AC/RC Force Structure

[Tyree]

Everything I wrote above the PS in the above post is nothing more than a mental exercise, well really a yellow legal pad and pencil exercise to bring back a sense of historical structure. I believe you have discovered my strategms. Now I will get really serious

I would welcome a forced based upon brigades, that carry the flags of former divisions. I have the presentation of the three options on my desk as I write this. Of course at lot of that presentation has been overcome by events, particularly in the Guard.

The elevated option would be my preference. A BCT with four maneuver battalions, along with everything else would be a very formidable force. It would probably top out in the 5000-5700 range. I would favor that over all other options.

I want to thank for your response to my straw man. Everything you have said is quite well thought out and I do appreciate all you have contributed.

I would like to see a link to you previous post in this area. In fact I would like to see everything you have written which touches on this subject matter. It seems I have found a kindred soul.

[82redleg]

Here a couple of threads that touch similar concepts.

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...&highlight=BCT

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...&highlight=BCT

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...&highlight=BCT

[Fuchs]

(1) Reserve forces get usually less training time / year.

(2) Reserve forces belonging to a small active force with long-serving (volunteer, not conscript) troops will not be able to draw fully from trained former AC personnel.


Both in combination leads me to the conclusion that reserve forces (or most of them) should focus on not very training-intensive missions.
This in turn leads to my preference for relatively small stand-alone reserve forces, such as a regional battalion battlegroups. Training in larger formations and training deployments to foreign terrains and climates should be skipped until a time of crisis.

Such reserve forces could then augment active forces after a brief period of additional training or be assigned rather auxiliary tasks.

The concept of reserve / national guard brigades that go to war on short notice is for me as great wars-concerned guy (who thinks that small wars are usually a stupidity) simply an unacceptable negligence.

[ganulv]

Training in larger formations and training deployments to foreign terrains and climates should be skipped until a time of crisis.

Anyone who says the United States Government doesn’t do anything well undersells its knack for engineering crisises.

[Tyree]

82REDLEG: Thanks for the links. Over the next few days or so I will review them, and let you know what I think. Right now it is drywall and light fixture time down in the old mess hall , oops dining facility.

[gute]

I would imagine that some have read this report, which really does not get too specific. What I do question is the idea of shifting the majority of heavy forces to the reserves/national guard - what does that mean? If the Army was forced to shift heavy forces to the national guard where do the heavy forces go? Do we re-set the national guard brigades back to armor brigades that were "transformed" into IBCTs? Or do we look to change existing IBCTs west of the Mighty Miss into HBCTs because there is more room to train?

Link to cited report:http://www.cnas.org/hardchoices

[Ken White]

They are actually -- logically and militarily -- fairly easy. Unfortunately, they are, politically, a number of varying size Rice Bowls all full of a mass of worms -- or worse.

Hard to say how it'll work out, we'll see -- but your comment about west of the Mississippi is very appropriate. The issue is not training room per se -- the NTC provides more maneuver space than is neccessary -- but range fans. Twenty years ago I tried to point out to folks that after 2020 or so, the likelihood of having adequate ranges for 105mm much less 120mm and above east of that river was quite slim. The antiwar Squirrels have been using and will continue to use environmental, heritage and other pretexts to shut down impact areas and live fire in general on both coasts -- they will not stop. They would totally ban training if they thought they could. Fortunately, the folks in flyover country are more sensible.

I also strongly believe it in the interest of the Nation that the 1980s concept of combat arms units only in the ArNG be revisited. While the Guard slickly co-opted the 'Militia' title as theirs alone, that's a politically beneficial belief and a flaky law, not a Constitutional clause. The Nation can do recruiting, training, location, employment and mission things with the Guard it cannot do with the USAR -- and vice versa. That versa indicates that some USAR combat units would be beneficial so also would some currently USAR peculiar skills be beneficial to the Guard and the States. Laws can be changed...

[gute]

I've heard a rumor that the 81st HBCT might be converting to a SBCT - anyone here have info?

Happy Thanksgiving!

[gute]

It's my understanding that round-out battalions were used in the 70's, but did suffer from readiness and recruitment issues. In today's fight are round-out battalions practical/feasible? Would it work to place all RC maneuver battalions and attached CS/CSS under operational command of an AC BCT for combat, but RC divisions would have administrative control of the battalions for drills, natural disasters, etc?