Quote Originally Posted by Tyree View Post
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My basic heartburn is with the construct of all of the non-Stryker Brigades, both heavy and light. I feel that it is a fundamental error to have only two maneuver battalions in these brigades, rather than three. Three that is, along with the cavalry squadron.
Everybody agrees we need the third maneuver bn, the trick is how to pay for it.

I am also not sure about the combined arms battalions in the heavy brigades. On paper they look great, and certainly would seem better, again on paper, than the task organization nut roll we did for sixty plus years. We did all of this in the midst of deployments, and I don't think the concept has been throughly vetted. It should be. I would never advocate a backward step, and I am not doing that here. I just want to be sure that the balance is right before we go any further forward.
We tested this on multiple occasions. 1CD did a test in the late 80s, reorganizing a 2 tank/1 mech (IIRC) into a balanced TFs and 2 AR Heavy (3 tank CO/1 mech CO) TFs. They called them CAMBs (Combined Arms Maneuver BNs). The issues noted in the Armor or Infantry magazine article all had to do with the temporary test bucking the Army bureaucracy (inability of the BN to conduct adminstration for its attached companies) and inability to split certain things three ways (certain low density MOSs, etc) to support across the BDE. Both of these are corrected by making the organization permanent. There is the possibility of training issues, but I think they are balanced by the benefit of building a cohesive team. I think that starting from a mixed organization makes task organization easier, because the BN level support structure is used to supporting both types of companies- the balance of work might change in supporting a 3 mech, 1 tank TF instead of a 2 mech, 2 tank TF, but the supporters are trained in supporting both without having to task organize the support.

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Active Component:
1st ID ------- 2 IBCT, 1 HBCT
...11th Cavalry Stryker Brigade
You moved flags around for some reason that I don't understand. We are bad enough about that already. Minimal change in flagging of type units is preferable.

Army National Guard
26th IBCT (New England)
...56th Stryker Cavalry Brigade (TX)
Even more issues here- we just trained a BCT in PA on the Stryker, why convert them back to IN and train TX on the Strykers? PA supports two BCTs now, NY doesn't. Rationalizing is good, but there are intangibles of unit history and heritage that are important. Plus, the above doesn't seem to match the realities of the currently supported force structure. Finally, why all IBCTs? IBCTs are more useful in less than full scale war, that might come up without warning, and are capable of rapid deployment, which is not a strong point of reserve components. My ideal balance is active component balanced 1/3-1/3-1/3 (or a little less for the H and I) between H/S/I BCTs, while the reserve component is about 40-60 H-S. I've written this on the blogs here before, my reasoning is that, in a emergency, the ARNG units with heavy equipment can train on training sets while their equipment deploys. IBCTs, for rapid deployment, wouldn't have the time to conduct post-mobilization training. There's some more details in my ideas, but I don't want to repeat the other posts.

All National Guard Divisions would be inactivated and their places taken in the force structure by coordinating headquarters co-located with FEMA Regions.
There's a SAMS monograph on the CARL website about the future of ARNG divisions. Might be worth a read.

I believe that this would result in a balanced force struture capable across the spectrum. Glad I had a chance to put this on paper. You may fire when ready
Shot, over.