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  1. #1
    Council Member TheCurmudgeon's Avatar
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    Default GAO Report

    This might provide some of what you are looking for, as well as some background on the difficulties of keeping Guard combat units sharp and fully staffed.

    Army Needs to Finalize an Implementation Plan and Funding Strategy for Sustaining an Operational Reserve Force
    September 2009

    http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09898.pdf
    Last edited by TheCurmudgeon; 01-05-2011 at 09:00 PM.
    "I can change almost anything ... but I can't change human nature."

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  2. #2
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    This may help. It's relevant to a force structure argument. Indeed this is why I wrote it.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  3. #3
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Three thoughts...

    Bob's World:

    That's as good a summation as I've seen. I think it's quite accurate and I also think it's a shame that the US Army does not realize the inherent accuracy in your comments. The Guard and Reserve bring a lot to the table but the bulk of the AC do not realize that and thus all too often fail to take advantage of their strengths.

    The current idea of using the RC as an augmentation to the active force isn't wrong but it doesn't accept some realities and it is in need of some major structural (and political) changes if it is to be continued.

    I have no idea where Gute is headed but back in the day, the general rule of thumb was that RC units cost about 25% as much to maintain as a like AC unit. That may have changed a bit but I suspect not much. It also should be recalled that overall the Federal government pays for between 75
    and 90% of the basic costs for the Guard and 100% for the USAR. Thus, Congress has an, uh, intense -- yes, that's a good word, intense -- interest in the Guard and Reserve.

    TheCurmudgeon:

    A suggestion. Be very leery of citing the GAO report on most any topic. Those folks have agendas when they start and their 'audits' are designed to produce the Congressionally desired results. Congroids, unfortunately, do not always have a good grasp of reality...

    For example, this quote from the Report you linked is, IMO, hilarious: "Best practices have shown that effective and efficient operations require detailed plans outlining major implementation tasks, metrics and timelines to measure success, and a comprehensive and realistic funding strategy." That's a good an accurate statement -- made by an organization that is beholden to the Congress that funds it (quite well...) and who know that Congress will jiggle funding and refuses to allow DoD to fund the Army for more than a year or two without significant changes and jerk arounds...

    IOW, said best practices are impeded by the reality of the budget system. You cannot get there from here.

    Wilf:

    I'd read that before, good article and the way to go IMO. However, due to factors Bob's World cites and others, it is not likely to work with the US and particularly not with US Reserve Components. It could work with the Active Force but then one is confronted with that training problem you cite. The Active force trains one way, the Reserve forces must train another. That is achievable but it complicates things considerably. In large measure, some of the issues cited by Bob and the GAO as well as more subtle inter organizational and interpersonal would preclude its adoption by the US. Size matters, it dictates simplistic approaches...

    One consideration, for example, is Gute's moving most of the Armor to the Guard. That makes operational sense, but Bob's cited political impact make it problematical and when you add the fact that with little or no Active component Armor the development of training and doctrine is inhibited somewhat you are in essence opting for possibly decreased combat readiness and that has potential military and political ramifications induced by the training factors.

  4. #4
    Council Member Infanteer's Avatar
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    I love how Wilf's article was right below one titled "Stabilizing Complex Adaptive Systems: Using Complexity Theory for Operational Design in Stability and Support Operations".

  5. #5
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    96% was the number I saw. Guard budgets are 96% federal, 4% state.

    The state pays the other 4%, mostly armory maintenance, and a handful of state employees that essentially are there to manage that state interest. When a governor declares an emergency, he signs his state up to pay for whatever the costs of use are for this federal equipment and personnel (You should see the jaws drop when you hand a state bureaucrat a bill for 8 hours of blade time on a CH-47...). Expensive, but still a tremendous bargain to every state. Much like US foreign policy, civilian state workers are 100% tapped out in day to day efforts, so do not "surge" for emergencies (other than road crews, emergency workers, LEA - all for overtime pay), so when some crappy job, like standing waist deep in sewage filling sandbags, comes up, they turn to the guard as their only reserve of "extra" manpower that comes organized, trained and equipped for action. So the rally cry is always "call up the guard" (pulling men and women away from their civilian jobs and creating hardships for them, their families, and employers) rather than "shut down the bureaucracy and focus on the emergency this week."

    Some states do this very well, and have an "emergency fund" to pay these costs. Oregon does not, so every physical emergency is followed by a corresponding fiscal emergency.
    Robert C. Jones
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    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

  6. #6
    Council Member Bob's World's Avatar
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    Ok, Ken has poked my training button. METL. Too often RC units carry a different METL than a like AC unit. METL is essential warfighting tasks, so they should be the same. Problem is that our training doctrine is written by and for the AC (with word "RC" sprinkled in, much like PC writing styles that say "He/she should then...") The fact is that

    A. RC METL should = AC METL

    B. RC units actually need what I called "mETL" for mobilization essential task list. A foundation of skills that a unit needs that are focused on creating skilled individuals and teams; and that are both atainable, and can be quickly buit upon once mobilized. Too many units attempt to train to larger unit collective tasks, which they invariably suck at, which also takes so much time that the individual and team skills fade as well. So upon mobilizaton a unit shows up that has to start from scratch. I told my general who was dead set that Brigade would do movement to contact and defend (but also thought that if every platoon could do those tasks, then the Companies, Battalions and the Brigade were a "T" in them as well" ) that upon careful review of the SQT manual for light infantry that I recommended that our focused task for training should be "Maintain Operational Security." (yes, I have always been that guy who can't just accept the status quo). It was, and I suspect is, the perfect pre-mob task for building that foundation of skills that prepares an RC unit to quickly ramp up to whatever mission it is that they have been mobilized to perform. (As the Brigade training officer I was then put to work developing lanes training on the high end collective tasks, with each lane being dumbed down to the point of irrelevance by our AC trainers, and with very few units getting "T"s even still because the AC Colonel convinced this same general that "all leader tasks should be "essential" tasks as well, so therefor any time a leader task was missed, the units would get a "U". Ok, I'm still pissed about both that lame general (who later picked up a second star before the Governor finally caught on and fired him), and the A-hole AC Armor Colonel who led the training bde and whose primary mission was to prevent Guard BDES from filling their CTC rotations, thereby denying some more worthy AC unit from getting an opportunity to go. I should let it go, but but guys who place their careers ahead of their nation really bug me.
    Robert C. Jones
    Intellectus Supra Scientia
    (Understanding is more important than Knowledge)

    "The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)

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