AC/RC Force Structure

[Ken White]

I still think a handful of HBCTs should be kept on the AC side though - just for mobile operation. Maybe rotate the funds per quarter or 1/2-year for each AC HBCT to be completely ready and capable to conduct tank-on-tank battle, and allow the others to perform maneuver/tank tables less. This may sound absurd to some AC guys, but ARNG does this all the time.

The AC used force on force training constantly -- produced better units more able to operate flexibly IMO. Canned stuff has its limitations even with a 'world class OPFOR'. Donated training has some advantages; it also has some disadvantages...

One size fits all does not work in fairly intense combat.

What Reed says above makes sense. If the Army Reserve still had combat units, that would be the ideal place for RC HBCTs and the Guard could have light Inf, MPs aEngineers and Medics for State missions. However, the ArNG didn't want the USAR to have such units and won that battle (another example of "be careful what you want..."). So the ArNG gets stuck with some HBCTs -- since that heavy stuff is a Federal need and since the Feds pay about 90% ± of the total cost of the Guard, I guess it's a fair trade...

Generally, RC units cannot train as thoroughly and have some problems with readiness compared to AC units (though I've seen RC units that could outperform some AC elements...) but that's okay -- an RC HBCT can get trained up and deploy a whole lot faster than the AC could recruit, equip, train and deploy one from scratch. Typically, RC elements cost about 25% of their AC counterparts costs, you get what you pay for and what we get is more than good enough -- far better than a lot folks active units.

[Bob's World]

Lending my concurrence to Ken's comments.

When I left the Regular Army to attend law school I joined the Oregon Guard and was assigned to a light infantry brigade. I have to admit I went through a couple years of shock as I adjusted to the different mission, different priorities, and different strengths and weaknesses between Regular and Guard units. Many soldiers don't survive that transition, a few of us, however actually come to understand and appreciate the differences and then work to use our skills and experience gained in the regular force to help make things better, without falling into the trap of thinking the AC way is the only way.

I found that (prior to AC trainers descending in mass and demanding that Guard units train to AC standards of collective training) Guard units were full of soldiers who had superior skills in certain areas. Forward observers who could drop a round on your helmet; howitzer and FDC crews who had worked together for years and, while a motley mob moving from position to position, were lights out at working their gun or generating data. Pilots with the innate skills of one who both loves what he does, and has done it for a long time. Then came the Readiness Training Brigades of AC soldiers who could only see the lack of collective training (which is a post-mob task, but try explaining that to some AC Major-Colonel with all the answers). It was sad to watch individual and section skills fade as scant training time was shifted to efforts focused on higher-level collective tasks. We broke up the solid foundation of these units in order to build a shaky structure of collective skills on top. It looked better to the AC trainers, but to me it looked like the Western town in the movie Blazing Saddles: All false fronts with little behind it that was real. Even today we see the conventional force seeking to build such a force with the ANA. Instead of helping them better at being an Afghan Army (which probably would have been largely militia-based and recruited, trained and employed at the local level), we have set about attemting to build a much less effective version of an American Regular Army.

Having been on the receive end of GPF FID/SFA I came to appreciate very much the difference in approach between what I had been selected, trained and employed to do as an SF officer and what I was getting from my former conventional peers. SF tends to accept people as they are, seek to understand their culture and situation, and then incorporate into the same while helping them to be as good as possible within that construct. GPF soldiers tend to judge others by the standard of how similar US units perform a task, with little consideration for why the unit they are working with might be different, and then assesses the unit to be inferior. They then isolate themselves in little enclaves and proceed to attempt to push the unit to the same tasks, but dumbed down to a level within in the means of such an inferior organization. Eight years of being on the receive end of GPF FID is one of the main reasons why I am not optimistic at all about the big push in recent years for SFA...

But for all its faults, the Guard is a great American institution. Great Americans, great soldiers, and many of my closest lifelong friends. They own the domestic mission of supplementing our civil service in times of domestic emergency; and they also own the mission of supplementing our Regular military and draftee armies in times of foreign emergency. Sad that the Regular force sees the Guard as a threat to the Regular force, rather than as a vital component of our national security in both peace and war.

I hope we can shake off the bad habits of the past 15 years of mobilizing and deploying Guard and Reserve units for peacetime deployments. Counter intuitively, I think it will be through making the Regular Army smaller that we break this habit. Keeping a war fighting army on the shelf tends to make it a COA we use too often. We make better decisions when Presidents have to ask Congress to mobilize or build an army before they can employ it. It is time to finally bring the Cold War army home and return to a more normal, appropriate, American approach to national security. Large standing armies have little place in that model.

[Ken White]

Those Readiness Training Brigades are a beautiful example of unintended consequences and flawed training strategies.

They were created in the wake of Desert Storm during which the Active Army fough stupidly and successfully to avoid deploying ArNG comabt units by insisting they had to go through the NTC. One Brigade was about to be declared operationally ready -- much to the chagrin of Binny Peay and Carl Vuono -- when the war ended, thus the issue became moot. That fiasco resulted in Congress passing a law that instituted those Readiness Training Brigades and a very wrong emphasis on collective skills. One AC GO called a Congressional Staffer he knew and asked what on earth Congress meant by that convoluted law. The response was that Congress wanted to make sure that in future wars, the ArNG was used as that would justify the costs. The GO replied "Well, you've screwed the pooch. You should have passed a law that said that. What you've done is create a monster that won't do what you want, will be terribly expensive, will harm both the AC and the RC and will create as many problems as it solves." He was horrifyingly right...

We simply do not train the basics well, AC or RC. We insist on teaching folks how to run before they can crawl, much less walk. I recall watching the 1-17th Infantry make a heliborne assault at Nightmare Range in the ROK some years ago. Great job, looked like a Benning training film. This from a Battalion that did not know how to employ, maintain or even dismount its M113s or conduct competent dismounted patrols.

However, they had good PT scores, could do great dog and pony shows and sent all their Platoon Leaders to Motor Stables.

Mayhap if we force the AC to become smaller, we can find time for everyone to become better...

[gute]

Mayhap if we force the AC to become smaller, we can find time for everyone to become better...[/QUOTE]


I believe this ties into the mechanized infantry thread and whether or not the U.S. Army should have the 11B mos and the 11M mos. IMO, if the AC army downsized and RC infantry specialized, a large portion of the heavy forces could be moved to the RC and there would not be a loss of fighting ability/effectiveness.

[gute]

As many here know the British Army is downsizing and going though a reorganization in which it will have a reaction force of three active mechanized brigades (1xarmor, 2xmech, 1xcav, 1xmotorized) and the 16th air assault brigade; and an adaptable force consisting of active light infantry and TA light infantry and cav.

See:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=16516

The Australian Army is reorganizing into three active duty multi functional brigades with each active brigade supported by two reserve brigades. The Canadian Army has something similar.

Could this be the future of the U.S. Army - 14-15 AC brigades supported by 28-30 brigades? Is this a feasible future Total Force structure?

[GLADsapper]

This thread has gone quiet for a while now so I figure that I would stir the pot. And just for brevity's sake I will be referring to the Reserves because that is what I know, but most of what I am talking about includes the National Guard as well.

I left the regular AC army and went straight into a RC Training Support Battalion (CS/CSS). I have now witnessed this whole issue first hand. During my first year at my unit (2010-2011), it was a ghost town. Half the unit was mob'd to the nearest readiness center (pulling guard duty or some BS) and the other half was sitting on their fourth point of contact with no mission because the Reserves hadn't validated its own units since 2004/5. To make matters worse, our unit was so understrength at our home station that our AC numbers were just about even with the RC. Forget about training. In those circumstances, the culture shock alone is enormous. The officers are usually pretty politic and understanding, but the NCO's....lets just say we had one SFC come straight from Drill Sergeant duty and it was a rough couple of BA weekends. I know as a Captain, I just breathed deeply, kept my opinions to myself, and shifted my “no major changes rule” from 90 days to a year.

Break to 18 months ago. We reflagged under a new brigade and were told that we would be supporting Reserve unit training. We ramped up our basic soldiering skills and then tackled the essential unit non-specific platoon collective tasks along with our OC/T specific tasks (you have to know what to look for before you can evaluate it, and some NCO and Officers needed some refreshing). End result, our unit just helped train a bunch of Reservists for the first time in 8 years. Job well done.

Here some preliminary impressions:

-All Reserve units are eaten alive by “DA Mandatory Annual Training”, its insane. I think we lose the equivalent of two to three Battle Assemblies in a year to these classes. I wish they were biennial for us part-timers.
-Reservists operate at a much faster tempo than the AC, we always try to cram 4 days of events in one weekend (and sometimes we succeed). AC can tend to waste time (make work).
-Maintaining individual and team skills is really all that should be expected from Reservists during the year. The two weeks of annual training are for raising a prioritzed list of collective tasks (METL) from a U to a P. I don't believe in double standards and there is no circumstance where a unit that only works together 38 days a year can be called a “T” on collective tasks when compared to the Active Component or deployed Reservists. A “T” is earned through repetition, repetition, repetition. Realistic expectations shared by all would be appreciated.
-The Active Component is valuable for training Reservists, but holy carumba, they need to remember that weak leadership is not the same as absent leadership. People forget how long it took them to develop leadership skills. It is an organic process that cannot be taught, only trial and error experience works.

My last comment is more general. Except for a few time/resource intensive units (airborne, air assault, special forces, etc.) the Army and the Nation would be well served by keeping a 4:3:3 (Active:Reserve:Guard) ratio of all unit types. Besides ensuring that skills and equipment are spread throughout the force there is a political motive. Too much Active Component and you end up in situations where we are fighting three wars simultaneously with no democratic incentive to stop the fighting. Not enough Active Component and you could lose the next war.

I have many more thoughts on the matter but this is starting to drift into a rant and I will stop right there. For those who thought this was a rant a while ago, my apologies. I am curious to hear any other stories about the AC/RC clash of cultures.

[gute]

Not a rant - quite interesting comments. Some I did not understand, but for the most part I was tracking. I did time in the Marine Corps AC/RC from 88-96. I do agree with the faster pace. We crammed more crap into a weekend then we did in a couple of weeks on the active side - outside of field training.

How the future force is organized and ratio of active to reserve will be interesting to see. How did you come up with a 4:3:3 ratio?