Air Power in the New COIN Era

[RTK]

the argument could be made that the Air Force is unwilling to change and adapt to the changing landscape and war environment.

Possibly because they would be marginalized in the current COIN structure to flying CAP in the possibility of TIC support and not much more. In essence, everything that we've built the Air Force up to be in the last 30 years would turn out insignificant.

[SWJED]

It is a terrible, terrible fact that "transformation" has been high-jacked by those who see high-ticket, high-technology solutions to every problem-set we now, and will for the foreseeable future, face. I have been working these issues (urban, asymmetric, IW, COIN, etc...) for ten years. Every time I think we have turned the corner and the light bulbs are popping on someone or some “program” flips off the switch. IMHO, the USAF and USN are most guilty – but others are too. Programs that have emanated out of JFCOM’s J9 over the last several years smack of inmates taking charge of the insane asylum. Moreover, as has been posted on another thread here today – our ground forces are still struggling for solutions – and not necessarily at the tactical level…

[Steve Blair]

I agree, Tom, that the report doesn't touch on some important considerations, but you need to consider that the target audience doesn't even *think* about COIN anymore. I'd consider this more of a lead-in: something to get USAF leaders thinking about basic COIN and then (hopefully) being followed up with more detail. This is directed at an audience that has little background in the subject.

This is especially vital when you consider that this year Air Force ROTC *removed* OOTW instruction from their course syllabus. Granted, it only got one or two class periods before, but now it gets *none*. The terrorism module remains about the same, and the cultural sections did change somewhat. But the AF seems to be trying to change its focus to space war and touting the strengths of the F-22.

[Tom Odom]

Steve,

You are right in saying that the audience has a shallow background. And that was what I was saying in a different way. For a RAND study to talk airpower in COIN and not cover the issues I mentioned says volumes about the audience they are trying to reach.

One of my best friends is a senior officer in USAF SOF; he is bright, articulate, mission oriented, and flexible. He knows more about this realm of airpower than most. But as an MC130 driver, he is not a fighter jock and as a Herky bird piot, not even a "real" jet pilot.

Does he have a shot at CSAF? doubtful

In any case I finished reading the study and here are some thoughts:

The poor.

Initial chapter gets bogged down in attempting and distinguishing between a terrorist and an insurgent. Most of it is irrelevant as the study's definition of a pure terrorist is so limited as to be nearly useless.

The good.

The Chapter on COIN Imperatives is quite useful.

The great.

The Chapter on Grand Strategy is CRITICAL. Just some samples:

"One of the most distinctive—and challenging—features of making and executing counterinsurgency strategy is that “information operations” are central to strategic success, not merely an appendage of kinetic operations. It would be unfair to say that the U.S. armed forces pay mere lip service to the importance of propaganda, public affairs, psychological operations, and the other elements of information operations, but it is certainly true that these elements of military power are generally treated as useful appendages of the military apparatus, whose value is usually measured merely in terms of their ability to facilitate or enhance traditional combat functions.

The political battlefield that counterinsurgency operations must seek to dominate is one in which perceptions and beliefs are what matter. If people believe that U.S. forces conducting counterinsurgency are attacking civilians indiscriminately, that their government is irredeemably corrupt, or that their streets are unsafe, it is irrelevant to the conflict whether these things are actually true except insofar as it may affect these impressions"

"Popular doctrinal concepts, such as “rapid decisive operations” that emphasize the merits of winning quick victories or achieving strategic-level shock and paralytic effects against conventional military opponents are intrinsically inconsistent with this reality, and seeking to apply them in counterinsurgency will often be counterproductive. Defeating any substantial insurgency requires sustained effort over years or even decades, which affects everything from
planning for appropriate force rotation to managing expectations when
the conflict is presented to domestic political audiences at home."

The intriguing.

The Chapter on 6th SOS as an advisory unit template is quite interesting. It is obvious that the Air Commandos used some of the basic SF structures, as models and I would say that is a good thing. Those structures work.

Where I did not get a clear sense of "fit" was in the realm of what is traditionally security assistance on the "air" side. That was a real problem for our efforts in Sudan while I was there: the Sudanese got 3 F-5s (one was a 2-seat trainer) and all 3 were smoking holes within a year or so. The same held even truer of our efforts in Zaire. In that case, when a rebellion did break out in the mid-60s, we threw together a Congolese "Air America" using US aircraft, expatriate Cuban pilots, and CIA/military advisors/support.

The doubtful.

Being a realist (cynic?) I doubt that the AF --without some kind of serious shove from above like JFK in the 1960s--is going to buy into this even if it does make sense.


Best

Tom

[Jedburgh]

Air & Space Power Journal, Fall 06:

Counterinsurgency Airpower: Air-Ground Integration for the Long War

Editorial Abstract: Unprecedented levels of joint cooperation have occurred in counterinsurgency operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Colonel Belote documents the successes of increased joint coordination in both nations, particularly with regard to improving close air support and ensuring the security and legitimacy of national elections. The author also offers ideas for improving joint training opportunities and enhancing joint doctrine, tactics, and procedures.

[cuba]

Mr Odom I am new in this forum,I would like to know your opinion about the cuban pilots who fought in Zaire against Simbas.



Did they help to destroy simbas?

Was that war a victory for Mobutu?

I heard Laurent kabila continued the war after 1967.

Did the cubans help to defeat Schramme and allies?

[Rob Thornton]

Hey Tom, one of my and Old Eagle's buddies at JCISFA is a retired Talon pilot. He works the USAF end of things for us, as well as contributing to broader effort - he also fills the shoes of the 2 x USAF AD slots we have here at JCISFA. While we have Army, Marines and a USN LtCDR, our USAF slots are currently unfilled. When they come in, I'm sure they will contribute to the effort - the USAF has an important role to play, and we will all benefit by their attendance & participation.
Best, Rob