Air Power in the New COIN Era

[Ron Humphrey]

I was waiting for someone to say that. (Should've known I could count on Ken.) I don't think we should be doing a Rumsfeld on the AF. "Can you maintain air superiority with fewer planes, even fewer, even fewer." It was a disaster in OIF, it'll be even worse if we lose air superiority because we spread too few planes too thin.

The Navy wants a new sub. Out of any service, they are the ones who should cut back.

I don't recall off hand the latest achievement of any peer competitors recently in airpower(at least not that we would be flying against that we know of),
but I seem to remember several instances of new subs showing up from somewhere

[Rob Thornton]

Man - seems like we retake this hill every so often.

Re-reading Secretary Gate's speech at Maxwell (and worth comparing to his speech at USMA, and Secretary Geren's speech at the Marshall Awards), I don't think he was worried too much about the procurement end and hardware - he was targeting grey matter.

I don't discount the $$$s - but I point out that the materiel piece is the end product. If we let the product define and constrain us, the enemy gets the advantage at some point. I think most of the hardware pieces I've seen in action are mostly suitable to us and our range of requirements - the piece that is sometimes lacking is our ability to get past our constrained thinking. On the ground - its people that make it work, that innovate, adapt, cooperate, empathize and understand the operational environment - breaking free from service cultures and prejudices. I've got many an Army 19D, Logistician and MI bubba, many an airman (who flew ISR, EW, and CAS missions), many a seaman (the naval EWOs & logisticians) to thank. All of these guys broke the mold - they discarded the mantra "that's not my job" and adopted "support the mission".

If we get the "grey matter" piece right - the rest will follow.

Best, Rob

[Rank amateur]

I don't recall off hand the latest achievement of any peer competitors recently in airpower(at least not that we would be flying against that we know of),
but I seem to remember several instances of new subs showing up from somewhere

Iran is rumored to be buying almost 300 of these.

They can afford good training too. I have wondered if the variable thrust gives these planes the ability to outmaneuver one of our missiles. (I'm sure a AF guy can tell me.) If so, it seems to me that they could cause a lot of damage. Especially since the Iranians have a tradition of martyrdom.

I think that if all our fighters were in the Middle East, China might be tempted to grab Taiwan. Kim Jung Il might start feeling a little adventurous too. Do we want to take the chance or do we want to be prepared?

On the other hand, I am more than willing to take a chance that we can destroy any enemy subs we might possible need to sink without another sub.

[Entropy]

I don't recall off hand the latest achievement of any peer competitors recently in airpower(at least not that we would be flying against that we know of),
but I seem to remember several instances of new subs showing up from somewhere

There are a few factors at play. Potential hostile world airforces are not, from a technical standpoint, as threatening as some F-22 advocates might have you believe, though some of the new Russian designs they're pushing for export are pretty sweet and they do outclass the F-15, but not by much when things like training, tactics and C3 are taken into account. The thing is that the F-22 will be the main fighter for perhaps the next 40-50 years, like the F-15 before it, and threat aircraft will undoubtedly increase in capability over that time.

Additionally, the F-22 was originally intended solely as a fighter, but will now have important strike missions and is actually intended to replace the F-117. Air Defense is really where the serious threats are these days and the F-22 will be what is sometimes called a "double-digit SAM killer" - meaning SA-10 and newer systems with capabilities on par with Patriot. I can go into some detail on the SAM threat as it relates to the F-22 if there anyone is interested - that is one of my geeky knowledge areas.

Finally, a lot of what's driving the boat are airframe limitations. The F-15's are wearing out and the first lot numbers have already been retired. There are three options in that case - SLEP and upgrade existing aircraft, buy new F-15's, buy F-22's. Were this 1998 and not 2008, I would probably recommend the second option - buy more F-15's. The first option has been studied and deemed too expensive - such upgrades almost equal the price tag on a new F-15. The second option doesn't make sense at this point. The F-15 production line is still open, though only producing a handful of aircraft. Those aircraft are the F-15K model that South Korea is buying and it's actually a really nice plane. The thing is, they cost about $110 million a copy. For around 30-60 million dollars more you can get F-22's, which are superior in every way and can also perform the SEAD and high-threat strike missions the F-15 cannot. Knowing what I know now with the expense and development time of the F-22, I think canceling it back in the 1990's in favor of more advanced F-15's might have been a better choice, and then shelve the F-22 for 10 or 15 years until the F-15 is really old in the tooth. At this point though, the F-22 is done. Over 1/2 of the planned 187 plane buy have been delivered and funding for the remaining has already been programmed or promised for by Congress. There are only three years of production left - The 187th plane will come off the line in 2011 at which point Congress and the next administration will have to decide whether to buy more, close the the line, or pay to keep the line on standby for future acquisitions.

We're at that point now with the C-17, actually. The line was supposed to shut down a couple years ago, but Congress and foreign orders have kept it open for now. Closing production is a serious decision because doing so costs close to half-a billion dollars by itself and if more airframes are needed in the future, it's neither easy nor cheap to re-start production.

Anyway, now I'm rambling - sorry, I get carried away!

[Ron Humphrey]

Iran is rumored to be buying almost 300 of these.

They can afford good training too. I have wondered if the variable thrust gives these planes the ability to outmaneuver one of our missiles. (I'm sure a AF guy can tell me.) If so, it seems to me that they could cause a lot of damage. Especially since the Iranians have a tradition of martyrdom.

I think that if all our fighters were in the Middle East, China might be tempted to grab Taiwan. Kim Jung Il might start feeling a little adventurous too. Do we want to take the chance or do we want to be prepared?

On the other hand, I am more than willing to take a chance that we can destroy any enemy subs we might possible need to sink without another sub.

I'll choose to concede to your reasoning. After all being Army background I'm kinda used to being told told to do more with less so accepting things isn't to hard.
perhaps this is part of the perception disconnect with us on why the AF seems to be whining vs laying out the facts. We're just kinda used to makin do so we expect others to be that way as well

[Entropy]

I'll choose to concede to your reasoning. After all being Army background I'm kinda used to being told told to do more with less so accepting things isn't to hard.
perhaps this is part of the perception disconnect with us on why the AF seems to be whining vs laying out the facts. We're just kinda used to makin do so we expect others to be that way as well

No need to concede to anything - assumptions should be challenged and if it turns out in the end you were wrong or simply misinformed, then it's a learning experience and if you're right, then you've changed someone's faulty assumptions. It's all good!

[Rank amateur]

I can go into some detail on the SAM threat as it relates to the F-22 if there anyone is interested - that is one of my geeky knowledge areas.

Yes please.

I'm kinda used to being told told to do more with less. We're just kinda used to makin do so

I think that's always been the case for infantry: probably always will be.

[120mm]

My NCO is in the desert based on orders from SECDEF - the AF had no input. He is not "making a statement".

You would rather not have AF folks there helping? The result would be increased deployments for your Army troops - I guess that is "caring" for your people?

The AF "help" is insubstantial, relative to numbers. It IS a PR move. And every time an AF supporter brings it up, I am reminded of that subordinate who suddenly starts bringing me coffee the week before his OER/NCOER.

I understand you dislike the Air Force, but that doesn't make everyone in it evil and uncaring.

Not true at all. If I disliked the Air Force, I wouldn't be so passionate about wanting them to do the right thing.

The thing I don't "get" is how incredibly effective they can be in getting what they "want", but the things they don't "want" are suddenly a bridge to far, or "We in the Air Force just do what we're told."

[120mm]

Before we get too involved in who can pee the farthest, this current discussion is indicative of what happens when you have two (or more) self-interested and separate groups competing for limited assets.

I work as a scenario writer at JMRC Hohenfels, and traditionally, the different groups would make their best attempt at a plan, separately, and then come together and hammer out their differences on the first day of an exercize. That was typically pretty bloody, and I doubt our effectiveness using this method.

The last rotation we ran, we made the unprecedented move of collaborating directly, between 3 different contractor groups, the Army, Air Force, and the UK Army from the beginning. Not surprisingly, we had the best rotation I've witnessed.

I think competing services are much more effective/less ineffective in conventional war. I also think that competitiveness between services is not conducive to winning COIN/unconventional warfare.

[Entropy]

The AF "help" is insubstantial, relative to numbers. It IS a PR move. And every time an AF supporter brings it up, I am reminded of that subordinate who suddenly starts bringing me coffee the week before his OER/NCOER.

I guess I don't quite understand how DoD ordering the USAF and USN to pony up manpower for tasks outside of their doctrinal missions is a "PR move." And if the numbers are "insubstantial" then why do ILO/IA requirements exist in the first place? The AF has about 6.300 people in these positions and the Navy about 8,000. What number is "substantial" and how many additional personnel are required before the reasoning ceases to be a "PR move?"

I think competing services are much more effective/less ineffective in conventional war. I also think that competitiveness between services is not conducive to winning COIN/unconventional warfare.

Partially agreed. I think a limited amount of competitiveness is usually a good thing - for questioning assumptions as much as anything else - but cooperation should be the norm. I'm a big, big fan of jointness and interoperability. Of course, the biggest service fights really boil down to money and the budget and I don't have much good to say about our current procurement process. If the budget rivalries could somehow be eliminated (I can't think of how that might be achieved) that would go along way to improving relations in other areas IMO.

Rank Amateur,

Essentially, the F-22 with it's sensor suit, stealth design, and supercruise capability allows it to penetrate the 100nm+ engagement envelopes of the new SAM systems that are beginning to proliferate and deliver weapons to kill the key nodes in those systems. It will have the ability to DF threats, image those areas with its SAR for target coordinates (for mobile and semi-mobile systems), and then pass those coordinates to a weapon - probably a small-diamter-bomb variant. It can also receive target information via datalink from other F-22's and a variety of other ISR platforms.

Anyway, to sum up based on what everyone's said it looks like there are four primary things to make the Air Force and air forces in general more effective in COIN:

1. Attitude: More AF humility and deference on COIN matters.
2. ISR: More, more, more
3. Airflift: More, more more
4. CAS: Better integration with the ground force and ??? not sure what else.

Thanks everyone for an interesting and lively debate!

[selil]

4. CAS: Better integration with the ground force and ??? not sure what else.

The way this bullet is stated exemplifies part of the problem. There can not be "better" integration with ground forces for close air support (CAS). There can only be perfect coordination. In CAS it is not the jet jockey who is sitting in the firing line of torrential hell and pain. If the Air Force took CAS seriously it would not allow any jet jockey to do CAS until they had been a forward air controller with grunts. Then again that is assuming that the Air Force takes CAS seriously and doesn't assign the bottom of the air plane driver class to A10's and other pretty things...

[Entropy]

The way this bullet is stated exemplifies part of the problem. There can not be "better" integration with ground forces for close air support (CAS). There can only be perfect coordination. In CAS it is not the jet jockey who is sitting in the firing line of torrential hell and pain. If the Air Force took CAS seriously it would not allow any jet jockey to do CAS until they had been a forward air controller with grunts. Then again that is assuming that the Air Force takes CAS seriously and doesn't assign the bottom of the air plane driver class to A10's and other pretty things...

Ok, three things. First the vagueness of that bullet was in large part due the general complaints here about CAS with an almost complete lack of specifics. Vague, generalized criticisms about not being "serious" are, to put it charitably, not very helpful.

Secondly, sending 10000 plus aviators (no mention of the Navy?) to "work with grunts" is a solution looking for a problem. It's the JTAC/JFO that needs to understand the various types of fires, capabilities and how to employ them in a particular situation. This was formalized a few years ago, in case you hadn't heard.

Finally, the comment on A-10 pilot selection is frankly an insult to the many outstanding Hog pilots out there and furthermore is 100% incorrect. A-10's are part of the same training track as fighters and bombers, which usually get the top 25% of candidates depending on AF needs, pilot desires and other factors. And in that top quartile, it's actually easier to get an F-16 than an A-10 and the B-2 is the most difficult.

[120mm]

I guess I don't quite understand how DoD ordering the USAF and USN to pony up manpower for tasks outside of their doctrinal missions is a "PR move."

I guess I just don't believe that the DoD made this move on their own, without USAF and USN input, or even suggestion (I don't accept that the USAF is not politically involved in this). I put it down in the "even if it was forced upon those services, it was the natural result of ignoring/neglecting the future of conflict since 1989" category at the very least. In other words, if the USAF was decisively engaged (and was pushing this fact in its IO) in their core competency in the COIN fight, there wouldn't be the reality or perception that they had airmen available to do the mission.

[120mm]

IIRC, the AF last considered killing the A-10 before the Gulf War in 1991. How long ago is that? The AF, whatever it's stance was over a decade ago, fully supports the A-10 now and is even looking at placing a squadron under AFSOC that would be dedicated to SOF support.

While it may not be a current issue, it is instructive of what they Air Force does when it doesn't get what it wants. And it is part of the "legend" that makes the Army reluctant to believe current Air Force promises. Even with the USAF keeping the A-10, there is a definite perception within the Army that the USAF only reluctantly and recently modernized the system.

And your history on the UAV's is simply wrong. Predator and several other UAV's all came out of an organization called DARO in the mid-1990's - an organization that was intended to be the NRO for airborne ISR platforms and would have controlled development and acquisition of these platforms. From the beginning, the Army opposed DARO, refusing even to fully man its alloted billets, and DARO subsequently died. Predator continued to be developed and improved by the Air Force long before OIF. It's hard to argue, therefore, that the "Army's adoption of UAS" was the only thing that kept the AF interested in UAV's. One could, I think, reasonably argue the opposite.

Army was developing UAVs long before DARO. Ya think there may be some reason why the Army didn't want to play nice with the USAF on this? Like they saw DARO as OV-10 pt II??? The Air Force as an institution had been opposed to UAS's since its inception in 1947. In fact, they used some unmanned drones developed from other platforms on an ad hoc basis, but persistently killed them once they could. You argue about yesterday, I look at everything that's come before.

The problem isn't that USAF types aren't bad guys. The problem is that the USAF is an institution, with a long history of pulling out the football just as the Army is ready to kick it.

And the Army is not blameless, here. In fact, you won't finding me defending The Army as an institution.

[selil]

Ok, three things. First the vagueness of that bullet was in large part due the general complaints here about CAS with an almost complete lack of specifics. Vague, generalized criticisms about not being "serious" are, to put it charitably, not very helpful.

So some specific complaints about CAS being done by the USAF.

1. The ground troop mission is not fully understood by the air crews and the CAS mission for air crews is an added mission rather than a primary mission.

2. Most debate around CAS seems to be an organizational issue rather than a tactical or capability issue centered on unity of command. A personal opinion is that the troops on the ground in close proximity to the most lethal weapons on the battlefield should be controlling the release of those weapons.

3. The Marine Corps was specifically left out of the discussion as until recently Marine Aviators and Naval Aviators do operate under a unified command system and rarely (in comparison) have the issues that the Army USAF and Marine USAF have in CAS.

4. There are examples of artillery and now UAVs being used for supporting missions that when employed rarely have the issues of fratricide CAS has involved.

Oh, you don't have to believe me because the Air Force said it all first.

Secondly, sending 10000 plus aviators (no mention of the Navy?) to "work with grunts" is a solution looking for a problem. It's the JTAC/JFO that needs to understand the various types of fires, capabilities and how to employ them in a particular situation. This was formalized a few years ago, in case you hadn't heard.

Relying on absurdity to counter a point is rarely relevant on the discussion. First only those dedicated to CAS should be required to train and understand the infantry position. Except the USAF has few dedicated CAS specialists. Further, deploying a single USAF Major to a battalion for coordination of all elements on the ground has to reach cognitive saturation rapidly.

Finally, the comment on A-10 pilot selection is frankly an insult to the many outstanding Hog pilots out there and furthermore is 100% incorrect. A-10's are part of the same training track as fighters and bombers, which usually get the top 25% of candidates depending on AF needs, pilot desires and other factors. And in that top quartile, it's actually easier to get an F-16 than an A-10 and the B-2 is the most difficult.

The comment though meant to be funny has an element of truth in it as several A10 drivers at Peterson recounted some hilarious tales about the first Gulf war and being pulled out of other air frames to drive the beast to me personally. You obviously know since you stated "pilot desires" that few pilots are interested in driving a relatively slow, high risk, platform when the big cheese is in fast movers countering other fast movers.

I have my personal USAF peeves. Once upon a time a long time ago the former commander of Peterson AFB and I were having lunch. Along came the topic of the state of the Air Force. I told him then that unless he could make a case for separating armor from the Army, submarines from the Navy, I could not see why the USAF should exist as a separate service based simply on a type of weapons platform.

Another not nearly related article starting on Page 28.. Specifically page 30 talking about the failure of precision munitions.

[VMI_Marine]

The way this bullet is stated exemplifies part of the problem. There can not be "better" integration with ground forces for close air support (CAS). There can only be perfect coordination. In CAS it is not the jet jockey who is sitting in the firing line of torrential hell and pain. If the Air Force took CAS seriously it would not allow any jet jockey to do CAS until they had been a forward air controller with grunts. Then again that is assuming that the Air Force takes CAS seriously and doesn't assign the bottom of the air plane driver class to A10's and other pretty things...

I don't think that is a realistic fix. The Marine Corps does not require pilots to perform a FAC tour before flying CAS missions. In fact, (speaking as a non-aviator JTAC) one of the reasons that aviators retain their place as SMEs in the ground combat element is their knowledge of CAS tactics in the air. The ground piece is relatively straight forward, the difficulty comes from things such as airspace management that aviators are much smarter on.

[Cavguy]

"You old guys need to get over that s—t."
- Young Marine to Marine Sergeant Major when asked how he felt about fighting alongside an Army unit in Al Anbar, Iraq.

I feel compelled to defend the USAF some. The USAF is undoubtedly making significant contributions to the conflicts in Iraq/Afghanistan. A soldier in theater can be assured of an armed CAS aircraft overhead to support in less than a half hour (often much less) when he gets into trouble. That makes them the "QRF" for many units.

I was on the receiving end of this support - both on the ground in combat and as a coordinator for a BCT's worth of assets. They never failed to show up and support the ground commander. There was sometimes some friction/difficulty, but no more than any other asset.

While I have signifcant disagreement with the USAF's approach to COIN as articulated by MGen Dunlap, (and for those who say it's only his opinion - name a serving USAF GO who has publically disagreed with him - therefore, he speaks for the USAF by default), many of their lower level guys "get it".

The JFO issue remains a problem to get "enough" to the force to support everyone who needs supporting. There are fixes in the pipeline. It was a major topic of the III Corps CALL collection I just attended.

The UAV issue is a self-inflicted wound IMO, and a failure to anticipate the growing demand for UAV's versus who should fly them. I'm not a pilot, so I won't say whether a pilot is needed to support the strategic UAV's or a highly trained WO/Enl. It does seem they're making efforts to fix.

This also applies to the supported/supporting relationship of the CAOC to the theaters requesting support - there is still some friction there to be addressed so too many cooks don't spoil the ATO and CAS pot.

Finally, the F-22. We must retain air dominance for the future. We lose that, I'm up Sh*t creek. I don't know whether it could be performed at lesser cost by another aircraft, and I doubt we need 380 F-22's versus other airframes. We can't affort to let anyone else control the skies.

I'm tempted with the USA and USMC to pull the biblical admonition - "Pull the stick out of your own eye (though the USAF has a stick too)"

I'm more concerned with the articles and speeches emerging from USAF thinking Airpower and PGM's can win a COIN fight than anything. It just defies reality as practiced the last few years. The IAF thought it could defeat Hizbollah using EBO, when it failed the Israeli army was left holding the (unprepared and untrained) bag. Listening to the USAF, they seem to hold similar views to the IAF in 2006 regarding airpower, EBO, and low intensity wars.

[Hacksaw]

well said padawan

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

that the capabilities that the USAF bring to the fight are the best in the world. However, their senior leadership in the five sided puzzle palace, rather than focus on the fight we're in, tend to advocate for more stuff we don't need at the moment to prosecute the two COIN wars we're eye deep in.

I guess I don't quite understand how DoD ordering the USAF and USN to pony up manpower for tasks outside of their doctrinal missions is a "PR move."

I don't agree either that it was a PR stunt. I think the USAF and USN made a legitimate and sincere offer to close a personnel gap that needed to be filled in the near term. While the typical Airman and Sailor may not be ready to pull on a set of cammies, grab a weapon, and join the fight tomorrow they at least have been through basic training and thus can be brought up to a certain level of tactical ability much quicker that someone who has just entered either the Army or Marine Corps training pipeline.

1. Attitude: More AF humility and deference on COIN matters.
2. ISR: More, more, more
3. Airflift: More, more more
4. CAS: Better integration with the ground force and ??? not sure what else.

I'll chew on these one at a time:

#1: I don't think humility is in order, more like better focus on the Nation's task at hand rather than advocating for future capabilities that have no application to the present situation. All the services have pride in what they do and thus it should be. As to deference to COIN, I'd say it's more along the lines of the USAF has been slow to recognize that the current brouhaha is COIN and accordingly shifted their focus to the fact that COIN takes a long time.

If you hearken back to the last "good war" I do not think that Arnold, Spaatz, Vandenberg, et all were crying "we need the B-36 now, we need a better fighter to deal with ME-262's, we need to be a separate service now,..." They certainly were thinking of those things and as soon as the war was over they shifted gears and pressed hard for all that and more. But while we were in the fight, they stayed focused on the fight. Same should hold true today.

#2: ISR is an important capability within which are UAVs, which should be deployed in greater numbers. Plus, UAV's have slipped slightly out of the ISR lane and are no longer passive sensors, they can bite.

#3: There’s the old hack “amateurs study tactics, professionals study logistics.” While I feel that’s way over simplified our strategic lift is second to none and if the USAF was screaming louder for C-17s they might get more sympathy from ground pounders.

#4: USAF CAS is really good but Marine CAS is better (just as USAF air superiority has the edge over the Marines), so part of staying relevant to the fight is to learn from those who do it for a living. Although with the advent of even better PGMs CAS has changed significantly in that the aircraft carrying the weapon is almost irrelevant (yes, predicated on air supremecy). It’s the coordination between the ground user and the airborne deliverer that is most important.

Oh, CavGuy, BTW, I always looked forward to a tour with the Army, better chow for one, and I usually learned some new stuff.

Sometimes while in the Corps I felt there often was an inverse proportion between rank and open mindedness.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

Man - seems like we retake this hill every so often.

Weigley's The American Way of War?