Air Power in the New COIN Era

[Cliff]

The current AF moves remind me of a "####bird", who spends the 30 days prior to his OER, "apple-polishing" for the boss, in order to make up for not doing his own job all along. To say that because the rest of us can see through the USAF's b.s. and critize their misdirected efforts, isn't the same as saying "that there are many out there who, for whatever reason, will criticize the service no matter what it does."

I obviously disagree with this on a fundamental level, but I don't really think it matters what evidence is cited - some folks will just feel the way they feel.

Using the logic above, you could also apply your comment on the "not doing your job all along" to the Army's COIN doctrine at the start of OIF phase IV, and the correction made more recently.

So the question remains: "How come the Air Force isn't hounding Congress to fund their COIN CAS aircraft, exportable air-transportable hospital packages and additional funds for cargo airframes?" The answer, I believe, is that no matter how many airmen they put on perimeter or convoy security, is that the USAF doesn't give a stroke and a crap about the current fight.

The AF has a stated requirement for more C-17s, just like it does for more F-22s. Unfortunately the civilian bosses get to decide what the services ask Congress for.

As for the USAF caring, I'm sorry you feel that way. I know the folks who I work with are well aware and all do care- almost every unit has someone deployed to the AOR. One of my two NCOs got mortared twice yesterday at Balad.

And don't get me wrong: We need either the F-22, or a much larger Air Force flying less capable planes, for the possibility of a larger, more conventional conflict.

I'm not trying to say the AF and Army are committed at the same level - but as you just said, the AF is having to hedge against a lot of potential nastiness in the not so distant future. Would you rather the AF buy a COIN aircraft in great numbers and let China or Iran be able to use SA-20s to prevent us from deterring them, or do the COIN role with Predator, Reaper, A-10, F-16s, and B-1s? Until the budgets are increased it unfortunately is close to a zero sum game. Again, it's kind of like asking why the Army is asking for FCS and not a purpose built COIN system of systems. The entire military is forced to balance future high end threats against the current coin fight.

I'm not looking to start a big arguement here. Just pointing out that you can make similar arguements about any service.

V/R,

Cliff

[Cliff]

While our Soldiers and Marines slug it out day to day in the dust and mud of far off battlefields the AF lobbies for more F-22s and the NGB while at the same time not taking a truly serious look at finding the offsets for these systems from within their own TOA. Then it seems that when it is ultimately decided that funding will go elsewhere the Air Force often acts the petulant child.

While I have no problem with any service expending as much of its budget as they so desire on creature comforts for their people, there is a point (gee, just like in real life) where you have to stop driving the Bugatti Veyron and drinking Cristal and get the Toyota Tercel and drink Asti.

The AF cut personnel to 316,000 folks in an effort to get more money. Personnelists/orderly rooms were elminated and replaced by centralized offices, the internet, and a call center. Finance, contracting, and legal are all going the same way. (See Air Force Magazine for details.)

What systems would you propose cutting (other than all the legacy aircraft the AF wants to retire but Congress won't let them) to pay for buying even minimum numbers of F-35s and F-22s?

[Entropy]

So the question remains: "How come the Air Force isn't hounding Congress to fund their COIN CAS aircraft, exportable air-transportable hospital packages and additional funds for cargo airframes?" The answer, I believe, is that no matter how many airmen they put on perimeter or convoy security, is that the USAF doesn't give a stroke and a crap about the current fight.

First of all, I'm going proceed on the assumption that comments like "apple-polishing" are not referring to the vast majority of rank-and-file USAF personnel. Secondly, different services and, indeed, different people have divergent perspectives on these issues. It's one thing to argue that the USAF's efforts are misdirected - it's quite another to impugn motives. From my perspective claims that essentially boil down to "the USAF doesn't give a ####" are more about perception than reality as are, I believe, claims that "relevance" is the only motivation the USAF seems to possess. I'm frankly always reticent to join into these discussions because too frequently such perceptions are regarded as both foundational and self-evident truths and therefore tend to result in an unconstructive discussion. Regardless, I might suggest that impugning motives, especially in a broad-brush fashion, is counterproductive to the stated intent of changing the USAF's position on one's issues of concern and it only serves to reinforce the service's attitude you do not like.

So the question remains: "How come the Air Force isn't hounding Congress to fund their COIN CAS aircraft, exportable air-transportable hospital packages and additional funds for cargo airframes?" The answer, I believe, is that no matter how many airmen they put on perimeter or convoy security, is that the USAF doesn't give a stroke and a crap about the current fight.

I'll take these one-at-a-time:

1. From my perspective the AF's position is that the A-10 along with UAV's will best fill the COIN CAS role. The A-10's are currently in a SLEP program to upgrade them to the C model - you can google the details if you wish - and extend the airframe's life out to around 2030. Army thinking on UAV's actually seems pretty close to the Air Force. The Army's version of the predator/warrior is slated to do armed reconnaissance/target acquisition and serve as a C3 platform for BFT, radios, etc. for the ground force. The Air Force version is going to be more focused on ISR and as a long-endurance precision strike platform. Together I think they will be a nice compliment.

Now many have suggested a turboprop, like the Texan or Tucano is needed and I'm assuming this is what you mean in your question above. In my view, the only role these aircraft can perform that an A-10/UAV combination cannot is superior MK1 eyeball recon as opposed to utilizing sensors. From the limited conversations I've had with guys on the ground side of things, it seems to me that most prefer the live data-link and video capability. Additionally, many, including me, feel a turboprop aircraft is too vulnerable - it won't have the armored protection and system redundancy of the A-10 and Apache and it operates in the sweet spot for both manpads and SA/lt AAA. Finally, weapons employment is arguably worse from these aircraft since precision air-dropped ordnance is best delivered from medium altitude. Low-altitude options like guns, rockets and some guided missiles can be done by A-10's and helo's. I do think they'd be a good aircraft for indigenous forces we're supporting but, imo, they don't provide enough additional capability to justify adding another airframe to the inventory.

2. Aeromedical evac is not my thing, but the AF did develop EMEDs in the late 1990's which are, I believe, used today. Beyond that, I'm not sure what the problem is - if you could expand on that point a bit more it would be helpful.

3. The Air Force would like to buy more cargo aircraft and has been quietly fighting for a few years now to buy more C-17's beyond what the DoD wants based on the latest joint mobility capabilities study. Additionally, it's trying to decide if it's better to upgrade the C-5 or retire the C-5 and buy more C-17's to replace that capability which is a tough decision actually. As for the C-130, the service is reluctant to buy a bunch more of these aircraft right now because new requirements imposed by FCS means a new airlifter will have to be built to carry those vehicles. FCS seems to be falling apart, however, so maybe that will change.

[Steve Blair]

I find a lot of the AF criticisms rather curious. On one hand, it's criticized for not doing enough to support the ground force and on the other hand, those areas where the AF is assisting the ground force are dismissed and motives are impugned as mere attempts to stay "relevant." As a result, it's hard to see how the AF can avoid criticism one way or another no matter what it does.

A great deal of this has to do with how the AF tends to present itself to the public and other services. You mentioned the A-10...they may be upgrading it now but some folks have a hard time forgetting that they didn't want the aircraft in the first place and have tried at least twice to get rid of it. The F-16 (another AF workhorse) was also decidedly unpopular with a fair chunk of the AF higher command when it came online. There's also the issue of their initial unwillingness in the 1980s to support CH-53 programs, which was a contributing factor to the formation of SOCOM.

I don't think anyone is saying that the AF doesn't do good things. But it's important that the AF (like any other branch) stop from time to time and try to see itself as others see them. They may also need to come to grips with the fact that this is not the 1950s (when they got about half of the total defense budget...more in some years) and they can't always fight the war they want to fight (and this is also something the Army needs to deal with...but that's a different thread).

I don't expect to change any minds here...but just pointing out that there are some long-term indicators and reasons that the AF's corporate motives may at times seem a little odd or out of sync with what's going on.

[Ken White]

many more years than I care to recall, I think you've really summarized the problem very well:

A great deal of this has to do with how the AF tends to present itself to the public and other services...

I don't think anyone is saying that the AF doesn't do good things. But it's important that the AF (like any other branch) stop from time to time and try to see itself as others see them...

Attitude...

One can be arrogant and dismissive (see me for an example ) but one has to be prepared to take the flak for doing so. To come on strong is fine; to whine about being called for it invites derision...

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

where to begin? First off I do not agree 100% with all of 120’s observations, but he makes a pretty good point when it comes to other’s perceptions of the Air Force.

What systems would you propose cutting (other than all the legacy aircraft the AF wants to retire but Congress won't let them) to pay for buying even minimum numbers of F-35s and F-22s?

What is the "minimum" number of F-35s and F-22s? And why both?

I admit that Congressional meddling does hurt the USAF's attempts to divest itself of platforms and programs (as well as the other services). It would take a SecAF and a CSAF with HUGE cajones (and no future employment prospects) to tell Congress too bad, so sad we're getting rid of the B-52s.

However, if I were the CSAF these are a few things I would do:

Kill NASCAR. Kill Jumbotron. Kill ABL (its a money pit). Stop the Thunderbirds F-16 swap. Stop BAS payments to deployed Airmen. All unmarried E-4 and below live in the dorms, with few exceptions, and also three to a room at that (saves BOS and O&M). No TDY's posing as "deployments" and deployments are minimum 6 months (saves O&M). Eliminate some officer billets and give more authority and responsibility to NCOs (they're cheaper). Eliminate AFSCs by requiring more "multitasking" of personnel (some of this is being done). Scrub acquisition costs with a wire brush (especially Space and AFSOC). Cancel all base maintenance contracts (Airmen can cut grass and paint stuff). Squeeze TDY "perks" to a minimum (if you're TDY or "deployed" to a site and billeted within walking distance of your work site, why do you need a rental car? When you deploy to support Cobra Gold at U-Tapao why do you need to stay in hotels in Pattaya Beach, 40 miles away?).

I could jump onto the DPD Warehouse and find more but those are just for starters. Now some will say “those are mostly small dollar amounts.” True, but start cutting the small stuff and it adds up over the FYDP.

Bump me up to SecDef (which is a truly scary thought, I'd have to wear suits all the time) and I would take a long hard look at all of OSD's programs (excluding the services) and scrub them really hard to eliminate waste and duplication of effort. Plus there'd be greater scrutiny on the COCOMs, which would get less of a free pass to dip into the service POMs for their support. Rather than give that cash back, I would pass those savings to the Services to help fund those programs that do need it.

However, change like that hurts when you’ve become used to certain perks, but it can be done. An AF GO once noted that given the fiscal restraints over the next several years the USAF can either be the best in the world at putting lead on target or be the world’s best base support service, but not both. To be the former while giving up the latter requires a big change in culture.

Granted you could also focus more scrutiny on the other three service’s programs and probably find significant savings. But the Marines seem to pretty much make do with what they get, the Army seems careful in what it pushes hard for (although IMHO I think JIEDDO was a bit pricey for the result), and these days it seems like the Navy just tries to stay under everyone’s radar.

[wm]

Pentagon chief: Getting aircraft to Iraq, Afghanistan 'like pulling teeth'

Article is here

[Van]

I think we're underestimating the degree of internal conflict in the Air Force. The message from the top is "Everything begins and ends with F-22". When was the last time you saw an AF graphic that didn't have an F-22 in it? When you get down to the Majors and Captains, you'll actually hear advocates for real jointness, as opposed to Douhet/H.G. Wells/Billy Mitchell's Air Power for COIN (but at heart, the old school folks' loyalty lies with the fighter community that emerged during Viet Nam).

As an institution, the Air Force does not value what they provide for the greatest value-added in COIN; comm, airlift, and ISR (I'm not denigrating the firepower, but for COIN, firepower in the sky is secondary to comm, airlift, and ISR from above). If we can get a generation of AF generals who don't kowtow irrationally to their own divinity as zipper-suited sungods, the problem will resolve itself. But as it stands, their fantasy of gun kills in dogfights is as rational as the really old school Navy vision of capitol ships duking it out. Dogfighting and battleships trying to cross the T might be relevant someday, but not in the near future given current geopolitics and technology.

Don't get me wrong, we'd have a lot more trouble with the current conflict without the capabilities the Air Force brings to the fight, I just wish their COLs and BGs would see that.

Oh, and Umar- for cost cutting, why do general officers in the air force maintain their flight status? Just the flight hours so they can fly is hundreds of thousands of dollars a month, it keeps them from doing the things Generals really should be doing, and it keeps the Lieutenants and Captains out of the airframes they should be current on. Put 'em in Cessnas from the Aeroclubs and Civil Air Patrol if they want flight hours.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

I think I hurt myself laughing at that.

I really do not know why rated GOs keep their flight pay (although it is at a reduced rate). Hell, rated pilots still draw flight pay even when they're not in flying billets. Ask a chairborne USAF guy wearing a bag when the last time he clocked any stick time.

On another note (caution snarky remark coming): Why do Air Force officers in the space AFSC wear flight suits? What exactly is it they fly in? Do we still have manned ICBMs?

Good time for a movie quote, paraphrased: "No, I like all you Air Force boys. Every time we've gotta go someplace and fight, you fellas always give us a ride."

There is a huge chasm between the Air Force culture and the Marines, and I speak not of yogurt.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

"These new realities and missions should be reflected in our training and doctrine. The Air Force will be increasingly called upon to conduct civil-military or humanitarian operations with interagency and nongovernmental organizations and partners and deal directly with local populations."

"All this may require rethinking long-standing service assumptions and priorities about which missions require certified pilots and which do not."

Who knows, perhaps our next air-to-air combat ace will be a senior airman (the horror!).

[Entropy]

I've noted all the "attitude" criticisms here and will again say that I have no fundamental disagreement. No one is saying (at least I'm not) the USAF should not be criticized - I have many criticisms myself - but my point is that such criticisms should at least have some substance and evidence behind them and be delivered professionally. The generalizations I most often read, many of which are extremely vitriolic, typically lack substance and do nothing to further the debate, much less change anyone's mind.

Additionally, part of the problem with criticisms of the USAF is that it's often not clear, to me at least, what critics actually want the USAF to do with regard to COIN. Like the other services, the AF was not prepared for, nor did it foresee the kind of environment we're in today. A bigger issue, ISTM, is it's not clear what big Army and the DoD want out of the AF in regards to COIN besides more ISR, which has already been identified.

Van has touched on something of real substance and impact when he/she mentions internal conflict within the AF and the generational gap in attitudes which, imo, mirror those in the Army. The AF in decades ahead is probably in for a lot of cultural turbulence .

The message from the top is "Everything begins and ends with F-22". When was the last time you saw an AF graphic that didn't have an F-22 in it?

As for everything "beginning and ending" with the F-22, that's true to a certain extent, but from an AF perspective, it's justified. The US military requires air supremacy in order to operate and achieving that is the Air Force's primary mission and the F-22's primary mission. For the Air Force it is a foundational capability like armor is for the Army or the destroyer for the Navy. So the AF takes that role very seriously which is the biggest reason why it wants the F-22. Everyone is justifiably unhappy about the cost, especially the AF, since costs have impacted the number of aircraft it can buy. Personally, I think the entire DoD procurement process is fundamentally flawed, but that discussion is probably best left to another thread.

"Zipper-suited Sun Gods" actually is heard all the time within the Air Force. Here's another for you. Since rated aviators fill the vast majority of leadership positions, aviator's wings on the uniform are often called "Air Force Universal Management Badges" in the private company of non-aviators.

Umar,

Some of your suggestions sound reasonable, others not so much, but what do any of them have to do with the AF and COIN - or the wars we're in currently? At most they seem like tertiary solutions only designed to save a bit of money.

On another note (caution snarky remark coming): Why do Air Force officers in the space AFSC wear flight suits? What exactly is it they fly in? Do we still have manned ICBMs?

The whole flight-suit is a source of tension within the AF, especially with Space officers and especially since most are issued those suits and don't have to spend their own money (unlike officers who wear BDU's, for example). The original reason, of course, was that those who worked in missile silo's needed the fire protection (particularly in the old days), but the missile force has been reduced to handful of personnel so now it's all about "tradition."

And while such service quirks are interesting to discuss in their own right (and having spent several years in the US Navy before the Air Force, I can say that every service has them), how are they relevant to the Air Force's role in COIN?

[Ron Humphrey]

Entropy,

I think I can empathize with what your saying, but doesn't most of what we're seeing come back to the old material girl principle. What have you done for me lately?

The capability to keep the skies clear forever and ever against all enemies foriegn and domestic is the mission dejour for AF as a whole (at least in my limited perspective). But what about the sudden introduction of anything (use your imagination) which would cause manned flights to be untenable. What then?

Just trying to take a stab at the meat of it.

[Entropy]

BTW, good on Secdef Gates for challenging tradition.

Oh, and the issue of officers as pilots for UAV's was looked at by a few in the 1990's. Here's one paper. I would support reexamining it and I hope the some enterprising NCO's or junior officers take it on.

The UAV pilot problems in the Air Force are not due to a shortage of pilots, but they way UAV's are currently operated in the force. UAV's are not yet their own co-equal weapons platform. So, for example, a pilot can't be a full-time UAV pilot under the current system. UAV slots are temporary assignments lasting 3-4 years, so there is no permanent cadre of pilots to build upon. The bottleneck is really training since with no permanent pilots training resources are sucked-up on replacements. Adding to the problem is the extreme demand for UAV's which has in some cases taken instructors away from training new pilots which negatively impacts the ability to increase the number of qualified pilots.

What the service needs to do, IMO, is create a permanent cadre of UAV pilots and make it a co-equal platform where pilots can spend a majority of their careers.

[Entropy]

Entropy,

The capability to keep the skies clear forever and ever against all enemies foriegn and domestic is the mission dejour for AF as a whole (at least in my limited perspective). But what about the sudden introduction of anything (use your imagination) which would cause manned flights to be untenable. What then?

Just trying to take a stab at the meat of it.

That certainly could be a possibility at some point, but one could say the same thing about manned tanks, for example. I know there's a lot of focus on unmanned aircraft for the future, but I think a lot of people are missing some significant vulnerabilities they introduce. Specifically, control of the aircraft has to come via some signal which could be hacked or jammed. An attack on the satellite network or the comm network could disable the entire force. Unmanned aircraft offer a lot of possibility, but until there is pretty solid assurance that the supporting C3 network cannot be interdicted I think a man-in-the-loop will remain a requirement. However, given that airframes are lasting longer and longer, I would not be surprised if the follow-on to the F-22 is unmanned 30-40 years from now, or perhaps platforms will go away completely in lieu of long-range autonomous weapons. Or maybe we'll get Iron Man! Now that would be cool, but imagine the service fight over who would get to develop it!

[Old Eagle]

A lot of chatter among the air guys about the efficacy of a prop airplane. In truth, props are bad, it would be much better to mod F-15s to run at a coupla hundred bucks per operational hour instead of whatever it costs now. The mods should also allow maintenance by largely illiterate populations with materials readily at hand.

As far as "BPC" goes, don't worry about it. Some enterprising company will step up to fill the void. Blackwater is already active in the air world; wouldn't take much to develop a core of contractors to advise HN air forces (or Army Air Corps in countries who keep the relationship in order.)

That way, OUR air force could fly air superiority missions against ...um..

[wm]

. . .it quite often helps to look at the past. I am currently reading Lee Kennett's The First Air War 1914-1918. I heartily recommend it to those who are trying to figure out where the attitude and culture of the worlds' air forces come from. We have not heard from our non-American readership about the other air forces of the world, but I suspect their reports would not be that different. Kennett has some interesting discussion that I find explains much of it quite handily. But, I suspect there is more to this as well.

While working in a strategic intelligence unit that was a tenant in USAREUR, my troops and I were treated by the folks from 7th Army units with an attitude similar to that expressed here by ground forces types about the air arm. On an almost daily basis we were subjected to comments like "get a haircut" and "try sleeping in a tent for a change." My troops would be jerked awake at 0500 (after working a second shift and getting back at about 0100) by Jodies about them "sleeping in," yelled by the neighboring FA Bn's batteries as they ran by in their PT formations. I suspect some part of it was envy/sour grapes on the part of the FA and Armor guys that we affectionately referred to as "treads." And, within our joint organization, interestingly enough, the Army INSCOM folks made similar snide comments about the Air Force and Navy personnel worked along side us. My point here is that some of the attitude expressed by members of the junior service may be a defense mechanism while some is simply an expression of group rivalry.

[Ron Humphrey]

That certainly could be a possibility at some point, but one could say the same thing about manned tanks, for example. I know there's a lot of focus on unmanned aircraft for the future, but I think a lot of people are missing some significant vulnerabilities they introduce. Specifically, control of the aircraft has to come via some signal which could be hacked or jammed. An attack on the satellite network or the comm network could disable the entire force. Unmanned aircraft offer a lot of possibility, but until there is pretty solid assurance that the supporting C3 network cannot be interdicted I think a man-in-the-loop will remain a requirement. However, given that airframes are lasting longer and longer, I would not be surprised if the follow-on to the F-22 is unmanned 30-40 years from now, or perhaps platforms will go away completely in lieu of long-range autonomous weapons. Or maybe we'll get Iron Man! Now that would be cool, but imagine the service fight over who would get to develop it!

However consider that an armor guy would probably be one of the first to try his hand at driving them by remote considering what happens if one actually gets hit by something which can hurt it.

Also consider that from their perspective if it stops moving then you get out and you "are " infantry. For a grunt whats the comparison to that scenario for the pilot?

Not trying to play devil's advocate so much as simply trying to get perspective on it.

[Ron Humphrey]

. My point here is that some of the attitude expressed by members of the junior service may be a defense mechanism {while some is simply an expression of group rivalry}.

Not too sure this part is such a bad thing since a little competition helps keep the rust off

[Entropy]

However consider that an armor guy would probably be one of the first to try his hand at driving them by remote considering what happens if one actually gets hit by something which can hurt it.

Also consider that from their perspective if it stops moving then you get out and you "are " infantry. For a grunt whats the comparison to that scenario for the pilot?

Not trying to play devil's advocate so much as simply trying to get perspective on it.

No, you're right. Both the Air Force and Navy are limited by their environments and depend on their machines not only to fight, but for basic human survival. But I should point out that although a tanker has the potential to be infantry, but does the average tanker have the training and mentality to do more good than harm if they find themselves on foot?

Additionally, I hinted above that big changes are coming in the Air Force and the service could be fundamentally different in 50 years - perhaps unrecognizable. I think the current leadership, despite their old-school mentality, may sense it as well which may explain why the AF has such a woody for "space" and "cyberspace." On the latter, I suspect the AF's effort here will prove them either be fools or visionaries. In either event, it will be interesting to see what happens!

[120mm]

First of all, I'm going proceed on the assumption that comments like "apple-polishing" are not referring to the vast majority of rank-and-file USAF personnel.

No, I'm talking about the USAF assigning airmen to missions like tower and convoy security. While I appreciate airmen doing this, their actual contribution in this role is micro-inconsequential and so far out of the Air Force's "lane" that it is obviously a transparent ploy to make the USAF look like they "are in the fight". What would happen if the USAF actually embraced missions that contributed to the current, actual fight, in addition to the theoretical future fight.

I'll take these one-at-a-time:

1. From my perspective the AF's position is that the A-10 along with UAV's will best fill the COIN CAS role. The A-10's are currently in a SLEP program to upgrade them to the C model - you can google the details if you wish - and extend the airframe's life out to around 2030. Army thinking on UAV's actually seems pretty close to the Air Force. The Army's version of the predator/warrior is slated to do armed reconnaissance/target acquisition and serve as a C3 platform for BFT, radios, etc. for the ground force. The Air Force version is going to be more focused on ISR and as a long-endurance precision strike platform. Together I think they will be a nice compliment.

With all due respect, this is complete and utter bull####. If it were up to the Air Force, there would be NO A-10 and NO UAS. It has taken acts of congress to get them to retain the A-10, and only the Army's adoption of UAS has kept the Air Force in this game, out of self-defense.

The current attempts to "get control" of UAS from the Army is indicative of traditional USAF MO. "State it is 'your lane', get control of the systems and then kill them." We have USAF officers and retirees acting as contractors who are pushing airstrikes like a dealer pushing meth on a playground around here, but I have never seen USAF types attempt to push recon or observation platforms on Army types. A more constructive strategy, by the Air Force, would be to "flood the skies" with their own airframes, and force the Army to prove they really need UAS.

The USAF effectively killed CAS in the past by using the same tactics as they are currently using against UAS: Wrest control from the Army, and then quit doing the mission. Then, when the stuff hits the fan "it's too hard".

2. Aeromedical evac is not my thing, but the AF did develop EMEDs in the late 1990's which are, I believe, used today. Beyond that, I'm not sure what the problem is - if you could expand on that point a bit more it would be helpful.

I'm not talking about Aeromedical evac, I'm talking about airtransportable hospitals, which can be exported to support both combat troops and HA missions. As the USAF doesn't push PR on this mission like the Army does, I'm left to assume they don't view it as a priority. Personally, I think the PR story of a dedicated HA/medical branch of the USAF would be awesome IO for them.

3. The Air Force would like to buy more cargo aircraft and has been quietly fighting for a few years now to buy more C-17's beyond what the DoD wants based on the latest joint mobility capabilities study. Additionally, it's trying to decide if it's better to upgrade the C-5 or retire the C-5 and buy more C-17's to replace that capability which is a tough decision actually. As for the C-130, the service is reluctant to buy a bunch more of these aircraft right now because new requirements imposed by FCS means a new airlifter will have to be built to carry those vehicles. FCS seems to be falling apart, however, so maybe that will change.

Quietly, indeed. I would submit that their priorities are reversed. I would be quietly funding the F-22, and screaming and hollering about cargo aircraft like there is no tomorrow.

While my manner is abrupt, do not mistake my dislike of the way the USAF has done business for their entire freaking history (John Gotti could learn something from them) and the way the institutional USAF is screwing the pooch right now, with a fundamental dislike of the USAF. In fact, my passion comes from my basic love of the USAF, and what they COULD be. Nothing ticks me off more than wasted talent and opportunities.