I've heard a rumor that the 81st HBCT might be converting to a SBCT - anyone here have info?
Happy Thanksgiving!
I've heard a rumor that the 81st HBCT might be converting to a SBCT - anyone here have info?
Happy Thanksgiving!
While it would make sense (We get a LOT of guys from 2ID and even our 2nd batt guys are familier with Strykers) we just got upgraded to a new type of Bradley and are going through a year plus cycle to get everyone "qualified" on it. This is one of the reasons I disagree with Ken about HBCT's belonging in the NG. Light Infantry, Aviation, MP, Medical, Engineering, etc, all have dual use ability (How exactly are you going to use M1's and M3's during a state emergency?) and are units that we typically have understrength after a shooting war turns to OOTW, UW or COIN. HCBT's also cost quit a bit to maintain becouse the equipment maintanaince needs don't change much, nor does the required rounds fired per year... SO I'm of the opinion that AC should be Heavy units, especially on the old armoured Cav model and rapid deployment forces to augment the USMC's ability in that area, and RC should be primarly the types of units mentioned above.Originally Posted by gute
Reed
As long as we keep the Guard relevant during ARFORGEN cycle green years, by sending them to NTC/Hoenfels/JRTC, the HBCT will work in the National Guard. If there's not a goal to work towards, it doesn't what type of BCT is out there.
I still think a handful of HBCTs should be kept on the AC side though - just for mobile operation. Maybe rotate the funds per quarter or 1/2-year for each AC HBCT to be completely ready and capable to conduct tank-on-tank battle, and allow the others to perform maneuver/tank tables less. This may sound absurd to some AC guys, but ARNG does this all the time.
Before there was an NTC...
The AC used force on force training constantly -- produced better units more able to operate flexibly IMO. Canned stuff has its limitations even with a 'world class OPFOR'. Donated training has some advantages; it also has some disadvantages...
One size fits all does not work in fairly intense combat.
What Reed says above makes sense. If the Army Reserve still had combat units, that would be the ideal place for RC HBCTs and the Guard could have light Inf, MPs aEngineers and Medics for State missions. However, the ArNG didn't want the USAR to have such units and won that battle (another example of "be careful what you want..."). So the ArNG gets stuck with some HBCTs -- since that heavy stuff is a Federal need and since the Feds pay about 90% ± of the total cost of the Guard, I guess it's a fair trade...
Generally, RC units cannot train as thoroughly and have some problems with readiness compared to AC units (though I've seen RC units that could outperform some AC elements...) but that's okay -- an RC HBCT can get trained up and deploy a whole lot faster than the AC could recruit, equip, train and deploy one from scratch. Typically, RC elements cost about 25% of their AC counterparts costs, you get what you pay for and what we get is more than good enough -- far better than a lot folks active units.
Lending my concurrence to Ken's comments.
When I left the Regular Army to attend law school I joined the Oregon Guard and was assigned to a light infantry brigade. I have to admit I went through a couple years of shock as I adjusted to the different mission, different priorities, and different strengths and weaknesses between Regular and Guard units. Many soldiers don't survive that transition, a few of us, however actually come to understand and appreciate the differences and then work to use our skills and experience gained in the regular force to help make things better, without falling into the trap of thinking the AC way is the only way.
I found that (prior to AC trainers descending in mass and demanding that Guard units train to AC standards of collective training) Guard units were full of soldiers who had superior skills in certain areas. Forward observers who could drop a round on your helmet; howitzer and FDC crews who had worked together for years and, while a motley mob moving from position to position, were lights out at working their gun or generating data. Pilots with the innate skills of one who both loves what he does, and has done it for a long time. Then came the Readiness Training Brigades of AC soldiers who could only see the lack of collective training (which is a post-mob task, but try explaining that to some AC Major-Colonel with all the answers). It was sad to watch individual and section skills fade as scant training time was shifted to efforts focused on higher-level collective tasks. We broke up the solid foundation of these units in order to build a shaky structure of collective skills on top. It looked better to the AC trainers, but to me it looked like the Western town in the movie Blazing Saddles: All false fronts with little behind it that was real. Even today we see the conventional force seeking to build such a force with the ANA. Instead of helping them better at being an Afghan Army (which probably would have been largely militia-based and recruited, trained and employed at the local level), we have set about attemting to build a much less effective version of an American Regular Army.
Having been on the receive end of GPF FID/SFA I came to appreciate very much the difference in approach between what I had been selected, trained and employed to do as an SF officer and what I was getting from my former conventional peers. SF tends to accept people as they are, seek to understand their culture and situation, and then incorporate into the same while helping them to be as good as possible within that construct. GPF soldiers tend to judge others by the standard of how similar US units perform a task, with little consideration for why the unit they are working with might be different, and then assesses the unit to be inferior. They then isolate themselves in little enclaves and proceed to attempt to push the unit to the same tasks, but dumbed down to a level within in the means of such an inferior organization. Eight years of being on the receive end of GPF FID is one of the main reasons why I am not optimistic at all about the big push in recent years for SFA...
But for all its faults, the Guard is a great American institution. Great Americans, great soldiers, and many of my closest lifelong friends. They own the domestic mission of supplementing our civil service in times of domestic emergency; and they also own the mission of supplementing our Regular military and draftee armies in times of foreign emergency. Sad that the Regular force sees the Guard as a threat to the Regular force, rather than as a vital component of our national security in both peace and war.
I hope we can shake off the bad habits of the past 15 years of mobilizing and deploying Guard and Reserve units for peacetime deployments. Counter intuitively, I think it will be through making the Regular Army smaller that we break this habit. Keeping a war fighting army on the shelf tends to make it a COA we use too often. We make better decisions when Presidents have to ask Congress to mobilize or build an army before they can employ it. It is time to finally bring the Cold War army home and return to a more normal, appropriate, American approach to national security. Large standing armies have little place in that model.
Last edited by Bob's World; 01-25-2012 at 10:10 AM.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
Echoing Bob's World.
Those Readiness Training Brigades are a beautiful example of unintended consequences and flawed training strategies.
They were created in the wake of Desert Storm during which the Active Army fough stupidly and successfully to avoid deploying ArNG comabt units by insisting they had to go through the NTC. One Brigade was about to be declared operationally ready -- much to the chagrin of Binny Peay and Carl Vuono -- when the war ended, thus the issue became moot. That fiasco resulted in Congress passing a law that instituted those Readiness Training Brigades and a very wrong emphasis on collective skills. One AC GO called a Congressional Staffer he knew and asked what on earth Congress meant by that convoluted law. The response was that Congress wanted to make sure that in future wars, the ArNG was used as that would justify the costs. The GO replied "Well, you've screwed the pooch. You should have passed a law that said that. What you've done is create a monster that won't do what you want, will be terribly expensive, will harm both the AC and the RC and will create as many problems as it solves." He was horrifyingly right...
We simply do not train the basics well, AC or RC. We insist on teaching folks how to run before they can crawl, much less walk. I recall watching the 1-17th Infantry make a heliborne assault at Nightmare Range in the ROK some years ago. Great job, looked like a Benning training film. This from a Battalion that did not know how to employ, maintain or even dismount its M113s or conduct competent dismounted patrols.
However, they had good PT scores, could do great dog and pony shows and sent all their Platoon Leaders to Motor Stables.
Mayhap if we force the AC to become smaller, we can find time for everyone to become better...
Mayhap if we force the AC to become smaller, we can find time for everyone to become better...[/QUOTE]
I believe this ties into the mechanized infantry thread and whether or not the U.S. Army should have the 11B mos and the 11M mos. IMO, if the AC army downsized and RC infantry specialized, a large portion of the heavy forces could be moved to the RC and there would not be a loss of fighting ability/effectiveness.
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