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  1. #1
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    Quote Originally Posted by tequila View Post
    The Taliban did not try to suppress opium production until they were in full control, and appear to have only done so in 2001 as part of their drive to get UN recognition as Afghanistan's legitimate government. Prior to their ban on opium production, they derived enormous revenue from taxing and sale of the crop, and continued to do so after the ban as 2000 had been a bumper crop. Some observers assert that the ban was more to restrict supply and increase profits for opium shippers, avoiding a glut on the market. In 2001, prior to September, they had authorized Afghan farmers to plant opium again (as seen in the record crops after their fall).
    This supports the argument that opium production is an important source of funding for the Taliban.

    I draw your attention to this source: How Opium Profits the Taliban

    I quote two short extracts from this 2009 paper:

    NATO commanders and donor nations have tended to view Afghanistan’s opium trade as a law enforcement issue, often not considering its broader implications for trade, security, and development. The insurgency, meanwhile, is treated as a military matter. This division has stymied efforts to build a comprehensive strategy toward southern Afghanistan, where a more holistic approach could prove more successful.

    ...

    … , this study will demonstrate that insurgent actors in many Afghan villages today behave more like mafiosi than mujahideen. More than 80 percent of those surveyed for this project believe Taliban commanders in the south now fight for profit rather than religion or ideology. And according to recent NATO military intelligence, as few as 5 percent of insurgent commanders now fight for ideological reasons.
    This brings us back to 120mm's earlier post and highlights where the problem lies... being if both the generals (and their political masters) and the troops on the ground don't have a clue about what they are dealing with on the ground then quite frankly there is no hope.

    So this then links into another thread here: Time to hold the US generals accountable for Afg. and Iraq. I believe that regular purges of the general staff is a good thing - short of (in Stalin style) shooting them out of hand as that is a little extreme - where they certainly lose all pensions and benefits and in deserving cases would face criminal charges.

    The criminal negligence of how the US and Brit commanders have approached the opium matter in Afghanistan should be dealt with the military justice system where I'm sure charged framed broadly under 'dereliction of duty' could see a number put away for ten years or more. That would be justice seen to be done.

    My comments some time ago that a number of seats on aircraft out of Afghanistan should be reserved for those (across the rank structure) who get (or should get relieved) and need to go were met with derision in some quarters but it certainly needs to be not just be considered but implemented without delay for in theatre commanders who haven't got the smarts to simply connect the dots (when it comes to the integration of the Afghan insurgency and opium production).

    As for the methods? That's pretty simple. The Taliban had Pakistan on their side and had established a government that has a monopoly of force over the Afghan countryside.

    So ... we should win the war first?
    No... the Taliban probably said something like... "if we see poppies growing we will get the farmers to first destroy their crop then we will shoot them." Its all about the KISS principle... keep it simple and unambiguous and let the ANA enforce it. Life is cheap in Afghanistan.

    Win first? Does this question indicate that you don't see how inextricably interwoven poppy production and the insurgency are?

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    No... the Taliban probably said something like... "if we see poppies growing we will get the farmers to first destroy their crop then we will shoot them." Its all about the KISS principle... keep it simple and unambiguous and let the ANA enforce it. Life is cheap in Afghanistan.

    Win first? Does this question indicate that you don't see how inextricably interwoven poppy production and the insurgency are?
    No. Defeating poppy production is not key to defeating the insurgency in my opinion.

    The warlords who the Taliban defeated also profited enormously from opium. Yet the Taliban did not seek to destroy opium (the main source of funds for their enemy - the warlords depended on opium to a far greater extent than the Taliban does) until they were fully in control.

    The Taliban are able to profit from opium because they have power in the countryside and over smuggling routes, not the other way around. That power did not come from opium money. It came from ideological commitment, successful organization, backing from the Pakistani military, and most importantly the lack of effective competition from the Afghan government or other Afghan actors.

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    Quote Originally Posted by tequila View Post
    No. Defeating poppy production is not key to defeating the insurgency in my opinion.
    You see this is what I find so strange about the attitude towards and understanding of COIN amongst serving age men of today.

    When someone says you need to get out there and kill the Taliban the response is that COIN is a 80:20 ratio where direct military action is only 20% of the effort required. Then when someone raises the matter of acting against opium production (which has been proven to a substantial part of the insurgency and significant source of funding for the Taliban) the shutters come down and its treated as a separate and insignificant aspect of the Afghan situation which should be virtually ignored even though it is one of the more important aspects of the 80%.

    All very strange.

    The warlords who the Taliban defeated also profited enormously from opium. Yet the Taliban did not seek to destroy opium (the main source of funds for their enemy - the warlords depended on opium to a far greater extent than the Taliban does) until they were fully in control.
    So what's your point? That you finally agree that the US government and its military is actually protecting the warlord/druglord side of the Afghan drug trade? And you are OK that thousands of US soldiers are being killed/maimed/wounded in the process? Shameful!

    The Taliban are able to profit from opium because they have power in the countryside and over smuggling routes, not the other way around. That power did not come from opium money. It came from ideological commitment, successful organization, backing from the Pakistani military, and most importantly the lack of effective competition from the Afghan government or other Afghan actors.
    Oh boy, I guess somehow it is lost on you that the poppy crop is in the fields right under the noses of the ISAF and ANA forces. This is unlike stuff grown elsewhere which is partially hidden under jungle canopy it is in the open and and can be easily identified from the air prior to harvest.

    Now I accept that the problem is to get an honest buy in from the current Afghan government. This can be used to leverage a quicker withdrawal from Afghanistan in the form of a demand for total compliance from the Karai regime - rather like the ultimatum Bush gave the Taliban over handing over AQ.

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