Afghanistan's Drug Problem

[davidbfpo]

David,

I thought the UK had the lead on the effort against drugs in Afghanistan? I know the DEA is also involved, but overall in charge of synching the effort, who does that?

The numbers you show are alarming and surprising (while I didn't think we were winning, I didn't know the problem was actually getting a lot bigger).

Bill,

Yes that is my understanding that the UK 'leads' on counter-narcotics and the 'lead' agency on the ground is the Serious & Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), which did have a substantial outpost in Helmand two years ago plus. SOCA is a criminal intelligence and law enforcement agency; one that has a very mixed reputation. SOCA's international partner is the US DEA.

..alarming and surprising..the problem..getting a lot bigger.

Yes, an understatement, scandal is mild and a disaster for UK public policy - in Afghanistan and at home.

I do not watch for coverage on counter-narcotics, which IMHO is rarely in the public domain and I doubt if HMG, SOCA and the DEA would appreciate the public, let alone politicians knowing the problem is getting bigger. Later I will see if there are any official, HMG statements on the situation.

[davidbfpo]

Jon,

Thanks for that insight and your arguments reinforce my view that we should simply buy the initial opiate product on site, then destroy it. This suggestion has appeared on another thread and led to a debate.

The challenge then would be to identify a local replacement crop, perhaps an international competition? Assuming an opium poppy alternative crop in such terrain has not been found before, just that we've all forgotten.

[jcustis]

The Afghans grow vegetables and some hardy cash crops, along with wheat and corn (which are water-intensive as I mentioned), so things can be grown. The output is variable depending on the access to canal irrigation from the Helmand, which is at a lower state at that time of year due to control policies at the Kajaki Dam and the lack or rainfall. The locals literally dam the Helmand and "push water uphill" in order to get it to their pumps, and the canals are at times silted over something fierce. The local answer is to employ village and migrant labor to clean them, perhaps reinforced with a caterpillar-tracked backhoe. The elders are very adept by now at trying to get the coalition to drop money for a canal cleaning or repair project, when they would likely be doing it regardless.

The poppy harvest experienced a lower haul in the Spring of 2010, and many of the locals spread the rumor that the coalition had done something to spike the poppy. Turns out, if I remember correctly, that the poppy simply experienced either some blight or pest that year.

We were hopeful that the possibility of lower output or even worse blight would drive farmers to move to a replacement crop, but the exact opposite seemed to happen, because the price of opium tar ended up going higher due to the impact the poor harvest had on supply. It was hard to turn away from poppy when the price was climbing and expected to go even higher.

This is all complicated by the fact that in our district, much of the land was owned by men who lived far away, in some cases Lashkar Gah or Goreshk. Finding them would be necessary if you wanted to buy the crop. And what then of paying the locals who live on the land and care for it as it grows, or the migrants who swarm in with their cutting knives to score the bulbs and scrape the resin off? Those are larger eradication policy questions that I never saw a cohesive plan, or even coherent policy paper, for; and I spent a lot of time with my team scouring the secure networks looking for someone's proposal.

[Bill Moore]

All the Western governments are having serious financial challenges, so the idea of having our governments pay for and then destroy the product year after year doesn't sound too appealing, even if it is more cost effective than the ineffeective drug war. I think it would take quite a bit of political salesmanship to make this option a reality. We have already signed up to spend billions to sustain Afghanistan's security forces for an indefinite period.

We need to start all over again and generate some creative solutions, instead of continuing down the same failed path.

[jcustis]

The drug scenario in Afghanistan is akin to the rotten apple in the bushel basket of good ones. We need to figure something out, and act on it. I don't think a coherent policy is on anyone's mind, unfortunately, and without it we are just sticking our fingers in the dike.

[Seahorse]

It is discouraging to note the poppy problem continues to grow worse despite claims by some counter-narcotics organisations of the increases in seizures and eradication. The problem however is growing faster than these 'successes', is involving more and more of the Afghan population and economy, is increasing in its diversity and resilience and most current efforts are only causing greater instability for the regions and country.

I have made small attempts in otehr threads here at SWJ to introduce an alternative to the current failed counter-narcotics strategies in an attempt to deal with the issue holistically. Looking at the problem from a systems perspective can yield strategies that have greater positive effects and far fewer negative secondary and tertiary effects.

For example, too many strategies rely on poppy eradication and related replacement efforts which fail to look broadly and deal with the secondary problems created by the poppy industry as a whole. Supplying wheat: may not work for all farmers, may not be viable to grow and/or market; furthermore, many grow wheat for subsistence and not to market it, some feed the seed to their cattle rather than grow wheat, and generally the associated labour for wheat is up to 80% lower than poppy which means that a vast number of Afghans that benefit from the poppy trade are now displaced and looking for an income (maybe recruits for the insurgency?). Buying the crop: feeds the current system, raises the street price and incentivises more Afghans and the potential for continued corruption. Destroying the crop: feeds corruption, contributes to insecurity, foments resentment from majority of Afghans, has proven to be a failed strategy.

I propose considering setting up an agricultural marketing type board consisting of a licence fee based quoto to grow poppy by the acre (not produce opiates) which would be managed in partnership with the current powerbrokers, landowners and government (police and provincial). A set number and size of licenses would be sold annually, with the fees and number adjusted each year in order to i) reduce the current poppy cultivation by 25% in the first year compared to current levels, ii) reduce the number of licences each year over ten years to nil, iii) continue and expand eradication and alternative livelihood progrmammes, iv) produce government revenues and involvement, and finally v) implement some demand reduction measures in destination countries.

In this proposal; there would be 100% eradication enforced in all non-licenced areas, farmers would have ten years to transition to licit agricultural products (vineyards for grapes and raisins, pomegranates, nut groves, etc.), fees from sales would go into alternatives, precurser opiate production chemicals from external suppliers would be interdicted, education programmes would be funded and corruption would be directly monitored and controlled.

That is the essence of the strategy, which I hope to publish as a longer paper with supporting evidence and conclusions. It is entirely feasible to adopt such a proposal province by province as a test case as well, however a whole country effort is more appropriate given the recent and continuing history.

Regards,

David

[davidbfpo]

David C,

Thanks for the considered and informed response. Plus being from someone who has had "boots on the ground" and not from my distant "armchair".

Now if we, the UK, are in Helmand Province in ten years time I will be amazed.