reading extensively on COIN, particularly its application in Afghanistan for some time now and I'm having difficulty locking down a narrow enough area of COIN to focus on in 12,000-15,000 words that will be provide me with a strong central thread/argument.

At first I planned to focus on metrics, particularly how they could be used to demonstrate progress in Afghanistan. Also looked at how the military and civilian organizations prioritise certain indicators over others and what this means for a inclusive approach. My dissertation advisor thought that this was perhaps a bit ambitious, given the word limit and complex nature of the area.

He guided me towards choosing a dominant theme in the literature that interested me and I found the interaction between civilian and military institutions in Afghanistan to be of particular interest. I'm particularly interested in PRTs and the idea of military forces being asked to achieve non-warfighting aims. My reading has been very wide (including a great deal on CIMIC) but I am having a lot of trouble trying to formulate a focussed undergrad-level question to base the dissertation on. In the past I've had an essay achieve a poor mark because I chose a weak argument/focus so I am more than a bit worried about my current situation. I've noticed that members of the board have given people in similar situations help before so I was hoping that someone here could guide me towards an appropriate question.

{Edited by mods at poster's request}

Any help would be greatly appreciated, if any clarification is needed please just ask.

-Silas

[Rex Brynen]

I'm not sure we should be in the role of suggesting research questions. Helping you refine them, sure; suggesting resources, yes. But coming up with a research problem--stated as a problem or question to be argued and answered, if not a formal hypothesis--is probably something you should take a stab at first.

Why not take the issues you've mentioned, and throw out a number of possible interesting questions that arise from them (and that are feasible to answer in the time and space permitted)? We could then comment on these.

{Edited by original poster's request}

[Silas]

{Edited per poster's request}

As far as the rest of your comments, I will dig around my notebooks for the draft questions I've been playing around with and post them here for comment/criticism.

-Silas

[Silas]

Thanks very much for editing the above SWJED.

Below are the questions I have written down in my notebooks. Most of them were just spur of the moment thoughts but any comments/criticisms or overall guidance would be greatly appreciated.

In no particular order:

Is civil-military cooperation vital to the success of NATO's mission in Afghanistan?
To what extent is ground-level civil-military cooperation the key to the success of NATO's mission in Afghanistan?
What place does ground-level civil-military cooperation have in the wider strategy of NATO in Afghanistan?
Should civil-military cooperation become the centre point of the counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan?
What civil-military cooperation exists on the ground in Afghanistan, and has it been successful?
In the case of Afghanistan, should military units adapt to tackle non-combat political objectives?
Should soldiers be expected to perform political and diplomatic roles on the ground in Afghanistan?
How can military forces in Afghanistan balance combat success with civil-military reconstruction?
To what extent are military forces and their civilian counterparts working towards different objectives in Afghanistan?

-Silas

[Rex Brynen]

Well done, all-powerful SWJED.

On the topics, some quick thoughts:

Is civil-military cooperation vital to the success of NATO's mission in Afghanistan?
To what extent is ground-level civil-military cooperation the key to the success of NATO's mission in Afghanistan?

Too easy, I think.

What place does ground-level civil-military cooperation have in the wider strategy of NATO in Afghanistan?

This could be interesting, although you would want to push it beyond the usual COIN orthodoxy to ask some difficult questions about COIN assumptions.

Should civil-military cooperation become the centre point of the counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan?

I'm not sure anyone would ever argue this.

What civil-military cooperation exists on the ground in Afghanistan, and has it been successful?

The first (descriptive) part is less interesting than the (second) analytical part. You might have trouble finding critical data, since the official releases tend to be good news stories.

In the case of Afghanistan, should military units adapt to tackle non-combat political objectives?
Should soldiers be expected to perform political and diplomatic roles on the ground in Afghanistan?
How can military forces in Afghanistan balance combat success with civil-military reconstruction?

Ahh, dear to Wilf's heart. Yes, there are some interesting potential debates here.

To what extent are military forces and their civilian counterparts working towards different objectives in Afghanistan?

A more interesting way of getting at this is looking at how a range of factors (SOPs, bureaucratic politics, technical expertise, budget envelopes) inhibit effective cooperation around clear goals.

I'm sure others will have some thoughts.

[John T. Fishel]

Silas, your questions all address tactical and operational issues with no strategic context. Until you put them in the context of the overall mission in Afghanistan, they are all equally good or bad. If you set the strategic context, in particular, the desired strategic objective, I suspect the question (or questions) you will really wish to answer/address will leap out from among the pile you have proposed. You don't have to dream up the strategic objective; you can simply take it as stated by NATO/ISAF or President Obama.

Hope that is useful.

Cheers

JohnT

[davidbfpo]

There are two options I see for your work: to use the contemporary situation and pull in the bewildering complexity of the civil-military aspect or compare the civil-military practices of the imperial era in NWFP and the borderlands of Afghanistan with today.

What were the objectives then and now? I suspect they are very similar.

Originally the work of the PRTs in Afghanistan was praised, prior to 2006 and now they appear to have been submerged. There is some irony in the UK PRT being in the north, largely away from the Pathan tribes and reported as being successful - then we "won" Helmand.

[jcustis]

Is civil-military cooperation vital to the success of NATO's mission in Afghanistan?
To what extent is ground-level civil-military cooperation the key to the success of NATO's mission in Afghanistan?
What place does ground-level civil-military cooperation have in the wider strategy of NATO in Afghanistan?
Should civil-military cooperation become the centre point of the counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan?
What civil-military cooperation exists on the ground in Afghanistan, and has it been successful?
In the case of Afghanistan, should military units adapt to tackle non-combat political objectives?
Should soldiers be expected to perform political and diplomatic roles on the ground in Afghanistan?
How can military forces in Afghanistan balance combat success with civil-military reconstruction?
To what extent are military forces and their civilian counterparts working towards different objectives in Afghanistan?

Silas, even in the midst of formulating a question that is central to a thesis, you need to hold a semblance of a position on the matter, at least in some small degree. What are your own thoughts on these topics these questions delve into?

You have posed a few questions that are extremely layered, and those layers have to be pulled apart before you are going to be able to get to the nuggets that are important.

[Silas]

This could be interesting, although you would want to push it beyond the usual COIN orthodoxy to ask some difficult questions about COIN assumptions.


Ahh, dear to Wilf's heart. Yes, there are some interesting potential debates here.

Thanks very much for the comments, I really appreciate it.

As far as the first of the two above could I ask you to clarify something? By pushing beyond the COIN orthodoxy to ask some difficult questions about COIN assumptions do you mean questioning ideas such as the centrality of the population in COIN? I read the recent interview with Colonel Gentile posted on SWJ and was very interested by his argument that the importance of the population was being overstated in mainstream COIN and that traditional kinetic methods were being neglected to some extent. In terms of the civil-military dimension and the wider strategy would it be possible to argue that it is becoming too large a part of the overall strategy?

As far as the second comment, I looked up some of William F. Owen's old posts and was particularly interested by the debate that occured surround Nagl's 'The Army We Need' article (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=6489). Are there many academics other than Gentile and Owen arguing that the military's role has drifted too far away from combat success (not to put words in their mouths, this is just my interpretation of what I've read)? Personally it's a bit intimidating to question Nagl and other giants of COIN as a lowly undergrad. The three questions you grouped with your comment are very appealing to me but I cant say I've read a lot of sources that I could use (perhaps I am reading too much mainstream modern COIN?).

[Silas]

Silas, your questions all address tactical and operational issues with no strategic context. Until you put them in the context of the overall mission in Afghanistan, they are all equally good or bad. If you set the strategic context, in particular, the desired strategic objective, I suspect the question (or questions) you will really wish to answer/address will leap out from among the pile you have proposed. You don't have to dream up the strategic objective; you can simply take it as stated by NATO/ISAF or President Obama.

Hope that is useful.

Cheers

JohnT

Thanks very much for your comments John. I see now that I need to reword whatever question I choose to include the overall strategic aim of the mission. One question I do have is choosing the source of the desired objective. There is a vast difference between the ISAF goal stated on their website and the much more realistic (in my mind) goal that Gates describes here: http://defensenews.com/story.php?i=3920595&c=ASI&s=TOP

If I were to choose question along the lines of the three below then I suppose that I could perhaps question whether the military should be performing these roles by contrasting the different strategic goals mentioned above. Arguing that whether they should or not is based on what set of goals you choose to accept (realistic vs. idealistic). Does this sound reasonable or am I on the wrong track?

In the case of Afghanistan, should military units adapt to tackle non-combat political objectives?
Should soldiers be expected to perform political and diplomatic roles on the ground in Afghanistan?
How can military forces in Afghanistan balance combat success with civil-military reconstruction?

[Silas]

There are two options I see for your work: to use the contemporary situation and pull in the bewildering complexity of the civil-military aspect or compare the civil-military practices of the imperial era in NWFP and the borderlands of Afghanistan with today.

What were the objectives then and now? I suspect they are very similar.

Originally the work of the PRTs in Afghanistan was praised, prior to 2006 and now they appear to have been submerged. There is some irony in the UK PRT being in the north, largely away from the Pathan tribes and reported as being successful - then we "won" Helmand.

Thanks very much for your response David.

The historical comparison you mention sounds extremely interesting, once the university library reopens I'm going to do some digging for sources. Without wanting to sound like I'm asking to be spoon fed, are there are authors that you know of who have covered the historical civil military practices well? The vast majority of historical material I've read recently is the Vietnam/Malaya/Algeria COIN literature and books that cover more general history of Afghanistan.

As regards your second comment, do you feel that the UK has swung back away from PRT use more recently? Are we more focussed on training the ANA/ANP now?

[davidbfpo]

Silas,

You ask:

Without wanting to sound like I'm asking to be spoon fed, are there are authors that you know of who have covered the historical civil military practices well?

Somewhere on SWC we have looked at the Imperial era, IIRC around the role of Political Agents; less certainly I think the PRSU @ Bradford have too. In the UK in Afghanistan thread there was a reference to pre-Helmand deployment, in 2006, that experts had advised against such a deployment. There are a coule of threads on PRT too.

Second:

do you feel that the UK has swung back away from PRT use more recently? Are we more focussed on training the ANA/ANP now?

The PRTs originally were quite small, military dominated and from my armchair focussed on establishing good relations with everyone willing to talk. Then came quite small development projects. Helmand as we learnt quickly was not a hospitable place and PRT concept IMHO waned. Somehow DFID, FCO and others embarked on projects that defy understanding. Reconstruction: a children's park, a road to nowhere and best of all supplying farmers with fertiliser in the right chemical mix that bombs could be made. Have a look at the comments on: http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com/ awhile back.

Training Afghan security forces? That is a completely different issue, which again from my armchair was not a PRT role.

[jcustis]

Arguing that whether they should or not is based on what set of goals you choose to accept (realistic vs. idealistic). Does this sound reasonable or am I on the wrong track?

You could compare and contrast the two administrations that have dealt with Afghanistan, in order to determine if policy has lined up with goals that were acceptable (your realistic vs. idealistic part).

[Silas]

Silas, even in the midst of formulating a question that is central to a thesis, you need to hold a semblance of a position on the matter, at least in some small degree. What are your own thoughts on these topics these questions delve into?

You have posed a few questions that are extremely layered, and those layers have to be pulled apart before you are going to be able to get to the nuggets that are important.

Thanks for your response.

My position in that the objectives stated by Gates here http://defensenews.com/story.php?i=3920595&c=ASI&s=TOP are the ones that should be adopted across the board. I feel that being realistic about objectives simplifies the mission as a whole and makes choosing a clear strategy much easier. In the interview with Colonel Gentile recently posted on SWJ he stated, "You should never think that improved tactics, whether it is a conventional or a counterinsurgency war, can rescue a failed strategy or policy." (referring to lessons to be learned from Algeria). To some extent I agree with him, COIN has sound theoretical grounds and in some cases measurable success but I'm starting to feel as if we are getting too bogged down in it in Afghanistan (maybe because of the success in Iraq).

As far as the role of military forces, I feel that both U.S. and British forces (and others too, those are just the two I read about most) have proved themselves adaptable to the varied roles that COIN demands but I feel that it's debatable whether they should be asked to achieve aims so far removed from traditional kinetic actions. This again links back to the point I made in an earlier post about objectives, I'm debating in my head if the over-ambitious objectives are forcing inefficient/innapropriate use of military foces and whether they've been muzzled at the wrong point in the mission.

I realised that there are probably some contradictions above and some less than sound arguments but there are just the opinions that are bouncing around my 22 year old brain.

[M-A Lagrange]

You could compare and contrast the two administrations that have dealt with Afghanistan, in order to determine if policy has lined up with goals that were acceptable (your realistic vs. idealistic part).

And end up in the trap: orthodox COIN (surge or the French school) versus POP CENTRIC COIN... Good luke with explaining why both do and do not work and how they are related to an administration change.
But that's the most interresting up to now, IMO.

[RotzKhan]

If you have questions on PRTs as they worked on the ground, I might be able to help with how some US PRTs have worked. Each nation runs its PRTs very differently.

In 2002, I helped establish the second US PRT in Bamian and stayed there until just before we turned it over to the Kiwis. (I was the lead Civil Affairs guy in Bamian before the PRT was established.) I was the number two guy at the PRT in Zabol in 04 and 05. In 08 and 09 I worked closely with the Bagram PRT in Kapisa when I was a Human Terrain Team leader.

You might also want to look up Michael Stout (COL. retired) at Joint Forces Command. If there is one person that deserves the credit or blame for the PRT concept, it is him.

I have access to many people who worked US PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq, so if you need more contacts I am willing to contact them. US Iraq and AFG PRTs are very different organizations.

BTW, we handled some security training in Bamian and Zabol for local ANP. After I left Zabol, they even established a little police academy run by the PRT's MOI rep (an MOI colonel).

[John T. Fishel]

Silas--

I see no reason not to use Gates' statement of the objective. (While there are other options beside ISAF's and Gates' - such as inventing your own, taking an exisiting authoritative statement is probably best.) With that, your last 3 questions work although I personally would stay with the first two.

The next step, of course, is to collect and analyze data that address your questions. And, then, draw some conclusions.

One of the things you should be considering is the size and structure of the militaries involved. Both affect capabilities. For example, two decades ago the British Army had no civil affairs organizations and thus very limited capability in that area. In 1992 or 93 they were developing it (the British Colonel in charge was a speaker at a Civil Affairs conference in Portland OR where I was also speaking). Today,with even smaller forces but with the organizations what is British CA capability? The question, while secondary, has bearing on your main questions. Contrast British Army capability in CA and combat with the US Army and Marines. BTW, that is part of my response to Gian Gentile - we have sufficient capacity to do both the kinetica and the other stuff.

Again, hope this is useful

Cheers

JohnT

[davidbfpo]

John Fishel asks:

Today,with even smaller forces but with the organizations what is British CA capability?

There was some early newsreel on UK PRTs in Afghanistan; IIRC they were very ad hoc and officer rich.

After a couple of years in Helmand, largely at the instigation of an outsider, the UK Army agreed to form new "heavier" military assistance stabilisation teams, i.e. development / engineering teams that could look after themselves (IIRC I have mentioned them before). The teams were heavily dependent on reservists (Territorial Army).

A similar situation is found IIRC in psy ops.

I did ask General Sir David Richards a question along these lines recently, as given the UK SDSR there is greater scope / priority given to early intervention and simply the UK civil sector has no real capability. His answer was optimistically bland. One known big gap is in law enforcement (ironically just as UK police start to shed a number of long serving staff). There is capability to act in non-government bodies, notably the charity / NGO sector and with few exceptions I cannot envisage them fulfilling such a role.

So to the punch line: Yes, we'd like to do CA and no, we cannot do it now.

[Silas]

You could compare and contrast the two administrations that have dealt with Afghanistan, in order to determine if policy has lined up with goals that were acceptable (your realistic vs. idealistic part).

Thanks for the input.


My worry with that question would be that I'd be getting too far away from COIN and into the foreign policy of the administrations (as much as they are linked obviously). I'd like to discuss some of the tactical level arguments without getting into Surge vs Pop-centric too deeply as was mentioned by another poster below.

[Silas]

If you have questions on PRTs as they worked on the ground, I might be able to help with how some US PRTs have worked. Each nation runs its PRTs very differently.

In 2002, I helped establish the second US PRT in Bamian and stayed there until just before we turned it over to the Kiwis. (I was the lead Civil Affairs guy in Bamian before the PRT was established.) I was the number two guy at the PRT in Zabol in 04 and 05. In 08 and 09 I worked closely with the Bagram PRT in Kapisa when I was a Human Terrain Team leader.

You might also want to look up Michael Stout (COL. retired) at Joint Forces Command. If there is one person that deserves the credit or blame for the PRT concept, it is him.

I have access to many people who worked US PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq, so if you need more contacts I am willing to contact them. US Iraq and AFG PRTs are very different organizations.

BTW, we handled some security training in Bamian and Zabol for local ANP. After I left Zabol, they even established a little police academy run by the PRT's MOI rep (an MOI colonel).

Thanks very much for the offer of information, if I choose a question that involves PRTs I'll try to come up with some intelligent questions for you.