Afghanistan's Drug Problem

[jcustis]

I had the chance to sit in on a lecture on 7/11/09, sponsored by the 1st Marine Division as part of a lecture series which will eventually include David Kilcullen and Greg Mortensen of Three Cups of Tea renown. The lecturer was Gretchen Peters, the author of Seeds of Terror: How Heroin is Bankrolling the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Participants were provided with a copy of the book and I am reading it slowly, but I made several notes that i offer up here as an after action review of sorts. I'll likely post a book review later, because I think she has some important things ton say, though they cut against the grain in terms of our current strategy.

My notes are in no particular order, and some are actually just notes to self:

-Ms. Peters began the lecture with several images of Afghan militants, and stated that most of the West views the Taliban as a bedraggled, bearded fighter toting a Kalashnikov, and sworn to protect Islam. She prefers the image of the mafioso, however, since the Taliban, from her research, are profiting from the drug trade despite other claims that they are anti-drug. They are less an ideologue, and more a basic thug. Although they are thugs, they are better equipped, better organized, and more capable than they were in late 2001 when the US first went in to Afghanistan. The reason is the profits made from the explosion of opium production.
-Methods of interrogation oriented on eliminating criminal elements, would in fact be better than the techniques we might use otherwise, because crime and corruption is at the heart of the insurgency while opium production skyrockets.
-In reported cases, the Taliban and peripheral drug kingpins have purchased, up front, a poppy crop's opium output. This results in occasions where farmers (who do not make significant profits from growing poppy) end up in debt to the trafficker and Taliban when we swoop in an d eradicate crops.
-We (read as coalition) need to be careful of how we are viewed when we cast our lot in with the ANA and ANP. [as in Iraq] the ANP are not as respected as the ANA, and are seen as the more corrupt of the two. Morale of the story: think about the IO aspect of your alliance with security forces, before you descend on a village with them in tow.
-Distribution, smuggling, extortion, and contract protection are making more money than the revenue created at the lower-level from growth of poppy and the initial production of opium from the poppy resin. We should be expending energy at disrupting these middle to upper-level activities, and interdict the trade after it leaves the farm.
-With the improvement of distribution networks, we need to conduct an analysis of drug trafficking ratlines first. Will a new road help us in our interactions with the local populace, or help the Taliban?
-In order to make our impact worthwhile, we might need to focus on corruption that is rampant within the civil servants and local official the strapped government, s. The reason for this is that too many people rely on instability in order to keep the illicit activities going, and their actions are more dangerous (although still corruption on the surface) than the policeman who pockets a few bucks while running a checkpoint. Ms. Peters was talking about instances where entire police forces are absent from certain roads that eventually see drug convoys pass through on the way to Pakistan or points west.
-The coalition would do itself a favor to take pictures of the drug kingpins homes in Quetta and other border areas who are living lavishly on the backs of poor farmers, and then use them as part of the IO campaign in poppy-rich areas.
-Proposals to legalize the Afghan opium production don't survive the rigor of the hygienic requirements needed in medicinal opiate production. Even if it did, the process would have to be subsidized in order to make the profit margin better than what can be gained from growing wheat, or we need to subsidize agricultural alternatives. Her point to that is "why not?" Why not totally reshape our counter-drug policy to put money into into alternative agriculture while focusing on interdiction at the same time.
-By and large, the problem in Afghanistan is more easily compared to Colombia, and therefore we should look at the COIN efforts conducted against the FARC to glean TTPs and operational-level policy.
-We can remove the terrorists through force, or maybe even hearts and minds, but unless we remove the narco-state, we still lose.

Ms. Peters utilized HN research assistants, paid with United States Institute of Peace grant money, to conduct primary source research in the study she conducted, which led to the book. She made several statements that we need to do a better job of killing the bad guys who need to be killed, so I don't take her assessments as tinfoil conspiracy theory that seeks to undercut any administration's effort. The simple fact that she advocates interdiction along the flow of opium, and not destruction at the source (since that is a problem too large to defeat), causes me to rethink my understanding of the problem, because I am going to be dealing with this at the farmer and local governance level during my next deploy. And since Helmand Province is the scene of the greatest poppy growth, I can expect to be dealing with a slice of the populace tied to the drug trade.

[davidbfpo]

Jon,

Thanks for that and to help education via SWJ, here is the author's website: http://gretchenpeters.org/ ; on a quick skim her blogsite has some useful pointers on relations with Afghans and a critical review of her book: http://www.registan.net/index.php/20...etchen-peters/ I note she responds at length to this on her blogsite: http://blog.gretchenpeters.org/

I will place a pointer to the book on the 'open' SWJ.

davidbfpo

[Red Rat]

Jon, Dave,

Thanks for the AAR and the links.

I think that the focus is changing in theatre from the cultivation to refining and distribution networks. The advice I had in-theatre (from a senior UK counter-narcotics official) was not to bother with poppy eradication but to look for the processing labs and chemicals. The latter were described to me as instantly recognisable as they did to your oral/nasal passages what scraping your nails on a blackboard does to your ears

Poppy eradication is a quick way to rile the locals at all levels. We had an incident where a benign district went red after poppy eradication. It transpired that the farmers had mortgaged themselves to the hilt to get the land and the seed for what was for them the most lucrative crop. When we started to eradicate the poppy they fought tooth and nail when all the known matrices (viable alternative crops, no prolonged history of poppy cultivation etc) said they should not. It transpired that the collateral on the mortgages was their children (mostly daughters), several of whom it was reliably reported ended up in bondage.

We are looking at the possibility of having some units mentoring the ANP. Problem is that we do not have enough MP to do this. How much police training does one need to mentor the ANP? Presumably basic forensics and an idiots guide to the Afghan legal system?

[Red Rat]

Just finished reading Gretchen Peters' book. What struck me was the similarities to N. Ireland.

We used to say that the difference between the Nationalist (Catholic, PIRA) and the Loyalist (Protestant, UVF, RHC) was that in the former 70% of the take from organised crime went to 'the cause' and 30% to their pockets; with the latter it was the reverse. When I first deployed there in 1994 the police's big worry was that the terrorists would metamorphisise Mafia like to an organised criminal fraternity - something which appears to have happened... although possibly not on the scale envisaged.

One of our most successful organisations in dealing with the Troubles came late and was a joint police/intelligence/customs/revenue organisation which targeted the money.

Violence will continue as long as people have a large stake in ensuring that it continues. While the majority of people in Afghanistan may want to live in peace, so long as the people in power (at all levels) have a strong vested interest in maintaining the status quo, then the 'quo is unlikely to be changed. I saw the same in Somalia. the powerful clan chiefs in Somalia had ne real interest in a strong government and the rule of law because they gained their power and profit from Somalia being in a state of lawlessness (lost white goods for central africa seemed to go through Somalia at one point!) The carrot and stick approach needs to be along the lines of:

• Violence will be met with violence
• Violence and criminality will not be profitable for you, your family or your associates.
• The IGoA will provide profitable legal alternatives.

Problem is when the whole system is corrupt where do you start? Top down or bottom up? Patronage is also part of the culture - where does patronage stop and criminality start? Retiring warlords with their ill-gotten gains just encourages others to emulate; criminality must be seen as risky and unprofitable in the long run.

As a matter of interest how has Columbia coped?

[MattC86]

Not certain how much stock y'all put into his increasingly pessimistic (and often bitter) critiques, but I thought Foust's review of the book had some relevancy:

It’s probably best to skip the first 130 pages of this book. That’s how long it takes Ms. Peters, who claims to be passionately involved in telling this story, to even begin to discuss the ways in which opium-based corruption has distorted the Afghan government in far more pernicious ways than merely fueling an insurgency. There, on page 134, Ms. Peters says that “almost everyone” she interviewed for this book agreed that “crooked members of Hamid Karzai’s administration are earning even more” from the drug trade than the Taliban.

Considering the finality of the book’s central thesis—drugs are funding the Afghan and global insurgency—it is a stunning admission. Why limit the discussion to just the Taliban and al Qaeda if there is almost universal consensus that the drug problem is much worse in the official government? This consensus carries into other discussions that fatally undermine Ms. Peters’ thesis: she notes the drugs trade is not why the insurgency is so strong in the FATA, for example (she notes, but doesn’t explain, why it is so significant that the Pakistani Taliban brag about imposing law and order by catching and executing bandits that rob locals).

Probably more relevant to higher level policy towards GOA than operational and tactical level issues, but more at Registan.net

Matt

[Seahorse]

I agree that we need to re-shape the counter drug strategies currently in place and I have a bold proposal that I wish to air and maybe get some constructive feedback in order to shape it more fully. Bear with me as I outline my argument and touch on some of the salient discussion points brought up previously in this trhead.

First of all, the eradication strategy is completely wrong for several reasons. It has not been managed or implemented in any way so as to actually effect any positive change in poppy cultivation. If anything, it has exacerbated the security situation and encouraged the opium trade and anti-government militias. The recent announcement that these practices would stop is welcome news, however the replacement strategy is actually one that focusses on the drug-counterinsurgency nexus (as some have described it). I am not optimistic that this strategy will prove any more effective since it fails to address the underlying problems that stoke the opium cultivation.

The annual reports from the UNODC portray a fairly accurate description of the poppy growth, cultivation and processing and in particular demonstrate the lack of effectiveness of previous strategies when one considers the explosive growth and spread of poppy cultivation across Afghanistan. According to their reports, insurgent related profits from the opium industry represent only 17 to 20% of the trade (still huge when one considers the figure of $4B). Most of the poppy trade is related to its street price, its hardiness and viability in the agricultural landscape of southern Afghanistan, and the lack of other alternatives (crops, markets etc.). Some 9 million Afghans are involved in some way in the poppy trade.

In many instances alternative crop suggestions are based on the market prices and how they relate to the farmer, however one extremely important element is overlooked in this analsysis - labour requirements. Poppy framing is very high in labour demands and therefore employs up to five times as many workers per acre than say wheat. This means that in replacing poppy for wheat, you are effectively cutting off employment for 80% of the labourers. These people need work and incomes to support themselves and their families and many turn to powerbrokers and insurgents as their only options. Therefore alternative strategies must accommodate the whole of the poppy industry.

What are some alternatives:

1) Conduct widespread eradication: this strategy has failed for the past several years and has resulted in poppy trade growth, heroin processing, and cartel like development.

2) purchase the crop and eradicate: drives street price up, creates unemployed fighting age males, encourages poppy cultivation for following years and spurns new cultivation.

3) legalise the crop for medicinal purposes: again drives up prices, encourages corruption, creates dual poppy economy and as discussed there would be significant investments required to produce medicinal grade opiates.

4) Implement a poppy license program with a 10 year reduction strategy. this strategy relates to poppy growth and not opiate production, distribution or sales, which supports the current Government policies on counter-narcotics. This last strategy is that which I propose and will briefly outline.

Essentially, we need to admit that eradication is not working despite the costs and effort, which therefore leads to the fact that poppy cultivation has become a dependent resource for s significant portion of the population.

I propose that we acknowledge poppy cultivation and implement a ten year reduction strategy that offers poppy cultivation licenses to farmers, with some direct and enforced limits on a yearly basis. Current poppy farmers and powerbrokers would be co-opted into this scheme and convinced that they have a ten year window during which to become legitimate farmers and wean themselves off of the poppy trade. Limits would decline each year and farmers would be provided support and incentives to transition into other crops during that period.

The government would adopt a 100% eradication effort in non-licensed poppy production tied to the current poppy trade brokers. This form of eradication is enforceable and potentially corrupt free since only licensed areas are permitted. (As an aside, I also endorse an interim policy of eradicating 80-90% of any crops found in violation in order to leave sufficient crops for the affected farmer to potentially recover any loans or debts associated with the poppy fields destroyed.)

Monies generated from the sale of the licenses would be: funnelled into local alternative livelihoods, used to provide agricultural loans and support interdiction and other anti-drug strategies. Licenses would be renewable but a ten year reduction strategy supported by increasing fees and fines would be enforced. The initial allocation of licenses could be set at 2007 poppy cultivation levels which would mean at least a 30% reduction over current poppy production in the first year.

This strategy combined with the Government counter-narcotics efforts could lead to an effective, enforceable, measureable and supportable counter-narcotic strategy for Afghanistan.

I would appreciate any feeedback you may have.

[jcustis]

For the sake of further training, let's say that the decision to eradicate a poppy field (or better yet, the yield of opium) before it has begun the process of movement to an area where further refinement and trans-shipment occurs. It is still in the immediate vicinity of the farm where it was grown, and has not been paid for (is that ever the case?).

As the business of eradication begins, what engagement strategies can I, the guy sent in to send a message to local leaders, employ? The classic answer might be some sort of aid drop done at the point of destruction, with follow-up engagement aimed at keeping the local growers and their leaders off balance, but that is an Iraq model I am thinking of.

What issues are inherent with this scenario? Honor? Family shame? Promise-making and deal-breaking? I know that there has to be a better incentive to break the cycle, but until that comes 'round, what else can I do?

[davidbfpo]

Jon,

Recently I read an account of the UK working with the ANA and they cited an incident where an ANA search found 100k heroin in a village and the elders shook their hands on leaving.

On that basis I'd suggest the ANA participate, in your example they hand out the re-supply of essentials.

What are the alternatives you can offer? Wheat is often cited and of course melons!

davidbfpo

[JMA]

As one of the previous posters said, you really, really ought to check with your DEA rep, or the CPEF folks in Helmand. You should have reps from both of them in Lashkar Gah, unless things have changed a lot. You mentioned that 'this would usually fall into the RFI category....', I guess I'm wondering if you submitted it as an RFI through your O&I channels?

Also, I definitely agree - interdiction is a much better CN strategy than eradication. I'd think you'd agree, if you're down in Registan/Rh*no area - far easier to interdict than try to manually eradicate. The farmers in Helmand sell their crops a season in advance - if we eradicate their crop, the narcos almost always get money's worth. Sometimes that means taking a child across into Pakistan and selling it into the human sex slave trade. Nasty business. Interdiction allows them to get paid, absolves them of responsibility for what happens next when you and the MAGTF hit the shipment, and gives them time to gradually transition to other crops.

Any thoughts for the western kids who get hooked on this stuff?

[Rex Brynen]

Any thoughts for the western kids who get hooked on this stuff?

Not just Western kids--it is a major problem in Afghanistan and neighbouring countries, and especially in Iran.

Indeed, by some estimates the Iranian security services have lost more casualties to clashes with Afghan drug smuggling networks than ISAF has lost to the Taliban.

[Rex Brynen]

And, on the broader topic:

Counternarcotics in Afghanistan
July 6, 2010, 10:00am-11:30am

Location:
U.S. Institute of Peace
2nd floor
1200 17th Street NW
Washington, D.C. 20036

The United States and its NATO allies in Afghanistan view counternarcotics initiatives as vital to counterinsurgency efforts by cutting off revenue to insurgents. A new Center for International Cooperation (CIC) report entitled "Drug Production and Trafficking, Counterdrug Policies, and Security and Governance in Afghanistan" challenges this assumption. Instead, the authors argue:

Current counter-narcotics policy in Afghanistan is financially benefiting - rather than hurting - insurgents;
Rural development efforts should be focused on assisting rural populations - aid should not be conditioned on desistance from poppy-growing; and
Counter-narcotics policy should be refocused to discriminate against illegal armed groups and corrupt officials in enforcement.
The report utilizes microeconomic analysis of the likely consequences of various counternarcotics strategies on both drug-market outcomes and the security and governance situation in Afghanistan. It examines the division of drug trafficking revenues among insurgents, "warlords", and corrupt government officials; the likely impact of drug enforcement policies on different points of the distribution chain; and the effect of these policies on drug consumption, dependency, and harm to drug users.

This event will feature the following speakers:

Jonathan Caulkins, Presenter
Co-author, "Drug Production and Trafficking, Counterdrug Policies, and Security and Governance in Afghanistan."

Mark Kleiman, Presenter
Co-author, "Drug Production and Trafficking, Counterdrug Policies, and Security and Governance in Afghanistan."

Jonathan Kulick, Presenter
Co-author, "Drug Production and Trafficking, Counterdrug Policies, and Security and Governance in Afghanistan."

Philip B. Heymann, Discussant
Ames Professor of Law at Harvard and former Deputy Attorney General

William Taylor, Moderator
Vice President of Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations, U.S. Institute of Peace

Inquiries

Please contact Ashley Pandya at 202-429-3849 or apandya@usip.org with any general questions about this event.

Media

Journalists should contact Lauren Sucher at lsucher@usip.org or Allison Sturma at asturma@usip.org.

[JMA]

Not just Western kids--it is a major problem in Afghanistan and neighbouring countries, and especially in Iran.

Indeed, by some estimates the Iranian security services have lost more casualties to clashes with Afghan drug smuggling networks than ISAF has lost to the Taliban.

So we are going to turn this whole issue into another talk shop. Talk, talk, talk and no action. (Re the conference mentioned in you other post)

If there are no poppies grown then there is no opium, then there is no heroin, there is no corruption...etc etc

The one unknown cog in the corruption wheel is the one close to US policy making on this issue. Take than one out and the poppies will go and with them the opium/heroin problem.

Imagine this. we have reached to the point where even soldiers are starting to agree that growing and harvesting poppies should be allowed. You go figure.

[tequila]

If there are no poppies grown then there is no opium, then there is no heroin, there is no corruption...etc etc

Seriously, no supply then no demand?

I think you have it the wrong way round.

The one unknown cog in the corruption wheel is the one close to US policy making on this issue. Take than one out and the poppies will go and with them the opium/heroin problem.

Corruption at any level does not create drug consumption, which is the root of the problem.

[JMA]

Seriously, no supply then no demand?

I think you have it the wrong way round.

Not at all. It is easier to locate a poppy field in Afghanistan where you have 100,000 troops and some of the most advanced surveillance kit the world has ever seen than it is to keep the finished product away from the kids in the USA.

Let them grow it elsewhere. It is criminal to allow it to be grown and harvested under the noses of the US troops in Afghanistan.

Corruption at any level does not create drug consumption, which is the root of the problem.

If the SF went after the drug barons as carefully and aggressively as they go after the AQ leadership in Afghanistan the problem would be over in a year.

... but first you have to take out the insiders on the US side that allow it all keep happening.

[Rex Brynen]

If there are no poppies grown then there is no opium, then there is no heroin, there is no corruption...etc etc

The question is whether eradication can be undertaken without increasing rural alienation to the point that it substantially strengthens, rather than weakens, the Taliban.

The general view is that widespread eradication would require massive numbers of troops, be only partially effective, and benefit the Taliban (in terms of rural alienation and increased recruitment) more than in hurt them (in terms of finance). Perhaps that view is wrong, but it is by no means a simple issue--even if we wished it was.

Iran has implemented a draconian anti-opium policy for more than a decade, including mass public hangings of drug smugglers. It hasn't stopped smuggling or distribution in the country--there's just too much money to be made.

[JMA]

The question is whether eradication can be undertaken without increasing rural alienation to the point that it substantially strengthens, rather than weakens, the Taliban.

The general view is that widespread eradication would require massive numbers of troops, be only partially effective, and benefit the Taliban (in terms of rural alienation and increased recruitment) more than in hurt them (in terms of finance). Perhaps that view is wrong, but it is by no means a simple issue--even if we wished it was.

Iran has implemented a draconian anti-opium policy for more than a decade, including mass public hangings of drug smugglers. It hasn't stopped smuggling or distribution in the country--there's just too much money to be made.

So am I to accept that in order to be in with a chance of "winning the hearts and minds" of the Afghan people they have to be allowed to continue to produce heroin?

By the time it gets into a form that can be smuggled its too late. The best time to get at this stuff is when its still in the field.

There is some really strange logic being used to justify poppy farming being allowed to continue. Wonder who is behind it?

[tequila]

I can see your point on that one ...

[Ken White]

Because if they were the drug hierarchy would have been long gone by now...

Spells assume. I believe your assumption is incorrect. Without going into a lot of detail -- much of which is available on Google but I'm not going to collect it for you -- there are people (DEA and others, not SOF; it is considered by us for several US domestic reasons a police / law enforcement function and not a military effort). They have had success but just as in any other endeavor where a lot of money is to be made, you remove one lab, one smuggler, one area Boss -- and another of each pops up. Progress is being made but it is slow. It is not as well funded, well staffed or as visible as the military effort and is poorly reported. All that mostly, again, due to US domestic political considerations.

Those considerations involve the 'heart and minds' foolishness and a desire to get along with everyone. As I said before, the US is a center right nation but the current administration is center left (and would like to be further left but can't quite get there). The attitude of 'being nice' is kinda dumb, I know but there you go...

[Rex Brynen]

Those considerations involve the 'heart and minds' foolishness and a desire to get along with everyone.

I don't have a strong view on counter-narcotics in Afghanistan, in part because I think it is damn complicated (and much more complicated than most of the discussion here). I will say, however, that evidence across many cases, countries, and time periods suggests that targeting a primary income crop of rural farmers tends to push them from passive to active support for rural insurgencies.

As I mentioned before, the Iranians have deployed massive numbers of police, paramilitaries, and military personnel to counter-smuggling/narcotics, have a death penalty for drug smuggling, execute drug lords when they catch them, and have very few ROE restrictions--and still, after several thousand security force casualties, still have a growing drug problem entering the country via Afghanistan. This is a difficult nut to crack, and even more so actually inside Afghanistan and alongside a major insurgency.

[tequila]

And seriously, do you actually believe that our tolerance for opium growing comes from the Administration's Leftist desire to get along with everyone? Do you think our relationship with Ahmed Wali Karzai began after November 2008?