Air Power in the New COIN Era

[PhilR]

From Danger Room: How the Afghan Air War Got Stuck in the Sky (http://www.wired.com/magazine/2009/1..._air_war/all/1). This short article offers an account of how the current gudiance on employing airpower is affecting ground operations. As noted in many other forums, the immediate result is that less ordnace is getting dropped and, in certain tactical situations, that's not good.

However, I'm not going to argue the for/against ICO the current theater guidance on utilizing air support. I'll just point out that one issue this article raises is that we conduct our tactical operations with a certain expectation of having that air support available. While in this case, the lack of immediate air support is consciously self-inflicted, there are many reasons on current and future battlefields where we may be denied the air support we have come to expect. In the "level playing field" of ground versus ground forces, how are we doing (and how will we do)?

In a recent Nightwatch report from AFCEA (to big to attach), one of the stats revealed was that since the new rules have been in effect, curtailing our air support operations, our friendly to enemy kill ratio has moved from about 6to1 to 1to1--an even trade during engagements. Now this is based on open sources and is inexact, but probably exposes a trend (of course this isn't a stat to support COIN success necessarily, but does indicate something with regard to tactical engagements).

In looking at MCDP 1 Warfighting and MCDP 1-3 Tactics, the Marine Corps espouses a concept of combined arms to use fire and maneuver to create a dilemma. In fact, we touted that fires weren't necessarily to destroy, but to enable maneuver. However, this requires enough maneuver elements at the point of engagement. My impression is that the small size of units we are employing has degraded our capability to execute our stated doctrine. We are maneuvering to bring destructive fires to bear, not having enough organic maneuver strength to merely use fires for suppression or temporary neutralization. Based on the fact that over the timeframe of the engagement, there was no discussion of other maneuver units reinforcing this squad, that there were none within supporting distance, given relevant terrain and mobility factors. I was also surprised at the stated ineffectiveness of the mortars and artillery fire.

I'm not in any way disparaging our ground unit's performance and capability. However, I think our dispersed operating methods may really depend upon a concept of air support that has changed. I'm sure our commanders on the ground are wrestling with this. It should also cause us to think about our planned future concepts. As I said, I think there are different ways that we could be denied air support.

Phil Ridderhof USMC

[slapout9]

I'm not in any way disparaging our ground unit's performance and capability. However, I think our dispersed operating methods may really depend upon a concept of air support that has changed. I'm sure our commanders on the ground are wrestling with this. It should also cause us to think about our planned future concepts. As I said, I think there are different ways that we could be denied air support.

Phil Ridderhof USMC

You said a mouthful there, The enemy must be drooling at the thought of not having to worry about a lightning bolt from the sky. The AF has a weaponering problem they need smaller precise munitions and they need to be able to deliver non-lethal weapons like concussion grenades/bombs (the ones from the 1950's) not those silly wimpy flash bangs.

[jmm99]

I appreciate the reference to why the kill ratio has dropped to 1:1:

In a recent Nightwatch report from AFCEA (to big to attach), one of the stats revealed was that since the new rules have been in effect, curtailing our air support operations, our friendly to enemy kill ratio has moved from about 6to1 to 1to1--an even trade during engagements.

I read an article recently which mentioned the drop in kill ratio, but ascribed it to the Taliban getting bigger and better - the author's conclusion was that we should get out while the getting is good. Correlation of the drop in kill ratio with the change in ROE/RUF was, of course, not mentioned in the article.

Limitation of air and artillary support would logically raise cain with our traditional small unit tactics. It seems this study at least provides an inference that the ROE/RUF change caused the drop in kill ratio.

Perhaps, "best practices COIN" and "best political practices" are inconsistent with the basic concepts of a "armed conflict". Certainly, the Laws of War (LOAC) require no such limitations as are in effect. It seems a hell of a note where sound warfighting tactics, legal under the LOAC, are pushed to the side in favor of other considerations.

The result is that our enemies can say "hey, we're winning". In the present case, some of this is "consciously self-inflicted", as you say; some is lack of ground forces. About the best that can be said is that some lessons will be learned about combat situations where US air power is not a factor. Back in those bad old days, the infantry could rely on arty backup. It's been a long time since US air power was not supreme. It's been an even longer time (ever ?) going back to our arty being hobbled.

Regards

Mike

[Firn]

Several considerations, the change in the ROE can cut multiple ways.

a) It might increase popular support, curb the diffuse ressentiment against the foreign troops or more likely at least not inflame it. This is of course a very good thing and might be key. At least the decision makers think (mostly) so.

b) This should greatly enhance the liberty of movement for the enemy in his many forms, enabling him to add overt violence and show of force to his arsenal.

c) This decreases the penalities to support or shelter the enemy. There are less chances that a mistake takes a bloody toll on the (innocent) civilians sheltering or maybe supporting the foe. Kids can transport weapons, people host the foe with even less fear of riprisal.

d) It should also increase the chances of the enemy in direct action. While such a drop in the kill ratio seems to me out of order it is tactically certainly a good thing for the other side.

e) It sends a signal to the world(media) that the coalition tries hard to keep civilian casualities down and does care about the people there.


I wonder if the coalition is able to make up for the loss in bombing power with other, less targeted forms of fire support. In short it might make sense to take the most controversial asset out of the (media, Karzai) firing line and increase the effort delivered by mortars, howitzers, AFV, etc. For example mortars close by are pretty accurate and can fly under the radar of many critics and don't go through so many decision levels. They too should also be handled with care so to avoid to collide too often with the strategic intent.


Firn

[slapout9]

USAF General Deptula responds. Link from SWJ Blog article.

http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009...vilian-deaths/

[Entropy]

On kill ratios:

I think that has more to do with the Taliban using a lot more IED's while avoiding decisive engagements than restrictive ROE on air support.

[Rex Brynen]

General Faces Unease Among His Own Troops, Too, New York Times, 22 June 2010.

One Marine infantry lieutenant, during fighting in Marja this year, said he had all but stopped seeking air support while engaged in firefights. He spent too much time on the radio trying to justify its need, he said, and the aircraft never arrived or they arrived too late or the pilots were reluctant to drop their ordnance.

“I’m better off just trying to fight my fight, and maneuver the squads, and not waste the time or focus trying to get air,” he said.

Several infantrymen have also said that the rules are so restrictive that pilots are often not allowed to attack fixed targets — say, a building or tree line from which troops are taking fire — unless they can personally see the insurgents doing the firing.

This has lead to situations many soldiers describe as absurd, including decisions by patrol leaders to have fellow soldiers move briefly out into the open to draw fire once aircraft arrive, so the pilots might be cleared to participate in the fight.