Afghanistan's Drug Problem

[davidbfpo]

David C,

Thanks for the considered and informed response. Plus being from someone who has had "boots on the ground" and not from my distant "armchair".

Now if we, the UK, are in Helmand Province in ten years time I will be amazed.

[jcustis]

I propose considering setting up an agricultural marketing type board consisting of a licence fee based quoto to grow poppy by the acre (not produce opiates) which would be managed in partnership with the current powerbrokers, landowners and government (police and provincial). A set number and size of licenses would be sold annually, with the fees and number adjusted each year in order to i) reduce the current poppy cultivation by 25% in the first year compared to current levels, ii) reduce the number of licences each year over ten years to nil, iii) continue and expand eradication and alternative livelihood progrmammes, iv) produce government revenues and involvement, and finally v) implement some demand reduction measures in destination countries.

This will never be tenable, until we get a handle on the matter of corruption and nepotism across all things currently that involve GIRoA, ANSF, development, etc. I mean widespread, sweeping changes that aren't likely without a lot of time, energy, partnered commitment, and honesty.

As davidbfpo shrugs, we don't have that sort of time.

Maybe we should study what the Taliban did more closely, when they went at opium for a bit, for lessons learned.

[Bill Moore]

Maybe we should study what the Taliban did more closely, when they went at opium for a bit, for lessons learned.

Actually that isn't a bad idea. I doubt that we could replicate their behavior and success, but it would still be interesting to explore:

+ how they reduced the trade
+ what the impact was on the farmers and others
+ how the farmers and others adapted
+ "why" the farmers went back to growing opium after the Taliban were forced out of power

If we could answer these factually (not based on assumptions) then it would probably yield some interesting insights in our never ending pursuit of a better way.

[JMA]

Actually that isn't a bad idea. I doubt that we could replicate their behavior and success, but it would still be interesting to explore:

+ how they reduced the trade
+ what the impact was on the farmers and others
+ how the farmers and others adapted
+ "why" the farmers went back to growing opium after the Taliban were forced out of power

If we could answer these factually (not based on assumptions) then it would probably yield some interesting insights in our never ending pursuit of a better way.

A few facts:

* Around 90% of the opiates that make it onto the world market originate from Afghanistan.

* The US government/NATO/ISAF are doing very little to reduce this flow.

* The Taliban stopped all poppy cultivation in Helmand in 2001 (without any crop replacement programs or cost or any armed uprising against them)

* The Taliban ban with the resultant loss of revenue all but bankrupted the country.

* (oh yes the the killer fact) That a portion of the revenues generated by the Afghan drug trade (which has tacit acceptance of the US government and ISAF) are used by the Taliban to fund the war against ISAF with significant resultant cost in terms of death and mutilation.

All this and despite the solution being blindingly obvious the US/ISAF just bungle on and advance deeper into the swamp. Very sad situation.

[jmm99]

One can no longer speak of purely "terrorist" or purely transnational criminal groups, as exemplified by the following:

DOJ News Release (July 26, 2011):

Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Arrests in DEA Narco-Terrorism Undercover Operations

One DEA Operation Results in Arrests of Defendants for Agreeing to Acquire $9.5 Million Worth of Surface-to-Air Missiles and Other Weapons for Hizballah

Separate DEA Operation Culminates in Arrest of Heroin and Weapons Trafficker from Kandahar, Afghanistan for Taliban-Related Narco-Terrorism Conspiracy

Note the well-traveled defendants and where they were arrested:

Preet Bharara, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, and Michele M. Leonhart, the Administrator of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), announced the unsealing of two indictments resulting from two DEA narco-terrorism undercover operations: first, an indictment against Siavosh Henareh, Bachar Wehbe, and Cetin Aksu for conspiring to provide various forms of support to Hizballah; second, an indictment against Taza Gul Alizai ("Gul") for narco-terrorism conspiracy, narco-terrorism, and heroin importation related to his supplying of 15 kilograms of heroin and six AK-47 assault rifles to a DEA confidential source whom Gul believed represented the Taliban. Henareh and aksu were arrested yesterday in Bucharest, Romania, where they were detained pending extradition to the United States. Wehbe and Gul were arrested yesterday in the Republic of the Maldives, and arrived in the Southern District of New York earlier today.

Of much greater general interest is the recent Executive Order--Blocking Property of Transnational Criminal Organizations (July 25, 2011):

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) (NEA), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code,

I, BARACK OBAMA, President of the United States of America, find that the activities of significant transnational criminal organizations, such as those listed in the Annex to this order, have reached such scope and gravity that they threaten the stability of international political and economic systems. Such organizations are becoming increasingly sophisticated and dangerous to the United States; they are increasingly entrenched in the operations of foreign governments and the international financial system, thereby weakening democratic institutions, degrading the rule of law, and undermining economic markets. These organizations facilitate and aggravate violent civil conflicts and increasingly facilitate the activities of other dangerous persons. I therefore determine that significant transnational criminal organizations constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States, and hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat.
....
Entities

1. THE BROTHERS’ CIRCLE (f.k.a. FAMILY OF ELEVEN; f.k.a. THE TWENTY)
2. CAMORRA
3. YAKUZA (a.k.a. BORYOKUDAN; a.k.a. GOKUDO)
4. LOS ZETAS

Note that the legal authority cited is Title 50 and not Title 10.

Regards

Mike

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to Circling The Lion's Den, which has id'd a UN report:http://circlingthelionsden.blogspot....han-opium.html

A few choice sentences from Nick's review:

A total of 131,000 hectares was under cultivation, compared to 125,000 ha last year. However, that obscures the fact that the amount of opium produced will rise by 61 per cent this year compared to last, to a total of 5,800 metric tonnes.

As I watch Helmand Province:

There have been some counter-narcotic successes, with a reduction in opium cultivation in central Helmand province, mainly due to the successful introduction of counter narcotics programmes by the central government. But in the north and south of the province production increased.

The final sentence reminds us of the impact on Afghans, have a look!

[JMA]

Hat tip to Circling The Lion's Den, which has id'd a UN report:http://circlingthelionsden.blogspot....han-opium.html

A few choice sentences from Nick's review:

As I watch Helmand Province:

The final sentence reminds us of the impact on Afghans, have a look!

David, there is no serious counter-narcotic programme in Afghanistan... I mean nobody... and I mean nobody could be that incompetent.

What was not mentioned beyond the dollar terms the Taliban's cut will be is what they are likely to do with it and an estimation of how many killed and maimed ISAF soldiers that with translate into.