Air Power in the New COIN Era

[Jedburgh]

Air Power in the New COIN Era: The Strategic Importance of USAF Advisory and Assistance Missions

With insurgency growing in importance as a national security problem, it is receiving new interest across the services, in the Department of Defense (DoD), and elsewhere in the U.S. government. Although ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq give particular immediacy to the problem, the challenge of insurgency extends well beyond these specific conflicts. It is important, therefore, that the U.S. Air Force (USAF) consider how to meet the growing demand for air power in joint, combined, and interagency counterinsurgency operations and that other services’ and DoD-wide reassessments of the subject take the potential roles of air power in counterinsurgency fully into account. In particular, airmen should take the lead in exploring how air power might work in combination with other military and civil instruments to help avert the development of an insurgency or perhaps to check a growing insurgency long enough to allow political and social initiatives (the heart of any successful counterinsurgency strategy) to take hold.

To address these and related policy challenges, RAND Project AIR FORCE conducted a fiscal year 2005 study entitled “The USAF’s Role in Countering Insurgencies.” This study addressed four major policy questions:
(1) What threat do modern insurgencies pose to U.S. interests?
(2) What strategy should the United States pursue to counter insurgent threats?
(3) What role does military power play in defeating insurgencies?
(4) What steps should USAF take to most effectively contribute to counterinsurgency?

This work builds on more than 40years of RAND Corporation work on insurgency, peace operations, and other types of lesser conflicts. This monograph has several purposes and audiences. First, it seeks to be a short primer on the problem of insurgency, counterinsurgency principles, and the role of air power in countering insurgencies. It is hoped that it will be a valuable introduction for airmen new to the topic. Second, it is hoped that the analysis on the potential demand for advisory assistance, as well as the data collection and analysis of recent 6th Special Operations Squadron (6 SOS) missions, will offer new insights to counterinsurgency practitioners in USAF. Finally, the monograph seeks to offer senior USAF leaders a way ahead to develop increased capability in this area without sacrificing the Air Force’s edge in major combat operations...

[Steve Blair]

Now let's just hope that the Air Force reads the study and actually learns something from it.

[Tom Odom]

I will reserve judgement until I read it but some key word searches are not encouraging. Very little on Africa--especially none on use of COIN air in 1960s Congo. A single mention of an AF FAO program to enhance regional understanding. No hit on air attache. A single hit on embassy as it relates to a country team. No hit on "FAC". No hit on "CAS". 6 total hits on airlift.

I will read and post a review.

best
Tom

[selil]

I’ve only read about 120 pages of the monograph, but it seems that the Air Force is hampered by an expectation and equipment issuance problem. The Air Force community according to the monograph neither realizes its place in the anti-counter insurgency effort, nor has an expectation of change to meet counter insurgency missions. I find the basic economics issues stated as officers are not incentivized to fill roles in Air Force special operations billets and that special markers may be needed to fill those billets with officers. So, in summary the Air Force does not have the knowledge, skills, or ability to meet counter insurgency missions (with few exceptions like the AC-130), and in fact the argument could be made that the Air Force is unwilling to change and adapt to the changing landscape and war environment.


Still reading, but that’s what I’m getting after gutting the document.

[RTK]

the argument could be made that the Air Force is unwilling to change and adapt to the changing landscape and war environment.

Possibly because they would be marginalized in the current COIN structure to flying CAP in the possibility of TIC support and not much more. In essence, everything that we've built the Air Force up to be in the last 30 years would turn out insignificant.

[SWJED]

It is a terrible, terrible fact that "transformation" has been high-jacked by those who see high-ticket, high-technology solutions to every problem-set we now, and will for the foreseeable future, face. I have been working these issues (urban, asymmetric, IW, COIN, etc...) for ten years. Every time I think we have turned the corner and the light bulbs are popping on someone or some “program” flips off the switch. IMHO, the USAF and USN are most guilty – but others are too. Programs that have emanated out of JFCOM’s J9 over the last several years smack of inmates taking charge of the insane asylum. Moreover, as has been posted on another thread here today – our ground forces are still struggling for solutions – and not necessarily at the tactical level…

[Steve Blair]

I agree, Tom, that the report doesn't touch on some important considerations, but you need to consider that the target audience doesn't even *think* about COIN anymore. I'd consider this more of a lead-in: something to get USAF leaders thinking about basic COIN and then (hopefully) being followed up with more detail. This is directed at an audience that has little background in the subject.

This is especially vital when you consider that this year Air Force ROTC *removed* OOTW instruction from their course syllabus. Granted, it only got one or two class periods before, but now it gets *none*. The terrorism module remains about the same, and the cultural sections did change somewhat. But the AF seems to be trying to change its focus to space war and touting the strengths of the F-22.