AC/RC Force Structure

[TAH]

Been awhile but saw something I wanted to comment on...

Background 12 years of active-duty followed by 18 years of RC duty (all Army Reserve). Three years with an AC/AR Training Support Bn.

a. Very different "cultures" across all three compos, AC, USAR and Army Guard (have a son with them). AC is very "its our way or the highway" focused. Have little to no appreciation (or concern) for what it takes to be an "RC guy/gal". No AC unit has to recruit its own folks. No AC troop has another career/job that impacts on decision making. AC folks normally don't have to pay the cost of traveling to and staying with their unit.

b. RC guy and gals who stay past 12-15 years have a greater level of dedication and committment. For many, the rest of their life (family, job school ect) fills up their plate and they leave. And the RC losses experienced commpetent mid-grade NCOs and officers. We operate with whats left...

c. Two days a month to get 20+ days (AC guys get weekends off) of stuff done is a b!tch. Not going to change.

d. Lots of RC folks are better at their job then their AC counter-parts due to being in the job longer or doing the same thing as a civilian. Especially true of E4s and E5s.

e. RC folks and their units bring a second set of skills with them. Whatever their "regular job" is. Need an IT geek ask jones over in 3rd squad. Need a carpenter go see Fred in 1st platoon ect. They also tend to be older (I know) and more mature then their AC compadres.

f. 4:3:3 may be good for some types of units but not "all". Does the AC need 40% of the water production capability on a daily basis or just the ability to get it within 30 days? Same for Civil Affairs, construction engineering, internment/re-settlement ect. If we stay with the current execution of Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) where an RC unit gets mobbed about once every 4-6 years for up to a year we can probably do OK. 40/60 split for Combat Arms (Armor, Infantry & Artillery) OK (No ADA! Do away with it or send it to the Air Force), 40/60 split for Combat Support (MPs, Engineers, Chem, MI, Aviation) OK, 40/60 split for CSS (Finance, Postal, Personnel ect) no way.

g. Struture of the three compos is VERY political. (Duh). AC wants near instant access to whatever they need whenever they need it. Guard wants whatever the governers want/need and whatever NGB gives them. USAR just wants to survive.

h. After a 30-60 day training period, most if not all RC units can and do preform at least as well as their AC counter-parts. After the third time I heard "Wow you don't act like a reservists" I started to get PO'ed.

[GLADsapper]

TAH,
I am so glad that it is not just my unit that sees the same things. On your points A-E, G and H... I agree 100%.

Getting to the theme of this whole thread. Point F. Here are my juicy details for my vision of a 4:3:3 split (as requested, gute).

So I have started by breaking the whole Army into 10 (very rough) parts. I start with the ARFORGEN cycle. So we keep the AC units on the reset/train, ready, available cycle. These are parts 1, 2, and 3. If you view the cycle like this then you will have a trio of every kind of unit. Then I add part 4, the whole non-deployable, but completely essential apparatus of the Army. Pentagon staff, drill sergeant battalions etc.

Next comes the Reserves and National Guard. Why make the Reserves the same size as the National Guard? Money. The AC always wants more troops and equipment. Are they going to get it? Of course not. That isn't how beans and bullets work in Congress. So increase the Reserves for 25% of the price. If a future war requires more soldiers, mobilize the reserves first. There is so much AC/RC integration going on nowadays it isn't that much of a stretch. When things get worse, you can call up the National Guard.

Now to the issue of force composition. When you take out the AC non-deployable units we actually have a 3:3:3 structure. I agree with TAH, there are some units that just don't belong in the RC. Airborne brigades go to the AC, Special Forces are much more numerous in the AC. Aviation units are definitely more numerous in the AC. The common theme is that these units are high training tempo with very perishable skills. Because of this, the RC will have a few more CS and CSS units to maintain a personnel balance.

Despite my last point, I disagree with TAH on his point about the support elements. The decision to fill up the Reserves with the CSS units the AC didn't want anymore is reflective of old thinking which no longer holds after the last 10 years of experience. I am of the opinion that CSS units, because they are constructive not destructive, are the only tool that can be used to maintain stability and security. All of the tools needed to fight every type of conflict should be as evenly distributed as possible. The end result would be something like 25-30% of the CSS units would be AC. The big change would be leveling out the Guard and Reserve.

[Fuchs]

Question: If the Reserves / National Guard can train up to almost active forces level within 60 days, why bother with active forces in the army at all?

The pointless expeditionary stuff is being done by Marines, and the quickest relevant response to a crisis will come from the USAF and naval aviation anyway.


Why not upgrade the NG to THE army (with two weekends per month, one two-week exercise per year and by constitutional amendment no compulsory deployment outside of the 50 states without a declaration of war)?

[Steve Blair]

Question: If the Reserves / National Guard can train up to almost active forces level within 60 days, why bother with active forces in the army at all?

The pointless expeditionary stuff is being done by Marines, and the quickest relevant response to a crisis will come from the USAF and naval aviation anyway.


Why not upgrade the NG to THE army (with two weekends per month, one two-week exercise per year and by constitutional amendment no compulsory deployment outside of the 50 states without a declaration of war)?

You'd have to use the Reserves for your idea. Plainly put, the NG has two chains of command. And a constitutional amendment? Good luck with that.

[gute]

Question: If the Reserves / National Guard can train up to almost active forces level within 60 days, why bother with active forces in the army at all?

The pointless expeditionary stuff is being done by Marines, and the quickest relevant response to a crisis will come from the USAF and naval aviation anyway.


Why not upgrade the NG to THE army (with two weekends per month, one two-week exercise per year and by constitutional amendment no compulsory deployment outside of the 50 states without a declaration of war)?

Good idea, but we have a lot of people who already question why we have a Marine Corps. Others have floated the idea here and other places about maintaining the Spec Ops command as organized and relying on large reserve/ng for protracted, conventional high end conflict. My issue with that idea is finding enough qualified people to fill all the ranks. The Navy doesn't seem to have too much of a problem bringing in new tadpoles and raising frogman, but what about SF and Delta or CAG or whatever they are called now? Rangers have been young guys for years so that's easy.

Two weekends a month might be too disruptive for a normal life, especailly if one is already working a full-time job. If we were to go to a shorter work week like 32 hours it would probably be more attractive.

[ganulv]

Good idea, but we have a lot of people who already question why we have a Marine Corps. […] Rangers have been young guys for years so that's easy.

The Marine Corps has been around for 237 years, the Ranger Regiment for 27 years. Which one is more dispensable?

[TAH]

Asked/said another way....

Why a USMC AND a AC Army AND a Army NG AND a USAR?

Do we need and can we afford all four?

Really is the Army NG is not going to go away. 50 governers and the DC plus Puerta Rico and Guam will stop that.

The Army brings capabilities to the table the USMC do not. Ability to do battalion and larger airborne ops, the ability to do bigger then a division heavy/armored ops, LOTS of CSS and medical. USMC relies alot on both the Navy and the Army for "overhead". Who does USMC medical? The Army supports the USMC by providing training base support (tankers and artilleryman for a start).

Why not a USMC that is 100% AC at 250K (or so) and an Army?Army Guard at 300K AC and 700K NG. No USAR (too much redundant overhead). Continue current ARFORGEN to allow Army to "right size" itself through mob, not AC end strenght.

Army would end up with:

1.An AC division HQs in Europe with two AC BCTs and some number of NG BCTs rotated in/out.

2. An AC division HQs in Korea with troops as is

3. An AC division HQs either in Hawaii or Fort Lewis for Pac Rim forces.

4. Two AC divisions HQ for Army first responders (82nd and a heavy/armored division).

[GLADsapper]

As mentioned earlier, the Constitution and politics will ultimately prevent the dissolution of the National Guard. In addition, the Reserves will probably always be around to some degree or another because it is a nice place to store unwanted, but necessary, capabilities when money gets tight (it applies to every branch).

To add some anecdotal evidence to another debate... logistical issues will always necessitate the existence of the Army. I worked for a logistics Major who would tell stories about how the Marines were begging Army log units for support during the initial weeks of the Iraq Invasion. Once the Marines get too far from the Navy, their CSS situation goes down the toilet. That is how they are able to maintain such a large tooth to tail ratio on paper. By the same token, there will always be a force that looks like the Marines and it will occupy that 200 mile strip of land between the ocean and the interior. I am willing to accept that fact and let them do their own thing (but can we please standardize weapons and uniforms between Army and Marines?)

Back to AC/RC structure. I am surprised that nobody in this thread has brought up Tom Barnett and the Leviathan/System Administrator structure. If you agree with his views of globalization and the US's role in the world system, it would seem that the AC/RC structure would be a great place to start tailoring the armed forces to perform those duties. His TED talk is a great summary of his line of thinking and offers a quick and dirty breakdown of AC/RC forces which is pertinent to this thread.http://www.ted.com/talks/thomas_barn...for_peace.html

If you followed Barnett's plan the AC Army would have the large majority of the Leviathan units (Special Forces, Maneuver BCTs, Fires, Combat Aviation, and Battlefield Surveillance) and the RC/NG would have most of the Sys-Admin units (Maneuver Enhancement Brigades, Sustainment Brigades, etc.) I can see MP and Engineer units being particularly valuable for a Sys-Admin force because of their dual nature (MP's and Combat Engineers relish their secondary “Fight as Infantry” mission.) When paired up with the Marines we have a force that could handle just about anything in a low-intensity conflict zone. The AC Army divisional headquarters' would be spread out by region roughly as TAH described it and paired with a joint-interagency Sys-Admin headquarters (which helps with contingency planning). The RC component and Marines would fall under the Sys-Admin joint headquarters during the mobilization.

I don't see this force mixture occurring anytime soon because the end result would make the AC Army much smaller (same size as AC Marine Corps perhaps?). This would be possible because there would be no need for 12 month deployments. The Leviathan force would crush countries like Iraq in a couple months and come straight back home. The RC/NG and the Marines would be a far larger component, personnel wise, because they would have to sustain long deployments repeatedly.

The more I write about it, the more I have to give Barnett credit. It seems like an elegant solution to many problems. Maintaining the skill sets and collective tasks needed to perform low-intensity warfare at a high level requires far less time and resources than maintaining those needed for high-intensity ops.

[gute]

I read Barnett's book when it first came out and I have watched the linked video before. Personally, I have not mentioned Barnett or his ideas because I don't agree with him. IMO Barnett has spent too much time traveling around the world hearing about what our military should be from people that don't necessarily have our best interests in mind and it has clouded his judgement.

I believe the U.S. has been at war since 1950 and the major threat collapsed in 1989. IMO the total maneuver force of AC, USANG and USMC would be the size of the pre-9/11 AC Army - roughly 100 maneuver battalions. All divisions become one large brigade (10xAC, 8xRC, 3xUSMC, 1xUSMCR) plus the 173rd, 2ACR, 3ACR and 11ACR. Special Ops Command would slim down a little by eliminating redundant mission sets.

The tricky part now is the ratio of heavy to light. What takes more training an ABCT (HBCT) or IBCT? Do we need 12 airborne battalions? Is it easier to go from heavy to light than light to heavy? Can the heavy force size be based on OIF in 2003 - is more armor necessary?

[Bob's World]

Slightly different take:
- At peace since '45.
- Required to sustain a warfighting military in peace due to decision to use a containment strategy to counter / compete with the Russians.
- Existence of such a military resulting in two very dangerous and detrimental effects on the very nature of US governance:
A. Empowering Presidents to commit the nation to a long string of "conflicts of choice" without the cooling off period and public debate that the founders intended; and
B. A corresponding shift from the intended balance of power, with the executive robbing from the Congress, and Defense robbing from State.
- Critical task now is to recognize both the reality and the danger of this drift, and to then get back on track.
- recognize we are a nation at peace with no immediate existential threats.
- convert the military to a size and mix of forces designed for the strategic and routine security missions of peace.
- produce new policies and tune up out-dated treaties better suited to the world we live in today and thereby free the military from many of most expensive and difficult quandries driving much of the current force structure debate.

We are our own worst enemy in so many ways.