Bob's World:

That's as good a summation as I've seen. I think it's quite accurate and I also think it's a shame that the US Army does not realize the inherent accuracy in your comments. The Guard and Reserve bring a lot to the table but the bulk of the AC do not realize that and thus all too often fail to take advantage of their strengths.

The current idea of using the RC as an augmentation to the active force isn't wrong but it doesn't accept some realities and it is in need of some major structural (and political) changes if it is to be continued.

I have no idea where Gute is headed but back in the day, the general rule of thumb was that RC units cost about 25% as much to maintain as a like AC unit. That may have changed a bit but I suspect not much. It also should be recalled that overall the Federal government pays for between 75
and 90% of the basic costs for the Guard and 100% for the USAR. Thus, Congress has an, uh, intense -- yes, that's a good word, intense -- interest in the Guard and Reserve.

TheCurmudgeon:

A suggestion. Be very leery of citing the GAO report on most any topic. Those folks have agendas when they start and their 'audits' are designed to produce the Congressionally desired results. Congroids, unfortunately, do not always have a good grasp of reality...

For example, this quote from the Report you linked is, IMO, hilarious: "Best practices have shown that effective and efficient operations require detailed plans outlining major implementation tasks, metrics and timelines to measure success, and a comprehensive and realistic funding strategy." That's a good an accurate statement -- made by an organization that is beholden to the Congress that funds it (quite well...) and who know that Congress will jiggle funding and refuses to allow DoD to fund the Army for more than a year or two without significant changes and jerk arounds...

IOW, said best practices are impeded by the reality of the budget system. You cannot get there from here.

Wilf:

I'd read that before, good article and the way to go IMO. However, due to factors Bob's World cites and others, it is not likely to work with the US and particularly not with US Reserve Components. It could work with the Active Force but then one is confronted with that training problem you cite. The Active force trains one way, the Reserve forces must train another. That is achievable but it complicates things considerably. In large measure, some of the issues cited by Bob and the GAO as well as more subtle inter organizational and interpersonal would preclude its adoption by the US. Size matters, it dictates simplistic approaches...

One consideration, for example, is Gute's moving most of the Armor to the Guard. That makes operational sense, but Bob's cited political impact make it problematical and when you add the fact that with little or no Active component Armor the development of training and doctrine is inhibited somewhat you are in essence opting for possibly decreased combat readiness and that has potential military and political ramifications induced by the training factors.