Page 1 of 6 123 ... LastLast
Results 1 to 20 of 101

Thread: Air Power in the New COIN Era

  1. #1
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Oct 2005
    Posts
    3,099

    Default Air Power in the New COIN Era

    Air Power in the New COIN Era: The Strategic Importance of USAF Advisory and Assistance Missions
    With insurgency growing in importance as a national security problem, it is receiving new interest across the services, in the Department of Defense (DoD), and elsewhere in the U.S. government. Although ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq give particular immediacy to the problem, the challenge of insurgency extends well beyond these specific conflicts. It is important, therefore, that the U.S. Air Force (USAF) consider how to meet the growing demand for air power in joint, combined, and interagency counterinsurgency operations and that other services’ and DoD-wide reassessments of the subject take the potential roles of air power in counterinsurgency fully into account. In particular, airmen should take the lead in exploring how air power might work in combination with other military and civil instruments to help avert the development of an insurgency or perhaps to check a growing insurgency long enough to allow political and social initiatives (the heart of any successful counterinsurgency strategy) to take hold.

    To address these and related policy challenges, RAND Project AIR FORCE conducted a fiscal year 2005 study entitled “The USAF’s Role in Countering Insurgencies.” This study addressed four major policy questions:
    (1) What threat do modern insurgencies pose to U.S. interests?
    (2) What strategy should the United States pursue to counter insurgent threats?
    (3) What role does military power play in defeating insurgencies?
    (4) What steps should USAF take to most effectively contribute to counterinsurgency?

    This work builds on more than 40years of RAND Corporation work on insurgency, peace operations, and other types of lesser conflicts. This monograph has several purposes and audiences. First, it seeks to be a short primer on the problem of insurgency, counterinsurgency principles, and the role of air power in countering insurgencies. It is hoped that it will be a valuable introduction for airmen new to the topic. Second, it is hoped that the analysis on the potential demand for advisory assistance, as well as the data collection and analysis of recent 6th Special Operations Squadron (6 SOS) missions, will offer new insights to counterinsurgency practitioners in USAF. Finally, the monograph seeks to offer senior USAF leaders a way ahead to develop increased capability in this area without sacrificing the Air Force’s edge in major combat operations...

  2. #2
    Moderator Steve Blair's Avatar
    Join Date
    Oct 2005
    Location
    Montana
    Posts
    3,195

    Default

    Now let's just hope that the Air Force reads the study and actually learns something from it.

  3. #3
    Council Member Tom Odom's Avatar
    Join Date
    Oct 2005
    Location
    DeRidder LA
    Posts
    3,949

    Default

    I will reserve judgement until I read it but some key word searches are not encouraging. Very little on Africa--especially none on use of COIN air in 1960s Congo. A single mention of an AF FAO program to enhance regional understanding. No hit on air attache. A single hit on embassy as it relates to a country team. No hit on "FAC". No hit on "CAS". 6 total hits on airlift.

    I will read and post a review.

    best
    Tom

  4. #4
    i pwnd ur ooda loop selil's Avatar
    Join Date
    Sep 2006
    Location
    Belly of the beast
    Posts
    2,112

    Default

    I’ve only read about 120 pages of the monograph, but it seems that the Air Force is hampered by an expectation and equipment issuance problem. The Air Force community according to the monograph neither realizes its place in the anti-counter insurgency effort, nor has an expectation of change to meet counter insurgency missions. I find the basic economics issues stated as officers are not incentivized to fill roles in Air Force special operations billets and that special markers may be needed to fill those billets with officers. So, in summary the Air Force does not have the knowledge, skills, or ability to meet counter insurgency missions (with few exceptions like the AC-130), and in fact the argument could be made that the Air Force is unwilling to change and adapt to the changing landscape and war environment.


    Still reading, but that’s what I’m getting after gutting the document.

  5. #5
    Council Member RTK's Avatar
    Join Date
    Aug 2006
    Location
    Wherever my stuff is
    Posts
    824

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by selil View Post
    the argument could be made that the Air Force is unwilling to change and adapt to the changing landscape and war environment.
    Possibly because they would be marginalized in the current COIN structure to flying CAP in the possibility of TIC support and not much more. In essence, everything that we've built the Air Force up to be in the last 30 years would turn out insignificant.

  6. #6
    Small Wars Journal SWJED's Avatar
    Join Date
    Sep 2005
    Location
    Largo, Florida
    Posts
    3,989

    Default Frustration All Around...

    It is a terrible, terrible fact that "transformation" has been high-jacked by those who see high-ticket, high-technology solutions to every problem-set we now, and will for the foreseeable future, face. I have been working these issues (urban, asymmetric, IW, COIN, etc...) for ten years. Every time I think we have turned the corner and the light bulbs are popping on someone or some “program” flips off the switch. IMHO, the USAF and USN are most guilty – but others are too. Programs that have emanated out of JFCOM’s J9 over the last several years smack of inmates taking charge of the insane asylum. Moreover, as has been posted on another thread here today – our ground forces are still struggling for solutions – and not necessarily at the tactical level…

  7. #7
    Moderator Steve Blair's Avatar
    Join Date
    Oct 2005
    Location
    Montana
    Posts
    3,195

    Default Interesting Read

    I agree, Tom, that the report doesn't touch on some important considerations, but you need to consider that the target audience doesn't even *think* about COIN anymore. I'd consider this more of a lead-in: something to get USAF leaders thinking about basic COIN and then (hopefully) being followed up with more detail. This is directed at an audience that has little background in the subject.

    This is especially vital when you consider that this year Air Force ROTC *removed* OOTW instruction from their course syllabus. Granted, it only got one or two class periods before, but now it gets *none*. The terrorism module remains about the same, and the cultural sections did change somewhat. But the AF seems to be trying to change its focus to space war and touting the strengths of the F-22.

  8. #8
    Council Member Tom Odom's Avatar
    Join Date
    Oct 2005
    Location
    DeRidder LA
    Posts
    3,949

    Default

    Steve,

    You are right in saying that the audience has a shallow background. And that was what I was saying in a different way. For a RAND study to talk airpower in COIN and not cover the issues I mentioned says volumes about the audience they are trying to reach.

    One of my best friends is a senior officer in USAF SOF; he is bright, articulate, mission oriented, and flexible. He knows more about this realm of airpower than most. But as an MC130 driver, he is not a fighter jock and as a Herky bird piot, not even a "real" jet pilot.

    Does he have a shot at CSAF? doubtful

    In any case I finished reading the study and here are some thoughts:

    The poor.

    Initial chapter gets bogged down in attempting and distinguishing between a terrorist and an insurgent. Most of it is irrelevant as the study's definition of a pure terrorist is so limited as to be nearly useless.

    The good.

    The Chapter on COIN Imperatives is quite useful.

    The great.

    The Chapter on Grand Strategy is CRITICAL. Just some samples:

    "One of the most distinctive—and challenging—features of making and executing counterinsurgency strategy is that “information operations” are central to strategic success, not merely an appendage of kinetic operations. It would be unfair to say that the U.S. armed forces pay mere lip service to the importance of propaganda, public affairs, psychological operations, and the other elements of information operations, but it is certainly true that these elements of military power are generally treated as useful appendages of the military apparatus, whose value is usually measured merely in terms of their ability to facilitate or enhance traditional combat functions.
    The political battlefield that counterinsurgency operations must seek to dominate is one in which perceptions and beliefs are what matter. If people believe that U.S. forces conducting counterinsurgency are attacking civilians indiscriminately, that their government is irredeemably corrupt, or that their streets are unsafe, it is irrelevant to the conflict whether these things are actually true except insofar as it may affect these impressions"
    "Popular doctrinal concepts, such as “rapid decisive operations” that emphasize the merits of winning quick victories or achieving strategic-level shock and paralytic effects against conventional military opponents are intrinsically inconsistent with this reality, and seeking to apply them in counterinsurgency will often be counterproductive. Defeating any substantial insurgency requires sustained effort over years or even decades, which affects everything from
    planning for appropriate force rotation to managing expectations when
    the conflict is presented to domestic political audiences at home."
    The intriguing.

    The Chapter on 6th SOS as an advisory unit template is quite interesting. It is obvious that the Air Commandos used some of the basic SF structures, as models and I would say that is a good thing. Those structures work.

    Where I did not get a clear sense of "fit" was in the realm of what is traditionally security assistance on the "air" side. That was a real problem for our efforts in Sudan while I was there: the Sudanese got 3 F-5s (one was a 2-seat trainer) and all 3 were smoking holes within a year or so. The same held even truer of our efforts in Zaire. In that case, when a rebellion did break out in the mid-60s, we threw together a Congolese "Air America" using US aircraft, expatriate Cuban pilots, and CIA/military advisors/support.

    The doubtful.

    Being a realist (cynic?) I doubt that the AF --without some kind of serious shove from above like JFK in the 1960s--is going to buy into this even if it does make sense.


    Best

    Tom
    Last edited by Tom Odom; 09-19-2006 at 08:06 PM. Reason: Finished reading the study

  9. #9
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Oct 2005
    Posts
    3,099

    Default

    Air & Space Power Journal, Fall 06:

    Counterinsurgency Airpower: Air-Ground Integration for the Long War
    Editorial Abstract: Unprecedented levels of joint cooperation have occurred in counterinsurgency operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Colonel Belote documents the successes of increased joint coordination in both nations, particularly with regard to improving close air support and ensuring the security and legitimacy of national elections. The author also offers ideas for improving joint training opportunities and enhancing joint doctrine, tactics, and procedures.

  10. #10
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Mar 2008
    Posts
    10

    Default Hi Mr Odom

    Mr Odom I am new in this forum,I would like to know your opinion about the cuban pilots who fought in Zaire against Simbas.



    Did they help to destroy simbas?

    Was that war a victory for Mobutu?

    I heard Laurent kabila continued the war after 1967.

    Did the cubans help to defeat Schramme and allies?

  11. #11
    Council Member Rob Thornton's Avatar
    Join Date
    Oct 2006
    Location
    Fort Leavenworth, KS
    Posts
    1,510

    Default

    Hey Tom, one of my and Old Eagle's buddies at JCISFA is a retired Talon pilot. He works the USAF end of things for us, as well as contributing to broader effort - he also fills the shoes of the 2 x USAF AD slots we have here at JCISFA. While we have Army, Marines and a USN LtCDR, our USAF slots are currently unfilled. When they come in, I'm sure they will contribute to the effort - the USAF has an important role to play, and we will all benefit by their attendance & participation.
    Best, Rob

  12. #12
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Feb 2008
    Location
    The Midwest
    Posts
    180

    Default AFROTC may not be the best indicator...

    I don't know what AFROTC is doing.

    I am doing the AF's Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) by correspondence right now, and I think a lot of SWJ folks would be surprised by the amount of focus on Small Wars in the courses.

    I'm on the 5th of 7 classes. The first was on leadership... std mil leadership stuff.

    The National Security class focused extensively on the interagency... 2/7 lessons were mainly dealing with the interagency process, mostly using OIF and OEF Phase IV as the examples. State's Coord for Reconstruction and Stabilization was discussed extensively. Weak and Failing States and Terrorism was another lesson, for a total of 3/7 in the National Security lesson on topics similar to what I've read here. The other lessons are the basics of how the NSC, PDDs, etc work, and then a WMD lesson.

    The Strategy and War (SW) class, you would think, would focus mostly on the F-22s kicking down the door for B-2s to take on the IADS and HV tgts... but no, it mostly focused on small wars.

    The strategy lesson of the SW class was standard... what is strategy, examples, etc. The War lesson focused on how a war is really won after the "Shock and Awe" is done, and the vanquished need to be made a functional country again.

    The American way of war lesson was the closest to what I would have expected, but included some articles about the effectiveness of the traditional American way of waging war.

    The other ways of war lesson included an article by SWJ's own Steve Metz, as well as one by Col Nagl.

    Even the Transformation and OIF lessons in the SW class focused on Phase IV ops... other than a Cebrowski article, the other readings dealt with Stabilization/reconstruction or 4GW...

    The Expeditionary Airpower class was mostly history of airpower and foundations, but had some pretty good stuff on Vietnam, and the treatment of OIF and OEF had some frank discussions, as well as articles like "EBO in Small Wars" and "The Phase IV Fight".

    3/7 lessons in the NS class on Small Wars-type stuff.
    5/7 lessons in the SW class.
    Some good stuff in the Airpower class.

    So far I have read very little about Shock and Awe, or big air campaigns... in fact, almost none. All this in the AF's premier PME course, the one that is supposed to take Majors from tacticians and take them into the realm of operational art and strategy...

    Now, I know that I will once again be seen as defending the AF. Which I am, because I am part of it. But I have to tell you that the AF in general is very focused on the fights in OEF and OIF in particular, and pretty focused on Small Wars in general (almost too much at times if you ask me). Is it in the way folks on this forum would like? Maybe not - I think we tend to look more at what our capabilities are using high intensity systems to support the low-end fight.

    That said, a couple facts:

    The AF has about 6000+ folks deployed with the Army on "In Lieu of Taskings".

    Under Total Aircrew Management Initiative (TAMI 21), 180 young fighter pilots are being sent to Predator and to U-28s and PC12s to support the GWOT. The single squadron of U-28s is being augmented by an unspecified number of PC-12s, according to Air Force Magazine.

    Predator CAPs are being boosted from 12 to 21 according to DefenseNews.

    I am sure not everything is as it could be if we had a lot more money to spend. But as I've said before, if you don't have enough F-22s and F-35s to stop those who by 4th gen fighters and double digit SAMs, then you're not going to have to worry about the small wars for long, because pretty soon someone will decide to go for a big one.

    I think the USAF is caught in the position of having to org, train, and equip for a high end war as well as low end, while in two low end fights. That combined with a lot of old airplanes means that you have to balance risks. I think with the Army neccessarily having to focus more on the low end, it makes sense for the USAF and USN to support that effort while hedging on the high end - reduces the risk of us getting caught flat footed in the near term.

    Anyway, it has been instructive to go through some of these classes after having been involved in the discussions here. I look forward to learning more - my next class is the Joint Forces one so I am sure I will be asking some questions.

    V/R,

    Cliff

  13. #13
    Council Member Umar Al-Mokhtār's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2007
    Location
    Cirenaica
    Posts
    374

    Default It only makes sense...

    for the USAF to try to stay relevant as the wind is now blowing in the COIN direction.

    But to rip a page from Vietnam: "This is a political war and it calls for discrimination in killing. The best weapon for killing would be a knife, but I'm afraid we can't do it that way. The worst is an airplane. The next worst is artillery. Barring a knife, the best is a rifle — you know who you're killing."

    Vann mayhave been over-zealous in many areas but he did have a sense for what tactical level COIN operated on.
    "What is best in life?" "To crush your enemies, see them driven before you, and to hear the lamentation of the women."

  14. #14
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Feb 2008
    Location
    The Midwest
    Posts
    180

    Default It's easy...

    for the USAF to stay relevant. All we have to do is wait for Iran to finally get their SA-20s.

    http://www.dia.mil/publicaffairs/Tes...atement29.html

    V/R,

    Cliff

  15. #15
    Council Member Umar Al-Mokhtār's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2007
    Location
    Cirenaica
    Posts
    374

    Default Let's not forget...

    China and that pesky Russian Bear!

    All the more reason to buy more toys.

    Then again, the Post seems to have found another Duryun incident brewing in the Air Force. Once again they have a bit of a conflict of interest issue at hand.
    "What is best in life?" "To crush your enemies, see them driven before you, and to hear the lamentation of the women."

  16. #16
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Mar 2008
    Posts
    1,457

    Default

    I find a lot of the AF criticisms rather curious. On one hand, it's criticized for not doing enough to support the ground force and on the other hand, those areas where the AF is assisting the ground force are dismissed and motives are impugned as mere attempts to stay "relevant." As a result, it's hard to see how the AF can avoid criticism one way or another no matter what it does.

  17. #17
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
    Join Date
    May 2007
    Location
    Florida
    Posts
    8,060

    Default I do not mean this to be derogatory or in any way

    insulting, it is a serious, non-snarky comment appropos of yours -- I have seen that for many years (believe it or not, the USAF existed before I put on a war suit, not long, mind you but it was there...) and I am convinced it has a lot to do with attitude. A whole lot...

  18. #18
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Mar 2008
    Posts
    1,457

    Default

    Ken,

    I don't disagree about the AF's attitude - in fact I think the service does itself a lot of harm not so much by its actions or policies, but the "attitude" it uses to further those policies. To personalize the service, I would say it is overly sensistive and insecure in the way in conducts itself.

    I think I can acknowledge that and still suggest that there are many out there who, for whatever reason, will criticize the service no matter what it does. The AF is frankly acting dumb when it's own rhetoric and actions provide those critics with ample ammunition - ammunition that, in my experience, makes cogent discussion of AF support to COIN or, indeed, any AF-related topic, difficult.

    The AF has a role to play in our current wars as well as future conflicts, so I'm all for discussions on how well the service is doing, what it could do better and what roles it should play, if any.

  19. #19
    Council Member Umar Al-Mokhtār's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2007
    Location
    Cirenaica
    Posts
    374

    Default Ken's spot on (as usual)

    in that the Air Force oft times comes off with a nose in the air sense of superiority to us earth bound hoi polloi.

    I worked for the AF for about seven years at two nearly diametrically opposite levels. The AF does many things in a superior fashion, transportation and airfield support being two of them. They are also the preeminent air superiority force. Oh, and you can’t beat the perks (ok had to throw at least one snarky dig).

    But I feel what irks some is, as Ken says, their attitude, particularly when it comes to their role enterprise wide. While our Soldiers and Marines slug it out day to day in the dust and mud of far off battlefields the AF lobbies for more F-22s and the NGB while at the same time not taking a truly serious look at finding the offsets for these systems from within their own TOA. Then it seems that when it is ultimately decided that funding will go elsewhere the Air Force often acts the petulant child.

    While I have no problem with any service expending as much of its budget as they so desire on creature comforts for their people, there is a point (gee, just like in real life) where you have to stop driving the Bugatti Veyron and drinking Cristal and get the Toyota Tercel and drink Asti.
    "What is best in life?" "To crush your enemies, see them driven before you, and to hear the lamentation of the women."

  20. #20
    Council Member 120mm's Avatar
    Join Date
    Nov 2006
    Location
    Wonderland
    Posts
    1,284

    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Entropy View Post
    Ken,

    I don't disagree about the AF's attitude - in fact I think the service does itself a lot of harm not so much by its actions or policies, but the "attitude" it uses to further those policies. To personalize the service, I would say it is overly sensistive and insecure in the way in conducts itself.

    I think I can acknowledge that and still suggest that there are many out there who, for whatever reason, will criticize the service no matter what it does. The AF is frankly acting dumb when it's own rhetoric and actions provide those critics with ample ammunition - ammunition that, in my experience, makes cogent discussion of AF support to COIN or, indeed, any AF-related topic, difficult.

    The AF has a role to play in our current wars as well as future conflicts, so I'm all for discussions on how well the service is doing, what it could do better and what roles it should play, if any.
    We've hashed and rehashed the ways the USAF could become relevant, especially in the realm of airlift, portable medical support facilities and perhaps a better (for COIN), more responsive air to mud airframe than the current stable holds.

    The current AF moves remind me of a "####bird", who spends the 30 days prior to his OER, "apple-polishing" for the boss, in order to make up for not doing his own job all along. To say that because the rest of us can see through the USAF's b.s. and critize their misdirected efforts, isn't the same as saying "that there are many out there who, for whatever reason, will criticize the service no matter what it does."

    So the question remains: "How come the Air Force isn't hounding Congress to fund their COIN CAS aircraft, exportable air-transportable hospital packages and additional funds for cargo airframes?" The answer, I believe, is that no matter how many airmen they put on perimeter or convoy security, is that the USAF doesn't give a stroke and a crap about the current fight.

    And don't get me wrong: We need either the F-22, or a much larger Air Force flying less capable planes, for the possibility of a larger, more conventional conflict.
    Last edited by 120mm; 04-20-2008 at 11:41 AM.

Bookmarks

Posting Permissions

  • You may not post new threads
  • You may not post replies
  • You may not post attachments
  • You may not edit your posts
  •