AC/RC Force Structure

[TAH]

Asked/said another way....

Why a USMC AND a AC Army AND a Army NG AND a USAR?

Do we need and can we afford all four?

Really is the Army NG is not going to go away. 50 governers and the DC plus Puerta Rico and Guam will stop that.

The Army brings capabilities to the table the USMC do not. Ability to do battalion and larger airborne ops, the ability to do bigger then a division heavy/armored ops, LOTS of CSS and medical. USMC relies alot on both the Navy and the Army for "overhead". Who does USMC medical? The Army supports the USMC by providing training base support (tankers and artilleryman for a start).

Why not a USMC that is 100% AC at 250K (or so) and an Army?Army Guard at 300K AC and 700K NG. No USAR (too much redundant overhead). Continue current ARFORGEN to allow Army to "right size" itself through mob, not AC end strenght.

Army would end up with:

1.An AC division HQs in Europe with two AC BCTs and some number of NG BCTs rotated in/out.

2. An AC division HQs in Korea with troops as is

3. An AC division HQs either in Hawaii or Fort Lewis for Pac Rim forces.

4. Two AC divisions HQ for Army first responders (82nd and a heavy/armored division).

[GLADsapper]

As mentioned earlier, the Constitution and politics will ultimately prevent the dissolution of the National Guard. In addition, the Reserves will probably always be around to some degree or another because it is a nice place to store unwanted, but necessary, capabilities when money gets tight (it applies to every branch).

To add some anecdotal evidence to another debate... logistical issues will always necessitate the existence of the Army. I worked for a logistics Major who would tell stories about how the Marines were begging Army log units for support during the initial weeks of the Iraq Invasion. Once the Marines get too far from the Navy, their CSS situation goes down the toilet. That is how they are able to maintain such a large tooth to tail ratio on paper. By the same token, there will always be a force that looks like the Marines and it will occupy that 200 mile strip of land between the ocean and the interior. I am willing to accept that fact and let them do their own thing (but can we please standardize weapons and uniforms between Army and Marines?)

Back to AC/RC structure. I am surprised that nobody in this thread has brought up Tom Barnett and the Leviathan/System Administrator structure. If you agree with his views of globalization and the US's role in the world system, it would seem that the AC/RC structure would be a great place to start tailoring the armed forces to perform those duties. His TED talk is a great summary of his line of thinking and offers a quick and dirty breakdown of AC/RC forces which is pertinent to this thread.http://www.ted.com/talks/thomas_barn...for_peace.html

If you followed Barnett's plan the AC Army would have the large majority of the Leviathan units (Special Forces, Maneuver BCTs, Fires, Combat Aviation, and Battlefield Surveillance) and the RC/NG would have most of the Sys-Admin units (Maneuver Enhancement Brigades, Sustainment Brigades, etc.) I can see MP and Engineer units being particularly valuable for a Sys-Admin force because of their dual nature (MP's and Combat Engineers relish their secondary “Fight as Infantry” mission.) When paired up with the Marines we have a force that could handle just about anything in a low-intensity conflict zone. The AC Army divisional headquarters' would be spread out by region roughly as TAH described it and paired with a joint-interagency Sys-Admin headquarters (which helps with contingency planning). The RC component and Marines would fall under the Sys-Admin joint headquarters during the mobilization.

I don't see this force mixture occurring anytime soon because the end result would make the AC Army much smaller (same size as AC Marine Corps perhaps?). This would be possible because there would be no need for 12 month deployments. The Leviathan force would crush countries like Iraq in a couple months and come straight back home. The RC/NG and the Marines would be a far larger component, personnel wise, because they would have to sustain long deployments repeatedly.

The more I write about it, the more I have to give Barnett credit. It seems like an elegant solution to many problems. Maintaining the skill sets and collective tasks needed to perform low-intensity warfare at a high level requires far less time and resources than maintaining those needed for high-intensity ops.

[gute]

I read Barnett's book when it first came out and I have watched the linked video before. Personally, I have not mentioned Barnett or his ideas because I don't agree with him. IMO Barnett has spent too much time traveling around the world hearing about what our military should be from people that don't necessarily have our best interests in mind and it has clouded his judgement.

I believe the U.S. has been at war since 1950 and the major threat collapsed in 1989. IMO the total maneuver force of AC, USANG and USMC would be the size of the pre-9/11 AC Army - roughly 100 maneuver battalions. All divisions become one large brigade (10xAC, 8xRC, 3xUSMC, 1xUSMCR) plus the 173rd, 2ACR, 3ACR and 11ACR. Special Ops Command would slim down a little by eliminating redundant mission sets.

The tricky part now is the ratio of heavy to light. What takes more training an ABCT (HBCT) or IBCT? Do we need 12 airborne battalions? Is it easier to go from heavy to light than light to heavy? Can the heavy force size be based on OIF in 2003 - is more armor necessary?

[Bob's World]

Slightly different take:
- At peace since '45.
- Required to sustain a warfighting military in peace due to decision to use a containment strategy to counter / compete with the Russians.
- Existence of such a military resulting in two very dangerous and detrimental effects on the very nature of US governance:
A. Empowering Presidents to commit the nation to a long string of "conflicts of choice" without the cooling off period and public debate that the founders intended; and
B. A corresponding shift from the intended balance of power, with the executive robbing from the Congress, and Defense robbing from State.
- Critical task now is to recognize both the reality and the danger of this drift, and to then get back on track.
- recognize we are a nation at peace with no immediate existential threats.
- convert the military to a size and mix of forces designed for the strategic and routine security missions of peace.
- produce new policies and tune up out-dated treaties better suited to the world we live in today and thereby free the military from many of most expensive and difficult quandries driving much of the current force structure debate.

We are our own worst enemy in so many ways.

[gute]

Slightly different take:
- At peace since '45.
- Required to sustain a warfighting military in peace due to decision to use a containment strategy to counter / compete with the Russians.
- Existence of such a military resulting in two very dangerous and detrimental effects on the very nature of US governance:
A. Empowering Presidents to commit the nation to a long string of "conflicts of choice" without the cooling off period and public debate that the founders intended; and
B. A corresponding shift from the intended balance of power, with the executive robbing from the Congress, and Defense robbing from State.
- Critical task now is to recognize both the reality and the danger of this drift, and to then get back on track.
- recognize we are a nation at peace with no immediate existential threats.
- convert the military to a size and mix of forces designed for the strategic and routine security missions of peace.
- produce new policies and tune up out-dated treaties better suited to the world we live in today and thereby free the military from many of most expensive and difficult quandries driving much of the current force structure debate.

We are our own worst enemy in so many ways.

Okay, WWII was "war" compared to last 60 years in that it involved the country as whole and the size of the conflict. I agree with what you wrote about how the nation has strayed from the original intent of the founders, but times do change. So with what you wrote what are your ideas for force structure?

[gute]

Bob I'm reading your older posts about this topic so if you previously posted your ideas I apologize.

gute

[Bob's World]

Gute,

Times do indeed change, and yet, in so many ways how we frame and approach problems is still stuck in the Cold War. How we approached problems during the 165 years prior to WWII is far more relevant to the world of today than how we approached them from '45-90.

Containment demanded control and land force deterrence. The current world demands neither. Today we need influence and are back to our historic maritime nation primary mission-set and can once again relax somewhat in our own geostrategic security now that we are no longer carrying the adopted geostrategic vulnerability of Western Europe in the face of a real land threat to the same.

This means we need a Navy designed to conduct strategic deterrence missions and to ensure freedom of the high seas for our merchant fleet and those of others that service our economic requirements. This means we need a small, but potent, expeditionary capability such as provided by the USMC and a handful of Army units. This means we need a SOF force fully capable of rapid DA anywhere in the world if necessary, but primarily out and about in the areas where our strategic interests are most reliant, ensuring we have the degree of understanding and the solidity of personal relationships necessary to prevent what is preventable, and to deal effectively (and appropriately) with what is not. We also need to refocus our air power on strategic/deterrence missions. We can probably skip a generation on tactical fighters. The Army needs to migrate warfighting missions to the Guard, and the Active force needs to get very lean and stay home more to do the training and maintenance that they have been deferring the past 15 years.

Mostly though, we need to take the "We can go to war now" COA off the table for the President. This will force us to lead with diplomacy or punitive expeditions; but will allow time for a public debate prior to committing the nation to long, costly violence to force our will upon some government, people or place.

I realize senior leadership in DC is full of "good Cold Warriors," so the forces of inertia are strong. Those old dogs show little inclination to learn new tricks. We also are battling the military industrial complex and powerful lobbies from places like Taiwan, Saudi Arabia, and Israel who warp our policies in their favor. It is a riptide that may drown us.