Afghanistan's Drug Problem

[Dayuhan]

The simple question must be asked why the US government (under both Bush and Obama) have chosen to cosy up to an obviously corrupt and democratically illegitimate regime ... together with scum of the earth druglords and warlords who infest the country.

What options have they got? The US doesn't have the capacity to create a non-corrupt democratically legitimate regime in Afghanistan. Short of letting the Taliban have the place or the non-option of taking over and running it as a colony, what else would you have them do?

Personally, I don't think the US should ever have gotten involved in prolonged occupation, installing governments, or attempts at "nation-building", but it's a little late for that.

The rate of car accident deaths in the US have nothing to do with the cycle from poppy cultivation in Afghanistan to heroin death in the US and the opportunities for at source eradication.

The key word here is "cycle". The question is what point of that cycle is the most efficient and economical target for intervention. Given the cost of military intervention in Afghanistan, I'd suggest that we'd be better off attacking the cycle where it's actually under our control, and we can do it with our own government, rather than having to either work though a completely dysfunctional government elsewhere.

US drug policy has for years been based on the utterly boneheaded notion that supply creates demand, that the people who buy drugs are innocent victims who need to be helped and the people who sell them are the evil ones who must be punished. That policy has left demand unchecked and has constrained supply just enough to make the business incredibly profitable. Of course as long as the demand and the profit are there, somebody somewhere will produce the stuff. The basic force driving the business is not supply, but demand. Trying to blame Mexican cartels (we're already being told we have to "do COIN" in Mexico) or Afghan growers for a problem that starts within our own borders is utterly counterproductive: until the US gets serious about addressing demand, any "solution" will be stopgap at best.

[JMA]

What options have they got? The US doesn't have the capacity to create a non-corrupt democratically legitimate regime in Afghanistan. Short of letting the Taliban have the place or the non-option of taking over and running it as a colony, what else would you have them do?

Personally, I don't think the US should ever have gotten involved in prolonged occupation, installing governments, or attempts at "nation-building", but it's a little late for that.

Second point first. Yes we appear to agree that the switch to nation building was a major error in judgement.

IMHO there were two Afghan related incidents along the timeline which would have/should have prompted a US/NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan.

* when it was realized that the Karzai regime irredeemably corrupt.

* when the second? election was obviously rigged.

It was time to withdraw recognition of the Karzai regime (as they should do for all non-democratic countries) and downgrade their diplomatic contact (there is a term for this I am in too much of a hurry to look up)

In concert with that a strategic withdrawal (or a better word; extraction) of troops would take place. The Karzai regime was never worth the lives and limbs of US or any ISAF servicemen.

The key word here is "cycle". The question is what point of that cycle is the most efficient and economical target for intervention. Given the cost of military intervention in Afghanistan, I'd suggest that we'd be better off attacking the cycle where it's actually under our control, and we can do it with our own government, rather than having to either work though a completely dysfunctional government elsewhere.

And obviously one such point (but obviously not the only one) is where you have 100,000 troops and the crop in the field. That's a no brainer.

That said one understands soldiers have to prioritize their tasks and focus one one enemy at a time. As per Mark Moyer in his paper ‘The Third Way of COIN: Defeating the Taliban in Sangin’ on 3/5 Marines approach in Sangin in 2010:

The Marines decided that they had too many enemies already to engage in large-scale counternarcotics activities. Much of the population depended on the opium industry for its livelihood, and could be expected to cling to insurgency more strongly if that livelihood were at stake. Counternarcotics could wait until the government had enough personnel and adequate security to undertake robust counternarcotics measures.

Sadly the situation in Sangin has never reached that of 'adequate security' for 'robust counternarcotics measures' to be undertaken (even if the will was there).

US drug policy has for years been based on the utterly boneheaded notion that supply creates demand, that the people who buy drugs are innocent victims who need to be helped and the people who sell them are the evil ones who must be punished. That policy has left demand unchecked and has constrained supply just enough to make the business incredibly profitable. Of course as long as the demand and the profit are there, somebody somewhere will produce the stuff. The basic force driving the business is not supply, but demand. Trying to blame Mexican cartels (we're already being told we have to "do COIN" in Mexico) or Afghan growers for a problem that starts within our own borders is utterly counterproductive: until the US gets serious about addressing demand, any "solution" will be stopgap at best.

Sounds good but you miss the obvious link between availability and use. Anyway as drugs in the states is a trillion dollar industry you don't really believe that corruption in that regard has not reached the highest levels of politics/government/law enforcement do you?

[JMA]

Afghans, US sign deal on night raids

Night raids are the only thing that's really working militarily.

Since when are night operations classed as 'special operations' or 'unconventional'? Has it got to that level?

Is Gen Allen off his rocker?

... in fact after the the Bales shootings when Karzai demanded that ISAF forces pull back to the large bases they should have done so.

[Dayuhan]

Second point first. Yes we appear to agree that the switch to nation building was a major error in judgement.

IMHO there were two Afghan related incidents along the timeline which would have/should have prompted a US/NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan.

* when it was realized that the Karzai regime irredeemably corrupt.

* when the second? election was obviously rigged.

I'd have said even earlier. I think it was predictable, even inevitable, that any government the US installed in Afghanistan was going to fall short of expectations and face widespread opposition. It was predictable, even inevitable, that once US attention turned from "clear" to "hold" - to occupying and protecting territory and preserving a regime - attacks aimed at weakening that hold would begin. Once that starts, the occupier is backed into a position where leaving becomes a defeat, where the people doing the attacking can claim credibly to have driven the occupier out. Once you back into that position, you make a place where you lose by not winning and the enemy wins by not losing, which is not a good place to be, especially when home front political will is lacking, as would inevitably be the case in a country where the US has so few real interests and so little to gain.

To me the time to leave was before those attacks ever began, before we made that transition to "hold". We didn't need "clear, hold, build", we needed "clear and walk away". Leave while you're still on top, still scary, when nobody can claim to have driven you out, while the mojo is still intact and the message "don't make us come back" carries real weight.

All that, of course, is just my opinion and water long under the bridge, though there might be a lesson for the future somewhere in there.

And obviously one such point (but obviously not the only one) is where you have 100,000 troops and the crop in the field. That's a no brainer.

So you destroy the crop... then what? The users are still there, they want the stuff really badly, and they are willing to pat for it. Reduce supply, and the price goes through the roof. That makes production even more attractive, and makes producers all along the supply chain even more willing to take risks. So you have to do it all over again next year,and the year after, ad infinitum, and while you're doing it people in every other potential poppy-growing area on earth fire up to get a piece of the profit.

If we've learned anything from decades of trying to suppress coca production in Latin America, it's that as long as the demand is there and the profits are large, somebody will find a way to meet the demand.

Trying to control the drug problem by focusing only on supply looks to me like wading deeper and deeper into the swamp, and heaping more and more endless responsibilities on the people in the field.

Sounds good but you miss the obvious link between availability and use. Anyway as drugs in the states is a trillion dollar industry you don't really believe that corruption in that regard has not reached the highest levels of politics/government/law enforcement do you?

This of course is true: fifty years or more of idiotic policy leaves a legacy that is not going to be unraveled quickly or easily. Shouldn't it be easier, though, to unravel our own corruption and our own counterproductive laws and habits than those of Afghanistan, or any number of others? Trying to control our drug problem in Afghanistan, Columbia, Mexico etc has a superficial appeal, in that the most visible impacts, including the worst of the violence, are imposed on people in other places. Ultimately, though, we end up relying on governments that don't share our interests, concerns, or priorities, or else trying to undertake governance functions in other countries on our own, which is the last thing we want to do. At least if we face our own problem on our own soil, we have our own laws to work with, and any resistance is ours to manage. Of course there will be costs and troubles as well, but that's fair enough: it's our problem after all.

[JMA]

I'd have said even earlier. I think it was predictable, even inevitable, that any government the US installed in Afghanistan was going to fall short of expectations and face widespread opposition. It was predictable, even inevitable, that once US attention turned from "clear" to "hold" - to occupying and protecting territory and preserving a regime - attacks aimed at weakening that hold would begin. Once that starts, the occupier is backed into a position where leaving becomes a defeat, where the people doing the attacking can claim credibly to have driven the occupier out. Once you back into that position, you make a place where you lose by not winning and the enemy wins by not losing, which is not a good place to be, especially when home front political will is lacking, as would inevitably be the case in a country where the US has so few real interests and so little to gain.

To me the time to leave was before those attacks ever began, before we made that transition to "hold". We didn't need "clear, hold, build", we needed "clear and walk away". Leave while you're still on top, still scary, when nobody can claim to have driven you out, while the mojo is still intact and the message "don't make us come back" carries real weight.

All that, of course, is just my opinion and water long under the bridge, though there might be a lesson for the future somewhere in there.

I don't believe you understand the concept of 'clear, hold, build'.

(Take a look at FM 3-24, 5-50 to 5-80)

[Dayuhan]

I don't believe you understand the concept of 'clear, hold, build'.

(Take a look at FM 3-24, 5-50 to 5-80)

The manual actually illustrates what I'm saying quite well. Of course the manual refers to an operation "executed in a specific, high-priority area experiencing overt insurgent operations", but you could argue that the US sees Afghanistan as a whole in exactly that way, and the progression described in the manual is reflected in the overall US strategy.

The manual's section on the "clear" side is short and concise. The basic description is this:

Clear is a tactical mission task that requires the commander to remove all enemy forces and eliminate organized resistance in an assigned area (FM 3-90). The force does this by destroying, capturing, or forcing the withdrawal of insurgent combatants.

That's a clear objective and it's an objective suited to achievement by armed force. It's a reasonable mission to assign to an army.

Move on the manual's description of "hold", and suddenly it all goes nebulous. Commanders are told that success depends on "effectively reestablishing a HN government presence at the local level" and "increasing popular support", while at the same time they must control the populace with actions like imposing curfews, limiting travel, setting up pass systems. They are told to "Establish a firm government presence and control over the area and populace" and to "Establish a government political apparatus to replace the insurgent apparatus." They are recommended tasks as diverse as picking up traqsh, digging wells, building schools.

In short, they are told to exercise governance functions, all the while relying on a hypothetical "host nation government" that may be unable to undertake any of the functions assigned to it, if it exists at all.

Are those reasonable jobs to hand to an army?

Seems to me that the moment we assigned the army to perform governance duties, we opened the door to a COIN operation that we never needed to be in, and could have avoided by leaving without trying to govern a "nation" that is fundamentally ungovernable, at least in any way that would be remotely compatible with western political expectations.

[JMA]

The manual actually illustrates what I'm saying quite well.

No it doesn't... but I guess you are going to try to apply a little spin to try to convince others with no military background (and yourself) that it does.

Of course the manual refers to an operation "executed in a specific, high-priority area experiencing overt insurgent operations", ...

Yes and it means just that.

... but you could argue that the US sees Afghanistan as a whole in exactly that way, and the progression described in the manual is reflected in the overall US strategy.

Nice try... but no. Why not just admit you got it wrong or just slink away to avoid further embarrassment?

The manual's section on the "clear" side is short and concise. The basic description is this:

Yes I know what it says... after all I drew your attention to that section.

That's a clear objective and it's an objective suited to achievement by armed force. It's a reasonable mission to assign to an army.

Do you know the difference between strategic and tactical? You are over your head here man.

Move on the manual's description of "hold", and suddenly it all goes nebulous. Commanders are told that success depends on "effectively reestablishing a HN government presence at the local level" and "increasing popular support", while at the same time they must control the populace with actions like imposing curfews, limiting travel, setting up pass systems. They are told to "Establish a firm government presence and control over the area and populace" and to "Establish a government political apparatus to replace the insurgent apparatus." They are recommended tasks as diverse as picking up traqsh, digging wells, building schools.

In short, they are told to exercise governance functions, all the while relying on a hypothetical "host nation government" that may be unable to undertake any of the functions assigned to it, if it exists at all.

Are those reasonable jobs to hand to an army?

Seems to me that the moment we assigned the army to perform governance duties, we opened the door to a COIN operation that we never needed to be in, and could have avoided by leaving without trying to govern a "nation" that is fundamentally ungovernable, at least in any way that would be remotely compatible with western political expectations.

Again you clearly don't seem to understand the subject.

Perhaps if you want a soundbite then you should take this one - being what the holding force should strive to accomplish:

�� Protect the population from insurgent intimidation, coercion, and reprisals.
�� Eliminate insurgent leaders and infrastructure.
�� Improve essential services where possible.
�� Reinstate HN government presence.

You should really avoid the temptation to sound off on a subject about which you clearly have very little background/experience/knowledge.

[JMA]

So you destroy the crop... then what?

Then you will have achieved an important victory by effectively cutting off the Taliban from a significant source of funding.

Then if those who are wringing their hands over the loss of income the farmers will suffer then they can prevail upon the US government to compensate them for their loss of earnings and start programs to assist them to grow alternative crops. (You know what? The US government would probably be dumb enough to shell out a few billion per year over the next few years for just that purpose - if China will lend them the money)

Of course the warlords/druglords would by now be beside themselves over their loss of future income and are likely to become belligerent... so as this had been anticipated and number of carefully targeted night operations or drone strikes would have been carried out to remove these individuals from the scene.

The users are still there, they want the stuff really badly, and they are willing to pat for it. Reduce supply, and the price goes through the roof. That makes production even more attractive, and makes producers all along the supply chain even more willing to take risks. So you have to do it all over again next year,and the year after, ad infinitum, and while you're doing it people in every other potential poppy-growing area on earth fire up to get a piece of the profit.

If we've learned anything from decades of trying to suppress coca production in Latin America, it's that as long as the demand is there and the profits are large, somebody will find a way to meet the demand.

Trying to control the drug problem by focusing only on supply looks to me like wading deeper and deeper into the swamp, and heaping more and more endless responsibilities on the people in the field.

OK, there will be some knock on effect on the global market. So in conjunction with the international agencies they would, one supposes, develop contingency plans to mitigate against an upsurge of poppy cultivation in other areas.

You continue to miss the simple fact that there is an opportunity here to take out 90% of current world opium production.

There has got to be a reason why this opportunity is not being seized. I will money on it that you won't like the answer when it finally comes out in the wash.

This of course is true: fifty years or more of idiotic policy leaves a legacy that is not going to be unraveled quickly or easily. Shouldn't it be easier, though, to unravel our own corruption and our own counterproductive laws and habits than those of Afghanistan, or any number of others? Trying to control our drug problem in Afghanistan, Columbia, Mexico etc has a superficial appeal, in that the most visible impacts, including the worst of the violence, are imposed on people in other places. Ultimately, though, we end up relying on governments that don't share our interests, concerns, or priorities, or else trying to undertake governance functions in other countries on our own, which is the last thing we want to do. At least if we face our own problem on our own soil, we have our own laws to work with, and any resistance is ours to manage. Of course there will be costs and troubles as well, but that's fair enough: it's our problem after all.

Well one has to start somewhere and it could be making the most of the opportunity to reduce opium production by 90%... and again in concert with this one would expect a number of contingency plans to be worked out to cater for both expected and possible un-expected consequences.

[davidbfpo]

The UK has for a long time been the 'lead' nation in Afghanistan for counter-narcotics and at times this role has been lauded in official statements.

What is clear from anecdotes from those who served in Helmand - the centre of the opium (heroin) production - destroying large quantities of the paste has not been the operational policy. I have commented upon this is another thread.

More recently comments have been made in Whitehall-Westminster that indicate counter-narcotics did not feature in the UK decision to act in Helmand.

It was alleged that in the early years of involvement the UK government "watered down" reports on the extent of cultivation and state collusion in the drugs trade.

[Dayuhan]

Then you will have achieved an important victory by effectively cutting off the Taliban from a significant source of funding.

Temporarily, that is. Even in a best case scenario you won't cut off the whole crop, and they'll plant a lot more carefully next year... and the year after that you'll be drawing down. And of course the Als will be fed infinite amounts of footage showing Americans blowing up irrigation systems, spraying herbicides on crops, and generally throwing Afghan farmers into penury. Those claims will be believed, true or not, and the beneficiary of that belief will be AQ.

Of course the warlords/druglords would by now be beside themselves over their loss of future income and are likely to become belligerent... so as this had been anticipated and number of carefully targeted night operations or drone strikes would have been carried out to remove these individuals from the scene.

So instead of fighting the Taliban we'll be fighting the entire Afghan state - nominal government, actual government, and Taliban - ... at a time when we've barely the resources to fight the Taliban.

OK, there will be some knock on effect on the global market. So in conjunction with the international agencies they would, one supposes, develop contingency plans to mitigate against an upsurge of poppy cultivation in other areas.

Hasn't worked terribly well in the past... the track record of crop eradication programs is not good.

You continue to miss the simple fact that there is an opportunity here to take out 90% of current world opium production.

That's assuming you get all of it, which you won't... and again, the reduction will be temporary. Eradication will get harder every year - they won't stop planting, they'll just hide it more effectively - and full production will resume as soon as we draw down, which is clearly in the cards. You're likely to impose a large new burden and significant additional risk on an already overstretched force to achieve a gain that's temporary at best.

There has got to be a reason why this opportunity is not being seized. I will money on it that you won't like the answer when it finally comes out in the wash.

Those in the field apparently believe that seizing that opportunity would raise a hornet's nest that they don't want to deal with. I don't think either of us is in a position to say that this is not the case, or to anticipate what local reaction would be. Opinions from those who are or recently have been in the field in Afghanistan would be good to hear.

[JMA]

Temporarily, that is. Even in a best case scenario you won't cut off the whole crop, and they'll plant a lot more carefully next year... and the year after that you'll be drawing down. And of course the Als will be fed infinite amounts of footage showing Americans blowing up irrigation systems, spraying herbicides on crops, and generally throwing Afghan farmers into penury. Those claims will be believed, true or not, and the beneficiary of that belief will be AQ.

You may believe that the farmers of Helmand (and other areas) have a right to produce poppies (which as become the chief crop since the Soviet invasion of the 80s). You are entitled to that opinion... but your reasoning is not intelligent. So out with it now what is the real reason you oppose the return to the virtually poppy free status quo of the pre-Soviet invasion period?

Oh yes... and save the AQ scare mongering for a pure USian audience... it does not have the same persuasive effect outside the US. Yes there will be a propaganda campaign started by the druglords and that will have to be countered. I would simply find out what coercion the Taliban used to all but eradicate poppy cultivation in 2001 and suggest to the US's Afghan partners that the same methods be adopted.

So instead of fighting the Taliban we'll be fighting the entire Afghan state - nominal government, actual government, and Taliban - ... at a time when we've barely the resources to fight the Taliban.

That's what I said when I commented on the Marines focus on the Taliban when the entered Helmand in 2010. It of course begs the question why the US insists on remaining in Afghanistan rather than diminishes the need to act against 90% of the worlds opium production.

This quote from Ben Anderson's book 'No Worse Enemy' is apt:

In July (2011), Ghulam Haider Hamidi, mayor of Kandahar, was killed. He and his daughter had returned to Afghanistan from the USA, believing they could help their homeland. A few months later, his daughter left Afghanistan again, saying it was in ‘360 degrees of chaos’ and she had lost all hope: ‘America came to Afghanistan and aligned itself with the very people who destroyed Afghanistan and who continue to destroy Afghanistan: warlords, drug lords, gun lords.’

Hasn't worked terribly well in the past... the track record of crop eradication programs is not good.

US programs you are talking about I believe? Yes it will be important to get another nation to lead on this. The Russians and Iranians are suffering the most from the Afghan opium production so maybe open the door for either/or or both to come in.

That's assuming you get all of it, which you won't... and again, the reduction will be temporary. Eradication will get harder every year - they won't stop planting, they'll just hide it more effectively - and full production will resume as soon as we draw down, which is clearly in the cards. You're likely to impose a large new burden and significant additional risk on an already overstretched force to achieve a gain that's temporary at best.

Again I am interested why you to almost want the opium production in Afghanistan to continue. Kind of like the 'hippie' arguments of the 60s. Are you perhaps pro drug legalisation across the board or just supportive of the Afghan poppy growers?

Those in the field apparently believe that seizing that opportunity would raise a hornet's nest that they don't want to deal with. I don't think either of us is in a position to say that this is not the case, or to anticipate what local reaction would be. Opinions from those who are or recently have been in the field in Afghanistan would be good to hear.

You remind me of Bertrand Russel's quotation and you will (I guess) be hoping that someone will come up with a contribution to support your position. Holding thumbs for you

If a man is offered a fact which goes against his instincts, he will scrutinize it closely, and unless the evidence is overwhelming, he will refuse to believe it. If, on the other hand, he is offered something which affords a reason for acting in accordance to his instincts, he will accept it even on the slightest evidence. The origin of myths is explained in this way. – Bertrand Russell

It is of course not that there is no effort against opium production. There is... it is just that the Brit efforts there are just as inept as US efforts elsewhere.

'Britain's war against Afghan opium production is failing'

[bourbon]

So out with it now what is the real reason you oppose the return to the virtually poppy free status quo of the pre-Soviet invasion period?

The destabilizing effect that the increasing traffic of Afghan heroin into China brings.

[Dayuhan]

Pressed for time at the moment, but re this...

the Taliban probably said something like... "if we see poppies growing we will get the farmers to first destroy their crop then we will shoot them." Its all about the KISS principle... keep it simple and unambiguous and let the ANA enforce it. Life is cheap in Afghanistan.

What makes you think the ANA or the Afghan government have any interest at all in reducing opium production? Aren't they sharing the profits from opium production?

The Taliban were able to eliminate poppy production because they governed the country and there were no limits on the amount or nature of force they were able to apply to do whatever they wanted to do.

The US doesn't want to govern Afghanistan and is not willing to run around shooting people who grow poppies. The Afghan government and army aren't going to shoot people who grow poppies because they get some of the money the poppies bring in. That makes a plan to eradicate poppies by shooting those who grow them a bit fanciful, because neither we nor the Afghan government/army are willing to do the shooting.