Tunisia: catch all

[Ken White]

What you recommend is a return to the failed "hobby diplomacy" of the Clinton era, and it sounds good, but it isn't.

Hobby diplomacy? Good term for a guy and era that saw the launching of explosives against four sovereign states and started the US on the road to its current world place as the Big Bully...

However, that's an aside. This:

I completely agree that we have no duty and no right to tell others what values to adopt, or what form of government, or any of a dozen other areas where too often we fail to mind our business. But I disagree adamantly that we have no duty to stand up for the little guy, to show up in such places and establish clear parameters as to the degree/nature of violence that is tolerable in such upheavals, to deter genocide rather than merely respond to the same.

is the dichotomy. How does one have no right and no duty to tell others what values to adopt and yet have a "duty to stand up for the little guy, to show up in such places and establish clear parameters as to the degree/nature of violence that is tolerable in such upheavals." You say we will not tell others what values to adopt and then turn right around and say we must stand up for the little guy and we will not tolerate certain actions. One cannot do what you suggest. Either you do not dictate or you do.

I have asked the same question of you several times and you have yet to answer that. Further, you say:

To actually be the nation we like to see ourselves as. Standing for broad concepts such as Self Determination, equality, Justice and Liberty. But that's just me.

As I've said many times in one way or another, it's not just you -- but those are almost certainly minority views. I have asked how you intend to persuade the majority -- and particularly the public policy makers -- to go along with your vision. You have not answered that, either...

So I again ask that two-fold question: How do you reconcile allowing self determination and forcefully standing up for the little guy? How do you convince those who oppose or do not support your policy ideas to become supporters and implement the policies?

[Bob's World]

A.

It is a mix of message and presence. Sit down and work this out, Negotiate. If you can't negotiate, then the US or someone will come in and mediate. If you can't mediate, then the US or the UN or someone will come in and Arbitrate. Currently we tend to dictate. All of this is basic contract law, basic dispute resolution. The parties need to work out the terms, and there are always guidelines based on fundamental concepts of equity that set the parameters of such negotiations. It's the same way we enforce the rule of law at home. This is why we don't have gunfights at high noon in main street, or bigger and stronger people running roughshod over the smaller and weaker.

There is a wide range of "acceptable" solutions; our problem is that we tend to neck it down to a narrow range of what is acceptable to us. Once a program is developed, then for example, the spokes people for the populace movement or the interim government in Tunisia could be requesting a neutral stand off security presence and a mediation team to come in and help move the process forward in a fashion that builds trust and helps avoid excess violence.

B. As to "how": I write things, I speak to people in positions of influence in and out of government, etc. Its a process. Most everyone appreciates that the status quo is not appropriate, and that things are changing. No one has "the" answer, to definitely include myself. I throw things I think about out to the SWC 'draw fire' and to facilitate refinement. I essentially conduct a mix of UW, law, and other tricks of various trades.

Sometimes its a bit glacier, but things are moving.

[Ken White]

I knew that...

Always a good answer though -- and it does indeed. Which is why I keep suggesting to you not to try to oversimplify things. That's just as bad as or possibly worse than overcomplicating them.

A.

It is a mix of message and presence. Sit down and work this out, Negotiate. If you can't negotiate, then the US or someone will come in and mediate. If you can't mediate, then the US or the UN or someone will come in and Arbitrate. Currently we tend to dictate...

Still sounds to me as though some dictation is involved. "The US or someone WILL...

There is a wide range of "acceptable" solutions; our problem is that we tend to neck it down to a narrow range of what is acceptable to us.

Exactly -- and that last, to whom it is acceptable -- is where your problem lies and the reason I keep tossing cautionary Grenades...

Not least because

...the spokes people for the populace movement or the interim government in Tunisia could be requesting a neutral stand off security presence and a mediation team to come in and help move the process forward in a fashion that builds trust and helps avoid excess violence.

The appearance of an afloat MAGTF offshore is likely to cause more ripples of discontent than of relief. Regardless of the announced reason, the event will be spun adversely by those not friendly to the US (and they will be in the nation of interest, in the US itself and in the world at large). I'm not saying we cannot or should not do it, merely that it will likely provide mixed results and the those results will not depend solely on the US and /or its actions; others will impact it and often, there'll be some nations and events that were unexpected. So, yes, it does indeed depend on the situation -- and most of those will not be cut and dried. Thus my frequent comment that your aim is laudable however, those folks in defilade will just try to wait you out. Indirect fire can help; that requires aiming stakes and offsets.

Those nations mentioned above will be those not friendly to the US, BTW, and as you know, a majority of the Nations in the world are in that category at times. Contrary to the assertions of many, that is not solely due to our sometimes blundering foreign presences and missteps. It is due mostly to the simple fact that we are large and wealthy; our bobbles only exacerbate that slightly. The size and wealth make us an object of envy; our assistance to others has made them somewhat nominally beholden to us -- and no one likes to in that position; they'll dislike you simply because you had to help them.

In order to remove the stigma of size and wealth, you're asking the US to forego many things to which it has become accustomed. While I can applaud the intent, sympathize with the goal and appreciate what you're trying to do, I may be unduly cynical but I suspect your chance of success is not good. Regardless, I wish you well and will continue to provide harassing fire on occasion.

Sometimes its a bit glacier, but things are moving.

They are indeed and have been for many years. I started calling it the 'Momization' syndrome back in the early 60s. It has many good points. It also poses some dangers as it inclines many to believe that all people are basically alike -- they are not -- and that most will behave rationally -- few do though many will try to appears if the are so behaving (most of the time...). Momization applauds good governance and good behavior generally; unfortunately, a very few kids are just flat evil and will rebel with little or no cause no matter how good the governance is seen to be. Momism does not cope well with that -- it's irrational.

The Glacier is a good simile. Avoid the crevasses and watch for slippery ice...

[Dayuhan]

Why have we not rushed a Marine Amphibious ship to the Med to simply sit, clearly visible on the horizon off of Tunis?

Why should we do any such thing? There's no genocide going on, nor any threatened, just a process of political change. There is absolutely nothing at this point to warrant external intervention.

Seems to me that going all 19th century and parking a gunboat off the coast would be completely counterproductive. There is not one person in Tunisia or the Arab world who would believe for a heartbeat that we were there on behalf of "the little guy". I don't think too many Americans would believe it. The universal assumption - no matter what we said - would be that big bad Uncle Sam was once again throwing his weight around to advance his own interests... and that, more than anything else, is what AQ thrives on.

The Tunisian "little guy" is not asking us to intervene. Nobody is asking us to intervene, or mediate, or facilitate, or anything else. What reason do we have to go pushing ourselves uninvited into other people's business? At least give them a chance to sort it out for themselves first. It is unbelievably presumptuous to think we could possibly know what the Tunisian populace wants or what is best for them, or that we would even consider pushing our presence uninvited into their process of political change. What right do we have to go walking into other countries and tell people there what we are or are not willing to tolerate?

There is likely to come a time when external influence is useful. An interim government will have to be pressured to hold elections; the elections will have to be monitored and assessed, and the various parties involved will have to be urged to accept the results. This may be an area where US leadership at the UN or other multilateral fora is called for, but unilateral intervention would be an absolute last resort.

Seems to me that our default response to internal instability in other countries should be to let the locals work things out for themselves. If we're asked to participate by parties with a credible claim to represent the populace or a portion thereof, the request should be considered. If influence or intervention is required it should multilateral efforts should always be preferred. Unilateral action or influence should be an absolute last resort, to be used when action is necessary and no other way is possible.

What we did not take into account was that the world had lost the tremendous balancing, and tempering effect of two superpowers waging a global competition for influence. One would wage a little UW, the other would counter. Most situations never got too out of control. Suddenly the Soviets weren't showing up, and then the Americans stopped showing up as well. Once everyone else realized this, those out of government who wanted power, or justice, or liberty started jockeying for position. Similarly those in government, many with no true writ of popular sovereignty, began ratcheting up the populace control measures.

This contention is I think almost horrifyingly backwards. There was no beneficial balancing during the Cold War: it was a devastatingly destructive time for the developing world. The Cold War was only cold if you were in Europe or the US and thinking nuclear: out on the periphery it was hot and continuous. The Cold War was fought by proxy, in the developing world, and the results were catastrophic. The end of that period hasn't eliminated violence in the developing world (nothing could), but it has drastically reduced it, and removed a major factor feeding it.

I can't think of any empirical measure that would suggest that violence and instability in the developing world have increased since the end of the Cold War. Quite the opposite. That entire line of argument needs to be either credibly supported or discarded.

It is a mix of message and presence. Sit down and work this out, Negotiate. If you can't negotiate, then the US or someone will come in and mediate. If you can't mediate, then the US or the UN or someone will come in and Arbitrate. Currently we tend to dictate. All of this is basic contract law, basic dispute resolution. The parties need to work out the terms, and there are always guidelines based on fundamental concepts of equity that set the parameters of such negotiations. It's the same way we enforce the rule of law at home. This is why we don't have gunfights at high noon in main street, or bigger and stronger people running roughshod over the smaller and weaker.

Enforcing the rule of law in our country is our right and our responsibility. Trying to enforce our concept of law in another country is imposition. We have no right whatsoever to tell the Tunisians how to resolve their internal conflicts.

There is a wide range of "acceptable" solutions; our problem is that we tend to neck it down to a narrow range of what is acceptable to us.

Isn't that exactly what you're advocating when you suggest that we "show up in such places and establish clear parameters as to the degree/nature of violence that is tolerable in such upheavals"?

Once a program is developed, then for example, the spokes people for the populace movement or the interim government in Tunisia could be requesting a neutral stand off security presence and a mediation team to come in and help move the process forward in a fashion that builds trust and helps avoid excess violence.

Is anyone requesting that?

[Bob's World]

Dayuhan,

As usual you disagree with me. That is fine, as a former trial attorney I appreciate the role of adversarial advocacy in helping the jury get the information they need to arrive at a just decision. The SWC is the jury, and the benefit from such diversity.

That said, I find your positions to be bizarrely rooted in a 20 year old US perception of the world that never actually existed then, and certainly does not exist now. But many smart people share your perspectives, so it's an important position to put to the jury.

So, I stand by my assessment. Read the dozens of news reports linked to this thread regarding the impact of events in Tunisia on the populaces and governments across North Africa and into the Arabian Penn. This has been a massive wake-up call to both. Governments are in shock that populaces that have been effectively suppressed for generations are suddenly acting out effectively and with greater coordination. The new information age provides a tremendous advantage to the people. Not only did it enable the specific events in Tunisia, but it allowed those events to motivate and encourage similarly situated populaces across a vast area in real time. This is a textbook example of the ONE THING THAT IS DIFFERENT ABOUT INSURGENCY TODAY vice the 1960s, the 1860s, or 60AD. It is this same information age that AQ leverages so well in their networked UW efforts.

But here is a break in our favor. Sure, we have been tied these governments as our tools for securing access and influence into the resources, LOCs, etc of this region. Such relationships also served to deny the Soviets access to the same during the Cold War. Sustaining such controlling/protective relationships long after the end of the Cold War has fed the growing populace discontent that AQ has feasted upon, and the same popular discontent that is now rumbling like a string of long dormant, but now smoking volcanoes across the region.

So I repeat: The U.S. has before it a tremendous opportunity to repair and rebuild our influence in the region. To supplant AQ as the self-appointed champion of the oppressed minorities (we call that "de oppresso liber" where I come from) and to update the nature of our relationships with these governments to be less focused on specific regimes and individuals and more focused on the nations and the populaces of which they are comprised.

How do we do that? Many options, and I'd like to think that right now in some dark basement in DC that a team of State Department and Defense planners are swarming like ants all over it, as the NSC guides the process and informs the President of progress. Are Marines the right answer for the long term? They rarely are. Are they a great way to put people and governments on notice that we think something is important and to tread cautiously in their actions? They always have been.

[Bob's World]

One of the four primary causal factors for growing the conditions of insurgency within a society.

Too much focus is put on jobs, poverty, infrastructure, religion, etc. These are all important and always contribute to why people are willing to join a movement. But when one looks to what converts a dissatisfied populace into an insurgent one, "Respect" is always high on the list. You can wrongfully rob a man of many things and he will roll with the punches. Attempt to rob him of his honor, his pride, and it is another degree of oppression all together.

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/22/wo...22sidi.html?hp

[davidbfpo]

I am not a student of revolution / violent changes of government and so rely on some history and observing recent events - say back to the fall of the Shah in 1979.

In Tunisia the catalyst appears to have been the student trader's arrest and self-immolation. After several days of nationwide disorder, none of which affected key institutions, there is reporting that the Army commander declined to order troops to use live rounds to quell the disorder. Today the BBC has reported police and para-military police have joined demonstrations.

When does state coercive power, including Information Warfare, cease to have an impact and why? Capability, non-lethal and lethal; lack of will, confidence etc. I do recall the fall of East Germany, the GDR, was attributed to a clear Soviet stance and so without the Soviet "muscle" the GDR was unable to use coercion.

I am uncertain that faraway observers, like me, can discern the tipping point beforehand; leaving aside how often the tipping point occurs and is avoided. Nor that extensive intelligence-gathering and awareness can help.

It puzzles me, how can ruthless states apparently cease to function. Not to overlook that such states can falter and then crush opposition - Tienanmen Square for example.

Talking to Muslims and reading the often cited tipping point into radicalisation, not violence, is a human rights violation that has impact.

[davidbfpo]

From ICSR a commentary 'Rachid Ghannouchi and the Struggle for Tunisia', including citations from an interview of the leader in London and worth a read for that alone:http://icsr.info/blog/Rachid-Ghannou...le-for-Tunisia

[Dayuhan]

As usual you disagree with me. That is fine, as a former trial attorney I appreciate the role of adversarial advocacy in helping the jury get the information they need to arrive at a just decision. The SWC is the jury, and the benefit from such diversity.

The benefits of diversity are enhanced if the points made are actually and specifically addressed.

That said, I find your positions to be bizarrely rooted in a 20 year old US perception of the world that never actually existed then, and certainly does not exist now.

How so, exactly? The jury might benefit from a specific elucidation of the question to be resolved.

Read the dozens of news reports linked to this thread regarding the impact of events in Tunisia on the populaces and governments across North Africa and into the Arabian Penn.

The impact remains speculative; the pieces cited discuss possible consequences that are anything but certain. Certainly political change is long overdue in many places, but how and when it will occur remains to be seen, and it is in no way certain that external interference will accelerate the process or make it less destructive.

It's important to note that these mostly peaceful uprisings that overthrow despotic governments do not simply occur because the populace has reached a point where the government can no longer contain them. They also indicate that the government's ability to contain has deteriorated to the point where the security apparatus is no longer willing to carry out orders. In many ways these are cases where a sick government essentially expires of natural causes. Trying to replicate or encourage these events in places where governments have not yet reached that point is a good way to start a bloodbath.

I repeat: US intervention should be a matter of last resort, when intervention is absolutely necessary and no other intervention is forthcoming. First choice is to allow the locals to manage on their own, a distant second is multilateral pressure, a distant third is multilateral action. I'll argue that case in front of a jury any time.

Sustaining such controlling/protective relationships long after the end of the Cold War has fed the growing populace discontent that AQ has feasted upon

This is said so often that it has become a mantra, and desperately needs to be realistically evaluated. Who exactly do we control and protect? What governments are we protecting from their own populaces, or enabling, or emboldening?

The only feast that matters to AQ is foreign intervention in Muslim lands, especially if it's military: this is what AQ thrives on, and no matter what the intention of the intervention is, it will be credibly presented as an attempt at suppression and control. AQ has tried to exploit resentment toward despotic governments, but these attempts have generally failed: AQ has never sparked a credible insurgency against a Muslim government that wasn't installed by foreign invaders. That's not because these populaces love their governments, it's because they don't see AQ as a viable alternative. AQ may have tried to appoint themselves champion of the masses, but the masses have never confirmed the appointment. The same is likely to happen to us if we try to appoint ourselves to that role.

To supplant AQ as the self-appointed champion of the oppressed minorities (we call that "de oppresso liber" where I come from) and to update the nature of our relationships with these governments to be less focused on specific regimes and individuals and more focused on the nations and the populaces of which they are comprised.

We cannot appoint ourselves as anyone's champion. If our help or protection is requested by parties with a legitimate claim to represent a populace, that's another story. Offering our help to such parties is another story... but imposing ourselves uninvited is simply not acceptable. It is not and never will be seen as "standing up for the little guy". It is seen as an attempt to take control and advance our own interests.

I agree with you on the importance of respect, but I think you miss an important part of the respect equation. People all over the world, even those who loathe their governments, react very badly when we lecture those governments on human rights, democracy, etc. Our interference is not seen as help for the oppressed, it's seen as disrespect for the nation and the culture. The fastest way for the US to rally support behind an oppressive government is often to criticize that government.

Allowing people to sort out their own issues to the greatest possible extent is respect. Offering help if it's needed is respect. Imposing "help" where it has not been requested is disrespect.

If we put Marines in the picture, this is not going to be seen as support for the little guy. That may be our intention, but it won't be seen that way. Our purposes may be as pure as the driven snow, but they won't be seen that way. US armed force will be seen as muscle-flexing, intimidation, and an attempt to advance our interests, and it will be seen that way no matter what we say.

I see absolutely no evidence of conditions in Tunisia that call for US intervention. We've already made statements supporting a democratic transition, and those should continue, from as many sources as possible. If the interim government starts trying to derail transition, multilateral pressure may be called for, but that's a bridge we should cross when and if we come to it. Nothing going on that calls for Marines.

[Bob's World]

Dayuhan,

For whatever reason you feel compelled to attack whatever I say. That's cool. But it does not create in me any compulsion or duty to argue with your opinions. They are your opinions, I see little to support them, so I let them stand on their own merit.

As a former prosecutor, I lay out the facts as I understand them, offer evidence to support and make my argument. The Defense has no duty to prove anything, so merely follows behind and attempts to create reasonable doubt in the prosecutor's case. I never worried too much about the defense, if my case was strong, it would stand on its own merit.

But as I would remind a jury, there is always doubt in life. But not all of it is reasonable, and the only doubt that is material is that that is both reasonable and goes to the elements of the crime before them. Most have driven, or at least ridden in a car on a two lane road, meeting cars traveling in the opposite direction at a combined speed of well over 100mph, separated by mere inches and line painted on the road. Everyone knows that car could swerve for any number of reasons and kill their entire family, and yet everyone goes out there every day and drives. The doubt is unreasonable.

You have many doubts, that's fine. I just find most of them to be either off point or unreasonable.

[Bob's World]

Regardless of what we call the surge of politically motivated, Islamist- Ideologically fused rise of act of terrorism against Western targets, the premise for the Western response possesses some major flaws. These flaws are of such a nature that they could actually make the problems for the West worse rather than better.

1. Promote sustainment of the status quo of political rule in all "allied" states.

This is foundational to the colonial intervention approach to foreign policy. Establishing and sustaining in power governments that are supportive of one's own national interests. Much of US COIN doctrine is built upon this foundation of colonial intervention, so has this problematic fault line of exercising control over (through subtle to overt means) the political processes of others.

2. To quick to promote overthrow of rule in non-allied states, or even those that disagree with us, and replacement with a regime that will support our national interests in the region.

3. Overly quick to brand non-state organizations that are emerging to positions of influence as "terrorist" organizations. This enables greater freedom to wage CT activities against these groups, but also effectively closes the door to other more productive forms of engagement. The State Department does not worry about establishing diplomatic relations with an organization, regardless of how influential it may be, once it goes on such a list. At that point it is just a "target" or a "threat" to be attacked or defeated.

4. Over reliance on CT tactics to target individuals and organizations that emerge to challenge the status quo through illegal means.

5. Over reliance on building the CT capacity of allied nation security forces to more effectively engage or suppress such nationalist organizations that emerge from their own populace to illegally challenge the status quo government.

6. Being so desperate for "friends" that we begin to hang out with some very shady characters, or just as bad, ignore the growing unacceptable nature of the behavior of our old friends.

EX:

The Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten released a series of US diplomatic cables from 2006 on massive and pervasive corruption and nepotism in Tunisia and its effect on economic development and social problems. The cables show that the United States government was fully aware of the dangerous and debilitating level of corruption in Tunisia, and its anti-democratic implications. But they raise the question of whether Washington was wise to make Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, despite his clear foibles, the pillar of its North Africa policy because of his role, as a secular strongman, in repressing Muslim movements (as William MacLean of Reuters argues).

The US embassy in Tunis noted the contradictions of what was once called "the Tunisian miracle" - relative stability and security and 5 per cent growth a year, but with mafia style corruption on the part of ruling cliques that was discouraging foreign investment and contributing to failing banks and high unemployment.

http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth...299907176.html

7. The coming shift of lead from Defense to State (good); and from combat to development (ok...) without a corresponding shift of Strategy.
We are merely changing the Ways and Means without updating our Ends or our understanding of the problem. Massive development in support of illegitimate and failing regimes is no more able to prop them up against a growing Tsunami of popular opposition than massive military support is. In fact, if suppression of symptoms is the goal, history is on the side of ruthless application of force as the most effective technique.


My point on this Tunisian thread is that here is an event that pokes big holes in the "expert" positions that have shaped our GWOT strategy and engagement over the past several years. Here is an opportunity to take a hard look into that hole, and gain a clearer perspective of what is going on and why. Here is an opportunity to make a substantive change in how we see and address such problems; and in how we promote and preserve our interests. The world is changing, the US and the West must evolve as well.

[Dayuhan]

For whatever reason you feel compelled to attack whatever I say. That's cool. But it does not create in me any compulsion or duty to argue with your opinions. They are your opinions, I see little to support them, so I let them stand on their own merit.

Why is very simple: I think the course of action you promote would be counterproductive and extremely dangerous: with the best of intentions I don't doubt, but good intentions don't always lead to good places. I also think your case is based on some very questionable assumptions, most notably the continuing and unsupported claim that autocratic states in the ME - particularly Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States - are somehow enabled and empowered by the US, and that the US therefore has some sort of influence that it could use to change their behavior. I might also cite your repeated and equally unsupported claim that the end of the Cold War increased instability in the developing world by removing some sort of benign equilibrium that existed between the US and the Soviet Union.

When these and other points are challenged, often with arguments that are by no means irrelevant, there is seldom any direct attempt to clarify or develop the points being made: they are simply repeated, as revealed truth. I admit that I find that frustrating, and that frustration produces the occasional intemperate post: temperance is perhaps not among my virtues (my wife assures me that have a few).

I cannot help but believe that the proposed intrusion of the US into the internal affairs of other nations as self-appointed "champion" of populaces that have never asked for our help, do not trust us, and whose issues and concerns are largely unfamiliar to us is not going to advance our interests in any way. I do not think that an unreasonable concern.

Omar advised, in an excellent post on another thread, that you stop looking at Afghanistan as the 51st state of the US. I agree, and I'd add Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, and a few others to the list.

I believe that intervention in the internal affairs of others is like punishment for guilt: to be undertaken only when it is necessary beyond reasonable doubt. The reasonable doubts do need to be addressed if intervention is to be contemplated or even threatened.

On a few individual points...

1. Promote sustainment of the status quo of political rule in all "allied" states.

Are we actually promoting the status quo? Where? There's a huge difference between promoting a status quo and dealing with a status quo that is not within our power to change. Attempting to initiate changes in the internal status quo of an allied nation (or any nation) is every bit as dangerous as trying to promote the status quo, possibly worse: it's simply not something we have the right to do. It is meddling of the worst sort and there will be a negative backlash no matter how good our intentions are.

2. To quick to promote overthrow of rule in non-allied states, or even those that disagree with us, and replacement with a regime that will support our national interests in the region.

Agree completely: I've always thought regime change a very dangerous idea. One might point out, though, that other than the rather irrational post-9/11 lashing out, this is not something we've done a great deal of since the end of the Cold War.

3. Overly quick to brand non-state organizations that are emerging to positions of influence as "terrorist" organizations. This enables greater freedom to wage CT activities against these groups, but also effectively closes the door to other more productive forms of engagement. The State Department does not worry about establishing diplomatic relations with an organization, regardless of how influential it may be, once it goes on such a list. At that point it is just a "target" or a "threat" to be attacked or defeated.

Groups that pursue terrorist tactics are terrorists, and responding to terrorism with attempts to engage productively simply sends a message that terrorism works. We might be better advised to try to engage with groups that disagree with us but have not embraced terrorism. In the case of AQ, there was going to be a confrontation no matter what we did: AQ needed it and was going to pursue it in any event. It takes two to talk and only one to fight. They needed a fight and they were going to push until they got one.

4. Over reliance on CT tactics to target individuals and organizations that emerge to challenge the status quo through illegal means.

Agreed... though just as we should not be too quick to assume that every insurgent is a terrorist, we must also not be too quick to brand every terrorist an insurgent. Blowing something up doesn't automatically make you a noble fighter for freedom: there are people out there trying to use violence to proactively impose an agenda that has nothing at all to do with freedom, and they are not necessarily wounded respondents to American provocation.

5. Over reliance on building the CT capacity of allied nation security forces to more effectively engage or suppress such nationalist organizations that emerge from their own populace to illegally challenge the status quo government.

The extent to which this occurs is quite exaggerated. Most of these nations do not need our help to suppress opposition, whether nationalist or otherwise. They do it very effectively on their own. They have lots of practice.

6. Being so desperate for "friends" that we begin to hang out with some very shady characters, or just as bad, ignore the growing unacceptable nature of the behavior of our old friends.

Agreed, to a point. "Friends", though, doesn't mean much in politics and diplomacy. There are shady characters that we have to deal with: they exist and we haven't the power to remove them. There are real limits to the extent to which the US can brand the behavior of other nations as "unacceptable". We are not the global morality police.

7. The coming shift of lead from Defense to State (good); and from combat to development (ok...) without a corresponding shift of Strategy.
We are merely changing the Ways and Means without updating our Ends or our understanding of the problem. Massive development in support of illegitimate and failing regimes is no more able to prop them up against a growing Tsunami of popular opposition than massive military support is. In fact, if suppression of symptoms is the goal, history is on the side of ruthless application of force as the most effective technique.

I don't see any reason to view political change as a problem. It happens when it's ready to happen. We should work with it as it happens, but if we try to initiate it or direct it we're only going to make a mess.

I quite agree that we should not be defending despots from their own populaces. Taking the opposite approach and trying to overthrow despots, or trying to impose ourselves as uninvited champion of the populace, is stepping way beyond any kind of appropriate role.

My point on this Tunisian thread is that here is an event that pokes big holes in the "expert" positions that have shaped our GWOT strategy and engagement over the past several years. Here is an opportunity to take a hard look into that hole, and gain a clearer perspective of what is going on and why. Here is an opportunity to make a substantive change in how we see and address such problems; and in how we promote and preserve our interests. The world is changing, the US and the West must evolve as well.

I don't see this is a problem, in any way. A crumbling regime fell, that's been expected for some time. It's not exactly a surprise. Political change is underway. There's no need for us to try and control or direct it: to the greatest possible extent this is something the Tunisians need to resolve on their own. If they ask for our help we should give it. If they don't - and they almost certainly won't - our role is to observe and to participate in whatever multilateral actions are deemed necessary.

Of course we should observe, learn, reconsider our positions. We should always be doing that. Bringing Marines into the picture is a matter of last resort and we're nowhere near that.

Too often in the past we've intervened on the wrong side of these situations. The antidote to that is not to try to intervene on the "right" side. The antidote is to stop intervening, unless it's requested and/or absolutely - beyond all reasonable doubt - necessary.

Argh. That was way too long...