AC/RC Force Structure

[Fuchs]

(1) Reserve forces get usually less training time / year.

(2) Reserve forces belonging to a small active force with long-serving (volunteer, not conscript) troops will not be able to draw fully from trained former AC personnel.


Both in combination leads me to the conclusion that reserve forces (or most of them) should focus on not very training-intensive missions.
This in turn leads to my preference for relatively small stand-alone reserve forces, such as a regional battalion battlegroups. Training in larger formations and training deployments to foreign terrains and climates should be skipped until a time of crisis.

Such reserve forces could then augment active forces after a brief period of additional training or be assigned rather auxiliary tasks.

The concept of reserve / national guard brigades that go to war on short notice is for me as great wars-concerned guy (who thinks that small wars are usually a stupidity) simply an unacceptable negligence.

[ganulv]

Training in larger formations and training deployments to foreign terrains and climates should be skipped until a time of crisis.

Anyone who says the United States Government doesn’t do anything well undersells its knack for engineering crisises.

[Tyree]

82REDLEG: Thanks for the links. Over the next few days or so I will review them, and let you know what I think. Right now it is drywall and light fixture time down in the old mess hall , oops dining facility.

[gute]

I would imagine that some have read this report, which really does not get too specific. What I do question is the idea of shifting the majority of heavy forces to the reserves/national guard - what does that mean? If the Army was forced to shift heavy forces to the national guard where do the heavy forces go? Do we re-set the national guard brigades back to armor brigades that were "transformed" into IBCTs? Or do we look to change existing IBCTs west of the Mighty Miss into HBCTs because there is more room to train?

Link to cited report:http://www.cnas.org/hardchoices

[Ken White]

They are actually -- logically and militarily -- fairly easy. Unfortunately, they are, politically, a number of varying size Rice Bowls all full of a mass of worms -- or worse.

Hard to say how it'll work out, we'll see -- but your comment about west of the Mississippi is very appropriate. The issue is not training room per se -- the NTC provides more maneuver space than is neccessary -- but range fans. Twenty years ago I tried to point out to folks that after 2020 or so, the likelihood of having adequate ranges for 105mm much less 120mm and above east of that river was quite slim. The antiwar Squirrels have been using and will continue to use environmental, heritage and other pretexts to shut down impact areas and live fire in general on both coasts -- they will not stop. They would totally ban training if they thought they could. Fortunately, the folks in flyover country are more sensible.

I also strongly believe it in the interest of the Nation that the 1980s concept of combat arms units only in the ArNG be revisited. While the Guard slickly co-opted the 'Militia' title as theirs alone, that's a politically beneficial belief and a flaky law, not a Constitutional clause. The Nation can do recruiting, training, location, employment and mission things with the Guard it cannot do with the USAR -- and vice versa. That versa indicates that some USAR combat units would be beneficial so also would some currently USAR peculiar skills be beneficial to the Guard and the States. Laws can be changed...

[gute]

I've heard a rumor that the 81st HBCT might be converting to a SBCT - anyone here have info?

Happy Thanksgiving!

[reed11b]

I've heard a rumor that the 81st HBCT might be converting to a SBCT - anyone here have info?

Happy Thanksgiving!

While it would make sense (We get a LOT of guys from 2ID and even our 2nd batt guys are familier with Strykers) we just got upgraded to a new type of Bradley and are going through a year plus cycle to get everyone "qualified" on it. This is one of the reasons I disagree with Ken about HBCT's belonging in the NG. Light Infantry, Aviation, MP, Medical, Engineering, etc, all have dual use ability (How exactly are you going to use M1's and M3's during a state emergency?) and are units that we typically have understrength after a shooting war turns to OOTW, UW or COIN. HCBT's also cost quit a bit to maintain becouse the equipment maintanaince needs don't change much, nor does the required rounds fired per year... SO I'm of the opinion that AC should be Heavy units, especially on the old armoured Cav model and rapid deployment forces to augment the USMC's ability in that area, and RC should be primarly the types of units mentioned above.
Reed

[btheives]

As long as we keep the Guard relevant during ARFORGEN cycle green years, by sending them to NTC/Hoenfels/JRTC, the HBCT will work in the National Guard. If there's not a goal to work towards, it doesn't what type of BCT is out there.

I still think a handful of HBCTs should be kept on the AC side though - just for mobile operation. Maybe rotate the funds per quarter or 1/2-year for each AC HBCT to be completely ready and capable to conduct tank-on-tank battle, and allow the others to perform maneuver/tank tables less. This may sound absurd to some AC guys, but ARNG does this all the time.

[gute]

It's my understanding that round-out battalions were used in the 70's, but did suffer from readiness and recruitment issues. In today's fight are round-out battalions practical/feasible? Would it work to place all RC maneuver battalions and attached CS/CSS under operational command of an AC BCT for combat, but RC divisions would have administrative control of the battalions for drills, natural disasters, etc?