Air Power in the New COIN Era

[120mm]

No, you're right. Both the Air Force and Navy are limited by their environments and depend on their machines not only to fight, but for basic human survival. But I should point out that although a tanker has the potential to be infantry, but does the average tanker have the training and mentality to do more good than harm if they find themselves on foot?

Ummm, some of the best fighters I've ever met were armor types. They tend to have extremely good awareness of how to apply sightlines and fires, as well as bringing a different paradigm to the infantry combat framework.

[120mm]

As for the USAF caring, I'm sorry you feel that way. I know the folks who I work with are well aware and all do care- almost every unit has someone deployed to the AOR. One of my two NCOs got mortared twice yesterday at Balad.

You make my point about the USAF "not caring". The USAF has put those NCOs into a position to get mortared not because their core mission required it, but because they are trying to make a "statement" by putting personnel in harms way.

There is not a single place on Anaconda where an USAF personnel should legitimately be, doing a valid USAF mission where mortars should be an issue. I calculated the sightlines myself, back in 2003, when we occupied it. (Rockets, on the other hand, can range the airfield, but not accurately)

While we're at it, the USAF fought tooth and nail not to even be IN Balad. They wanted to occupy BIAP, and intentionally bombed Balad SE runways(which was abandoned pre-war) in order to deter the Army from occupying it. I saw the freaking target lists, both before, and after we attempted to coordinate with the Air Force to form Balad SE as the Corps air hub.

[Cliff]

What is the "minimum" number of F-35s and F-22s? And why both?

Why do you need enough armor/troops to be able to fight on the Korean peninsula and in another conflict at the same time?

Why do you need both Bradleys and M-1s? Or both MRAPs and Strykers?

The F-22 and F-35 are different airplanes, with different capabilities. You need the F-22 because it has capabilities that the F-35 doesn't have. And not just for shooting down Flankers. It is not an either-or option - the F-35 is not viable without the F-22, just like the F-16 was not viable without the F-15 to provide air superiority.

You need a minimum number of them so that you can support the National Military Strategy and cover more than one conflict at the same time while still doing your everyday homeland defense missions.

Put another way, which AOR would you prefer your Army and USMC folks be open to air attack in?

Eliminate some officer billets and give more authority and responsibility to NCOs (they're cheaper). Eliminate AFSCs by requiring more "multitasking" of personnel (some of this is being done).

These are all already in the works. In many cases it isn't working out - there's only so many jobs you can have folks do. For example, they have combined all the life support folks into one AFSC. Problem is that now you don't have the folks with the specalized knowledge... there's only so far you can go in being a jack of all trades before you become a master of none.

Scrub acquisition costs with a wire brush (especially Space and AFSOC).

Agree with this!

Cancel all base maintenance contracts (Airmen can cut grass and paint stuff).

Contractors are cheaper than airmen in many cases - when you include the medical benefits and the retirement, it's much cheaper to have a contractor do it. Better to save your money for the jobs only military folks can do - or at least that's the rationale.

Granted you could also focus more scrutiny on the other three service’s programs and probably find significant savings. But the Marines seem to pretty much make do with what they get, the Army seems careful in what it pushes hard for (although IMHO I think JIEDDO was a bit pricey for the result), and these days it seems like the Navy just tries to stay under everyone’s radar.

The Marines and Navy are a fundamental part of the F-35... so if you're arguing the AF doesn't need the F-35, why do the USMC and USN need it? And by the way, if the F-35 is so horrible for CAS, why is the USMC fighting so hard to get them?

Again, I am not trying to start arguements, but at some point you may have to accept that if you would like the US and its forces to be able to operate, you might need Air Superiority as a prerequisite.

What level of risk are you willing to accept in this area? What AOR should the risk be accepted in? Or will you attempt to use another system to achieve the same effects as the F-22? If so what system?

[Cliff]

You make my point about the USAF "not caring". The USAF has put those NCOs into a position to get mortared not because their core mission required it, but because they are trying to make a "statement" by putting personnel in harms way.

My NCO is in the desert based on orders from SECDEF - the AF had no input. He is not "making a statement".

You would rather not have AF folks there helping? The result would be increased deployments for your Army troops - I guess that is "caring" for your people?

I understand you dislike the Air Force, but that doesn't make everyone in it evil and uncaring.

[Entropy]

No, I'm talking about the USAF assigning airmen to missions like tower and convoy security. While I appreciate airmen doing this, their actual contribution in this role is micro-inconsequential and so far out of the Air Force's "lane" that it is obviously a transparent ploy to make the USAF look like they "are in the fight". What would happen if the USAF actually embraced missions that contributed to the current, actual fight, in addition to the theoretical future fight.

Airmen got assigned to convoy duty and other "in lieu of" positions because the USAF was told to pony up manpower for that purpose - not, as you allege - as some kind of transparent AF ploy. The Navy is shouldered with similar requirements. The CSAF and other senior AF leaders have testified before Congress and others they oppose airmen operating out of their core competencies, yet the ILO requirements were increased again this year.

You last question begs another which is what missions exactly could the AF be doing to contribute to the "current, actual fight" that it is not already doing?

With all due respect, this is complete and utter bull####. If it were up to the Air Force, there would be NO A-10 and NO UAS. It has taken acts of congress to get them to retain the A-10, and only the Army's adoption of UAS has kept the Air Force in this game, out of self-defense.

IIRC, the AF last considered killing the A-10 before the Gulf War in 1991. How long ago is that? The AF, whatever it's stance was over a decade ago, fully supports the A-10 now and is even looking at placing a squadron under AFSOC that would be dedicated to SOF support.

And your history on the UAV's is simply wrong. Predator and several other UAV's all came out of an organization called DARO in the mid-1990's - an organization that was intended to be the NRO for airborne ISR platforms and would have controlled development and acquisition of these platforms. From the beginning, the Army opposed DARO, refusing even to fully man its alloted billets, and DARO subsequently died. Predator continued to be developed and improved by the Air Force long before OIF. It's hard to argue, therefore, that the "Army's adoption of UAS" was the only thing that kept the AF interested in UAV's. One could, I think, reasonably argue the opposite.

I'm not talking about Aeromedical evac, I'm talking about airtransportable hospitals, which can be exported to support both combat troops and HA missions.

And like I said, the AF developed such a thing in the 1990's called EMEDS and EMEDS personnel are some of the highest optempo in the Air Force. So what's the complaint? Are there not enough of these in theater? Are they being poorly utilitized? What, precisely, is the problem and what, exactly, do you want the AF to do differently?

As the USAF doesn't push PR on this mission like the Army does, I'm left to assume they don't view it as a priority. Personally, I think the PR story of a dedicated HA/medical branch of the USAF would be awesome IO for them.

The AF prioritizes aeromedical evacuation because that's it's primary medical mission. Perhaps the AF should advertise its EMEDS support more often, though I suspect some would cynically view that as simply more evidence of the AF attempting to remain "relevant." The AF has it's own medical people and "branch."

Quietly, indeed. I would submit that their priorities are reversed. I would be quietly funding the F-22, and screaming and hollering about cargo aircraft like there is no tomorrow.

Well, a few years ago, the AF WAS loud about it, but the DoD told them to shut up and color, so the service has worked quietly since. The USAF wants more airlift and has for quite a while - but as you probably know, the services can only do so much once DoD has made up its mind. More recently, the AF again publicly went against the DoD on the question of F-22's and was, again, told to shut up and color. Guess which incident received all the press coverage? If you want more airlift, find out who's representing the Army at the next joint airlift requirements board and ask them to scream long and loud for more - the AF will appreciate such efforts.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

Some of your suggestions sound reasonable, others not so much, but what do any of them have to do with the AF and COIN - or the wars we're in currently? At most they seem like tertiary solutions only designed to save a bit of money.

Just responding to Cliff’s query.

To address USAF and COIN I guess the first challenge is to get the Air Force to culturally realize they are a "support" service first and foremost.

I'm going to offer an oversimplification here: The only way to completely defeat your enemy, particularly in COIN, is to occupy his land with your people (and by “your” people I mean they can be our troops or indigenous personnel on our side of the COIN). You do not have to kill them necessarily, but you do have to be physically present on the ground. That is the essence of the infantryman.

Everything else the military does is done to support him.

COIN is conflict with both a knife and a handshake, and while having air “power” is nice, it’s not always necessary, air transportation is much more important. It is difficult to win hearts and minds and show people you care from 30,000 feet. Although today you certainly can kill them more accurately from up there.

Having total control of the air certainly makes the infantry’s job easier. But typically in COIN the opposition has no aircraft of note, so it’s a moot point.

Having space superiority certainly makes the infantry’s intel support better. But typically in COIN the opposition has no space capability of note.

So were does the USAF fit in the COIN picture? First must come that essential realization they are a "support" service first and foremost (and yes I believe Douhet, Doolittle, Arnold, and LeMay will roll in their graves). Then seriously asking the Army and Marines what the USAF can do for them to best assist them in the fight. I suspect the answers would be more airlift, UAVs, and ISR capability.

Perfect their CAS capability. If this means more A-10’s, so be it. Get more UAS assets into service. If it means having operators who are not rated, so be it.

Put the F-22/F-35/Tanker issues on the back burner and move to the front things that COIN actually needs, but that means looking at COIN from the practitioner’s POV and not from the Air Forces’.

“there's only so far you can go in being a jack of all trades before you become a master of none.” That’s the Marines motto! Although it’s more along the lines of being a jack of all trades yet a master of few. You do what you must to get the job done. Sometimes the USAF does suffer from over specialization.

“..you may have to accept that if you would like the US and its forces to be able to operate, you might need Air Superiority as a prerequisite.” That depends on where we operate. Air Superiority in not a prerequisite for us to operate, it is something very, very nice to have. When was the last time US ground forces were subjected to sustained air attack? Not that it couldn’t happen in the future.

“I am not trying to start arguments.” But this is a great place for argumentation, in the polite sense, as long as we can agreeably agree to disagree while avoiding being disagreeable.

“What level of risk are you willing to accept in this area? What AOR should the risk be accepted in? Or will you attempt to use another system to achieve the same effects as the F-22? If so what system?”

I guess I could counter with what relevancy does the F-22/F-35 have in COIN? Who is it we are looking to use the F-22 against? China? Iran? Russia? Lichtenstein? If so, when and where?

I do not get to see what our National leadership is really thinking but I do know that at this moment in time we are in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan and not in China and Russia. Our primary focus should be on how we defeat an implacable enemy in those two arenas, an enemy I might note without a single aircraft, before we seek to pick a fight somewhere else.

[Ken White]

...To address USAF and COIN I guess the first challenge is to get the Air Force to culturally realize they are a "support" service first and foremost.

Yes and no. In the air, they are primary; for land warfare they are indeed support and I suggest that dichotomy is a part of their character and thus gives rise to the attitudinal problem.

I'm going to offer an oversimplification here: The only way to completely defeat your enemy, particularly in COIN, is to occupy his land with your people (and by “your” people I mean they can be our troops or indigenous personnel on our side of the COIN). You do not have to kill them necessarily, but you do have to be physically present on the ground. That is the essence of the infantryman...Everything else the military does is done to support him...Having total control of the air certainly makes the infantry’s job easier. But typically in COIN the opposition has no aircraft of note, so it’s a moot point.

True and that is the here and now -- but there's a reason that is true...

“...you may have to accept that if you would like the US and its forces to be able to operate, you might need Air Superiority as a prerequisite.” That depends on where we operate. Air Superiority in not a prerequisite for us to operate, it is something very, very nice to have. When was the last time US ground forces were subjected to sustained air attack? Not that it couldn’t happen in the future.

Having been subjected to enemy air attack, friendly air superiority is indeed nice to have. Very, very nice. I 'm personally a fan of us having all the air superiority we can get. Your points on COIN are correct -- but neither you nor I can guarantee that COIN will be the role we'll always be in or even that our very next war will be a COIN fight. It's important to recall that we are and have been in several COIN fights in recent years in large measure simply because the Air Force, the Navy and the Marines can all mount a successful air dominance battle. I for one would greatly prefer to keep it that way.

I guess I could counter with what relevancy does the F-22/F-35 have in COIN? Who is it we are looking to use the F-22 against? China? Iran? Russia? Lichtenstein? If so, when and where?

Fair question. Do you know the answer?

I do not get to see what our National leadership is really thinking but I do know that at this moment in time we are in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan and not in China and Russia. Our primary focus should be on how we defeat an implacable enemy in those two arenas, an enemy I might note without a single aircraft, before we seek to pick a fight somewhere else.

Wise words. Hopefully our national leadership will heed them. Who's prepared to guarantee that others will play by our rules...

The F22 is necessary; so is the F35 (even more so IMO -- and it will be an F16 on steroids in the COIN fights). More C17s, 130s and re-engining the C5Bs would be nice. Nice and necessary are different. Not to mention that as Cliff and Entropy pointed out, there's a body od folks in the AF who are on board with you on that score (notably AFSOC). DoD and the mil contractors can be faulted for gold plating equipment, excessively long development cycles and poor procurement practices but I'd note that is a DoD wide (EFV, MV22, Commanche, LCS, Virginia class anyone???) problem and is far from Air Force specific. The USAF can be faulted for misplaced priorities off and on over the years and for having an attitude problem but to be fair, they've done a lot more good than harm.

[Ron Humphrey]

Air Superiority is very important. OK

What other assets besides just the airplanes themselves help maintain air superiority?

Are there perhaps some being left out of this discussion which might have a lot to say about more cooperative and/or integrated ways of fulfilling the requirement?

And if so would this not allow for more measured approach to specialized order but more in the realm of whats truly necessary vs what might just be more comfortable?

[Ken White]

...And if so would this not allow for more measured approach to specialized order but more in the realm of whats truly necessary vs what might just be more comfortable?

predict what the next war and, given todays development times, the one after that will be like, I think...

[Ron Humphrey]

predict what the next war and, given todays development times, the one after that will be like, I think...

I was merely thinking about ADA, High flying drop it and let it run big boys, helicopter, etc

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

at Agincourt count as "Having been subjected to enemy air attack."?

Fair question. Do you know the answer?

Well, I'm pretty sure it's not Lichtenstein. I do not argue from the aspect that the F-22 is unnecessary, but the USAF has already been given the "hand in the face" by the SecDef on how many to buy. But still they whine about peer competitors. How about a nice "Aye aye, Sir" coupled with a snappy about face and press on. I would hope the 10 pound brains across the Potomac figured out how much risk to take by cutting production levels.

But I do keep asking them to allow me in on those NSC briefs... or just let me be in charge for awhile.

I agree, its ultimately predicated on whether you can accurately predict the level of the next few wars. Still, our military history shows more COIN/LIC level conflicts with the "big battalion" wars being the exception rather than the rule. So my Vegas bookie says bet on lower intensity for the short term but keep an eye on the trifecta of Beijing Moscow Tehran.

Who's prepared to guarantee that others will play by our rules...

No one, besides, most of the "rules" imposed upon us are our own, stemming from a sincere desire to do what's right.

Perhaps we should stop assuming there are rules, but then we would be stooping to the base levels of those we fight.

It's a conundrum at best and all part and parcel of a Democracy with morals fighting a war using volunteers.

[Ken White]

at Agincourt count as "Having been subjected to enemy air attack."?:

Yes they did...

Well, I'm pretty sure it's not Lichtenstein. I do not argue from the aspect that the F-22 is unnecessary, but the USAF has already been given the "hand in the face" by the SecDef on how many to buy. But still they whine about peer competitors. How about a nice "Aye aye, Sir" coupled with a snappy about face and press on. I would hope the 10 pound brains across the Potomac figured out how much risk to take by cutting production levels.

While I totally agree with you on a philosophical level, that is, unfortunately, not the way our Congress chooses to work -- or to allow DoD to work. Reality is always a pain in the tail. I also suggest the five sided funny farm does not have a great track record in ascertaining (or accepting) risk -- or probabilities. The neat thing about being a dumb grunt is I don't have to worry about peer competitors in the air; I can be pretty cavalier and dismissive about it. However, some folks do get paid to worry about that. They may not do it our way but that doesn't necessarily mean they're wrong.

But I do keep asking them to allow me in on those NSC briefs... or just let me be in charge for awhile.

Me too, so far with little success

I agree, its ultimately predicated on whether you can accurately predict the level of the next few wars. Still, our military history shows more COIN/LIC level conflicts with the "big battalion" wars being the exception rather than the rule. So my Vegas bookie says bet on lower intensity for the short term but keep an eye on the trifecta of Beijing Moscow Tehran.

Yep. Though I'm not worried about Tehran. The EU or a monolithic South America, OTOH...

Not to mention that I don't bet, I seem to end up donating, so I don't got no bookie; said bookies may end up winning more than they lose but when they get it wrong, it's usually way wrong, with them, it's only money; with us, somebody's gonna be dead...

No one, besides, most of the "rules" imposed upon us are our own, stemming from a sincere desire to do what's right.

Generally if not universally true but the other guy does have a say and he doesn't have to tell us in advance what he'll say or when or where he'll say it...

Perhaps we should stop assuming there are rules, but then we would be stooping to the base levels of those we fight.

We can be and have been pretty base ourselves. I can recall some incidents in Korea with the 1 MarDiv that are better left unmentioned. May have to be that way again, never can tell. In any event, I used 'rules' as shorthand; I simply meant the other guy is not constrained to do what we would like him to do. Assymetric is not just a COIN fight, it's doing the unexpected...

It's a conundrum at best and all part and parcel of a Democracy with morals fighting a war using volunteers.

To get the thread back on track, I don't think it's a conundrum at all, in this case it's simply a case of making prudent and sensible investments and that is always extremely difficult because as the man said, "It's hard to make predictions, especially about the future."

[selil]

I have some concerns about the f22, f35, etc... class of air craft. These all seem like fast moving, anti-aircraft, aircraft. Where are the Warthogs? In COIN the fighting is in close and pin-point accuracy versus saturation effect means bombers aren't as effective. Fast moving jets can't be nearly as effective unless they are using laser guided munitions which takes at least one or two individuals out of the ground fight to designate a target that may be highly mobile. I'm not sure if these are issues or not, but the choices of platform seem to be driving farther from CAS and COIN.

[Ken White]

I have some concerns about the f22, f35, etc... class of air craft. These all seem like fast moving, anti-aircraft, aircraft. Where are the Warthogs? In COIN the fighting is in close and pin-point accuracy versus saturation effect means bombers aren't as effective. Fast moving jets can't be nearly as effective unless they are using laser guided munitions which takes at least one or two individuals out of the ground fight to designate a target that may be highly mobile. I'm not sure if these are issues or not, but the choices of platform seem to be driving farther from CAS and COIN.

Both the F15 and F16 as well as the F22 and F35 can do their own laser designating from on high -- as can the bombers nowadays as more and more of them are equipped with Sniper or other pods.

The issue on the F22 and F35 is, again, can you guarantee that we'll only need aircraft to support COIN operations in the admittedly excessive length of time it now takes to develop and field an aircraft system?

Plus the F35 will bring some real strengths to any type of war, COIN or air dominance...

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

a philosophical level.

Granted Congress does mess with the procurement process a wee bit too much but the F-22 is not one of those systems that they are pushing the Air Force to acquire, just the opposite.

If Congress would allow the USAF to divest themselves of those legacy systems they are trying to rid themselves of then mayhaps they could make a better case for more F-35s. B-52's have been relegated to systems carriers, and slow ones at that.

I believe that here “prudent and sensible investments” is often an oxymoron.

[Ken White]

a philosophical level.

Granted Congress does mess with the procurement process a wee bit too much but the F-22 is not one of those systems that they are pushing the Air Force to acquire, just the opposite.

Didn't say it was -- but the way Congress works the appropriations process is what drives the train on procurement, the F22 is just one example of how that charade works. The EFV is another. The process is the reality I referred to.

If Congress would allow the USAF to divest themselves of those legacy systems they are trying to rid themselves of then mayhaps they could make a better case for more F-35s. B-52's have been relegated to systems carriers, and slow ones at that.

Conversely, if the USAF would not skew its purchases (Build the golf course, then the club -- then ask for more money to build an airstrip) then Congress wouldn't have to do that. It would also help if Lockheed Martin had been too dumb to get subcontractors in virtually every Congressional district but they weren't. Unfortunately, the AF and all the services do play with system as do the contractors and as does Congress. Plenty of egg here for everyone's face...

I believe that here “prudent and sensible investments” is often an oxymoron.

As it is everywhere -- because one mans "prudent and sensible" is another's "maybe..." and yet another's "waste and inefficiency." Always easy for us kibitizers to find errors and point 'em out; less easy to make those decisions when one has the responsibility if things go wrong.

[Cavguy]

But I should point out that although a tanker has the potential to be infantry, but does the average tanker have the training and mentality to do more good than harm if they find themselves on foot?

<sigh>

OIF has shown that the tankers (and artillerymen, and engineers) can convert into quite adequate infantry if need be. The cost is that they degrade their primary MOS sills. At a basic level, tactics are tactics. Infantry platoon maneuver isn't conceptually that much different than armor or cav maneuver. Leadership is leadership. Tactics for the environment can be quickly learned.

Even more so, their leaders are often exceptional COIN fighters. As has been repeatedly noted, Armor officers have sheparded the most significant successes in Iraq, and developed tactics and operational art that became models for the rest of the country.

Peruse some of the Armor/Mech in COIN threads for your answer. Look for anything on Tal Afar, Ramadi, Kerbala, or Najaf. Google the branches of H.R. McMaster, Sean MacFarland, John Nagl, and Peter Monsoor.

[Rank amateur]

Having been subjected to enemy air attack,

I was waiting for someone to say that. (Should've known I could count on Ken.) I don't think we should be doing a Rumsfeld on the AF. "Can you maintain air superiority with fewer planes, even fewer, even fewer." It was a disaster in OIF, it'll be even worse if we lose air superiority because we spread too few planes too thin.

The Navy wants a new sub. Out of any service, they are the ones who should cut back.

[Entropy]

Just responding to Cliff’s query.

To address USAF and COIN I guess the first challenge is to get the Air Force to culturally realize they are a "support" service first and foremost.

I feel pretty safe in saying that pretty much everyone in the AF knows that we are the supporting service. When you think about it, the AF is the most joint service because so much of what the AF does is not for AF needs. Airlift is one, CAS is another, ISR is a third, Aeromedical evac another and one could consider tanking for Navy and Marine aircraft a fifth. Even missions like BAI are ground-component support since the goal is to attrit enemy ground forces to reduce their threat to ours. How many functions does the Army or Navy have that support the AF mission? I would say Patriot, but it's shot down more allied aircraft than enemy, so I'm not so sure about that one.

You can even consider one of the AF's newer TV commercials or even it's own internal propaganda...er...press. Could you imagine an Army recruiting ad talking about what wonderful support they provide the AF or Navy?

I'm going to offer an oversimplification here: The only way to completely defeat your enemy, particularly in COIN, is to occupy his land with your people (and by “your” people I mean they can be our troops or indigenous personnel on our side of the COIN). You do not have to kill them necessarily, but you do have to be physically present on the ground. That is the essence of the infantryman.

Everything else the military does is done to support him.

The vast majority of the time that is correct.

So were does the USAF fit in the COIN picture? First must come that essential realization they are a "support" service first and foremost (and yes I believe Douhet, Doolittle, Arnold, and LeMay will roll in their graves).

First of all, see above. Secondly, all those guys rolled over in their graves many times back in 1992 when SAC was disestablished. I don't think a lot of people realize what a big deal that was - SAC was the big Kahuna in the AF and the AF got rid of it right after the cold war ended and completely reorganized. I think it shows the AF is perfectly capable of changing with the times and instituting big changes in response to a new strategic environment.

Then seriously asking the Army and Marines what the USAF can do for them to best assist them in the fight. I suspect the answers would be more airlift, UAVs, and ISR capability.

I think perhaps you assume the AF hasn't done this, and regardless, the Army is perfectly capable of making its support requirements clear without the AF having to prod. I think your suspicion as to what is needed is correct - now if we can only get DoD to sign off on more airlift and solve the UAV issues.

Perfect their CAS capability.

I don't hear many complaints about CAS anymore. It seems the system and support is working pretty good, though there is always room for improvement.

Put the F-22/F-35/Tanker issues on the back burner and move to the front things that COIN actually needs, but that means looking at COIN from the practitioner’s POV and not from the Air Forces’.

Why? The AF can walk and chew gum and work on these and ground support at the same time. Besides, without tankers, there won't be much CAS or ISR or even airlift. There's a very good reason that tankers are the AF's #1 procurement priority. Also, the Army is not neglecting it's conventional capabilities either considering the money it's requested in the latest budget for things like Patriot and MLRS.

[Entropy]

<sigh>

Thanks for setting me straight. I made some dated erroneous assumptions based on the tales a couple of old school armor guys I know. My apologies on that.