Afghanistan's Drug Problem

[Bill Moore]

I guess the first question is are the drugs actually funding the insurgency? The Taleban eliminated the drug trade when they ruled, and the routing of the Taleban gave the clans the freedom they needed to convert back to their old ways. They may pay protection money to some insurgent elements where the coalition isn't effective, but do they willingly fund a significant portion of the insurgency?

If we go after the drugs, won't that be perceived as an attack on their culture and their means of wealth production? In that case wouldn't that encourage them to form a temporarily alliance with the Taleban or other insurgent or criminal organizations to resist the coalition?

If we don't go after the drugs (just let it happen), then what happens? What is the worst case scenario? I'll go out on a limb here thinking out load. Wouldn't we have more influence over a criminal clan that has real economic interests, than a bunch of ideological zealots? Maybe the lesser of the evils is the drug clans in the short term is drug clans?

If not, can we effectively go after both? 53 percent of their GDP is very, very significant. I imagine the other 47% is foreign aid?

[Merv Benson]

Bill,

I don't think the Taliban ever really eliminated the drug trade, although they did make it more inconvient for a while. I have seen some reports that they actually found a way to profit from the trade.

If it were true that the enemy did not profit from the drug trade, then it might be cost effective to just buy the drugs and take them off the market or sell them to pharmaceutical companies. My speculation is that people who grow and sell drugs do not have many inhibitions and therefore, they are likely to be dealing with other people without inhibitions including the enemy.

[RTK]

If it were true that the enemy did not profit from the drug trade, then it might be cost effective to just buy the drugs and take them off the market or sell them to pharmaceutical companies. My speculation is that people who grow and sell drugs do not have many inhibitions and therefore, they are likely to be dealing with other people without inhibitions including the enemy.

We were going to do this and then stiffed the farmers. We told them if they planted wheat instead of poppies, we'd buy it and give them the difference. Then we cut that part out of the budget. In the end, there were a whole bunch of new wheat farmers pissed at Americans for not making good on their promise. So now poppie production is about 60% of the country. Cool little 2nd and 3rd order effect there.

[slapout9]

Merv, that is exactly what we should be doing. Opium has many legitimate medical purposes and the potential for a win win situation for all is something that should be pursued ASAP. However it probably want happen. Why? Because we spend to much time trying to figure out how to fight instead of figuring out how to win.

Bill, I think your observations are correct not just one but all. Here is why. The results of drug profits that you never hear about is that the money creeps into legitimate business, government, etc. The local hospital has a new wing built by the upstanding citizen who is related to a big wealthy drug dealer. The upstanding citizen gets elected to public office, the hospital gets a new wing to treat children, and the drug dealer grows more powerful, safe in the shadows.

[Tom Odom]

I have been referring to the drug issue in OEF as the 900 pound gorilla in the room for more thhan a year because no one was addressing it in serious discussions. At least LTG Eikenberry is doing that now.

Tom

[Jedburgh]

From The Senlis Council:

Failed Counter-Narcotics Policies Central to Failure of Afghanistan’s Reconstruction

Misguided and badly formulated drug policy has accelerated and compounded all of Afghanistan’s problems, and has effectively hijacked the international community’s nation-building efforts in the country. Five years ago, the international community prioritised counter-narcotics as one of their top objectives for Afghanistan, yet this priority, almost more than anything else, ignored the realities of the country. Afghanistan is severely debilitated by poverty, and poppy cultivation represents a survival strategy for millions of Afghans. Most of Afghanistan is so mired in poverty that without poppy, families cannot feed their children. This misplaced prioritisation of counter-narcotics focused substantial amounts of aid funds away from development and poverty relief; prompted the formulation of ill conceived drug policies for Afghanistan and misinformed the implementation strategies for these eradication and alternative development policies.

Yet despite all the counter-narcotics and alternative development funds provided by the international community, the opium crisis in Afghanistan is worse than ever, and entrenched in almost all facets of Afghan society. In September 2006 the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime announced record poppy cultivation levels in Afghanistan: 165,000 hectares of poppy were cultivated in the 2005-2006 growing season, with a potential yield of 6,100 metric tons of opium. This is a 59% percent increase from 2005, and demonstrates that five years of flawed counternarcotics priorities have brought no positive change in Afghanistan. They have only served to undermine government legitimacy, stability, security and development, whilst farmers have lost confidence in the current Karzai administration. Ultimately, this loss of confidence has ultimately aided insurgents. Five years ago, the total area of cultivated hectares of poppy was less than half of the current total....

CRS, 25 Jan 06: Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy (first published in '04, updated annually)

[slapout9]

I guess Tom Ricks can write another book and call it Fiasco II.