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Thread: Air Power in the New COIN Era

  1. #81
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default I think we're there already...

    "Before we get too involved in who can pee the farthest"
    said 120mm. He also said
    "I put it down in the "even if it was forced upon those services, it was the natural result of ignoring/neglecting the future of conflict since 1989" category at the very least."
    causing me to wonder if he was talking about DoD, the Army, the USAF or anyone else other than C. Krulak...

    He also added
    "...And the Army is not blameless, here. In fact, you won't finding me defending The Army as an institution."
    I can agree with that...

    Selil said:
    "Oh, you don't have to believe me because the Air Force said it all first."
    I think that's a dated document and the AF has fixed most of that. Last time the kid was in Afghanistan, he had a JTAC with his Platoon frequently and said the CAS was way better than his previous two tours in both theaters. I believe they're flooding the zone with JTACs and that many of the RAND recommendations have been or are being implemented

    Umar Al-Mokhtar said:
    "...more like better focus on the Nation's task at hand rather than advocating for future capabilities that have no application to the present situation."
    Sounds good but I'm not sure the Marines are ready to dump the EAV, the Army to dump NLOS or the Navy ready to stop building Submarines. I suspect the respective Bosses realize that there's more going on in the world right now than the two big theaters; that it takes an excessively long time to develop and field new stuff and that there's no certainty in predicting war. We have the luxury to focus on the here and now; they do not.

    He also said:
    "USAF CAS is really good but Marine CAS is better (just as USAF air superiority has the edge over the Marines), so part of staying relevant to the fight is to learn from those who do it for a living."
    True, good point. It also makes the point -- correctly -- that CAS is the primary mission of Marine Tac Air while it is a secondary mission for the USAF. AS, IMO, it should be and stay...

    I agree with Umar on the C17s but realize that Congress is a part of the problem with that. As is Lockheed Martin.

    I tend to agree with Hacksaw.

  2. #82
    Council Member ODB's Avatar
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    Default God bless the USAF

    I've been getting caught up on this one. Notice a lot of AF bashing, just wanted to give them a thanks. They have gotten my brothers and me outta a lot of hairy situations. When your running black on ammo and A/C are stacked overhead to bail you out there is no greater feeling. Gotta love em' for what they do. How they get there I honestly don't care, as long as they are there, which they have been when they were needed most!!!
    ODB

    Exchange with an Iraqi soldier during FID:

    Why did you not clear your corner?

    Because we are on a base and it is secure.

  3. #83
    Council Member Umar Al-Mokhtār's Avatar
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    Default ODB, it's not "bashing" per se...

    yet as the old adage goes "squeeky wheel gets the grease" and it also may attract more than it's fair share of unwanted attention.

    And since the thread specifically targeted Air Power in the New COIN Era and given the recent SecDef speech at Maxwell it was pile on time.

    Sandbox can get rough like that.

    Plus almost everyone had good things to say about what the AF does bring to the fight.

    So what about those sneaky Sailors and all this talk about new submarines?
    "What is best in life?" "To crush your enemies, see them driven before you, and to hear the lamentation of the women."

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    Council Member 120mm's Avatar
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    The problem with addressing problems is that you paint yourself into the corner as a "critic" pretty quick.

    I think the USAF does a pretty good job in their specific mission, and CAS has become a "good thing" in recent years.

    The great majority of the perceived problems between the services could be solved by practicing basic fundamental customer service techniques, and that is a two-way street. When I was assigned a FAC team in the early 90s, I made a point of treating them right, and in return, I got everything I wanted from them.

    The rest of the issues are basically the natural result of the competitive nature of the services. The Army can't advocate for Air Force solutions, because that would be "blood in the water" come funding time.

    In my fantasies, the USAF takes over the great majority of UAS operations because they insinuate themselves into the Army Loop, and push Air Force support hard. Give the Army more than they can use or expect, and I think the USAF may get the control they want and need in the field of UAS. The Army UAS guys I know don't particularly like being in charge of it, and I'm not impressed with the job they do.

    Simply demanding that the USAF get control of UAS ops, and saying they'll let us know how they will support us doesn't cut it. It's an example of attracting more flies with honey kind of thing.

    I wish I could take some time and actually elaborate on this, but as of yesterday, it's back to "head crushing time" for me at work.

  5. #85
    Council Member Sargent's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Umar Al-Mokhtār View Post
    To address USAF and COIN I guess the first challenge is to get the Air Force to culturally realize they are a "support" service first and foremost.
    Agree, but you'd have an easier time fighting a land war in Asia. I'm sure I've mentioned it before, but I recall when I was with a defense contractor a brainstorming session we had, during QDR 01, of ideas to present to the AF on other areas to push. I, not being a member of the "faith," foolishly suggested that we might come up with new ways to use extant systems to support the ground element. If looks could kill.... Needless to say, the idea did not fly.

    I would argue the cultural problem comes down to service survival. USAF does not believe it can maintain itself as an independent branch if its mission is to support the other services -- at some point, they could just assume the missions themselves. Therefore, there must be something that makes the service unique and special. And unfortunately, strategic airlift and the like just aren't sexy enough either.


    “..you may have to accept that if you would like the US and its forces to be able to operate, you might need Air Superiority as a prerequisite.” That depends on where we operate. Air Superiority in not a prerequisite for us to operate, it is something very, very nice to have. When was the last time US ground forces were subjected to sustained air attack? Not that it couldn’t happen in the future.
    Thank you for pointing out the difference between the need to have and the nice to have. I think that far too many in the defense establishment, government, and public either never learned or have forgotten this rule. Same thing that happened to "no plan survives first contact."

    Cheers,
    Jill

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    Quote Originally Posted by 120mm View Post
    I'm not talking about Aeromedical evac, I'm talking about airtransportable hospitals, which can be exported to support both combat troops and HA missions. As the USAF doesn't push PR on this mission like the Army does, I'm left to assume they don't view it as a priority. Personally, I think the PR story of a dedicated HA/medical branch of the USAF would be awesome IO for them.
    Sorry, been gone for a while. Not to beat a dead horse, but it seems like the AF has done a pretty good job of taking care of wounded grunts. See below.

    -Cliff

    From http://www.airforce-magazine.com/Pages/default.aspx :

    On The Same Page: Gen Eric Schoomaker, the Army's top doctor, said the Army and Air Force medical communities are working to ensure that the highly successful aeromedical evacuation system now in place in the global war on terror continues without a hitch as the land service's end strength increases over the next few years. Speaking to defense reporters May 27 in Washington, D.C. (see above), Schoomaker said his largest role in the Army's expansion is to make sure facilities and infrastructure are up to par as forces are realigned across the globe from Korea to Europe. These facilities have been vital in supporting aeromedical efforts in the GWOT thus far, he said, noting that more than 50,000 service personnel have been evacuated from theater with a survival rate that hovers around 98 percent. The Army, for its part, also has to make sure that the right equipment, such as the small infusion pumps that travel on Air Force medevac aircraft, is ready and positioned where it needs to be, he said. Schoomaker said he just returned from a visit to Afghanistan. He had high praise for the Air Force-led Craig Joint Theater Hospital at Bagram Air Base.

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    Quote Originally Posted by 120mm View Post
    There is not a single place on Anaconda where an USAF personnel should legitimately be, doing a valid USAF mission where mortars should be an issue. I calculated the sightlines myself, back in 2003, when we occupied it. (Rockets, on the other hand, can range the airfield, but not accurately)
    I know this statement has been refuted. But to make sure everyone is one the same page, a JTAC/ROMAD/ALO - in other words the TACP, vary in rank from Airman to Col. They do an amazing job with what they are given and can provide an intelligent army commander great infuence on the battlefield.
    Last edited by Laxman; 12-07-2008 at 10:47 PM. Reason: Correct quote - No spaces between bracket and text.

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    Quote Originally Posted by selil View Post
    The way this bullet is stated exemplifies part of the problem. There can not be "better" integration with ground forces for close air support (CAS). There can only be perfect coordination. In CAS it is not the jet jockey who is sitting in the firing line of torrential hell and pain. If the Air Force took CAS seriously it would not allow any jet jockey to do CAS until they had been a forward air controller with grunts. Then again that is assuming that the Air Force takes CAS seriously and doesn't assign the bottom of the air plane driver class to A10's and other pretty things...
    I'll tag on a little bit to what Entropy has said.

    If the Army (not all, just the majority) was a little smarter in doing business, or understood what CAS actually does for it, then CAS integration would become a lot easier. Prejudice inhibits full integration and the prejudice is propagated within its training plan. Also, please find one RCO/BCO that fully understands what a JFO actually brings to the table. More often than not, a JFO usually ends up a cook or is staring at maps in the 2 shop, not out forward where they should be. The Air Force does not help itself with a lack of leaders that deal directly at the DIV / Corps level and help Army COs make sound decisions. The only service that truly has integration with land and air components is the Marines.
    Last edited by Laxman; 12-07-2008 at 10:53 PM.

  10. #90
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default That's a function of the type of and location of the war

    Quote Originally Posted by Laxman View Post
    ...please find one RCO/BCO that fully understands what a JFO actually brings to the table. More often than not, a JFO is usually ends up a cook or is staring at maps in the 2 shop, not out forward where they should be.
    The JFO should be out forward if there were a forward direction and the Bn/Bde was oriented that way. When subordinate units are in dispersed static locations with only sporadic (or even heavy but distributed geographically) contact, where is forward? When units are spread out as in Afghanistan on distributed patrols, which units should the JFO (as opposed to the JTACs. Do we have enough of those yet?) accompany? The JFO is going to be where he and the Cdr agree he can do the most good and have the most flexibility.

    Given a war of movement or one of frequent, heavy contact instead of a static low key COIN operation I suspect your complaint would not be a problem.

    You might also consider that the Army's lack of smarts about CAS is due to a failure for many years to develop doctrine and to train for it. Both the Army and the AF bear about equal responsibility for that. Consider also that in the current wars, the use of CAS is spotty -- it is not a constant thing for all units in all places, so it is a sometime thing for many in both suits. The important thing is that it's getting better...
    The only service that truly has integration with land and air components is the Marines.
    Well, yeah. Uh, do you really want to go there?

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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    The JFO should be out forward if there were a forward direction and the Bn/Bde was oriented that way. When subordinate units are in dispersed static locations with only sporadic (or even heavy but distributed geographically) contact, where is forward? When units are spread out as in Afghanistan on distributed patrols, which units should the JFO (as opposed to the JTACs. Do we have enough of those yet?) accompany? The JFO is going to be where he and the Cdr agree he can do the most good and have the most flexibility.

    Given a war of movement or one of frequent, heavy contact instead of a static low key COIN operation I suspect your complaint would not be a problem.

    You might also consider that the Army's lack of smarts about CAS is due to a failure for many years to develop doctrine and to train for it. Both the Army and the AF bear about equal responsibility for that. Consider also that in the current wars, the use of CAS is spotty -- it is not a constant thing for all units in all places, so it is a sometime thing for many in both suits. The important thing is that it's getting better...

    Do we have enough JTACs, no. Do we have enough JFOs, no. Is there a conventional "front" or forward to push all the JFOs to, not really. But to keep your JFOs basically locked away on a FOB does you little good either.
    Therefore, the requirement to have more JTACs and JFOs will remain. There is a major misunderstanding of what a JFO is capable of by doctrine IAW the JFIRE and JFO MOA. With very little in the way of currency training stateside, and very little actual joint training as well (besides NTC, JRTC) the problem shall remain regarding the lack of knowledge and utilization. Again, the AF does not help enough in pushing for an understanding. The Cdr should place their JFOs where they can be of greatest value, unfortunately this has not been the case in many instances. The doctrine is there, the understanding of the doctrine is not quite there.

    The lack of smarts is a problem for both services. The Army generally does not understand air, the AF generally does not understand landbased operational requirements.

    I wouldn't call CAS "spotty" necessarily. At least until you have defined the requirement. I'm sure I can find a few soldiers that would not want to be without CAS, which means JTAC/JFO support.

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    Some relevant articles from the latest ASPJ:

    Asymmetric Air Support

    The land component is acutely aware that under current doctrine, it is apportioned/allocated CAS assets based only on CAS requirements.4 The word close in CAS does not imply a specific distance; rather, it is situational. The requirement for detailed integration due to proximity, fires, or movement is the determining factor, but this is becoming less and less relevant to what the ground component actually needs in order to serve as a stabilizing force. The need for CAS to deliver ordnance in close proximity to friendly forces is becoming a smaller factor in the current environments of Iraq and Afghanistan.

    Over the last five years, fighter/bomber aircraft of the coalition air forces have evolved to become more than just strafing/bombing platforms. Granted, their targeting pods were designed to employ precision-guided munitions and reduce collateral damage, but the inherent capabilities of the pods have expanded their role into widely used and effective reconnaissance/surveillance. Unfortunately, the Air Force lacks the intelligence infrastructure to exploit the information garnered from the pods and other sources. The Air Force should have intelligence capability integral to the squadron, as did an RF-4 squadron, if it is going to fully exploit the intelligence gained from full-motion video (FMV) footage.5

    In today’s operations, the land component has a great need for reconnaissance platforms; some people have even called it a “limitless hunger.”6 This need far exceeds the assets available to cover requirements, some of which are for armed reconnaissance to enable immediate strikes against the enemy during time-critical operations (e.g., indirect-fire setups and emplacement of improvised explosive devices). These requests may not involve close proximity to friendly forces or require detailed integration since no operations may be occurring at the proposed reconnaissance location. Even so, none of the current fighters in the Air Force’s inventory were designed as FMV reconnaissance platforms. The F-16C+ (Block 30), a reconnaissance-capable aircraft, replaced the RF-4 as the Air Force’s primary armed-reconnaissance platform, but its capabilities lack the real-time feed desired by the land component, which wants the real-time, FMV feed that it gets from aircraft equipped with the Remote Operations Video Enhanced Receiver (ROVER). Because the land component can’t fulfill reconnaissance-support requirements from organic assets or from surveillance and reconnaissance platforms, it now uses the JTAR process to request armed reconnaissance from traditional CAS assets. Although referred to as CAS to keep within doctrinal limitations, this is not CAS as the air component community would typically define it. Unfortunately, fighter units assigned to the two theaters of operations must provide CAS to the land component. This is where the friction starts.
    Also a good (and related) piece on problems with ISR tasking:

    I READ WITH GREAT interest Lt Col Michael Downs’s article “Rethinking the Combined Force Air Component Commander’s Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Approach to Counterinsurgency” (Fall 2008). I agree that the system needs reform but disagree with his proposal to use the close air support request process for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). Though faster than the air tasking order cycle, the joint tactical air strike request process used for close air support still does not allow the flexibility in execution required by the ground commander. Given that the Air Force has decided to apply theater ISR assets to tactical priorities, that commander must have the ability to shift those assets when priorities change. The combined air operations center (CAOC) must allow decentralized execution of ISR assets—particularly full-motion-video platforms—by delegating tactical control of platforms apportioned to Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) during execution. Doing so would speed the process of dynamic retasking and shorten the time required to respond to the ground commander’s shifting priorities and time-sensitive targets.

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    The latest Wright Stuff from Air University has a couple of interesting and relevant articles:

    Airpower in Irregular Warfare: Doctrine and Concepts

    This is a presentation given to some members of the French Air Force. I think there is a lot of valuable content here and it's well worth a read, particularly for fans of Clausewitz. There's also a lot of relevance for the discussion taking place in the thread about defining IW.

    Given the QDR intent to shift effort toward non-traditional threats without unbalancing the credibility of US forces in major combat operations, the directions are understandable. However, with the current economic meltdown in the news every day, it is not difficult to understand the principal criticism of the 2006 QDR. It lacks fiscal constraint and is patently unexecutable as a strategy. For the flying community, this is not a trivial matter. In a fiscally constrained environment, can you afford to buy different platforms for different missions? You must choose suitable and sustainable aircraft and munitions inventories for two diverse roles. You must also find ways to maintain crew proficiency and platform availability for wholly dissimilar tasks. If you buy just one type of aircraft, a 5th generation
    fighter for example, is it capable of performing both missions? If you believe current US Army, Marine Corps and Air Force doctrine, then your answer must be “no.” The Air Force must be prepared to simultaneously conduct irregular and traditional warfare operations.


    THE ROLE OF AIRPOWER IN THE ALGERIAN COUNTER-INSURGENCY – THE PLAN CHALLE


    This is an interesting if somewhat disjointed piece not by a French Air Force officer, but a former member of the Algerian insurgency:

    The Algerian War had many unusual features. Once the various typical circumstances to that conflict are peeled away, the Algerian insurgency provides valuable lessons, relevant to the conduct of counterinsurgency operations in today’s security environment. The Algerian experience might provide some of the initial and very basic elements of a framework that could eventually lead to a generic model for the conduct of counterinsurgency operations in the Greater Middle East (defined as ranging from North Africa, through the Arabian Peninsula, to Iran) and the Muslim world at large. In order to do so, it will be necessary to explore the Algerian insurgency in depth by detailing the relevance of the conflict today and then exploring the conduct of operations (both by the FLN and the French) in the field prior to drawing pertinent lessons at the operational level.
    and

    The Plan Challe was named after Air Force General Maurice Challe, commander-in-chief of French forces in Algeria from 1958 to1960. The Plan Challe was an offensive plan that took the war to the insurgents. The French relegated reserve and conscript units to static defense roles, e.g., protecting roads, quadrillage, etc, in order to free up regular units to conduct mobile “search and destroy” missions in the mountains where guerrilla bands had taken refuge. Employing helicopters, the French inserted special mobile units composed of elite troops such as Foreign Legionnaires, paratroopers, marines, special commandos units, and airmobile regulars. These elite forces never exceeded 20,000 troopers. Operationally, the Plan Challe comprised a series of sweeps against known insurgent spots. Releasing troops from static quadrillage duties, Challe broke down large formations into small units, many of which were mixed Franco-Algerian in make-up, that could move quickly and bring the guerrillas to battle in rough country.

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    Default Picking this thread back up from another perspective

    From Danger Room: How the Afghan Air War Got Stuck in the Sky (http://www.wired.com/magazine/2009/1..._air_war/all/1). This short article offers an account of how the current gudiance on employing airpower is affecting ground operations. As noted in many other forums, the immediate result is that less ordnace is getting dropped and, in certain tactical situations, that's not good.

    However, I'm not going to argue the for/against ICO the current theater guidance on utilizing air support. I'll just point out that one issue this article raises is that we conduct our tactical operations with a certain expectation of having that air support available. While in this case, the lack of immediate air support is consciously self-inflicted, there are many reasons on current and future battlefields where we may be denied the air support we have come to expect. In the "level playing field" of ground versus ground forces, how are we doing (and how will we do)?

    In a recent Nightwatch report from AFCEA (to big to attach), one of the stats revealed was that since the new rules have been in effect, curtailing our air support operations, our friendly to enemy kill ratio has moved from about 6to1 to 1to1--an even trade during engagements. Now this is based on open sources and is inexact, but probably exposes a trend (of course this isn't a stat to support COIN success necessarily, but does indicate something with regard to tactical engagements).

    In looking at MCDP 1 Warfighting and MCDP 1-3 Tactics, the Marine Corps espouses a concept of combined arms to use fire and maneuver to create a dilemma. In fact, we touted that fires weren't necessarily to destroy, but to enable maneuver. However, this requires enough maneuver elements at the point of engagement. My impression is that the small size of units we are employing has degraded our capability to execute our stated doctrine. We are maneuvering to bring destructive fires to bear, not having enough organic maneuver strength to merely use fires for suppression or temporary neutralization. Based on the fact that over the timeframe of the engagement, there was no discussion of other maneuver units reinforcing this squad, that there were none within supporting distance, given relevant terrain and mobility factors. I was also surprised at the stated ineffectiveness of the mortars and artillery fire.

    I'm not in any way disparaging our ground unit's performance and capability. However, I think our dispersed operating methods may really depend upon a concept of air support that has changed. I'm sure our commanders on the ground are wrestling with this. It should also cause us to think about our planned future concepts. As I said, I think there are different ways that we could be denied air support.

    Phil Ridderhof USMC

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    Quote Originally Posted by PhilR View Post
    I'm not in any way disparaging our ground unit's performance and capability. However, I think our dispersed operating methods may really depend upon a concept of air support that has changed. I'm sure our commanders on the ground are wrestling with this. It should also cause us to think about our planned future concepts. As I said, I think there are different ways that we could be denied air support.

    Phil Ridderhof USMC
    You said a mouthful there, The enemy must be drooling at the thought of not having to worry about a lightning bolt from the sky. The AF has a weaponering problem they need smaller precise munitions and they need to be able to deliver non-lethal weapons like concussion grenades/bombs (the ones from the 1950's) not those silly wimpy flash bangs.

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    Default Hi Phil,

    I appreciate the reference to why the kill ratio has dropped to 1:1:

    In a recent Nightwatch report from AFCEA (to big to attach), one of the stats revealed was that since the new rules have been in effect, curtailing our air support operations, our friendly to enemy kill ratio has moved from about 6to1 to 1to1--an even trade during engagements.
    I read an article recently which mentioned the drop in kill ratio, but ascribed it to the Taliban getting bigger and better - the author's conclusion was that we should get out while the getting is good. Correlation of the drop in kill ratio with the change in ROE/RUF was, of course, not mentioned in the article.

    Limitation of air and artillary support would logically raise cain with our traditional small unit tactics. It seems this study at least provides an inference that the ROE/RUF change caused the drop in kill ratio.

    Perhaps, "best practices COIN" and "best political practices" are inconsistent with the basic concepts of a "armed conflict". Certainly, the Laws of War (LOAC) require no such limitations as are in effect. It seems a hell of a note where sound warfighting tactics, legal under the LOAC, are pushed to the side in favor of other considerations.

    The result is that our enemies can say "hey, we're winning". In the present case, some of this is "consciously self-inflicted", as you say; some is lack of ground forces. About the best that can be said is that some lessons will be learned about combat situations where US air power is not a factor. Back in those bad old days, the infantry could rely on arty backup. It's been a long time since US air power was not supreme. It's been an even longer time (ever ?) going back to our arty being hobbled.

    Regards

    Mike

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    Question

    Several considerations, the change in the ROE can cut multiple ways.

    a) It might increase popular support, curb the diffuse ressentiment against the foreign troops or more likely at least not inflame it. This is of course a very good thing and might be key. At least the decision makers think (mostly) so.

    b) This should greatly enhance the liberty of movement for the enemy in his many forms, enabling him to add overt violence and show of force to his arsenal.

    c) This decreases the penalities to support or shelter the enemy. There are less chances that a mistake takes a bloody toll on the (innocent) civilians sheltering or maybe supporting the foe. Kids can transport weapons, people host the foe with even less fear of riprisal.

    d) It should also increase the chances of the enemy in direct action. While such a drop in the kill ratio seems to me out of order it is tactically certainly a good thing for the other side.

    e) It sends a signal to the world(media) that the coalition tries hard to keep civilian casualities down and does care about the people there.


    I wonder if the coalition is able to make up for the loss in bombing power with other, less targeted forms of fire support. In short it might make sense to take the most controversial asset out of the (media, Karzai) firing line and increase the effort delivered by mortars, howitzers, AFV, etc. For example mortars close by are pretty accurate and can fly under the radar of many critics and don't go through so many decision levels. They too should also be handled with care so to avoid to collide too often with the strategic intent.


    Firn

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    Default It's The Taliban Causing All The Deaths

    USAF General Deptula responds. Link from SWJ Blog article.

    http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009...vilian-deaths/

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    On kill ratios:

    I think that has more to do with the Taliban using a lot more IED's while avoiding decisive engagements than restrictive ROE on air support.

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    Default ROE and CAS

    General Faces Unease Among His Own Troops, Too, New York Times, 22 June 2010.

    One Marine infantry lieutenant, during fighting in Marja this year, said he had all but stopped seeking air support while engaged in firefights. He spent too much time on the radio trying to justify its need, he said, and the aircraft never arrived or they arrived too late or the pilots were reluctant to drop their ordnance.

    “I’m better off just trying to fight my fight, and maneuver the squads, and not waste the time or focus trying to get air,” he said.

    Several infantrymen have also said that the rules are so restrictive that pilots are often not allowed to attack fixed targets — say, a building or tree line from which troops are taking fire — unless they can personally see the insurgents doing the firing.

    This has lead to situations many soldiers describe as absurd, including decisions by patrol leaders to have fellow soldiers move briefly out into the open to draw fire once aircraft arrive, so the pilots might be cleared to participate in the fight.
    They mostly come at night. Mostly.


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