It is discouraging to note the poppy problem continues to grow worse despite claims by some counter-narcotics organisations of the increases in seizures and eradication. The problem however is growing faster than these 'successes', is involving more and more of the Afghan population and economy, is increasing in its diversity and resilience and most current efforts are only causing greater instability for the regions and country.

I have made small attempts in otehr threads here at SWJ to introduce an alternative to the current failed counter-narcotics strategies in an attempt to deal with the issue holistically. Looking at the problem from a systems perspective can yield strategies that have greater positive effects and far fewer negative secondary and tertiary effects.

For example, too many strategies rely on poppy eradication and related replacement efforts which fail to look broadly and deal with the secondary problems created by the poppy industry as a whole. Supplying wheat: may not work for all farmers, may not be viable to grow and/or market; furthermore, many grow wheat for subsistence and not to market it, some feed the seed to their cattle rather than grow wheat, and generally the associated labour for wheat is up to 80% lower than poppy which means that a vast number of Afghans that benefit from the poppy trade are now displaced and looking for an income (maybe recruits for the insurgency?). Buying the crop: feeds the current system, raises the street price and incentivises more Afghans and the potential for continued corruption. Destroying the crop: feeds corruption, contributes to insecurity, foments resentment from majority of Afghans, has proven to be a failed strategy.

I propose considering setting up an agricultural marketing type board consisting of a licence fee based quoto to grow poppy by the acre (not produce opiates) which would be managed in partnership with the current powerbrokers, landowners and government (police and provincial). A set number and size of licenses would be sold annually, with the fees and number adjusted each year in order to i) reduce the current poppy cultivation by 25% in the first year compared to current levels, ii) reduce the number of licences each year over ten years to nil, iii) continue and expand eradication and alternative livelihood progrmammes, iv) produce government revenues and involvement, and finally v) implement some demand reduction measures in destination countries.

In this proposal; there would be 100% eradication enforced in all non-licenced areas, farmers would have ten years to transition to licit agricultural products (vineyards for grapes and raisins, pomegranates, nut groves, etc.), fees from sales would go into alternatives, precurser opiate production chemicals from external suppliers would be interdicted, education programmes would be funded and corruption would be directly monitored and controlled.

That is the essence of the strategy, which I hope to publish as a longer paper with supporting evidence and conclusions. It is entirely feasible to adopt such a proposal province by province as a test case as well, however a whole country effort is more appropriate given the recent and continuing history.

Regards,

David